Camp v. Lockwood
Camp verſus Lockwood.
The Plaintiff and Defendant had both been inhabitants of Connecticut previous to the revolution, when the debt, for which this action is brought, was alledged to be contracted, and continued ſo for ſome time after the commencement of the war. Subſequent, however, to the declaration of independence, the Plaintiff joined the Britiſh army, and, on the return of peace, he removed with other Loyalties to Halifax, where he continues to reſide. On the ſecond Thurſday of May in the year 1778, the legiſlature of Connecticut enacted a law declaring that all the eſtate, real and perſonal, of any perſon or perſons who had joined the enemies of the United States, or had aſſiſted them, or ſhould thereafter do ſo, ſhould be confiſcated; and that, with reſpect to thoſe perſons who had been inhabitants of the State (the laſt ſection of the act providing for the caſe of perſons who had never been inhabitants) the County Court upon application was empowered and directed to give judgment, that all their eſtate ſhould be forfeited to the Commonwealth, and thereupon to appoint adminiſtrators (as in the cafe of interſtates) who were to fell ſuch confiſcated eſtate, inſtitute ſuits, recover and pay debts, and to deliver the ſurplus, if any, into the Treaſury of the State &c. In September 1779, the Plaintiff was proceeded againſt under this law, as one who had been lately as reſident of the town of Newhaven; and, it being duly adjudged that he was guilty of joining the enemies of the United States, his eſtate was declared to be forfeited for the uſe of the State of Connecticut, and certain parts of it was ſeized and ſold; but no ſteps were taken to recover from the Defendant the debt ſaid to be due from him to the Plaintiff, although the Defendant at the time of the confiſcation, and for ſometime afterwards, remained an inhabitant of Connecticut, and has always had property there, liable to legal proceſs.
Under theſe circumſtances, Camp inſtituted this ſuit; in bar of which Lockwood pleaded, hat the confiſcation, by virtue of the act of Connecticut, had diveſted the Plaintiff’s property in the debt, if any was due, and veſted the fame in that State: And to the clemency of this plea the preſent argument was confined, upon a demurred and joiner in demurrer.
The point was firſt opened on the 6th of Auguſt, 1788, and finally argued by Ingerſol, for the Defendant, and Rawle, for the Plaintiff, on the 21ſt of November following.
Ingerſol. The forfeiture of an enemy’s eſtate, moveable or immoveable, and of his rights, corporeal or incorporeal, is a matter of ſtrict ſovereignty, although, by the curteſy of nations, debts are allowed to revive at the concluſion of a war. Lee on Capt. 111. The Plaintiff, however, comes not within the rule reſpecting an enemy, but having been proceeded againſt as a delinquent ſubject, he muſt be conſidered as an attained traitor; and, by ſuch attainder, all his eſtate, real and perſonal, were abſolutely and irrecoverably forfeited. 3 Bac. Abr. 755. And a forfeiture of real and perſonal eſtate extends to things in action as well as in poſſeſſion. 2. Bac.Abr. 577. in which general point of view the law of Pennſylvania has alſo expreſsly regarded the ſubject. 2 State Laws 99. The act of Connecticut is as clear and comprehenſive as words can make it, conſidering the party as actually dead, and appointing adminiſtrators of his eſtate. Nor can the proviſions contained in the treaty of peace affect the queſtion; for, the treaty does not operate like the reverſal of an outlawry, but like a pardon. 22 Vin. tit. Outlawry.
Rawle contended, that, whether the queſtion was conſidered, 1ſt, upon the pleadings here; or, 2dly, upon a ſuppoſition that the ſuit had been inſtituted in Connecticut, the Plaintiff was not barred of his recovery.
