CIA and Guatemala Assassination Proposals: CIA History Staff Analysis

From Wikisource
Jump to: navigation, search
Warning: This page does not provide {{Header}} information. If you'd like to help, add a comment, or edit the page and replace "{{no header}}" with the following and fill in at least the title and author fields:
{{header
 | title      = 
 | author     = 
 | translator = 
 | section    = 
 | previous   = 
 | next       = 
 | year       = 
 | notes      = 
 | categories =
 | portal     =
}}
Click here for a list of Author pages that link to this page.

found here in scanned form and here on the CIA FOIA page


CIA and Guatemala Assassination Proposals: 1952–1954[edit]

CIA History Staff Analysis

Gerald K. Haines

June 1995

Introduction[edit]

In the early 1950s, the Central Intelligence Agency directed covert operations aimed at removing the government of Jacobo Arbenz Guzman from power in Guatemala. Included in these efforts were various suggestions for the disposal of key Arbenz government officials and Guatemalan Communists. The Agency drew up lists of individuals for assassination, discussed training Guatemalan exiles for assassination teams, and conducted intimidation programs against prominent Guatemalan officials.

This brief study traces, in a chronological manner, the injection of assassination planning and proposals into the PBFORTUNE covert operation against the Arbenz government in 1952 and into the PBSUCCESS operation in 1954. It attempts to illustrate the depth of such planning and the level of involvement of Agency officials. It also attempts to detail where the proposals originated, who approved them, and how advanced the preparations for such actions were. Finally, the study examines the implementation of such planning and the results — i.e., in the end, the plans were abandoned and no Arbenz officials or Guatemalan Communists were killed. The study is based almost exclusively on Directorate of Operations records relating to PBFORTUNE and PBSUCCESS.

Background[edit]

As early as 1952 US policymakers viewed the government of President Arbenz with some alarm. Although he had been popularly elected in 1950, growing Communist influence within his government gave rise to concern in the United States that Arbenz had established an effective working alliance with the Communists. Moreover, Arbenz' policies had damaged US business interests in Guatemala; a sweeping agrarian reform called for the expropriation and redistribution of much of the United Fruit Company's land1. Although most high-level US officials recognized that a hostile government in Guatemala by itself did not constitute a direct security threat to the United States, they viewed events there in the context of the growing global Cold War struggle with the Soviet Union and feared that Guatemala could become a client state from which the Soviets could project power and influence throughout the Western Hemisphere.2

CIA and Intelligence Community reports tended to support the view that Guatemala and the Arbenz regime were rapidly falling under the sway of the Communists.3 Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) Walter Bedell Smith and other Agency officials believed the situation called for action. Their assessment was, that without help, the Guatemalan opposition would remain inept, disorganized and ineffective. The anti-Communist elements — the Catholic hierarchy, landowners, business interests, the railway workers union, university students, and the Army — were prepared to prevent a Communist accession to power, but they had little outside support.4

Other US officials, especially in the Department of State, urged a more cautious approach. The Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, for example, did not want to present "the spectacle of the elephant shaking with alarm before the mouse." It wanted a policy of firm persuasion with the withholding of virtually all cooperative assistance, and the concluding of military defense assistance pacts with El Salvador, Nicaragua, and Honduras.5 Although the Department of State position became the official public US policy, the CIA assessment of the situation had support within the Truman administration as well. This led to the development of a covert action program designed to topple the Arbenz government — PBFORTUNE.

PBFORTUNE[edit]

Following a visit to Washington by Nicaraguan President Anastasio Somoza in April 1952, in which Somoza boasted that if provided arms he and Guatemalan exile Carlos Castillo Armas could overthrow Arbenz, President Harry Truman asked DCI Smith, to investigate the possibility. Smith sent an agent, codenamed SEEKFORD, to contact Guatemalan dissidents about armed action against the Arbenz regime.6 After seeing his report,7 [ ] Chief of the [ ] Division of the Directorate of Plans (DP), proposed to Deputy Director of Central Intelligence Allen Dulles that the Agency supply Castillo Armas with arms and $225,000 and that Nicaragua and Honduras furnish the Guatemalans with air support.8 Gaining Department of State support, Smith, on 9 September 1952, officially approved [ ]'s request to initiate operation PBFORTUNE to aid Guatemalan exiles in overthrowing Arbenz. Planning for PBFORTUNE lasted barely a month, however, when Smith terminated it after he learned in October that it had been blow.9

