Confederate Military History/Volume 3/Chapter 7
CHAPTER VII.
THE BULL RUN, OR MANASSAS, CAMPAIGN—JANUARY TO JULY, 1861.
OF the four columns of Federal invasion in 1861, by which Scott and Lincoln expected to overrun and subjugate Virginia in ninety days, the third, that from Washington toward Richmond, was the most important, as it had for its object, not only a direct movement upon the capital of Virginia and of the Confederacy, but also the protection of the Federal capital; furthermore, it was under the special supervision of the general-in-chief of the United States army, Lieut.-Gen. Winfield Scott. The important result of the operations of that line of invasion was the famous Bull Run, or Manassas, campaign of 1861. The events leading up to this require at least a brief notice.
President Buchanan, alarmed by the action of the Southern States and by the excitement throughout the Union that followed the election of Lincoln, called Scott, from the headquarters of the army in New York, to Washington, and on the last day of 1860 conferred with him in reference to the protection of that city and of the coming inauguration of Lincoln, both of which, he was led to believe, were threatened with violence. As the result of this, Col. Charles P. Stone was appointed inspector-general for the special purpose of reorganizing and arming the volunteer militia companies of the District of Columbia, in such a way as to secure their loyalty to the Union, in the belief that these would furnish all the military protection Washington then needed. This work was thoroughly done, and these citizen soldiery served as guards in the city and at the inauguration of President Lincoln, on the 4th of March, 1861; and sixteen companies of them, organized into battalions, were mustered into the service of the United States, about the 12th of April, when Fort Sumter was fired on, and became the nucleus for the great volunteer army that later assembled at Washington in response to Lincoln's call of April 15th.
The first State troops to reach Washington after Lincoln's call was the Sixth Massachusetts, which was attacked in passing through the streets of Baltimore, on the 19th of April, by unorganized citizens, but reached Washington late that day and was encamped in the Capitol. After the passage of these troops, the railways from Baltimore north to Harrisburg and east to Philadelphia were broken in consequence of the destruction of bridges by Southern sympathizers, and were not again opened for travel until the 7th of May; but in the meantime, troops in large numbers were brought to Washington from the North and the West by steamers from Perryville, on the Susquehanna, on the road to Philadelphia, down the bay to Annapolis, and thence by rail across to Washington, and also around the coast to Chesapeake bay, and up that and the Potomac, so that quite an army was gathered in that city when Col. J. K. Mansfield took command of it on the 27th of April. Steps were taken to guard the bridges from Virginia and all other approaches, Lincoln on the same day calling for twenty-five regiments of regulars in addition to the 75,000 three-months' men previously called.
On the 25th of April, the Confederates planted batteries on Arlington heights, and placed guards in Alexandria and along the Potomac above and below Washington. On the 28th, Federal troops guarded the northern, and Confederate troops the southern, end of the long bridge; but on the 30th, General Lee ordered the withdrawal of all troops between the long bridge and Alexandria, to avoid provoking a collision for which he was unprepared. On the 5th of May, the Confederate forces in Alexandria, some 500 in number, including 70 cavalry, under Lieut.-Col. A. S. Taylor, alarmed by a rumored attack, evacuated Alexandria, without orders, and fell back to Springfield. General Cocke, in command along the Potomac, from his headquarters at Culpeper promptly ordered them back. On the 9th two Virginia regiments of infantry were ordered to Cocke, and on that day he located his headquarters at Manassas Junction and began the gathering of troops at that point, establishing connections with Col. Daniel Ruggles, in command at Fredericksburg with his advance at Aquia creek on the Potomac, and strengthening Leesburg, under command of Colonel Hunton, with several regiments of infantry and companies of cavalry and artillery, to protect that place, the line of the railway to Alexandria, and watch the fords of the Potomac. On the 12th, Federal gunboats in the Potomac were brought up in front of Alexandria. On the 21st of May, Brig.-Gen. M. L. Bonham was put in command of the Alexandria line, and established his headquarters at Manassas Junction. Troops from all portions of the South were ordered forward to that place, which, it was rumored, was threatened with early attack.
On May 24th, the day after the citizens of Virginia approved her ordinance of secession, about a dozen regiments of Federal infantry, with cavalry and artillery, at 2 a. m. crossed the Potomac by the aqueduct and the long bridge, and by steamer at Alexandria, and took possession of Arlington heights, Alexandria and the intermediate front of the Potomac, driving out the Confederates, some 500 men, from Alexandria, at half-past four, and capturing Ball's company of cavalry. The Confederates fell back to Manassas and the Federals at once began fortifying their front, after advancing their pickets several miles on the roads leading into Virginia. The supposition of Colonel Terrett, who evacuated Alexandria, was that the Federals proposed to advance toward Leesburg. The next day Bonham reported to Lee that he then had at Manassas Junction but 500 infantry, four pieces of artillery and one troop of cavalry.
Before the opening of the Manassas campaign there were a number of minor affairs, of which a condensed account may be here given:
On May 21st, and again on June 1st, two armed steamers attacked the Confederate battery established at Aquia creek on the Potomac, but without doing much damage. Colonel Ruggles promptly moved 700 men across from Fredericksburg, with some 6-pounder rifle guns, and engaged the gunboats successfully. He then established Bate's Tennessee regiment in a camp at Brooke Station, and returned the rest of his forces to Fredericksburg.