1. Arguing the cafe on the pleadings here, he premiſed, that it was a general principle, that nations, with reſpect to each other, muſt be conſidered as individual in a ſtate of nature. Puſſ. lib. 2. c. 3 ſect. 23. 1 Vat. 4. 5. Burlam. 195. Moral entitles, or perſons, are given to them, in order to render them ſubjects of action; but, as to what relates to a nation itſelf, or the property which it has acquited, there is no power that can direct or reſtrain, its conduct. In a ſtate of ſociety private property yields to the general good; but this is not the cafe in a ſtate of nature; and, therefore, it may be taken as an axiom, that where the act of a particular nation veſts in itſelf the property of an individual, whether a ſubject or not, the right, thus acquired, extends no further than the juriſdiction of that nation, and the act on which it is founded can have no extra-territorial force. 1 Vol. 145. This principle has, indeed, been recognized by the practice of the United States. For, there is no inſtance of the agents for forfeited eſtates paſſing from one State into another; but, on the contrary, acts of attainder have always been paſſing againſt the ſame perſon in the ſeveral States where his property was found; which would not, ſurely, have been neceſſary, if, either on general law, or under the articles of Confederation, the act of one State, appropriating private property to its own uſe, had any effect beyond the limits of its own juriſdiction. If then the State which has paſſed the law of confiſcation, has forborne to reduce the Defendants debt into poſſeſſion, and the State where the debtor reſides has no power to do ſo, it neceſſarily follows, that the debt, remaining on its original footing, is liable to the Plaintiff’s demand. When, indeed, the act of Connecticut was paſſed, the Defendant reſided in that State; but when this ſuit was inſituted he had removed hither; and the law is clear, that the debt follows the perſon in every inſtance, except that of a diſtribution in the cafe of inteſtacy. Carth. 373.
2. Conſidering the point, in the ſecond place, upon a ſuppoſition that the action had been brought in Connecticut, the queſtion ariſes, whether a right not reduced into poſſeſſion within due time, can afterwards be recovered? If the adminiſtrators had recovered from the Defendant, it would certainly have been ſufficient to bar the Plaintiff’s claim; but, when the State allowed the debtor to remove from its juriſdiction, an implied power was given to the creditor to purſue him elſewhere. Should a huſband neglect during his life time to recover choſes in action belonging to his wife, ſhe is entitled to them afterwards, and not his executors or adminiſtrators; for, the law will never favor negligence. The reaſoning in this caſe will apply as well with reſpect to nations as individuals. Leo on Capt. 119. Beſides, a right veſted for a particular purpoſe, ceaſes with that purpoſe: The war being at an end, the object of confiſcating the Plaintiff’s debts, &c. is alſo extinguiſhed; and if the Adminiſtrators could not recover the debt in Connecticut, nor, a fortiori, in Pennſylvania, by the rules of natural juſtice, Camp may recover it; for, there can be no plauſible reaſon why Lockwood ſhould be exonerated. Under the Treaty of Peace, indeed, and the law of Connecticut (paſſed the 2d Thurſday of May, 1787) repealing all acts repugnant to the Treaty, the Adminiſtrators could not now interfere to prevent the Plaintiff’s recovery; for, the act by virtue of which they were appointed, is certainly of that deſcription;–ſo that by the 4th article Lockwood is ſtopped from ſaying that he will pay the debt to the Adminiſtrators; and, by the 6th article, they are precluded from compelling him to do ſo. This expoſition has alſo prevailed in England; for, the Agents on the claims of the Loyaliſts make no allowance for outſtanding debts; becauſe, as it has been already obſerved, they may be recovered under the Treaty.
Rawle then proceeded to confider, particularly, the objections offered by the Defendant’s Counſel, in ſupport of his plea; which were, he ſtated, 1ſt. That the Plaintiff was not an enemy, but a rebellious ſubject; 2dly, That by the act of Connecticut, and the proceedings under it, he was attained, and conſidered as actually dead; and 3dly. That he was not entitled to any benefit under the Treaty of Peace.