Throughout planning for PBFORTUNE there were proposals for assassination. Even months before the official approval of PBFORTUNE, Directorate of Plans (DP) officers compiled a "hit list." Working from an old 1949 Guatemalan Army list of Communists and information supplied by the Directorate of Intelligence, in January 1952 DP officers compiled a list of "top flight Communists whom the new government would desire to eliminate immediately in event of successful anti-Communist coup." Headquarters asked [ ] to verify the list and recommend any additions or deletions.10 Headquarters also requested [ ] to verify a list of an additional 16 Communists and/or sympathizers whom the new government would desire to incarcerate immediately if the coup succeeded.11 [ ] in Guatemala City added three names to the list in his reply.12 Nine months later, SEEKFORD, the CIA agent in touch with Castillo Armas, forwarded to Headquarters a disposal list compiled by Castillo Armas. That list called for the execution through executive action of 58 Guatemalans (Category I) and the imprisonment or exile of 74 additional Guatemalans (Category II).13 SEEKFORD also reported at the same time, 18 SEptember 1952, that General Rafael Trujillo, the dictator of the Dominican Republic, had agreed to aid Castillo Armas in return for the "killing of four Santo Dominicans at present residing in Guatemala a few days prior to D-Day." According to SEEKFORD, Castillo Armas readily agreed, but cautioned that it could not be done prior to D-day because of security reasons. Castillo Armas further added that his own plans included similar action and that special squads were already being trained.14 There is no record that Headquarters took any action regarding Castillo Armas' list.

After the PBFORTUNE operation was officially terminated, the Agency continued to pick up reports of assassination planning on the part of the Guatemalan opposition. In late November 1952, for example, an opposition Guatemalan leader, in a conversation with SEEKFORD, confirmed that Castillo Armas had special "K" groups whose mission was to kill all leading political and military leaders, and that the hit list with the location of the homes and offices of all targets had already been drawn up.15 On 12 December SEEKFORD reported further that Castillo Armas planned to make maximum use of the "K" groups.16 Another source subsequently reported that Nicaraguan, Honduran, and Salvadoran soldiers in civilian clothes would infiltrate Guatemala and assassinate unnamed Communist leaders.17

In addition to monitoring events in Guatemala, the Agency continued to try to influence developments and to float ideas for disposing of key figures in the [ ] government. [ ] in 1953 proposed not only to focus on sabotage, defection, penetration, and propaganda efforts with regard to Guatemala, but to eliminate [ ]. According to [ ]'s draft memorandum, after creating a story that [ ] was preparing to oust the Communists, he could be eliminated. His assassination would be "laid to the Commies" and used to bring about a mass defection of the Guatemalan army.18 A Western Hemisphere Division memo of 28 August 1953 also suggested possibly assassinating key Guatemalan military officers if they refused to be converted to the rebel cause.19 In September 1953 [ ] also sent [ ] an updated plan of action which included a reference to "neutralizing" key Guatemalan military leaders.20

In the psychological warfare area, Guatemala City Station sent [ ] all leading Communists in Guatemala, "death notice" cards for 30 straight days beginning 15 April 1953. The Station repeated the operation beginning 15 June 1953 but reported no reaction from the targeted leaders. 21

PBSUCCESS[edit]

By the fall of 1953, US policymakers, including CIA officials, were searching for a new overall program for dealing with Arbenz. The Guatemalan leader had moved even closer to the Communists. He had expropriated additional United Fruit Company holdings, legalized the Guatemalan Communist Party, the PGT, and suppressed anti-Communist opposition following an abortive uprising at Salmá. In response, the National Security Council authorized a covert action operation against Arbenz and gave the CIA primary responsibility. 22

The CIA plan, as drawn up by [ ]s Western Hemisphere Division, combined psychological warfare, economic, diplomatic, and paramilitary actions against Guatemala. Named PBSUCCESS, and coordinated with the Department of State, the plan's stated objective was "to remove covertly, and without bloodshed if possible, the menace of the present Communist-controlled government of Guatemala." In the outline of the operation the sixth stage called for the "roll-up" of Communists and collaborators after a successful coup. 23

Dulles placed [ ] in charge of PBSUCCESS and sent a senior DDP officer, [ ] to establish a temporary station (LINCOLN), to coordinate the planning and execution of PBSUCCESS. Other key Agency figures involved were [ ] and [ ] Chief of the [ ] Staff. Department of State [ ] Assistant Secretary of State for [ ] from the office of [ ] Affairs, and [ ] State liasion to the agency, also played major roles.