On June 1st, Lieutenant Tompkins, with 75 men of the Second United States cavalry, sent on a scout, drove in the pickets and charged through Lieut.-Col. R. S. Ewell's camp, at Fairfax, between three and four in the morning. A lively skirmish ensued, forcing the Federals to pass around the village in retreat, after some loss. Colonel Ewell was wounded, and Captain Marr, of the Warrenton rifles, was killed, while bravely rallying their men. This attack was made without orders, and McDowell says it frustrated, for the time, a more important movement, which Ewell learned was to have been an attack on Manassas.
On June 10th, Col. Charles P. Stone began, with the District of Columbia volunteers, what is known as "the Rockville expedition," having for its object the holding of the line of the Potomac from Washington up toward Harper's Ferry, guarding the fords and ferries of that river from Virginia, and any movement on Washington from that direction. This resulted in skirmishes near Seneca mills on the 14th, at Conrad's Ferry on the 17th, at Edward's Ferry on the 18th, at Harper's Ferry July 4th, and at Great Falls July 7th. Colonel Stone was reinforced from time to time with other volunteer troops from Washington. His headquarters were opposite Harper's Ferry July 6th, when he marched, with most of his command, to Williamsport, Md., and thence to Martinsburg, to reinforce Patterson. The Confederate force opposing him was mainly that under Col. Eppa Hunton, in observation at Leesburg.
On June 16th. Col. Maxcy Gregg, with the First South Carolina infantry, about 575 strong, several companies of cavalry and two guns of Kemper's battery, marched from his camp near Fairfax on a reconnoissance to Dranesville, where he learned that several hundred of the enemy had that day come up the Leesburg turnpike to near Hunter's mill. On the morning of the 17th, Gregg rode with a troop of horse to the Potomac, opposite Seneca creek, and reconnoitered. Returning, he marched by Hunter's mill to Vienna, on the Alexandria & Leesburg railroad. About 6 p. m., as he was moving off, the whistle of an approaching train was heard in the direction of Alexandria. He at once marched back, planted his two guns on a hill commanding a curve in the railroad, and placed his infantry and cavalry in support. As the train came round the curve, Kemper opened on it a rapid fire from his guns, which badly damaged the train and caused the Federals, the First Ohio, under Brig.-Gen. R. C. Schenck to escape from it and rapidly retreat. Owing to the lateness of the hour Gregg, could not pursue, but he destroyed one passenger and five platform cars, captured some arms, and killed and wounded several of the enemy, without loss and with credit to his management.
On June 25th a small party of the enemy landed at Mathias Point, under cover of guns from a steamer, and burned the house of Dr. Howe; the object being to discover whether a battery was being located there. On the 27th another descent was made by a force landed from boats. Maj. R. M. Mayo's command of one cavalry and three infantry companies met and drove this body. Brig.-Gen. T. H. Holmes, in command, reported that he then had fifteen companies of volunteers at Mathias Point, and had ordered a section of Walker's battery to the same place.
On July 14th, Colonel Davies, with the Fifteenth New York, made a reconnoissance from Alexandria 7 miles out on the Fairfax road, 10 miles on the Richmond, or Telegraph road, and to Mt. Vernon. Only a small picket was met on the Richmond road. Some of Davies' command visited the house of Col. John A. Washington, near Mt. Vernon, and brought away plantation supplies, taking Colonel Washington's teams and negroes to haul them to camp. Davies sent back the teams and supplies, but kept the negroes to do team duty in his brigade. Col. D. S. Miles, his division commander, instructed Davies to respect private property, and send back the negroes.
The only advantages of the line of Bull run to the Confederates were strategic. It was, by public roads, about 20 miles from the Potomac, a distance over which the movements of the Federal army could be easily watched; and it covered the junction of the Orange & Alexandria railroad—which had connection at Gordonsville, by the Virginia Central, with Richmond, the capital of the Confederacy, and with Staunton, a great depot of supplies and the most important town in the Shenandoah valley—with the Manassas Gap railroad, which led from Manassas Junction to Strasburg in the lower valley of the Shenandoah, giving quick connection with the army there operating under Gen. J. E. Johnston.
Excellent highways from Alexandria and Washington, and from other important points to the northwest and southwest, converged at Centreville, about 3 miles east of Bull run, offering great advantages for the concentration of the Federal army in the immediate front of this line; while roads diverging from the same village to the northwest, west and southwest, made it an easy matter to maneuver troops for offensive operations upon the flanks of a defensive army holding the line of Bull run. There were also excellent positions on the north-eastern side of that stream for holding the defensive army in check in front of its center while flanking movements to either hand were in process of execution.