1. To the firſt objection, he anſwered, that the proceedings were expreſsly againſt Camp as an enemy; that it was by reaſon of his adherence to the enemies of the United States, and of actions nor merely criminal as they relate to his duty to the State, but to a Foreign nation at war with the State, that the forfeiture had been effected; and that the law of Connecticut neither knew, nor indicated, a diſtinction between the immical character of a ſubject and a Foreigner. But, he urged, that, as againſt a delinquent citizen, merely in relation to the State of which he was a member, not an enemy in the ſtrict ſenſe of the word, the act of the State, non valet extra territorium; that, therefore, it could never be any bar to Camp’s recovery in Pennſylvania; and that, even in Connecticut he would now be entitled by the Treaty of Peace, and the law paſſed there in ſupport of it, to recover all the property not actually veſted and in poſſeſſion of the State. It, on the other hand, he was proceeded againſt as an offending ſubject, in relation to his adherence to a foreign power, the general principle entitle him to recover alter the war has ceaſed. But, in either point of view, the allowance of the preſent plea would contravene the eſtabliſhed principles in the cafes enumerated by Vattel 1 Vol. p. 4. ſect. 13. 14. p. 121. ſect. 2. 3.p. 129. ſect.25.
Beſides, his offences as a Subject, though committed againſt a nation confederated and allied with ours, do not allow us to join in the infliction of puniſhment. 1 Vat. 98. ſect. 232. We cannot, therefore, make ourſelves parties to the public ſeverities of Connecticut, nor interfere in the relation and conflict, between that State and its Subjects: And, as no public proceedings have taken place againſt the Plaintiff here, there is no any authority for denominating him an offender againſt Pennſylvania. The only inſtance in which theſe general principles have ſuſtained an alteration by the articles of Confederation, is confined to the perſons of offenders; and expreſſlio unius eſt excluſio alterius.
But the admiſſion of this plea would be attended with conſequences ſo inconvenient, that the more argument ab inconvenio ought to prevent it. In whatever ſhape it is claimed, it would interfere with the axiom, that one nation cannot intermedle with the government of another. Vall. p. 138. ſect. 54. If the Plaintiff was attainted, or in debt, here, his property could not be forfeited or attached, ſince, by the adverſe argument, it belongs to Connecticut: Nay, if he came hither with a view to ſettle, he could not act, trade, or become a uſeful Citizen on the funds he found here. Thus a coliiſio legum would ariſe; the univerſal rule, of which, is, that the laws and the intereſt of the State have juriſdiction of the cauſe, ſhall be preferred. 2 Hub. 26. 3 axiom.
2. To the ſecond objection he anſwered, that it was not founded in the truth of the caſe. Names ought not to be miſlead us; for although his property in Connecticut had been confiſcated, and an adminiſtrator appointed to collect it; yet nothing appears to prove that the Plaintiff is not ſtill alive to every legal purpoſe there, as well as here; independent too of the Treaty of Peace.
3. But, in anſwer to the third objection, he inſiſted, that the Treaty of Peace removes not only the perſonal diſability, if any ſuch there was, but alſo the particular Bar. Whether, indeed, it operates as a general reverſal, or a general pardon, may be queſtionable; although the former in the more probable conjecture, ſince the proviſion made in favor of recovering property fold as confiſcated, would have been needleſs if it was only conſidered in the light of a pardon. But, admitting it to be only a pardon, and that it has no effect againſt bona fide purchaſers, he contended, that it was concluſively in favour of the Plaintiff on the point of reſtitution, as againſt the State; and, a fortiori, in a cafe where his credits had not been reduced into poſſeſſion. The fair conſtruction of the Treaty neceſſarily warrants this doctrine.
Ingerſol, in reply,–There are a variety of inſtances in which this queſtion will be agitated, if the Plaintiff ſhould now prevail; and the purſes of individuals, as well as the coffers of the State, will be deeply affected by the deciſion. It muſt be remarked that neither the Defendant, nor Connecticut, aſk the interpoſition of this Court, but the perſon who was the object of the law of that State; that the Defendant does not intercept the money in its courſe to the public Treaſury; but prevents its being remitted to Nova-Scotia; and that the conteſt, in fact, lies between an individual and a ſiſter State.
He obſerved, that he did not controvert the general doctrine advanced by the oppoſite council, that the law of nations, is the law of nature applied to nations, and that one ſovereign power cannot be bound by another; but he diſtinguiſhed between the neceſſary, and the voluntary law of nations, which ariſes ex comitate. Valt. preſ. 12. Ibid. p. 6. and inſiſted that the laws of a nation actually enforced, are every where obligatory, unleſs they interfere with the independency of another Legiſlature. 2 Hub. 26. for, common convienency renders it neceſſary to give a certain degree of force to the ſtatutes of foreign nations. 2 Ld. Kaim. Prin. Eq. 350. 360.