Training[edit]

Although assassination was not mentioned specifically in the overall plan, the Chief of [ ] at [ ] requested a special paper on the liquidation of personnel on 5 January 1954. This paper, according to the [ ] chief, was to be utilized to brief the training chief for PBSUCCESS before he left to begin training Castillo Armas' forces in Honduras on 10 January 1954. A cable from [ ] the following day requested 20 silencers (converters) for .22 caliber rifles. Headquarters sent the rifles. 24 The [ ] chief also discussed the training plan with the agent SEEKFORD on 13 January 1954, indicating that he wanted Castillo Armas and the PBSUCCESS [ ] offices to train two assassins. In addition, he discussed these "assassination specialists" with Castillo Armas on 3 February 1954 25

The idea of forming assassination teams ("K" groups) apparently originated with Castillo Armas in 1952. Adapting Castillo Armas' concept, the [ ] chief routinely included two assassination specialists in his training plans. 26

CIA planning for sabotage teams in early 1954 also included creating a "K" group trained to perform assassinations. The main mission of the sabotage teams or harassment teams, however, was to attack local Communists and Communist property and to avoid attacks on the army. 27. A chart depicting the [ ] chief's plan for the CALLIGERIS (Castillo Armas) organization showed the "K" Group. It was distributed in various paramilitary planning packets as late as the spring of 1954. 28 In a briefing for [ ] in June 1954, [ ] also mentioned that sabotage teams would assassinate known Communists once the invasion operation began. 29

Psychological Warfare[edit]

As in PBFORTUNE, an intensive psychological warfare program paralleled the planning for paramilitary action. Utilizing the anti-Communist network established by a Guatemalan dissident, the Chief of Political and Psychological Operations at LINCOLN developed a major propaganda campaign against the Arbenz government. Part of this program included the sending of new mourning cards to top Communist leaders. These cards mourned the imminent purge or execution of various Communists throughout the world and hinted of the forthcoming doom of the addressee. Death letters were also sent to top Guatemalan Communists such as [ ] Guatemala City Station, [ ] prepared these letters for the dissident leader. The "Nerve War Against Individuals," as it was called, also included sending wooden coffins, hangman's nooses, and phony bombs to selected individuals. Such slogans as "Here Lives a Spy" and "You have Only 5 Days" were painted on their houses. 30

Wanting to go beyond mere threats, the dissident leader suggested that the "violent disposal" of one of the top Guatemalan Communists would have a positive effect on the resistance movement and undermine Communist morale. The dissident leader's recommendations called for the formulation of a covert action group to perform violent, illegal acts against the government. LINCOLN cautioned the dissident leader, however, that such techniques were designed only to destroy a person's usefulness. By destroy "we do not mean to kill the man," LINCOLN cabled the dissident leader. Responding to the proposal that a top Communist leader be killed, [ ] Guatemala City told [ ] he could not recommend assassinating any "death letter" recipients at this time because it might touch off "wholesale reprisals." Reiterating that the plan was "to scare not kill" he nevertheless suggested that [ ] might wish to "study the suggestion for utility now or in the future." 31

While Agency paramilitary and psychological warfare planning both included suggestions which implied assassination proposals, these proposals appear never to have been implemented. The [ ] chief had sought to use Castillo Armas' "K" group scheme but there was no State Department or White House support. Such was also the case when the subject of assassination emerged in high-level Agency and inter-agency planning discussions.