The Federal army of invasion consisted of five divisions: The First, under Brig.-Gen. Daniel Tyler, was composed of four brigades of infantry and four batteries of regular United States artillery; the Second, under Col. D. M. Hunter, of two brigades of infantry, a battalion of United States cavalry, a battery of regular United States artillery, and two volunteer batteries; the Third, under Col. S. P. Heintzelman, of three brigades of infantry and two batteries of regular United States artillery. These three divisions and their cavalry and batteries participated in the battle. The Fourth division, under Brig.-Gen. T. Runyon, and the Fifth, under Col. D. S. Miles, each composed of two brigades of infantry, two batteries of regular United States artillery, and one volunteer battery, were held in reserve, in front of and at Centreville, and in its rear, and did not participate in the battle, except that the Fifth had some skirmishing while covering the retreat of the Federal army. The Fifth division guarded the roads leading to the Potomac and did not get nearer to Centreville than about Fairfax, 7 miles eastward. The official returns for July 17th show that McDowell had 34,127 men present for duty. His adjutant-general claims that the rank and file of his army that participated in the battle of Bull Run numbered 18,572, with 24 pieces of artillery. This does not include the two divisions in reserve, which had over 11,000 men and 25 pieces of artillery.[1]
The Confederate forces at Bull Run were embraced in the army of the Potomac, which, under Brig.-Gen. G. T. Beauregard, had been holding Manassas and the line of the Potomac east of the Blue ridge, and the army of the Shenandoah, under Gen. J. E. Johnston, which reinforced the former, from the Shenandoah valley, during the engagement. The army of the Potomac, before the battle, consisted of the First brigade, one North Carolina and four South Carolina regiments, under Brig.-Gen. M. L. Bonham; Second brigade, two Alabama and one Louisiana regiments, under Brig.-Gen. R. S. Ewell; Third brigade, two Mississippi and one South Carolina regiments, under Brig.-Gen. D. R. Jones; Fourth brigade, one North Carolina and three Virginia regiments, under Brig.-Gen. James Longstreet; Fifth brigade, one Louisiana battalion and five Virginia regiments, under Col. P. St. George Cocke; Sixth brigade, two Virginia, one Mississippi and one South Carolina regiment, under Col. J. A. Early; and not brigaded, two Louisiana and one South Carolina infantry regiment, two cavalry regiments and one artillery battalion, and five artillery batteries.
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When Beauregard took command at Manassas, Johnston's "army of the Shenandoah," in the lower Shenandoah valley, was, in a sense, Beauregard's left, although not under his command, as Johnston ranked him. On the right, at Aquia creek, on the Potomac, holding the terminus of the Richmond, Fredericksburg & Potomac railroad, was a Confederate force of some 2,500 men, under Brig.-Gen. T. H. Holmes. Beauregard had a small advanced outpost, under Colonel Hunton, at Leesburg, watching the fords of the upper Potomac east of the Blue ridge; another at Fairfax, in direct observation of the Federal army at Washington, with detachments on the line of the railway toward Alexandria, and to the south of that road, guarding the approaches to his right from Alexandria. The principal advantage of his chosen line of defense was that it was an interior one.
From information that he deemed authentic, Beauregard concluded that he was confronted by an army of 50,000 men, fully equipped and ready for offensive operations, under the direction, as general-in-chief, of Lieut.-Gen. Winfield Scott, then considered the most able, as he was the most distinguished military officer on the American continent, and under the immediate command of Brig.-Gen. Irvin McDowell, one of the most esteemed of the active officers of the Federal army. To oppose these he could muster barely 18,000 men and 29 guns. In view of this supposed disparity of opposing force, Beauregard urged President Davis to concentrate the armies of Johnston and Holmes with his at Manassas, that he might be ready to fall upon McDowell's flanks, rear, and line of communication, whenever he should advance, cut off his retreat upon Washington, and force him to surrender; and, by so doing, compel Patterson to retreat from the lower Shenandoah valley, and thus insure the capture of Washington. These suggestions were not favorably received at Richmond, and it was intimated to Beauregard that he should retire behind the Rappahannock when an offensive movement of the Federal army began.
Left to his own discretion, Beauregard informed himself fully concerning his position and the approaches to it, destroyed the railroad bridge across Bull run in front of Manassas Junction, and awaited results. A faithful spy, sent to Washington, having reliable information July 15th that the Federal army would march the next day, rode rapidly around the left flank of that army and put this important information in the hands of Beauregard before 9 p. m. of the same day, thus giving him notice of the ordered movement of the Federal army nearly half a day before it began. He at once ordered his outposts back to assigned positions; that from Leesburg, by way of Aldie, by forced marches (28 miles in a day and a half) to Manassas. President Davis was informed of the situation and the suggestion made that the army of the Shenandoah and Holmes' brigade at Aquia creek should be ordered to reinforce Manassas. Davis promptly ordered Holmes to report to Beauregard, and gave Johnston discretion to move his command for the same purpose. The latter, in anticipation of such a call for aid, unhesitatingly consented to this arrangement, and Beauregard, on request, hastened trains up the Manassas Gap railroad to meet the army of the Shenandoah on the way to Manassas Junction and expedite its arrival. At the same time he suggested to Johnston that he concentrate his army at the Aldie gap of the Bull Run mountains, where the turnpikes from the valley through Snicker's gap and Ashby's gap of the Blue ridge unite, and then march southeastward by roads leading to McDowell's line of advance, and fall upon the right and rear of the Federal army while he pressed him offensively in front. This proposition of a divided instead of a combined co-operation did not meet the approval of Johnston.