If nations, unconnected by any tie, thus indirectly give effect to the laws of each other, the principle upon which it is done, muſt with greater ſtrength prevail in the caſe of a political union like that of the American States. It is true, that theſe States are ſaid to be ſovereign and independent; but they are evidently bound by a link which muſt be taken into view, or we ſhall argue wrong in the abſtract. Thus, it is declared by the articles of Confederation, that a citizen of one State, is a citizen of every State; and the Congreſs are not, as Mr. Adams[1] has termed them, as Aſſemblage of Ambaſſadors; but a ſovereign power, and capable of ſuing like a corporation, without any expreſs ſtatute to enable them. See ant. 41.
But, the operation and effect of a ſentence, or judgment, of a foreign Court, cannot ſurely be more binding than the act of a foreign Legiſlature; and theſe, ex comitate et jure gentium, are in many caſes final. 1 Black. Rep. 258. 262. Vatt. lib. 2. c. 7. ſect. 84. p. 147. If a debtor be diſcharged where the debt was contracted, he is equally ſo in every other place; ſo that it Lockwood had been diſcharged by the State of Connecticut, this ſuit would not be maintainable againſt him even in the King’s Bench of England. Co. B. L. 347. The Court of Chancery held itſelf bound by the deciſion of a competent foreign juriſdiction, declaring an acceptance to be void; 2 Stra. 733. and, becauſe a debt had been diſcharged according to the lex loci, though in the depreciated paper money of North-Carolina, Lord Thurlow, ſince the revolution, has refuſed a ne exeat regno. Brown. 376. A ſimilar principle has governed the Supreme Court, in the caſe of Millar v. Hall (ant. 229) and this Court, in the cafes of Thompſon vs. Young (ant. 294.) and Le Clerc vs. Richette.
A diſtinction is likewiſe to be obſerved between a foreign ſentence authorizing, and a foreign ſentence diſmiſſing, a claim; for, if the proper tribunal diſmiſſes a claim, the ſentence is definitive. 2 Ld. Kaim. Prin. Eq. 375. and in that deſcription the proceedings, as far as they affect Lockwood, muſt be included. The caſe in Carth. 373 is certainly right as a general rule; but it is liable to ſeveral exceptions; for, 1ſt, The law of one country may indirectly have effect in another, by the voluntary law of nations; 2dly, If a right of action has been legally transferred in one juriſdiction, the rule by which it is to operate, is the fame in every other juriſdiction, and 3dly, Where a debtor has been diſmiſſed by the proper tribunal, it is a protection every where elſe: And theſe exceptions take place in conſidering the queſtion as between nations totally independent and unconnected. It is true, that the American States have hitherto been held by a very ſlight confederacy; but what remedy is to be purſued? Shall we, if the knot is looſe, make it ſtill looſer? If the union is weak, ſhall we encreaſe the debility? Or, when a more perfect conſolidation is eſſential to the national exiſtence, ſhall we employ repulſion inſtead of attraction, and thus widen the inconvenient and ruinous diſtance between the different members of our political body? Neither reaſon or experience would juſtify ſuch a conſtruction; and the United States, though individually ſovereign and independent, muſt admit, not only the voluntary law of nations, but a peculiar law reſulting from their relative ſituation.
