Can Germany Invade England?/Chapter2

by Colonel H. B. Hanna

CHAPTER II

STRENGTH AND DISPOSITION IN EUROPEAN WATERS OF THE ENGLISH AND GERMAN FLEETS

"The recent activity of the invasion-monger, in spite of the fact that, relatively and absolutely, the Royal Navy is now stronger than at any period of its wonderful history, is an unhealthy symptom."—Sir George Sydenham Clarke, G.C.M.G., Governor of Bombay, late Secretary of the Defence Committee.

"As to the present position of the British Fleet, there is no possibility of cavil. It is extremely easy to produce sophisticated statistics to prove almost anything, but it will be impossible for any alarmist to paint a picture of naval peril at present from the materials at command."—Archibald Hurd.

"As about 42,000 men are required to man the active fle<it, and about 7,000 of the nominal personnel are not available for purposes of war, it follows that Germany, having to exchange 15,000 men under training for trained men, could not mobilise her fleet without calling out the reserve—an important point when we are asked to believe in the possibility of a surprise attack."—Gerard Fiennes.

"For this, at least, I thank Heaven devoutly; the hegemony of the wider seas is vested, as always, in ships-of-the-Line, and when I note our position to-day (a greater ratio of superiority as against other nations than ever known before!), and review our position in the future—why, I sleep right soundly in my bed."—Alan H, Burgoyne, M.P., Editor of the "Navy League Annual."

I Shall now lay before my readers a number of facts and figures which will, I think, convince them that so far from Germany's being in a position to invade England, her fleet, should there ever be war between the two countries, would scarcely dare to weigh anchor and venture out into the open sea.

So recently as six years ago dissemination, as opposed to concentration, was Great Britain's Naval policy. Her ships-of-war were "scattered here and there as with a pepper-box" ^[1]; but, in 1906, Lord Fisher put an end to this haphazard state of things, and to-day we are literally in a position to talk with the enemy in our gates.

TABLE I^[2]

MEDITERRANEAN SEA

4th Squadron of the 1st Fleet :
Battleships			6	No German Fleet.
Armoured Cruisers	4	$\scriptstyle {\left.{\begin{matrix}\ \\\ \end{matrix}}\right\}\,}$	8
Protected Cruisers	4
Destroyers			10

A new squadron, consisting of four cruiser-battleships and two armoured cruisers, is eventually to be based on Malta, a great place d' armes, in whose well-protected harbour all requisites for docking, repairing, and refitting the largest men-of-war are provided. The Torpedo-boat Destroyer Flotilla is to be increased next winter to thirty destroyers, a new base for small craft is to be formed at Alexandria, and a squadron of six battleships is to be based on Gibraltar, which is also a first-class naval harbour. This squadron is, in time, to be increased to eight battleships. The criticisms levelled against these changes are undeserved. A great naval base at Gibraltar will ensure our communications with India in the event of the route through the Suez Canal being interrupted; and a battle squadron permanently located at the entrance to the Mediterranean, a "fertile area," where "trade tends to be crowded,"^[3] will be well placed either for the purpose of reinforcing the Cruiser Squadron at Malta or the British Fleets in the Home waters, which, in their turn, can at any moment spare ample vessels to make the Mediterranean Fleet superior to any possible combination against it.

TABLE II^[4]

ATLANTIC OCEAN (IRISH WATERS)

3rd Squadron of the 1st Fleet:				No German Fleet.
Battleships			6
Armoured Cruisers	4	$\scriptstyle {\left.{\begin{matrix}\ \\\ \end{matrix}}\right\}\,}$	7
Protected Cruisers	3

The Atlantic Fleet is in future to be based on home ports instead of Gibraltar, and is to be brought up during the year from six to eight battleships.