The Federal army, in light marching order, began its march toward Manassas in the afternoon of Tuesday, July 16th, and its advance, in well-disposed parallel columns, but little opposed, encamped that night in front of Fairfax. Advancing again on the 17th, the cavalry moving along the right of the Federal army had a skirmish with the Confederate cavalry at Vienna, on the Alexandria & Loudoun railroad, and the column on the Centreville road with the Confederate pickets in front of Fairfax as they retired, leaving the way open for the Federals to reach the vicinity of Centreville and the front of Bull run late in the evening of that day, after having covered 20 miles from the Potomac in two days.
By morning of Thursday, July 18th, McDowell's army was massed around Centreville, with the exception of a division which had been left at Fairfax Court House to guard the right of the advance and watch the roads leading to the northwest. The Confederate line south of Bull run, at Mitchell's ford, on the direct road from Centreville to Manassas Junction, was but 3 miles from Centreville. On this road the Federal forces advanced on the morning of the i8th, the leading division, under Tyler, making infantry demonstrations before Mitchell's ford and Blackburn's ford (about a mile further east), opening with artillery from the fine positions on the north side of Bull run in front of each of these fords. Beauregard had placed Longstreet's brigade, with Early's in reserve, to cover these two fords. These repulsed the Federal attacks and efforts to force a passage, and the enemy's infantry retired about 1 p. m., but an artillery duel continued the contest.
Federal authorities deny that an attempt was made to force a passage of Bull run on the i8th, and that this engagement, which has been called the "Battle of Bull Run" (that of the 21st being known as the "battle of Manassas"), was only a demonstration to engage the attention of the Confederates while McDowell reconnoitered to decide upon his plan of attack. Beauregard claims that his success in this first encounter was of especial advantage to his army of raw troops; that it made McDowell cautious and hesitating in forming his plans for a general engagement, and that it gave him time, then his greatest need, for the concentration of the three Confederate armies for the final struggle.
While providing for and awaiting the general attack, Beauregard was, on the 19th, urged by Adjutant-General Cooper to withdraw his call upon Johnston for assistance if the enemy in front of him had abandoned an immediate attack. As this was not an order, Beauregard paid no attention to it, and continued his efforts to secure the early arrival of Johnston's forces, intending, with their help, to take the offensive. McDowell spent the 19th and 20th reconnoitering the Confederate front and waiting for rations. During these two days, 8,340 of Johnston's men with twenty guns, and 1,265 of Holmes', with six guns, arrived upon Beauregard's left and right; the larger number of them in the afternoon of the 20th. Most of these were ordered to the Confederate left-center and left, at the instance of General Johnston, as Beauregard had placed the most of his own army on his right-center and right, expecting, from McDowell's demonstrations of the 18th, that his main effort would be to turn the Confederate right by marching southward to Union Mills.
From Centreville, in the rear of which McDowell had established his headquarters, and around which he had massed his troops, seven public roads diverge to the principal points of the compass, and from each of these, at no great distance from that village, other roads diverge to intermediate points, until not less than a dozen roads lead from that village, crossing Bull run at nearly as many fords, making it an extremely difficult matter to watch the movements of an army there concentrated and having for its objective the southwestern side of Bull run. A circle with a radius of 3 miles from Centreville will pass through or near ten of these fords, from McLean's on the southeast to Poplar on the northwest. Bull run, in this interval of 6 miles of arc, nearly follows the three-mile circle drawn around Centreville. A circle with 7 miles of radius, drawn around the same center, crosses Bull run to the south of Centreville, near Union Mills and the bridge of the Orange & Alexandria railroad; about 9½ miles away to the northwest it crosses the Sudley ford of Bull run; and from that ford, back toward the beginning, in a distance of 3 miles, it passes directly through the field of the 21st.
With this many-roaded problem of offense and defense before him, and his notions of McDowell's designs, Beauregard disposed his forces along Bull run for over a dozen miles in the following order, from right to left, so as to cover all the fords by which he thought McDowell might seek a crossing: At the Union Mills ford, on his extreme right, beyond the railway bridge, he placed Ewell's brigade, supported by that of Holmes, which had arrived from Aquia creek; at McLean's ford, about two miles farther up the stream, D. R. Jones' brigade, supported by Early's; at Blackburn's ford, one mile farther up, Longstreet's brigade; at Mitchell's ford, about a mile farther up stream, Bonham's brigade, which also covered another ford about three-quarters of a mile still farther up and near the mouth of Cub run. Cocke's brigade held the line from Bonham's left, covering Island, Ball's and Lewis' fords, for two miles up the stream to the mouth of Young's ranch, three-fourths of a mile below the stone bridge, while Evans' half brigade, under Cocke's command, extended the Confederate line up to and covering the stone bridge, the Warrenton turnpike from Centreville, and a farm ford a quarter of a mile above that bridge. The brigades of the army of the Shenandoah that had already arrived were placed in reserve; those of Bee and Bartow between McLean's and Blackburn's fords, in the rear of Early's and Longstreet's brigades, and Jackson's to the left, between Blackburn's and Mitchell's fords, covering the rear of parts of Longstreet's and Bonham's brigades.