No caſes can be more diſtinguiſhable then the preſent, and that in which the rule for reviving rights and credits at the expiration of a war occurs. There is no doubt, that, on the declaration of peace, a Britiſh ſubject could ſue here; and, we find, that although our government conceived that they might act as they thought proper with reſpect to the citizens of the State, yet the inſtalment laws were never extended to obſtruct and protract the recovery of debts due to foreigners. If, therefore, Camp is to be conſidered in the honorable light of an open enemy, the argument for the Defendant is unfounded: but, when it is recollected, that he did not avow his ſentiments on the declaration of Independence; and that, nevertheleſs, he remained in the enjoyment of his property under the law of Connecticut for ſome time afterwards, it is impoſſible to regard him in any other light than that of a ſubject, and ſubjects are the objects of the municipal law, not of the law of nations. In the caſe of Respublica v. Chapman on an indictment for treaſon (See ant. 53.) The Defendant was acquitted, becauſe, in the opinion of the Court, he was not a ſubject: If he had been a ſubject, he muſt have been attainted; and being ſo attainted, he could never have claimed any advantage from the law of nations on the return of Peace. Thus, with reſpect to Camp, he was a Traitor; the proceedings under the Act of Connecticut produced a forfeiture and attainder; and the right of action was as excluſively veſted in the State (and by the power of that State alone can it be diveſted) as if he had been taken and executed. The Act, indeed, does not ſpeak at all of an enemy, but of ſuch perſons as were reſident in Connecticut, and had joined the Britiſh troops; for proceedings of this kind are never carried on againſt an open enemy. The profits of his property may be ſequeſtered during the war, in order to prevent their being remitted, but no forfeiture can take place.
If then Camp was a ſubject of Connecticut, he derives no right from the Treaty of Peace; for, Great-Britain could not mean to interfere between that State and her own citizens. The deſcription in the fourth Article cannot be extended to him, and though the ſixth Article certainly deſignates perſons acting as he has done, yet it gives no farther advantage than to protect his perſon from moleſtation, and to preclude any future confiſcations of this property. The confiſcation of the preſent debt, &c. was in the year 1779, and no further proceedings are requiſite to retain the right which the State thereby acquired. The Marquis of Carmarthaen’s complaint of laws paſſed againſt the Treaty did not include laws of this deſcription; for although he muſt have known that ſimilar ones exiſted in Pennſylvania, he admits, that here there are no acts paſſed againſt the Treaty as holding a good title; but it provides for perſons entering into a negotiation for the reconveyance of their forfeited eſtates from ſuch purchaſers.
In the cafe of Reſpublica v. Gordon, (ant. 233.) the confiſcation was compleat before the treaty; and, therefore, though it would have been incompatible with it to have ſuſtained any legal proceedings afterwards in the Supreme Court againſt the Defendant, an act of the Legiſlature became neceſſary to divert the right, which the State had acquired by the previous confiſcation.
The conduct of the Britiſh agents can furniſh no authority to us; but the reaſon for their refuſing to make an allowance for debts was the difficulty of aſcertaining them, and not the preſumption of their being recoverable after the peace. Nor does the act of Connecticut, repealing all laws againſt the treaty, affect the law in queſtion, which is directed to an object of mere municipal regulation. The State had a right to do as they pleaſed with all the confiſcated property; and on any, or no conſideration, to releaſe all his debtors. Whether, indeed, they had recovered the whole, or a part, or whether they have compounded, or diſmiſſed the debt, it could not enure to the benefit of Camp. He cannot now be puniſhed for paſt depredations; but the property veſted in the State of Connecticut, cannot be re-veſted without her authority.
If the treaty is to be conſidered as a reverſal of outlawry, then a reſtitution would enſue; but if it is taken in the light of a pardon, that does not diveſt any thing previouſly veſted in a ſubject, nor even in the King who grants it, unleſs by expreſs words. 3 Bar. Abr. 810. 2 Vin. 401. pl. 4. p. 404. The right of action in the preſent cafe was clearly transferred to Connecticut, and neither expreſsly, or by implication, has ſhe waved it.
After conſidering the cafe and arguments, the President delivered the opinion of the Court in theſe words:
Shippen, Preſident.–The queſtion in this caſe is of importance, both on account of the principles to be eſtabliſhed by the deciſion, and the many caſes which may poſſibly be affected by it. It has been learnedly and ingeniouſly argued on both ſides; but, though large ground has been taken, I think the whole may be reduced to a very moderate compaſs.