TABLE IIIA

IN HOME WATERS
British Fleet

In the English Channel
7th Battle Squadron of the 3rd Fleet (in commission with nucleus crews)[5]
Battleships			11
Armoured Cruisers	9	$\scriptstyle {\left.{\begin{matrix}\ \\\ \end{matrix}}\right\}\,}$	19
Protected Cruisers	10
8th Battle Squadron of the 3rd Fleet (in reserve with skeleton, or maintenance, crews)[6]
Battleships	4
Protected Cruisers	11
In the North Sea[7]
1st and 2nd Battle Squadrons of 1st fleet, and 5th and 6th Battle Squadrons of 2nd Fleet (Fully manned)
Battleships	25	$\scriptstyle {\left.{\begin{matrix}\ \\\ \end{matrix}}\right\}\,}$	30
Battle Cruisers	5
Armoured Cruisers	13	$\scriptstyle {\left.{\begin{matrix}\ \\\ \end{matrix}}\right\}\,}$	29
Protected Cruisers	16
Scouts	8

Eventually the 5th and 6th Battle Squadrons of the 2nd Fleet will each consist of eight battleships with full complements of active service ratings. The 7th Squadron, 3rd Fleet, will be manned by a nucleus crew, and on mobilisation brought up to full strength by a new force to be called the "Immediate Reserve." The 8th Squadron will only be a reserve manned by skeleton, or maintenance, crews. Destroyer flotillas in support of 1st and 2nd Battle Squadrons, 1st Fleet, and 5th and 6th Battle Squadrons, 2nd Fleet, based on:

Rosyth	(1st)	20
„	(2nd)	16
„	(8th)	24
Harwich	(3rd)	16
Harwich	(5th)	26
Portsmouth	(6th)	23
Portland	(4th)	16
Devonport	(7th)	24	—165

1st, 2nd, 3rd, and 4th Flotillas are driven by turbines, and not one has been launched more than five years.

In full Commission	68
In reserve with nucleus crews	97	—165

(Continued on page 16)

TABLE IIIb

IN GERMAN WATERS
German Fleet

In Baltic Sea[8]
In Reserve
Battleships					4
Protected Cruisers					2
Destroyers					12
In North Sea[8]
1st and 2nd Squadrons of the High Sea Fleet
Battleships			17	$\scriptstyle {\left.{\begin{matrix}\ \\\ \end{matrix}}\right\}\,}$	19
Battle Cruisers			2
Armoured Cruisers			1	$\scriptstyle {\left.{\begin{matrix}\ \\\ \end{matrix}}\right\}\,}$	6
Protected Cruisers			5
Destroyers					24
In Reserve
Battleships					4
Destroyer Flotilla in support of the High Sea Fleet:
Based	on	Wilhelmshaven	24
„	„	Kiel in Baltic (in reserve)	12	—36

Note.—Of the 30 English Battleships and Battle Cruisers in the North Sea, three are armed with 13*5-inch guns, the remainder with 12-inch; whereas of Germany's 19, three are armed with 12-inch guns, the remainder with only ii-inch, which gives to Great Britain a great superiority in weight of metal.^[9]

(Continued on page 17)

Abstract of British Fleets in the Home and Irish Waters (see Tables II and IIIa):

Battleships, including Battle Cruisers	51
Armoured Cruisers	26
Protected Cruisers	40
Scouts	8
Destroyers	165
Total number of vessels in Home and Irish Waters when all are mobilised	290

A little over 18,000 men are sufficient at present to complete the crews of the 7th and 8th Squadrons of the 3rd Fleet to full commission.^[10] These vessels are fully provisioned, and ammunition, stores, and coal laid in. The crews who are on shore ready to embark, can be shipped in a few hours.

A "nucleus crew consists of everything required to manage a ship, and to fight a ship, excepting only what maybe described as the unskilled maritime labour required for the purpose. These nucleus crews take out their ship. They practise the guns of their ship; they are not liable to those inevitable breakdowns which people changing to new machinery for the first time always experience."^[11]

A skeleton, or maintenance, crew consists of everything necessary to keep the ship, machinery, and guns in perfect order.

Two cruisers of exceptionally high speed are attached to the Destroyer Flotilla. The eight scouts (small fast cruisers) act as "mother" or depot ships to the destroyers.^[12]

The 1st and 2nd Squadrons of the 1st Fleet and 5th and 6th Squadrons of the 2nd Fleet are at present based on Chatham, Portsmouth, and Devonport, and the 7th and 8th Squadrons of the 3rd Fleet on Dover. When completed, Rosyth will form another base for the Fleet in the North Sea.