During the night of Saturday, July 20th, the Federal army was thus disposed: Tyler's division was advanced along the Warrenton road and massed about a mile west of Centreville, near Rocky run, and Richardson's brigade of this division was advanced about a mile and a half to the southwest of Centreville, on the road to Blackburn's ford. The remainder of the Federal army, except the reserve divisions left near Centreville and Fairfax, was encamped a short distance to the east of Centreville. After having spent two days reconnoitering along Bull run, McDowell decided to make demonstrations in the Confederate front, on the Warrenton road and on the road to Blackburn's ford, with Tyler's division, while with Hunter's and Heintzelman's he would, by a wide detour of 7 miles or more to the westward and northward, cross Bull run at Sudley ford, turn the Confederate left, and get in its rear between Bull run and the Manassas Gap railroad, hoping by so doing to prevent Johnston from joining Beauregard. This plan of engagement adopted, McDowell intended to begin his movement during the night of the 20th, but his division commanders persuaded him to put it off until the morning of the 21st. Schenck's and Sherman's brigades of Tyler's division, with Carlisle's battery of six brass guns and a 30-pounder Parrott gun, marched at 2:30 a. m. of the 21st from near Centreville, along the Warrenton road to near the stone bridge over Bull run, where Schenck deployed his brigade on the left of the road and Sherman's on the right, with artillery in the Warrenton road and in that leading to Blackburn's ford, and opened at 6:30 a. m. on the Confederate left with all his guns, but brought no reply, as the Confederate guns were of too short range. This disconcerted McDowell, leading him to fear an attack from Blackburn's ford, and caused him to hold back one of Heintzelman's brigades in reserve to Schenck. Later, as Schenck's skirmish line advanced, it was met on the eastern side of Bull run by that of the Confederates. About 7 Beauregard ordered Jackson's brigade, the nearest reserve force, to move with Imboden's Staunton artillery and Walton's battery to the left to support Cocke as well as Bonham; the brigades of Bee and Bartow, under the former, were also sent to support the left against the threatened attack by Schenck.
In the meantime, the main Federal column continued its flanking movement by Sudley ford, but losing time in wading across as the men halted to drink. Seeing clouds of dust rising in the direction of Manassas Junction, indicating the coming of a large force that might head off his movement, McDowell ordered the heads of regiments to break from the columns and march forward, separately, as rapidly as possible; directed Heintzelman's reserve brigade to cross the fields on the left to a nearer ford below Sudley, and sent word to Tyler to hurry up the advance. The brigades of Burnside and Porter, with Griffin's battery, had already passed through the Sudley wood, which Jackson made famous the next year, and were deploying, facing southward, on the sloping open of cultivated ground beyond; and immediately behind these were marching the brigades of Franklin and Wilcox, accompanied by the batteries of Ricketts and Arnold. The brigades of Howard and Keyes were still detained in the vicinity of the Warrenton turnpike, where the road that the flanking columns had followed diverged to the northward. The distance to Sudley had proved greater than McDowell expected and the troops had been delayed.
Learning from his scouts that the enemy was concentrating along the Warrenton turnpike, Beauregard concluded that an attempt would be made to turn his left flank at the stone bridge; therefore, at half past four, not long after sunrise, he ordered his brigade commanders to hold themselves in readiness to move at short notice, suggesting to each that the Federal attack might be on his left. A little later he was advised of the advance of the Federals toward the stone bridge, and, by half past five, that they were deploying in front of Evans, who covered that bridge. Concluding that the opportunity had arrived for an offensive flank movement on the Federal left and rear, Beauregard sent orders to the brigades on his center and right to cross the fords and advance rapidly on Centreville, with vigorous attacks, while he held, with Evans and Cocke and their supports, the attack on the stone bridge to the last extremity. This wheeling movement of his right to the Federal left and rear, by his front line, was to be followed up by the reserves, which, without orders, were to move to the sound of the heaviest firing. Ewell was to begin this flanking movement from the Union Mills ford, on the extreme right, to be followed by the brigades to the left, successively, at the various fords, as before enumerated. Great care had been taken to instruct the subordinate commanders in reference to this movement, as they were all unaccustomed to command in battle maneuvers; they were also ordered to establish close communication with each other before making the attack.
