Association of Westinghouse Salaried Employees v. Westinghouse Electric Corp./Dissent Douglas

by William O. Douglas

United States Supreme Court

348 U.S. 437

Association of Westinghouse Salaried Employees  v.  Westinghouse Electric Corp.

 Argued: Nov. 17 and 18, 1954. --- Decided: March 28, 1955

Mr. Justice DOUGLAS, with whom Mr. Justice BLACK concurs, dissenting.

I agree with Mr. Justice REED that Congress in the Taft-Hartley Act created federal sanctions for collective bargaining agreements, made the cases and controversies concerning them justiciable questions for the federal courts, and permitted those courts to fashion from the federal statute, from state law, or from other germane sources, federal rules for the construction and interpretation of those collective bargaining agreements.

My dissent is from the refusal of the majority to allow the union standing to bring this suit. The complaint alleged that by reason of a collective bargaining agreement the employer was obligated to pay each employee, whom the union represents, his full salary during April 1951, regardless of whether he missed a day's work, unless the employee's absence was due to 'furlough' or 'leave of absence.' The complaint further alleged that the employer had violated the collective bargaining contract by deducting from the pay of some 4,000 employees their wages for April 3 on account of their absence, that absence not being a 'furlough' or 'leave of absence' within the meaning of the collective bargaining agreement. The union requested a declaration of rights under the collective bargaining agreement. Though the employees affected were not parties to the suit, the complaint prayed for an accounting of the amount owed each employee and a judgment in favor of the individual employees for the unpaid wages.

We make mountains out of molehills in not allowing the union to be the suing as well as the bargaining agency for its members as respects matters involving the construction and enforcement of the collective bargaining agreement. Individual contracts of employment result from each collective bargaining agreement. But those contracts are the resultant of the collective bargaining system, a system that continues to function and operate after the contracts and made. The concept of collective bargaining contained in the statute, 29 U.S.C. § 159(a), 29 U.S.C.A. § 159(a), includes of course, the negotiation of the collective agreement and the settling of the terms of the individual contracts. But the collective bargaining relationship does not end there. To be sure, the Taft-Hartley Act provides that there shall be no changes in the provisions of the agreement during its terms, 29 U.S.C. § 158(d), 29 U.S.C.A. § 158(d). But that does not mean that the collective bargaining agent drops out of the picture once the agreement is made. We know enough of trade-union practices to know that the advent of collective bargaining has produced a permanent, organized relationship between the union and the employer, involving a day-to-day administration of the collective agreement. The Act in deed extends the right of collective bargaining that far. For it specifically provides that '* * * to bargain collectively is the performance of the mutual obligation of the employer and the representative of the employees to meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising thereunder * * *,' 61 Stat. 142, 29 U.S.C. § 158(d), 29 U.S.C.A. § 158(d) (italtics added).

The processing of grievances is recognized by the Act as a function which the labor organization performs or may perform. For 29 U.S.C. § 152(5), 29 U.S.C.A. § 152(5) defines 'labor organization' as an agency which deals with employers, inter alia, 'concerning grievances.' As the National Labor Relations Board stated in Hughes Tool Co., 104 N.L.R.B. 318, 326, 'The adjustment of grievances, viewed in the larger aspect, constitutes, to a great degree, the actual administration of a collective-bargaining contract.'

The administration of the collective agreement is its life and meaning. The adjustment and settlement of grievances, the development of an administrative practice concerning the collective agreement give it force and authority

The right of individual employees to present their own grievances is recognized by the Act. 29 U.S.C. § 159(a), 29 U.S.C.A. § 159(a). But even when they desire to speak for themselves, rather than through the union, Congress attached two important conditions. First, any adjustment of the individual grievance must not be 'inconsistent with the terms of a collective-bargaining contract or agreement then in effect.' Second, the union must be given 'opportunity to be present at such adjustment.' Id.

It is plain, I think, that the grievance procedure is a part of the collective bargaining process. And a lawsuit is one of the ultimates of a grievance. A lawsuit, like negotiation or arbitration, resolves the dispute and settles it.

In short, the union represents the interests of the community of employees in the collective bargaining agreement. The wide range of its interests are envisaged by the Act, which gives the collective bargaining agency exclusive authority to bargain 'in respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, or other conditions of employment.' 29 U.S.C. § 159(a), 29 U.S.C.A. § 159(a). The range of its authority is the range of its interests. What the union obtains in the collective agreement it should be entitled to enforce or defend in the forums which have been provided. When we disallow it that standing, we fail to keep the law abreast of the industrial developments of this age.

Notes