Abstract of the German High Sea Fleet in the North Sea, including Reserves in that Sea and the Baltic (see Table IIIb):

Battleships, including Battle Cruisers	27
Armoured Cruisers	1
Protected Cruisers	7
Destroyers	36
Total number of vessels in North Sea and Baltic Sea when all are mobilised	71

Germany's High Sea Fleet is based on Wilhelmshaven, and her ships in the Baltic on Kiel. The canal which connects the Baltic Sea with the River Elbe is about sixty-two miles long, and at the prescribed speed of 5.3 knots per hour it would take a ship thirteen hours to get through it.^[13] Its channel is, at present, too shallow to allow of the passage of ships of the Dreadnought type, but the work of deepening the canal is going on, and will probably be completed in 1915.^[14] The alternative route from the Baltic by the Little and Great Belts, the Kattegat and Skager Rak, is from 600 to 700 miles long; in winter often infested by ice, and at all seasons dangerous, owing to dense fogs which prevail in these shallow and contracted waters. The following table sets forth the total strength of the Navies of Great Britain and Germany:

TABLE IV

Comparative strength of the two Navies (omitting Battleships and Armoured Cruisers over 20 years old).
Great Britain						Germany
Battleships			55	$\scriptstyle {\left.{\begin{matrix}\ \\\ \end{matrix}}\right\}\,}$	60	Battleships			33	$\scriptstyle {\left.{\begin{matrix}\ \\\ \end{matrix}}\right\}\,}$	55
Battle Cruisers			5			Battle Cruisers			2
Armoured Cruisers					34	Armoured Cruisers					9
Protected	Cruisers	I.	18	$\scriptstyle {\left.{\begin{matrix}\ \\\\\ \ \end{matrix}}\right\}\,}$	72	Protected	Cruisers	I.	0	$\scriptstyle {\left.{\begin{matrix}\ \\\\\ \ \end{matrix}}\right\}\,}$	37
„	„	II.	38			„	„	II.	26
„	„	III.	16			„	„	III.	11
Unprotected Cruisers					5	Unprotected Cruisers					6
Scouts			8	$\scriptstyle {\left.{\begin{matrix}\ \\\\\ \\\ \\\ \ \end{matrix}}\right\}\,}$	387	Destroyers			109	$\scriptstyle {\left.{\begin{matrix}\ \\\\\ \ \end{matrix}}\right\}\,}$	202
Torpedo Vessels			26			Torpedo Boats			80
Destroyers			179			Submarines			13
Torpedo Boats			109
Submarines			109
Grand total					558	Grand total					289

There are some battleships over twenty years old still appearing in England's and Germany's Naval Lists ; and in these so-called obsolete vessels Great Britain is also much stronger than Germany.^[15]

Referring to the obsolescence of men-of-war, Mahan, in his latest work on Naval Strategy,^[16] writes: " The last expression of foreign professional opinion, concerning these so-called obsolete ships, is that, in the later stages of a war, when the newest ships have undergone their wear and received their hammering, the nation which then can put forward the largest reserve of ships of the older types will win."

Tables I and II show that, whereas Great Britain has twenty-four big and little vessels in the Mediterranean and six battleships and seven cruisers in the Atlantic (Irish waters), Germany has not a single vessel in either; and Table III shows that, leaving the Channel Fleet out of account and Germany's small reserves in the North and Baltic Seas, Great Britain's North Sea Fleet is numerically much stronger than Germany's High Sea Fleet. These, in themselves, are reassuring facts; but their value is greatly enhanced by the knowledge that the British ships are much larger than the German ships, as will be seen in the following table:

TABLE V

DISPLACEMENT IN TONS OF BATTLESHIPS AND BATTLE CRUISERS OF FLEETS IN NORTH SEA
(See Table IIIA)
Great Britain's 1st and 2nd Battle Squadrons of 1st Fleet, and 5th and 6th Battle Squadrons of 2nd Fleet	539,450	tons.
(See Table IIIb)
Germany's 1st and 2nd Squadrons of the High Sea Fleet	313,600	,,
In favour of Great Britain	225,850	,,
AVERAGE TONNAGE OF SINGLE SHIPS
Great Britain	17,982	,,
Germany	16,506
In favour of Great Britain	1,476

As, however, a ship is merely a floating platform for the transport of men and guns to the scene of battle, and the displacement of this floating platform is the measure of its carrying capacity, it follows that the British Fleet in the North Sea can bring to the scene of battle a much more powerful armament than is carried by the German High Sea Fleet. Now, the broadside fire of their battle- ship armament is the true test of the fighting power of men-of-war, and, in this respect also, Great Britain's superiority to Germany is overwhelming, as shown in the table below:

TABLE VI^[17]

BROADSIDE FIRE OF BATTLESHIPS AND BATTLE CRUISERS IN NORTH SEA

Great Britain	230,726	lb.
Germany	131,700	,,
Great Britain's superiority	99,026	,,

AVERAGE BROADSIDE FIRE OF THE SHIPS TAKEN SINGLY

Great Britain	7,690	lb.
Germany	6,935	,,
Great Britain's superiority	755	,,

Or, in a fleet of thirty battleships, practically equivalent to three extra men-of-war.