At half past eight, Generals Johnston and Beauregard took position on a high hill in the rear of the center, opposite Mitchell's ford, to await the opening of the Confederate attack on the right, by which Beauregard confidently expected to win a decisive victory by midday, and cut off the retreat of the Federal army to Washington. At about the same hour, Evans, from near the stone bridge, discovered a lengthening line of dust advancing from the north toward the Warrenton turnpike, and, observing that the attack on his front was not pressed with vigor, became satisfied that it was a mere feint, and that a column of the enemy was moving, masked by the Sudley woods, to fall on his left flank. He promptly informed General Cocke, his immediate commander, of the enemy's movement, and took the responsibility of making dispositions to meet it. Leaving four companies under cover at the stone bridge, which had been previously destroyed, he led six companies of the Fourth South Carolina riflemen and Wheat's battalion of Louisiana Tigers, with two 6-pounder howitzers, across the valley of Young's branch to the high ground called Matthews' hill (on the divide between that branch and one parallel to it on the north, facing the Henry hill), about three-fourths of a mile north of the Warrenton road, and placed his men so as to meet the Federal advance by the Sudley road, on which he rested his left, planting one gun on his right and the other on his left. His front was covered by a small piece of woods extending along the Sudley road. Here he awaited the approach of the Federal column, which, led by Burnside's brigade, deployed in his front a little before 10 o'clock. Wheat at once engaged the Federal skirmishers, and when the second Rhode Island regiment and its six guns appeared, Evans met them with his South Carolinians and two howitzers, at short range, and drove them back. Burnside's entire brigade, supported by eight guns, was now sent forward in a second charge. These were met and driven back into the strip of woods from which they had advanced, and from which they continued to fire, until, reinforced by eight companies of United States regular infantry and six pieces of artillery, supported by other regiments of Porter's brigade, they advanced to a third attack, which Evans held in combat for about an hour. Major Wheat was severely wounded in the first attack, and, having to leave the field, his battalion became somewhat disorganized. During the third attack, which Evans was sustaining with great firmness, he called upon General Bee, who was in reserve with his own and Bartow's command near the stone bridge, for help. Bee, informed of the Federal movement, had already moved to the left following the sound of conflict, and taken position on the Henry hill, or plateau, to the south of the Warrenton turnpike. This hill commanded the stone bridge and the Sudley road where that crossed the turnpike, by its elevation of about 100 feet above the level of Bull run. Bee was holding this admirable position with his two brigades on opposite sides of Imboden's battery (which he had borrowed from Jackson's brigade), in full view of Evans' contention on the opposite side of Young's branch valley, and was opening with his artillery upon the Federal batteries opposed to Evans, when he received the latter's request for aid, which he answered by advising Evans to withdraw to his position on the Henry hill. Still full of fight, Evans was unwilling to retreat, and renewed his appeal for reinforcements. As it was plain to be seen that the visibly swelling numbers of McDowell's advance were giving them great advantages over Evans in the combat, Bee yielded to his appeal and led his two brigades across the valley under fire of the enemy's well served artillery, and threw them into the contention, one regiment in the woods held by Evans, two along a fence extending to the right, and two, under Bartow, extending the right still further, but at right angles along the edge of a wood, not more than 100 yards from the Federal left, where the combat, at short range, quickly became sharp and deadly. The superior numbers of the Federal infantry failed to make any headway against this stubborn vanguard, although the powerful batteries of Griffin were playing on Bee's whole line, until two strong brigades from Heintzelman's division, arriving on the field, extended the line of fire on the Federal right, and a six-gun battery of rifled 10-pounders took part from a strong position behind the Sudley road. While contending with these odds, the brigades of Sherman and Keyes, of Tyler's division, under orders from McDowell to force the stone bridge, crossed at a ford above that bridge and moved into position on the Federal left, so lengthening that as to overlap Bee and force him to retire, which he began to do, steadily, covered by the fire of Imboden's guns and of Hampton's legion from the Henry plateau and his own retiring howitzers; but the Federal fire that followed was so fierce and heavy that the Confederates were soon thrown into confusion, and the greater part of them retreated, discomfited, across Young's branch, and sought safety around the sheltering spur to the right of the stone bridge.
While this brave battle of Evans and Bee was going on, Johnston and Beauregard were anxiously awaiting on Lookout hill the development of the flank movement ordered against the Federal left and rear. Surprised that Ewell did not begin this, they learned from D. R. Jones, at the nearby McLean's ford, that he had long been ready and waiting for Ewell to join his right in the forward movement, as he had sent him, between seven and eight in the morning, a copy of the order from headquarters directing Ewell to at once begin that movement; but so far he had heard nothing from him. Beauregard at once, by a staff officer, repeated his order to Ewell, directing him to promptly advance; but soon hearing from him that he, too, had been waiting, having received no orders, and the firing on the left indicating a serious attack by the enemy in that direction, the generals decided to abandon the intended offensive movement and hurry all their available forces to the left, where it was now apparent the main battle was to be fought. Ewell, Jones and Longstreet were left in their assigned positions on the right and along the center, to hold the Federals in their front and make demonstrations toward Centreville. The brigades of Holmes and Early and two regiments of Bonham's brigade, with six guns, were ordered to move rapidly to the left to reinforce the battle of Evans and Bee on the Warrenton road. These orders given, the two generals rode rapidly to the field of conflict, arriving on the Henry hill, which over-looked that field, just as the discomfited men of Bee and Evans, overpowered by numbers, were seeking refuge from the hot and heavy Federal fire in the shallow ravines that ascended from Young's branch, from near the turnpike, to the right and rear of the line that Jackson had formed with his brigade on the Henry hill; Hampton's legion, by steady combat, having covered the rear of the retreat.