Target Lists[edit]

A weekly PBSUCCESS meeting at Headquarters on 9 March 1954 considered the elimination of 15-20 of Guatemala's top leaders with "Trujillo's trained pistoleros." Those attending the meeting were [ ], DP Operations, along with State Department representatives [ ]. Addressing the group, [ ] while stating clearly that "such elimination was part of the plan and could be done," objected to the proposal at that time. [ ] however, expressed the view that "knocking off" the leaders might make it possible for the Army to take over." 32

Following this meeting, [ ] appears to be the Agency official who revived discussion of assassination as an option. On 25 March he broached the subject with [ ] who had just returned from the Organization of American States meeting in Caracas, Venezuela, that voted 17 to 1 to condemn communism in Guatemala. With [ ] and [ ] again present, [ ] asked [ ] if hehad changed his thinking since the conference on the possible methods to get rid of the Arbenz government. [ ] replied that in his opinion "the elimination of those in high positions of the government would bring about its collapse." He then qualified his statement, according to [ ]'s bebo, by saying that perhaps "even a smaller number, say 20, would be sufficient." 33

Less than a week later, [ ] visited [ ] on 31 March. The records do not indicate why [ ] flew to [ ], 34 but on that date the [ ] officers were asked to draw up an up-dated target list. Criteria for inclusion on thedisposal list required that individuals be (1) high government and organizational leaders "irrevocably implicated in Communist doctrine and policy," (2) "out and out proven Communist leaders," or (3) those few individuals in key government and military positions of tactical importance "whose removal for psychological, organizational or other reasons is mandatory for the success of military action." 35

The [ ] chief took the new list with him when he consulted Castillo Armas on 7 April 1954. [ ] also borrowed a copy of the list on the same day. The [ ] chief and Castillo Armas apparently discussed the list and at least tentatively agreed that any assassination would take place during the actual invasion of Guatemala by Castillo Armas' forces. There was still no time date for the actual beginning of hostilities, however. 36

Agency contacts with conservative Guatemalan exile leader [ ] at the same time also produced an assassination list. [ ] provided a CIA cutout with a list of Communist leaders he would like to see executed. [ ] saw [ ] as a loose cannon, however. They did not wanthim to become involved in PBSUCCESS.37

CIA received further Department of State encouragement for assassination plotting in April 1954. Fueling the fire for action, [ ], in a meeting with [ ] and another CIA officer, concluded that "more drastic and definitive stops to overthrow the government [in Guatemala] must be taken." In response to a question of whether Guatemalan [ ] was "salvageable," [ ] replied in the negative and suggested "he be eliminated." 38

On 16 May 1954 the [ ] Officer at [ ] proposed in a memorandum to [ ] the new Chief of [ ] and [ ] now serving as [ ] that assassination be incorporated into the psychological part of PBSUCCESS. The [ ] Officer laid out a specific assassination schedule leading up to D-Day, the actual invasion by Castillo Armas. He proposed a raid on [ ] on D12. This was to be a show of force, no one was to be harmed and the attack was to take place when [ ] was absent [ ]. The [ ] Officer, however, proposed the disposal of [ ], on D-10 as a means of paralyzing the [ ]. The [ ] Officer suggested that [ ] be killed on D-8. This would, according to the [ ] Officer, eliminate the [ ] character of the Arbenz regime. The [ ] Officer called for the disposal on D-6 of [ ] in the Guatemalan Communist Party (PGT) [ ]. This would leave Guatemala's [ ] believed. On D-4 [ ] would be eliminated. [ ] was to be eliminated so that the rebel forces would not hav eto worry about him or deal with him after the Victory. The [ ] Officer considered the possibility of reprisals as a weakness in his scheme, but decided that "such actions were expected anyway." The [ ] Officer argued that his proposal, if adopted, would not only be physically impressive but psychologically significant by providing a show of strength for the opposition. It would also "soften up" the enemy. He added his first three suggestions had the previous approval of [ ].39

On 21 May [ ] asked Headquarters for permission to implement the Officer's proposal and asked for suggestions about the specific individuals to be targeted.40 No reply from Headquarters to [ ] has been found. On 29 May 1954, however, the [ ] chief requested the names of the "four men" he and the [ ] Officer discussed assassinating. More than likely, the [ ] chief wanted to take up the issue again with Castillo Armas. Again, no cable reply from Headquarters or [ ] has been found. 41 At the same time, [ ] continued compiling information on [ ] and lists of home addresses for individuals named on the "disposal list" drafted in April. 42 [ ] believed [ ] was a "worthy target."43