The preponderance in weight of the broadside fire of the British cruisers in the North Sea as compared with that of the German cruisers in the same sea is even more marked, as Great Britain has twenty-nine cruisers, thirteen of which are armoured, as against Germany's six, only one of which is armoured. Here again Germany is out-numbered and out-classed by Great Britain.

Since ships-of-war cannot be always at sea and are liable to accident and deterioration, the next point to be considered and compared is the docking accommodation possessed by each nation.

TABLE VII

DOCKYARDS FOR DREADNOUGHTS AND KINDRED CLASSES

In Use[18]
	Great Britain		Germany
In Home Waters		29		11
Abroad		15		0
Total		44		11
Building and Projected in Home Waters[19]
Building		8		2
Projected		3		1
Total		11		3
Abroad
Building		3		0
Projected		2		0
Total		5		0
Grand Total
Great Britan		60	Germany	14

This is a very satisfactory state of things, and our position in regard to docks capable of taking ships of ever-increasing size is no less satisfactory. Two floating docks suitable for the largest vessels that at present exist will be completed in a few months—one for the Medway and the other for Portsmouth. Early in 191 3 a new dock will be available at Portsmouth, another in January 1914; and three docks and the lock at Rosyth in 191 6. There are also five private docks which could be used for the largest vessels, and two more are building.^[20]

Mercantile Auxiliaries

The difference between the size, speed, and number of the British merchant-men that could be used as cruisers or scouts in time of war and the German merchant ships that might be similarly employed is as great, and as much to the advantage of the former marine, as the difference which has been shown to exist between the British and the German Navies.

TABLE VIII^[21]

				Great Britain	Germany
Tonnage				Number of Ships	Number of Ships
2,000	and	under	3,000	830	140
3,000	,,	,,	4,000	1,198	140
4,000	,,	,,	5,000	773	59
5,000	,,	,,	7,000	420	109
7,000	,,	,,	10,000	201	110
10,000	,,	,,	12,000	57	40
12,000	,,	,,	15,000	37	12
15,000	,,	,,	20,000	6	10
20,000	,,	,,	25,000	4	1
25,000	,,	,,	30,000	—	1
30,000	,,	,,	40,000	2	—
40,000 and above				1	—
Total				3,529	489

So far, however, the Admiralty has refused to subsidise any merchant vessel with a speed of less than 22 knots, on the ground that, unless their speed is much above that of the enemy's fastest cruisers, they must, in course of time, suffer capture; and as only the Mauretania, Lusitania, and a few other vessels of the Cunard Company attain this speed, only steamers of that line have been accepted as auxiliaries to the Navy. It is possible, however, that the Admiralty may reconsider this decision, for, as Sir William White has pointed out, very few of the great cruiser-battleships recently built can maintain a sea-speed approaching 25 knots, in moderate weather, for any length of time.^[22]

Germany has also subsidised some of her swiftest merchant vessels; and it has been reported, but not confirmed, that they habitually carry their armaments in their holds, ready, at any moment, to exchange a peaceful for a warlike status.^[23] If true, this report need cause British shipowners little alarm, for, as Germany has no naval bases and only two coaling-stations outside her own waters,^[24] such transformed vessels would soon run short of fuel, and, with the English Channel shut against them, would fall a prey to the British cruisers which would be on their track. A similar fate must, in the end, overtake any of Germany's regular cruisers that might happen to be at large on the ocean routes when war was declared, though, for a time, they might cause some loss and a great deal of annoyance to our shippers and insurance companies.

The Soul of a Skip

Having dealt with the ships of the two Fleets under comparison, I come now to the crews, without whose hands, eyes, and intelligence to navigate the hulls, set and keep the machinery in motion, and load and fire the guns, the finest ship in the world is but so much dead matter, fit only for the scrap-heap^[25]; and here too Great Britain's numerical strength is far in excess of that of Germany or any other nation.