The field officers of the more than 2,000 routed men of the commands of Evans and Bee, among whom Federal shot and shell from the batteries of Griffin and Ricketts were raining, were making desperate efforts to rally their men and reorganize them, but to no purpose, although Johnston and Beauregard both joined in the effort. Strong masses of Federal infantry were rapidly advancing, and disaster seemed imminent, when the heroic Bee, exhausted in his fruitless effort to rally his men, rode up to Jackson, who was steadily holding his brigade in a full fronting position, notwithstanding the approaching attack of the enemy, the artillery fire that was thinning his ranks, and the nearby confusion, and cried out in a tone of despair: "General, they are beating us back!" The reply came, prompt and curt, but calm, "Then we will give them the bayonet." The blazing and defiant look of Jackson, his bold and prompt determination, and the steady line of brave men that supported him, gave new life to Bee. Galloping back to the disorganized masses of his command, he shouted, waving his hand to the left: "Look! There is Jackson, standing like a stone wall. Rally behind the Virginians! Let us determine to die here, and we will conquer. Follow me!" Obedient to this clarion call to duty and the example of soldierly bearing to which their attention had been called, a number of Bee's men rallied and followed him in a charge to the left against the advancing enemy, in which this heroic leader fell dead. From that time forward, through all the ages of history, Jackson became, and will continue to be, "Stonewall" Jackson, and his brigade the "Stonewall brigade."
At this crisis of the battle on the Confederate side, Beauregard ordered the regimental standards to be advanced some 40 yards to the front of the still disordered masses of the commands of Evans and Bee. This was promptly done by the field officers, thus gaining the attention of the men and inducing them to obey orders and rally on their colors. Johnston and Beauregard in person, at about this time, advanced to the front with the colors of the Fourth Alabama, when, as General Beauregard relates, "the line that had fought all the morning and had fled, routed and disheartened, now advanced again into position as steadily as veterans."
Order was but partially restored on the Henry hill, when, flushed with their partial victory and eagerly striving for a complete one, the Federals, in battle array, came sweeping down the slope on which Evans had so long detained them, crossed Young's branch and the Warrenton turnpike, and began climbing the northern slope of the Henry hill, detained for awhile by Hampton's legion, which he had promptly thrown forward to cover the retreat of Bee and Evans.
Seeing the superior numbers of the enemy advancing to another conflict, Beauregard persuaded Johnston, who yielded with great reluctance, to ride back about a mile to "Portici," the Lewis house, on the line of communication with the right, and hasten forward, as they came up, the reinforcements that had been ordered to the battle, while he looked after the immediate combat, which was provided for by placing Smith's Forty-ninth Virginia, ordered up from Cocke's brigade on Bull run, on Jackson's left, and the Seventh Georgia still farther to the left. Hampton's legion of South Carolinians and Hunton's Eighth Virginia, which had also been called up from Cocke, were placed in the rear of Jackson's right to oppose any attack from the direction of the stone bridge. These 6,500 men and 13 field guns in place, he awaited the attack of four Federal brigades, a battalion of cavalry, and the fine batteries of Griffin and Ricketts of the regular army, some 11,000 soldiers in rank and file, that in splendid martial order were now nearing the front of his position on the Henry plateau. The north-western crest of this they soon reached, in well formed line of battle, captured the Robinson house on the Confederate right and the Henry house on its left-center, quickly placed the batteries of Griffin and Ricketts in position near the Henry house, and poured a galling fire of infantry and artillery on the Confederate line, to the fury of which three other Federal batteries contributed from the hills beyond the turnpike. The somewhat-sunken Sudley road, along which the Federals had been advancing, furnished a covered way up the Henry hill which their infantry took advantage of in supporting their batteries near the Henry house. The lines of battle were now not far apart on the undulating Henry plateau, and the Confederate batteries of Imboden, Stanard, Walton, Pendleton and Alburtis had their innings at short range, cutting fearful gaps in the oncoming lines, which were still more severely punished by the steady fire of the musketry of Jackson's men and of those on his right and left; especially was this the case on Beauregard's left, which he had strengthened with two companies of the Second Mississippi. Two companies of Stuart's cavalry, coming from the left, just then charged through the Federal ranks to the Sudley road, and added to the havoc wrought by the infantry and artillery.
McDowell, watching from the Sudley ridge slope the wavering battle, followed up his attack by continuing to extend his right with fresh bodies of infantry and artillery as they came forward from the rear, and by so doing threatening to turn Beauregard's left. Some of the Federal guns were pressed so boldly to the front that men from the Thirty-third Virginia sprang forward and captured them, but they were soon retaken. To meet this threatened blow on his left, Beauregard took the offensive and ordered a counterstroke from his right to clean off the Henry plateau in his front. The commands of Bee, Bartow, Evans and Hampton, the men who had so bravely and stubbornly held back McDowell's advance in the early morning, now responded with spirit and speed, striking the Federal left; Jackson, with strong and steady blows, pierced its center, while Smith's Virginians and Gartrell's Georgians charged on its right. This bold movement, sweeping over both infantry and artillery, entirely cleared the plateau of Federal troops and captured the batteries of Ricketts and Griffin. The success of this brilliant counterstroke cheered the Confederates and braced them for another struggle.
