Cammack v. Lewis/Opinion of the Court

by Samuel Freeman Miller

United States Supreme Court

82 U.S. 643

Cammack  v.  Lewis

If the transaction as set up by Cammack be true, then, so far as he was concerned, it was a sheer wagering policy, and probably a fraud on the insurance company. To procure a policy for $3000 to cover a debt of $70 is of itself a mere wager. The disproportion between the real interest of the creditor and the amount to be received by him deprives it of all pretence to be a bon a fide effort to secure the debt, and the strength of this proposition is not diminished by the fact that Cammack was only to get $2000 out of the $3000; nor is it weakened by the fact that the policy was taken out in the name of Lewis and assigned by him to Cammack. This view of the subject receives confirmation from the note executed by Lewis to Cammack for the precise amount of the risk in the policy, which, if Cammack's account be true, was without consideration, and could only have been intended for some purpose of deception; probably to impose on the insurance company.

Under these circumstances, we think that Cammack could, in equity and good conscience, only hold the policy as security for what Lewis owed him when it was assigned, and such advances as he might afterwards make on account of it, and that the assignment of the policy to him was only valid to that extent.

Whether Lewis was a participant in the fraud, does not fully appear. Such conversations of his as are proved tend to show that he looked upon Cammack as a friend, to whom he was willing to trust the policy assigned, and that he never supposed more would be claimed by Cammack than what he owed him. It is also probable that he believed he would survive the life of the policy, and with the single exception of the note for $3000, given by him without consideration, there is nothing proved against him inconsistent with that view of the matter, and with his fair dealing. At all events, we do not see such evidence on his part of a corrupt transaction, as to forbid the court from doing justice between his administratrix and Cammack, after the amount secured by the policy has been paid by the company to the latter.

The receipt of the one-third of the insurance money by the complainant does not, we think, under all the circumstances of the case, conclude her as a settlement of the matter in dispute. It is obvious that she was ignorant of the full extent of her rights; that she acted hastily and without due consideration, and was largely influenced by the advice of Mr. Chandlee, who had been her husband's friend and adviser, and who was prompted to do what he did by Cammack, while in ignorance of many of the facts of the case.

Besides, the bill in this case, as appears on its face, is brought by her as administratrix, and the receipt by her of the one-third paid on the policy was before any administrator had been appointed. If she has a right to recover all the $3000 as administratrix, it could not be defeated by her receipt of $1000, paid to her in her own right before any administration had been taken out on Lewis's estate.

On the whole, we are of opinion that the decree of the Supreme Court should be affirmed, and it is

SO ORDERED.

Notes