Meanwhile, [ ] traveled to Washington and submitted a proposal on 1 June 1954 that suggested that as an alternative approach to the paramilitary action program "specific sabotage and possibly political assassination should be carefully worked out and effected." 44 [ ] took up [ ]'s suggestion in discussions with [ ] on 1 and 2 June. According to [ ] considered the proposal and thne ruled it out, "at least for the immediate future," on the ground that it would prove counter-productive. [ ] wanted more specific plans concerning the individual targets, timing, and statement of purpose. Both [ ] and [ ] agreed that the advantages gained by this type of activity needed to be clearly spelled out.45 This appears to be the end of serious planning in Washington for the inclusion of selective assassination proposals in PBSUCCESS. Returning from Washington to [ ], on 2 June 1954, [ ] however, reported to his staff that the consensus in Washington was that "Arbenz must go; how does not matter." 46

The Paramilitary Operation[edit]

On 16 June 1954 Castillo Armas' CIA-supported force of armed exiles entered Guatemala. While these forces advanced tentatively in the hinterland, [ ] Guatemala City on 16 and 17 June met with a leading Guatemalan military commander, in the hopes of convincing him to lead a coup against Arbenz. In these discussions, the military commander hinted he would like to see [ ] killed. The [ ], frustrated by the continued inaction of the Guatemalan military commander, told him that if he wanted them killed he should do it himself. Despite the Guatemalan military commander's vacillation, a [ ] cable indicated that he remained convinced that [ ] had to be eliminated. 47

With the Guatemala Army's position uncertain and the outcome still in doubt, a few days later, the [ ] chief, in [ ], requested permission to bomb the [ ] and [ ]. LINCOLN responded on 22 June thatit did not want to waste air strikes on [ ] or [ ] while a battle was raging at Zacapa. 48 The [ ] and [ ] also supported the [ ] chief's request to bomb [ ] with a dramatic cable which ended "Bomb Repeat Bomb."49 LINCOLN and Headquarters held fast and [ ] was never bombed. "We do not take action with grave foreign policy implications except as agent for the policymakers," Dulles cabled LINCOLN. 50

President Arbenz, on 27 June 1954, in a bitterly anti-American speech, resigned his office and sought asylum in th eMexican embassy in Guatemala City. [ ].51 After Castillo Armas assumed the presidency, however, Arbenz was allowed to leave the country for Mexico, which granted him political asylum. In addition, 120 other Arbenz government officials or Communists departed Guatemala under a safe passage agreement with the Castillo Armas government.52 There is no evidence that any Guatemalans were executed.

CONCLUSION[edit]

CIA officers responsible for planning and implementing covert action against the Arbenz government engaged in extensive discussions over a two-and-a-half year period about the possibility of assassinating Guatemalan officials [ ]. Consideration of using assassination to [ ] purge Guatemala of Communist influence was born of the extreme international tensions in the early Cold War years. The Agency did not act unilaterally, but consulted with State Department officials with responsibility for policy toward Latin America. In the end, no assassinations of Guatemalan officials were carried out, according to all available evidence.

Proposals for assassination pervaded both PBFORTUNE and PBSUCCESS, rather than being confined to an early stage of these programs. Even before official approval of PBFORTUNE, CIA officers compiled elimination lists and discussed the concept of assassination with Guatemalan opposition leaders. Until the day that Arbenz resigned in June 1954 the option of assassination was still being considered.

Discussions of assassination reached a high level within the Agency. Among those involved were [ ]. [ ] is known to have been present at one meeting where the subject of assassination came up. It is likely that [ ] was also aware in general terms that assassination was under discussion. Beyond planning, some actual preparations were made. Some assassins were selected, training began, and tentative "hit lists" were drawn up.

Yet no covert action plan involving assassinations of Guatemalans was ever approved or implemented. The official objective of PBSUCCESS was to remove the Guatemalan government covertly "without bloodshed if possible." Elimination lists were never finalized, assassination proposals remained controversial within the Agency, and it appears that no Guatemalans associated with Arbenz were assassinated. Both CIA and State Department officers were divided (and undecided) about using assassination.

Discussion of whether to assassinate Guatemalan Communists and leaders sympathetic to Communist programs took place in a historical era quite different from the present. Soviet Communism had earned a reputation of using whatever means were expedient to advance Moscow's interests internationally. Considering Moscow's machinations in Eastern Europe, role in the Korean War, sponsorship of subversion through Communist surrogates in the Third World, and espousal of an ideology that seemed to have global hegemony as th ultimate objective, American officials and the American public alike regarded foreign Communist Parties as Soviet pawns and as threatening to vital US security interests.