TABLE IX

PERSONNEL OF THE TWO NAVIES

	Men on Active Service	Reserve	Length of Service
Great Britain	134,000[26]	57,904[27]	12 years[28]
Germany	60,805[26]	110,000[27]	3 years[28][29]

British Bluejackets and Marines are drawn principally from a seafaring stock, and are enlisted, on a voluntary system, for twelve years, at the end of which they are eligible for re-engagement for a second term of ten years, completion of which entitles them to a pension.^[30] Two-thirds of Germany's sailors are conscripts enrolled for three years, the greater proportion of whom have never seen the sea,^[31] and are looked upon rather as "soldiers on board ship than seamen."^[32]

Germany's short-service system accounts for the large number of her reservists. If England adopted the same system, her Reserve would be immense; but she has no need to increase it, since her service personnel, trained from boyhood to middle-age on the sea, is sufficient to man the whole of her war-Navy,^[33] whereas the German High Sea Fleet is under the necessity of changing one-third of its personnel every year, with the result that the sea-going fleet is always more or less of a training squadron; and when it goes to sea for its first cruise in May, it is hardly in condition to fight without returning to exchange its contingent of recruits for trained reservists.^[34] I have now shown: (1) That England has in her Home and Atlantic Fleets 51 line-of-battleships against Germany's 27 in the Baltic and North Sea; 66 cruisers as against 8, and 165 destroyers as against 36, besides having a very serviceable active fleet in the Mediterranean. (2) That the superiority of the broadside fire of the British line-of-battleships to the broadside fire of the German line is about 3 to 2, and the superiority of her active-service personnel is over 2 to i. (3) That the strategical position with which Nature has endowed her has been taken such full advantage of since 1906 that, in case of war breaking out between the two countries, not a single German man-of-war, not a single German merchant ship, not a single German fishing-smack, could leave or enter a German port, and her ocean-borne trade would cease to exist.

This is no idle boast, and certainly it carries with it no desire on my part to see its fulfilment—the more peaceful German ships there are on the world's waters the better for the world, England included—but facts are facts, and it is well for the peoples of both countries to know them. There are only two ways out of the North Sea—one round the north of Scotland, the other through the English Channel. If the German Fleet tried to break through by the former, it would meet the British Atlantic Fleet, reinforced by the Channel Fleet, and be attacked in rear and in flank by the North Sea Fleet. Even if, by some ruse on their part or some negligence on ours, German men-of-war did reach the Atlantic, what could they do there, with no ports and only two coaling-stations to resort to, and the British Fleets that they had eluded in full chase? And, of course, an attempt to force a passage through the English Channel would be a still more hopeless undertaking, for that Channel is like unto a well-guarded, formidable mountain pass held by a superior force—a position which no prudent soldier would attempt to capture by direct attack, but would try to turn; and whereas there are few positions on land that cannot be outflanked, there is no possibility of turning the English Channel, and direct attack, in this case, would mean engaging the North Sea, Channel, and Atlantic Fleets, with the Mediterranean Fleet, called up by wireless telegraphy, hurrying north to pounce upon any vessel that might chance to reach the Bay of Biscay.

Again I repeat—Nature has given to Great Britain a position which carries with it supremacy of the sea; and it is of no use for Germany to try to wrest that supremacy from her, because it is rooted in a natural advantage of which she cannot be deprived. It was Great Britain's position which enabled her to reduce Holland from a first-class to a third-class Power, without once landing an army on her shores, though the Dutch ships were as numerous, as well manned, and as well fought as the English; and Great Britain's position would tell in exactly the same way, and with greater force, in her favour in a war with Germany—a war which for that very reason is never likely to be declared.

one, for which there was neither excuse nor justification."—Morning Post, October 21, 1911.

1. "All these small detachments scattered here and there as with a pepper-box are common devices, but are dangerous, and proofs of extreme ignorance in military matters."—Indian Misgovernment, by Sir Charles Napier, p. 408.

   Sir C. Napier's remarks are as applicable to the Navy as to the Army.—H. B. H.

