Briggs v. Pennsylvania Railroad Company/Opinion of the Court

by Robert H. Jackson

United States Supreme Court

334 U.S. 304

Briggs  v.  Pennsylvania Railroad Company

 Argued: and Submitted March 30, 1948. --- Decided: May 24, 1948

This case first presents the question whether a plaintiff recovering under the Federal Employers' Liability Act, 45 U.S.C.A. § 51, is entitled to have interest on the verdict for the interval between its return and the entry of judgment, where the Circuit Court of Appeals' mandate which authorized the judgment contains no direction to add interest and is never amended to do so.

The jury returned a verdict of $42,500. The District Court then granted a motion, as to which decision had been reserved during the trial, to dismiss the complaint for lack of jurisdiction, and the judgment entered was therefore one of dismissal. However, the Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, 2 Cir., 153 F.2d 841, 163 A.L.R. 841, and directed that judgment be entered on the verdict for plaintiff. When the District Court entered judgment, it added to the verdict interest from the date theref to the date of judgment. The mandate of the Circuit Court of Appeals had made no provision for interest. No motion to recall and amend the mandate had been made and the term at which it was handed down had expired. Motion to resettle so as to exclude the interest was denied by the District Court. The Circuit Court of Appeals has modified the judgment to exclude the interest in question and to conform to its mandate, 164 F.2d 21, and the case is here on certiorari, 333 U.S. 836, 68 S.Ct. 609.

In its earliest days this Court consistently held that an inferior court has no power or authority to deviate from the mandate issued by an appellate court. Himely v. Rose, 5 Cranch 313, 3 L.Ed. 111; The Santa Maria, 10 Wheat. 431, 6 L.Ed. 359; Boyce's Executors v. Grundy, 9 Pet. 275, 9 L.Ed. 127; Ex parte Sibbald v. United States, 12 Pet. 488, 9 L.Ed. 1167. The rule of these cases has been uniformly followed in later days; see, for example, In re Washington & Georgetown R. Co., 140 U.S. 91, 11 S.Ct. 673, 35 L.Ed. 339; Ex parte Union Steamboat Company, 178 U.S. 317, 20 S.Ct. 904, 44 L.Ed. 1084; Kansas City Southern R. Co. v. Guardian Trust Co., 281 U.S. 1, 50 S.Ct. 194, 74 L.Ed. 659. Chief Justice Marshall applied the rule to interdict allowance of interest not provided for in the mandate, Himely v. Rose, 5 Cranch 313, 3 L.Ed. 111; Mr. Justice Story explained and affirmed the doctrine, The Santa Maria, 10 Wheat. 431, 6 L.Ed. 359; Boyce's Executors v. Grundy, 9 Pet. 275, 9 L.Ed. 127. We do not see how it can be questioned at this time. It is clear that the interest was in excess of the terms of the mandate and hence was wrongly included in the District Court's judgment and rightly stricken out by the Circuit Court of Appeals. The latter court's mandate made no provision for such interest and the trial court had no power to enter judgment for an amount different than directed. If any enlargement of that amount were possible, it could be done only by amendment of the mandate. But no move to do this was made during the term at which it went down. While power to act on its mandate after the term expires survives to protect the integrity of the court's own processes, Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford Co., 322 U.S. 238, 64 S.Ct. 997, 88 L.Ed. 1250, it has not been held to survive for the convenience of litigants. Fairmont Creamery Co. v. Minnesota, 275 U.S. 70, 48 S.Ct. 97, 72 L.Ed. 168.

The plaintiff has at no time moved to amend the mandate which is the basis of the judgment. That it made no provision for interest was apparent on its face. Plaintiff accepted its advantages and brings her case to this Court, not on the proposition that amendment of the mandate has been improperly refused, but on the ground that the mandate should be disregarded. Such a position cannot be sustained. Hence the question whether interest might, on proper application, have been allowed, is not reached. ^[1] In re Washington & Georgetown R. Co., 140 U.S. 91, 11 S.Ct. 673, 35 L.Ed. 339. ^[2]

Affirmed.

Mr. Justice RUTLEDGE, with whom Mr. Justice BLACK, Mr. Justice DOUGLAS and Mr. Justice MURPHY join, dissenting.

Notes

1. Compare Louisiana & Arkansas R. Co. v. Pratt, 5 Cir., 142 F.2d 847, 153 A.L.R. 851, with Briggs v. Pennsylvania R. Co. 164 F.2d 21.
2. 'We do not consider the question as to whether interest was allowable by law, or rule, or statute, on the original judgment of the special term, or whether it would have been proper for the special term, in rendering the judgment or otherwise, to have allowed interest upon it, or whether it would have been proper for the general term to do so; but we render our decision solely upon the point that, as neither the special term nor the general term allowed interest on the judgment, and as this court awarded no interest in its judgment of affirmance, all that the general term could do, after the mandate of this court went down, was to enter a judgment carrying out the mandate according to its terms, and simply affirming the prior judgment of the general term, and directing execution of the judgment of the special term * * * with costs, and without interest * * *.' 140 U.S. 91 st pae 97, 11 S.Ct. 673 at page 674, 35 L.Ed. 339.