This is not a ſuit brought by the State of Connecticut, or any perſon claiming property under their local laws, wherein a queſtion can ariſe, whether effects forfeited by the laws of the State can be recovered here, by the adminiſtrators of the perſon whoſe eſtate is confiſcated. It is ſimply, whether the debt has been forfeited there, and actually veſted in that State; and whether any thing has occurred which diveſts it; and whether, under the peculiar circumſtances of our relative ſituation with regard to each other, the Courts of this State can take notice of ſuch confiſcation and veſting, ſo as to preclude the Plaintiff from recovering here, a debt due to him there, before that confiſcation.
In order to gave the way for a deciſion of theſe queſtions, and to diſtinguiſh between the ſituation of this country, and thoſe treated of by the learned writers on the laws of nature and nations, and the rights of diſtinct independent ſovereignties quoted by the counſel, it will be neceſſary to point out that peculiar, relative ſituation which theſe States ſtand in which regard to each other.
When a reſiſtance was made to the execution of the laws of Great Britain, and an actual war took place between us and them, we were not thirteen independent States, but Colonies and Provinces, belonging to, and a part of, a great Empire, comprehending both countries. The reſiſtance was made in conſequence of common grievances ſuffered by all the Provinces, from the head of that empire; and it was a ſtruggle to unite the knot that bound us together, and to emancipate us from the dominion of our then mother country. In the proſecution of this plan, all were equally principals, and carried on the war as a common cauſe, and by common conſent, without being tied together by any regularly organized ſyſtem of Government. The firſt body that exerciſed any thing like a ſovereign authority, was the Congreſs of the then United Colonies, who ſuperintended the whole, and, by the like common conſent, were inveſted with ſuch general powers as were neceſſary for the proſecution of the war. We afterwards divided ourſelves into ſeveral diſtinct governments, by the name of States; ſtill leaving the general power in Congreſs, which, being in a great meaſure undefined, was exerciſed, with regard to internal matters, by recommendations to the ſeveral Governments, inſtead of laws; which however had generally the force of laws.
The articles of Confederation were not acceded to by all the States for ſome years. By theſe articles, each State was to retain its ſovereignty, freedom, and independence, and every right not expreſsly delegated to Congreſs, but the free inhabitants of each State were to be intitled to all the privileges and immunities of free citizens in the ſeveral States. Before the article of Confederation were agreed to, Congreſs had recommended to the ſeveral States to confiſcate, as ſoon as might be, and to make ſale of all the real and perſonal eſtates therein, of their inhabitants, and other perſons, who had forfeited the ſame, and the right to the protection of their reſpective States.
In conſequence of this recommendation, the State of Connecticut, in the month of May, 1778, paſſed an act to confiſcate the eſtates of perſons inimical to the independence and liberties of the United States, within that State. By this law, all eſtates, real and perſonal, within the State, which belonged to any perſon, on perſons, who had gone over and joined with the enemies of the United States, or had aided or aſſiſted them, or ſhould thereafter do ſo, were declared to be confiſcated. The mode of proceeding againſt thoſe who had been inhabitants, was directed to be by application to the County Court, who are empowered to give judgment and ſentence, that all the eſtate of ſuch perſons ſhould be forfeited for the uſe of State. The Court is then directed to grant adminiſtration of the eſtates, as in caſe of interſtates eſtates.–The adminiſtrators were to ſell ſuch eſtates, inſtitute ſuits, recover and pay debts, and deliver over the ſurplus, if any, into the Treaſury of the State. The laſt clauſe in the act directs the mode of proceeding as to the eſtates of perſons who never had an abode within the State.
In purſuance of this act, Abiatbar Camp, (who is ſtated to have been lately a reſident of the town of Newhaven,) in the month of September 1779, was charged on the information of the ſelect men, before the County Court, with having joined the enemies of the United States, and put himſelf under the protection of the King of Great Britain: He was thereupon adjudged guilty, and ſentence paſſed, that all his eſtate real and perſonal ſhould be forfeited to the uſe of the State. Certain parts of Camp’s eſtate were in conſequence of this forfeiture ſeized and ſold; but no proceeding was had to recover againſt James Lockwood, the preſent Defendant, the debt ſaid to be due from him to the Plaintiff, although the Defendant was at that time, and for ſome time afterwards, an inhabitant of Connecticut, and amenable for the ſame.