Cold War realities and perceptions conditioned American attitudes toward what political weapons were legitimate to use in the struggle against Communism. It would be over two decades after the events in Guatemala before DCI William Colby prohibited any CIA involvement in assassination and a subsequent Executive Order banned any US government involvement in assassination.

References[edit]

  • Note 1: See Piero Gleijeses, Shattered Hope: The Guatemalan Revolution and the United States, 1944–1954 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991), pp. 187-88. United Fruit dominated Guatemalan banana production, controlled the International Railroad of Central America, and its merchant fleet had a virtual monopoly of Guatemalan overseas shipping. It was second only to the Guatemalan government as an employer.
  • Note 2: See Gleijeses, Shattered Hope and Richard H I[numcrman], The CIA in Guatemala: The Foreign Policy of Intervention, (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1982) for general overviews of the Guatemalan situation in the early 1950s and US reaction. See also John P[emrifoy] US Ambassador to Guatemala statement of 23 October 1953 in Department of State, Foriegn Relations of the United States, The American Republic 1950 – 1954, 4:1093. (Hereinafter cited as FRUS)
  • Note 3:See PBSUCCESS Planning Documents, Directorate of Operations, Latin American Division Records, Job Number 79-101025A, CIA Archives (S). See also NSC 144/3, 18 March 1953 FRUS 4:1 – 73 and J. C. King, memo for DDP, "Estimate of Situation in Guatemala," 11 January 1952 printed in Michael Warner, ed. The CIA under Harry Truman (Washington, DC: Center for the Study of Intelligence, CIA, 1994) pp.452 – 53
  • Note 4:J. C. King, Chief, Western Hemisphere Division, dispatch, 22 March 1952, Box 7 (S).
  • Note 5:See Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, "Alternative Policy Lines, 1953." and NSC, "Guatemala," 19 August 1953, FRUS 4:1074–1086.
  • Note 6:See cable to Dulles, "Conference with ...," 4 August 1952, Box 69 (S).
  • Note 7:See memorandum to Dulles, "Guatemalan Situation," 9 July 1952, Box 67 (S) and memorandum to Dulles, "Conference with...," 4 August 1952, Box 69 (S).
  • Note 8:See [ ] "Chrnolology of Meeting's Leading to Approval of Project A," 8 October 1952, Box 69 (S); to [ ] "Guatemala," 8 October 1952, Box 69 (S); and to Dulles, "Guatemala Situation," 9 July 1952, Box 69.
  • Note 9:See [ ] "Chrnology of Meetings Leading to Approval of Project A." (S) Se also Irmnerman(?) CIA in Guatemala, pp. 120-122. Because of security leaks and the boasting of General Somoza about his and the Agency's role in supporting the rebellion PBFORTUNE was soon called off. Secretary of State Dean Asheson asked DCI Smith to stop the operation on October 1952.
  • Note 10:See Cable 24629 OPC/OSO/WHD to [ ], 26 January 1952, Box 7 (S). For a list of the names and biographical data see Chief, Economic Warfare Operations, LINCOLN to All Staff Officers, "Selection of Individuals for Disposal by Junta Group," 31 March 1954, Box 145.
  • Note 11:Washington Cable [ ] to [ ] 29 January 1952, Box 7 (S).
  • Note 12:[ ] to Headquarters, 29 January 1952, Box 10 (S).
  • Note 13:See to [ ] "Guatemala Communist Personnel to be Disposed of During Military Operations of CALLIGERIS," (Castillo Armas), 18 September 1952, Box 134 (S).
  • Note 14:See report #3 to [ ] "Lieason between CALLEGERIS and General Trojillo of Santo Domingo," 18 September 1952, bot 134 (S). Assasination was a nasty but frequent tool of Guatemalan politics. Arbenz himself benefited from the killing of his arch rival for the presidency Francisco Arans in 1949.
  • Note 15:See in [] memo "Conferences," 1 December 1952, Box 134 (S).
  • Note 16:To [] memo "Current Planning of Calligeris Organization," 12 December 1952, Box 134 (S). See also, Acting Chief, [ ] Branch, Western Hemisphere Division that resported in November 1952 that Castillo Armas was studying PW use of liquidation lists. Memorandum for the record, "PW Conferences" 5 November 1952, Box 151 (S). The case officer also reported that the Arbenz government had targeted Castillo Armas for assasination.