2. Brassey's Naval Annual for 191 2, p. 71.
3. See "Attack and Defence of Trade" in Some Principles of Maritime Strategy, p. 263, by Julian S. Corbett, LL.M.
4. Brassey's Naval Annual for 1912, p. 71.
5. Brasseys Naval Annual for 1912, p. 70.
6. Ibid. 1911, p. 9.
7. Ibid. 1912, p. 71.
8. Brassey's Naval Annual for 1912, p. 71.
9. Fleets (Great Britain and Foreign Countries) 127, May, 1912.
10. Brassey's Naval Annual for 1912, p. 71.
11. Mr. Balfour at Glasgow on January 12, 1905.
12. Sir William White, late Director of Naval Construction, in Nineteenth Century for July, 1911.
13. Alan H. Burgoyne, M.P., Editor of the Navy League Annual.
14. Sir William White in Nineteenth Century for July 1911.
15. Lord Brassey, at page 8 of The Naval Annual for 1912, writes: "It has been a wise policy, largely due to the initiative of Lord Fisher, to put out of the dockyards vessels hopelessly inefficient for every service "; but he adds: " The policy may be carried too far." Eleven battleships of the Japanese Navy " are similar in armament, protection, and speed to the battleships we have lately sold at nominal prices, ... all of large dimensions, powerfully armed, of good speed, with ample coal [space], and in sound condition." See also his remarks, at p. 9, regarding the hasty scrapping of cruisers.
16. Naval Strategy, p. 7, by Captain A. T. Mahan, D.C.L., LL.D., United States Navy.
17. Fleets (Great Britain and Foreign Countries), May 1912, No. 127.
18. The Ocean Empire pp. iii, 112, by Gerard Fiennes.
19. The Navy League Annual for 1911-12, Table X, p. 278, by Alan H. Burgoyne, M.P.
20. Brassey's Naval Annual for 1912, p. 33.
21. Lloyd's Register of Shipping for 1912, Table V, vol. ii. p. 920. The largest steamer in the world is the Olympic, a British steamer, registering 45,324 tons; the largest German steamer is the George Washington, 25,570 tons; but Germany is building a vessel considerably larger than the Titanic, recently lost in the Atlantic— H. B. H.
22. Nineteenth Century and After,July 1911.
23. The Australian Government "are doing their utmost to ascertain whether foreign ships were really equipped for immediate conversion into commerce destroyers"; but the Chairman of the Norddeutscher Lloyd Company, trading with Australia, characterised the statement "as a ridiculous
24. At Kamaran I . in the Red Sea and Swakop in the Atlantic, which, in the event of war, would at once be captured.—H. B. H.
25. "The one abiding lesson of every great naval victory, from Salamis to Tsu-Shima, is that men are more than material; and the mistaken inferences drawn from them are mainly due to forgetfulness of the fact."—The Ocean Empire., p. 95.
26. Brasseys Naval Annual for 1912, p. 467. The Naval Estimates of both countries for this year make provision for an increase in their active service lists, when "we should have a total personnel of 137,500 as against Germany's 66,783, giving us a preponderance of more than two to one" (Parliamentary Debate on the Defence of the Empire, reported by The Morning Post of July 27, 1912).
27. Navy Estimates, 1912-13. Statement of the First Lord [Cd. 6106].
28. The Ocean Empire p. 96, by Gerard Fiennes.
29. "Five years are required to train a really efficient seaman, and while he is being trained he is necessarily a weak element in a fighting service."—Lord Charles Beresford.
30. The Ocean Empire,p. 97.
31. "Early in October the [German] Fleet will lose at least one-fourth of its trained men, their places being taken by a like number of raw recruits, most of whom have never before set foot on shipboard."— German Naval Notes from The Navy's Own Correspondent, see Number for October 1911, p. 269.
32. The Ocean Empire p. 101.
33. "The active-service personnel is, however, sufficient to man the whole of our war-Navy, and that is not the case with any foreign Power." —The Ocean Empire, p. 98.
34. Ibid. pp. 100, 101.

    "It is declared [so writes Captain von Pustau in the Tägliche Rundschau] that our men are better trained, or even more courageous, than the British. This assumption is entirely without foundation; on the contrary, every one who has seen British seamen at work knows that they represent the very best stock and type of their race, and will have remarked that, under the influence of glorious traditions handed down from a period of continued brilliant triumphs, these men have acquired a boundless selfconfidence, an independent bearing, and a recklessness approaching brutality— all of them characteristics which may very often bring decisive victory in naval warfare, as surely as the best military discipline and training."— German View of the British Seaman, see The Navy for October 1911, p. 268.