And here the queſtion ariſes, whether the Plaintiff himſelf can now recover it?
It is contended, on the part of the Plaintiff, that the proceeding againſt him was as an enemy, and not as a traitor, and that, therefore, the war being over, his right revives. The ſentence againſt him was certainly not expreſsly for treaſon, and there is no judgment againſt him that, in terms, ſubjects his perſon to puniſhment as a traitor. The act of Aſſembly directs the proceeding to be had only againſt the eſtates of ſuch perſons as had joined the enemy, but it diſtinguiſhes between ſch as had been inhabitants of that State, and thoſe who never had an abode within it, but had eſtates there. The preſent Plaintiff was convicted as an offender of the former deſcription, being late a reſident in the town of Newhaven, and is plainly pointed out as a ſubject. Indeed, the fact is conceeded, that he really was a citizen of the State, who joined the enemy long after the declaration of independence and the organization of our State Governments. He cannot, therefore, be conſidered in the light of ſuch a public enemy whoſe rights are ſaid by the writers on the law of nations, to revive after the termination of the war: the municipal law of the country operated upon him as a ſubject, and he could not be an object of the law of nations.
The objection to the Courts of this State, as a ſovereign independent State, interpoſing to prevent the recovery of a debt, on account of the confiſcation of it in another independent State, is in a great meaſure obviated by the ſtatement which I have before made of the peculiar relation that theſe States ſtand in to one another. Though free and independent States, they appear not to be ſuch diſtinct ſovereignties as have no relation to each other but by general treaties and alliances, but are bound together by common intereſts, and are jointly repreſented and directed as to national purpoſes, by one body as the head of the whole. The offence, which incurred the forfeiture, was not an offence againſt the State of Connecticut alone, but againſt all the States in the union: And the act, which directed the forfeiture, was made in conſequence of the recommendation of Congreſs, compoſed of the Repreſentatives of all the States, and was a caſe within the general powers veſted in them as conductors of a war, in which we were all equally principals. Our Courts muſt, therefore, neceſſarily take notice of the confiſcation made in a ſiſter State on theſe grounds.
It remains, then, only to confider, whether this debt was veſted in the State of Connecticut, and, if it was, whether it is reveſted in the Plaintiff by the treaty of peace?
All this eſtate, both real and perſonal, in that State was confiſcated. All things come within the deſcription of confiſcable perſonal eſtate, which a man has in his own right, whether they be in action or poſſeſſion: This debt was due from a perſon then reſiding within the State of Connecticut, and was, conſequently, confiſcated as other debts due there, and the right of action, as well as the debt, was veſted in the State.
The 4th article of the treaty of peace, which directs that creditors, on either ſide, ſhall meet with no lawful impediment to the recovery of all bona fide debts theretofore contracted, is moſt certainly confined to real Britiſh ſubjects, on the one ſide, and the citizens of America, on the other; and it has been always ſo conſtrued.
As to the reſtitution of eſtates, rights, and properties, already confiſcated, it is not required by the treaty to be done, even as to real Britiſh ſubjects. It is agreed, indeed, by the 5th article, that Congreſs shall recommend it to the ſeveral Legiſlatures to provide for ſuch a reſtitution; and, as to thoſe of another deſcription, they have liberty given them by the treaty, to reſide twelve months in the United States to ſolicit a reſtitution and compoſition with the purchaſers of their eſtates, and Congreſs is to recommend to the States, that they be reſtored on refunding the money paid for them. But no acts for thoſe purpoſes have been paſſed by the Legiſlatures in conſequence of any ſuch recommendations. Indeed, the ample proviſion made for theſe people in England, ſeems to have been conſidered by the Government there as an act of juſtice, for not having been able to obtain a reſtitution for them by the treaty.
For theſe reaſons, we are of opinion, that Abiathar Camp is not ſuch a perſon as has a right to ſue for and recover this debt, already wiſhed by confiſcation in the State of Connecticut.
- ↑ See Mr. Adams’s “Defence of the American Conftitution.”