  • Note 17:See [ ] 10 March 1953, Box 15D (S).
  • Note 18:See [ ] memorandum, "Proposed Course of Action If Plan is Not Continued in Present Form," undated but probably 1951, Box 154 (S).
  • Note 19:Western Hemisphere Division, memo "PBFORTUNE," 28 August 1953, Box 72 (S).
  • Note 20:See [ ] memo in [ ] "Guatemala - General Plan of Action," 11 September 1953, Box 5 (TS). See also the attached memorandum from [ ] to [ ] 9 September 1953 (TS).
  • Note 21:See Dispatch, COS Guatemala City to LINCOLN, "Death Notices," 19 April 1954, Box 99 (S).
  • Note 22:NSC Policy Paper, 19 August 1953, FRUS 4:1083.
  • Note 23:See [ ] to [ ] "Guatemala - General Plan of Action," Box 5 (TS) and [ ] Special Deputy for PBSUCCESS, memo for the record, "Program for PBSUCCESS," 12 November 1953, Box 135 (C). See also memo to [ ], "Summary of Directives and Instructions on PBSUCCESS," 5 November 1953, Box 142 (S). [ ] goes not specially mention assasination either.
  • Note 24:[ ] opened on 9 December. See [ ] to Headquarters, 5 January 1954, Box 1 (S) and [ ] to Headquarters 6 January 1954, Box 1 (S). See also J8 to Headquarters, 9 March 1954, box 13 (S); [ ] to Headquarters, 4 January 1954, Box 1(S).
  • Note 25:See the [ ] cheif in Chief, [ ]. "CALLIGERIS Briefing Notes," J [ ] "Cost of Support for PBSUCCESS," 17 September 1954, Box 43 (S). He listed the 20 silenced risent. See also [ ] to Headquarters, 6 Januar 1954, Box 75 (S) and [ ] 2 to Headquarters, 21 January 1954, Box 1 (S).
  • Note 26: To [ ] Report #5. [ ] ." 18 September 1952, Box 73 (S) and [ ] cheif, memo for the record, "Pbt conference Held at [ ] " 13 February 1954, Box 74 (S). See also [ ] to Headquarters, 4 January 1954, Box 1 (S). The Headquarters Registry cpy of the pouch manifest for 8 January 1954, Box 97 (S) list the manual "A Study of Assasinations." A handwritten note of the origianl manifest says the pouch was carried to [ ] by [ ]. The serial assasination study is in Box 145 (S).
  • Note 27:See [ ] to Headquarters. 8 June 1954. Box 5 (S) or [ ] to Headquarters 8 June 1954, Box 5 (S).
  • Note 28:See ic [ ] Report $22, "Current Planning of CALLIGERIS Organization," 12 December 1952, Box 134 (S) nd "Contact Report," 11 January 1954, (S).
  • Note 29:See Dispatch to [ ] , "Training," 6 June 1954, Box 75 (Secret, PBSUCCESS, Rybat). [ ]
  • Note 30:To LINCOLN, 16 May 1954, "Tactical Instrucitons (part II)" (S) and To LINCOLN "Instructions" Nerve War Against Individuals," 9 June 1954, Box 50 (S).
  • Note 31:See COS Guatemala City, to Western Hemisphere Division, undated, Box #6, (C) and Guatemala City 553 to LINCOLN, 14 May 1954. See also the COS dispatch Guatemala City to LINCOLN, 14 May 1954, Box 145 (S). [ ]
  • Note 32:See [ ] memo for the record, "Weekly PBSUCCESS Meeting with [ ]" 9 March 1954, Box 154 (TS). Even before this meeting [ ] suggested that the top Guatemalan leadership needed to be assasinated during the first hours of the revolution. They had to be "pulled out by the roots." If we waited [ ] argued, "If too many of these birds get out they will be back in about three years." See [ ] Tape 17, Box 209 (S). [ ] Sec [ ] "Administrative Details." 15 April 1954, Box 70 (S); [ ] memo for the record, "Meeting" 2 March 1954, Box 70 (S).
  • Note 33:[ ] memo for the record. "Report of Mr. [ ] on OAS Conference," 29 March 1954, Box 145 (TS).
  • Note 34:See, Chief, Economic Warfare, [ ] memo to All Staff Officers, "Selection of individuals for Disposal by Junta Group." 31 March 1954, Box 145 (S). We know [ ] visited [ ] on this date from the [ ] visitors log book. He signed into [ ] on 31 March. See [ ] Log Book for 31 March 1954, Box 138 (S).
  • Note 35:Memo, Box 145 (S).
  • Note 36:See memo and attachment notes on the memo which indicates that [ ] returned the list to the file on 1 June 1954, Box 145 (S)

[1]

  • Note 37: [ ] 1950. See memo to [ ] "Summary of Operation," 18 April 1954, Box 134 (S). Se also Dispatch [ ] to [ ] "Assets in Guatemala," 14 April 1954, Box 134 (S). An attachment notes that some assets are also on another list for "eradication." (see attachment in Box 102). See also [ ] to [ ] 5 April 1954, Box 125 (S).
  • Note 38:See memo for the record, "Synthesis of [ ]'s remarks Relevant to PBSUCCESS Made at a Meeting 21 April 1954, Box 151 (S).
  • Note 39:See [ ] Officer, [ ], memo to [ ] and [ ], "Acts of Force Before D-Day," 16 May 1954, Box 142 (Secret, PBSUCCESS, Rybat). See also [ ] memo to [ ] Officer, undated, in which [ ] states, "Your views were discussed with Chief [ ]" Box 145 (Secret, PBSUCCESS, Rybat).
  • Note 40:See [ ] to Director, 21 May 1954, Box 4 (S) and [ ] to Director, 21 May 1954, Box 4 (S).
  • Note 41:See to Headquarters, 29 May 1954, Box 13 (S). Perhaps [ ] Officer, [ ] and chief [ ] talked at a conference held at [ ] on 2 june 1954. See [ ] "Contact Report," 2 June 1954, Box 146 (Secret, PBSUCCESS, Rybat).
  • Note 42:See dispatch, [ ] to [ ] "K-Program, [ ]," 25 May 1954, Box 145 (Secret, PBSUCCESS, Rybat).
  • Note 43:See "Disposal List Home Addresses," copied from an attachment to dispatch, [ ] to [ ] 1 June 1954. Box 145, (S). It contained 15 names. See also [ ] routing slip for the attachment, (Dispatch dated 25 May 1954), Box 145 (Secret, Rybat).
  • Note 44:See [ ] draft memo, "Present Status and Possible Future Course of PBSUCCESS," 1 June 1954, Box 145 (S).
  • Note 45:[ ] memo for the record, "Points Covered in H/W Discussions of June 1 and 2," 3 June 1954, Box 145 (S). This memo is originally from Job 00075R, Box 1, Folder 3.
  • Note 46:See "Contact Report," 2 June 1954, Box 146 (Secret, PBSUCCESS, Rybat). See also [ ] memo for the record, "Points Covered in H/W Discussion of June 1 and 2," 3 June 1954 and [ ] note for the file, "Disposal List Prepared by C/EW," 1 June 1954, Box 145 (S).
  • Note 47:See [ ] to Headquarters, 17 June 1954, Box 75 (S); [ ] to Headquarters, 18 June 1954, Box 11 (S). See earlier Agency meetings with Guatemalan military leader, "First Meeting, 4 May 1954, Dispatch [ ] to [ ], 4 May 1954, Box 154 (S). For [ ]'s cable, see [ ] to [ ], 24 June 1954, Box 153 (Secret, PBSUCCESS, Rybat).
  • Note 48:See [ ] to LINCOLN, 14 June 1954, Box 93 (Secret, PBSUCCESS, Rybat); [ ] to LINCOLN, 19 June 1954, Box 93 (S); and LINCOLN, 4175 to Headquarters, 22 June 1954, Box 93 (Secret, PBSUCCESS, Rybat).
  • Note 49:[ ] to LINCOLN, 25 June 1954, Box 146 (S) and [ ] to Dulles, 19 June 1954, Box 91 (S).
  • Note 50:See Headquarters to LINCOLN, 5857, 22 June 1954, Box 143, (TS)
  • Note 51:See Guatemala City 977 to LINCOLN, 27 June 1954, Box 145 (Secret, PBSUCCESS, Rybat).
  • Note 52:John H. Waller, CIA Inspector General, letter to Thomas Farmer, Chairman of the Intelligence Oversight Board, 15 October 1979.

[2]