Looking from his commanding position to the northward, Beauregard saw the still constant and steady coming on of Federal reinforcements. Without delay he reorganized his line of battle, under heavy fire from the artillery on the hills north of the turnpike, and prepared for the third attack, which McDowell was then organizing with Howard's brigade, which had just arrived on the field of battle. The attack soon came; the fresh Federal troops swept down the slope from the north, crossed the valley of Young's branch, and pressed up the northwestward slope of the Henry hill, taking advantage of ravines, clumps of trees, and the sunken Sudley road, and reaching the crest, by the force of numbers bravely led, pressed the Confederates back across the plateau, regained their lost position and recaptured their lost guns. The conflict now became a death struggle for the final possession of the Henry hill and for the closing victory to which that was the key. The advantage of numbers enabled McDowell to still further extend his right through the woods west of the Sudley road, again threaten to turn Beauregard's left, and force him to throw that back as a protection against such a movement; this also enabled McDowell to extend his left toward Bull run, and threaten to turn Beauregard's right from the direction of the stone bridge.
It was now between two and three of the afternoon of a scorchingly hot midsummer day, and many of Beauregard's men, who had been almost constantly fighting since the early morning, were nearly exhausted; but having faith in the unflinching endurance of his men, whose mettle he had so thoroughly tested during the preceding hours of the day, he not only determined to hold on and await reinforcements, which he knew Johnston was sending, for the final struggle, but to again take the offensive and drive the enemy from the plateau, advancing his whole line as before and adding to it the reserves on the right, which he would lead in person. Of this Beauregard wrote: "The movement was made with such keeping and dash that the whole plateau was swept clear of the enemy, who were driven down the slope and across the turnpike on our right and the valley of Young's branch on our left, leaving in our final possession the Robinson and the Henry houses, with most of Ricketts' and Griffin's batteries, the men of which were mostly shot down where they bravely stood by their guns."
The Sixth North Carolina, which, by railway, had just reached Manassas Junction from toward Richmond, now came to the field in time to join with the left of Beauregard's charge; the Eighteenth Virginia, under Colonel Withers, which had been ordered up from Cocke's brigade on the banks of Bull run, also arrived, opportunely, on the right, and joined in the charge with Hampton's legion, capturing several guns, which some of the officers of these commands turned upon the retreating foe, and so helped to finish the hot work of driving McDowell's men for the second and last time from the Henry plateau.
This successful Confederate charge, across the fields and through the patches of forest of the Henry hill, did not reach McDowell's right, which extended through the woods to the west of the Sudley road and to some distance beyond Beauregard's left. The Second and Eighth South Carolina, moving from the Confederate right on Bull run, had been turned by Johnston to the Confederate left of the engagement. These reached the field in time to meet McDowell's movement from the right. Preston's Twenty-eighth Virginia and Kemper's Virginia battery also appeared in time to join the South Carolinians in holding, with hot contention, Howard's brigade, Sykes' battalion of regulars, and the accompanying artillery and cavalry of McDowell's right, but were not strong enough to drive them back. The hour of three in the afternoon had now come, and it was time to strike a last telling blow to decide the fortunes of the day. Providentially for the Confederates, E. Kirby Smith's brigade of 1,700 fresh and rested soldiers, the last of the available reinforcements from the army of the Shenandoah, had reached Manassas Junction, by rail, at midday. They were 6 miles in the rear of the battle, but officers of the general staff were at hand to guide and hurry them to the critical point of the pending contention, the Confederate left of the field. Just as that brigade entered the wood to the left of the Sudley road, a Federal bullet seriously wounded General Smith, and the command devolved upon Col. Arnold Elzey, a most efficient successor, who, guided by Captain Harris of the engineers, marched his brigade to Beauregard's extreme left and then, moving forward, met the Federal advance just coming into the open fields of the Chinn farm, and, aided by Beckham's Virginia battery, poured upon it a destructive fire which held it in check in the forest on the northward slopes toward the turnpike. Just then McDowell made another strenuous effort to turn the Confederate right by sending Keyes' brigade across the turnpike near the stone bridge, and thence southward, under cover of the spurs from the Henry plateau, to a favorable point for attack. Latham's Virginia battery, in position to guard that flank, met this advance with a galling fire, aided by Alburtis' Virginia battery, which Jackson had hastened to his left and supported by broken fragments of troops collected by staff officers. These repulsed this movement, and showed McDowell that it was useless to attempt to turn that flank of Beauregard's army.
Still unwilling to yield the field, McDowell formed from fresh men that came up a new line of battle, formidable in numbers and in length, and crescent in outline, across the Sudley road, on the heights to the north of the turnpike, and throwing forward a strong line of skirmishers, proposed for a third time to assault the Henry plateau; but his intention was quickly thwarted by the fierce combat that Elzey was now pressing on his right, the force of which was intensified by the arrival of Early's grand Virginia brigade from McLean's ford, which, by direction of Johnston, swept around the rear of the woods through which Elzey had passed, and bravely bore down upon the flank of the already wavering Federal right and started that wing in full retreat. Learning of the success on his left which the forest concealed from his center and right, Beauregard ordered his staff and escort to raise a loud cheer, and sent orders all along the line for a common charge on McDowell's left, in which his eager men, now confident of victory, joined with wild yells and drove the already yielding Federal lines from the field of contention, causing them to break, for shelter and safety, for the rear in the Sudley ridge forest, for Bull run, and in all directions, to get beyond reach of the Confederate fire. Sykes' regulars and Sherman's brigade stood firm and withdrew in good order, protecting the rear of the routed soldiers and enabling many of them to escape by way of the fords near the stone bridge, but most of them sought refuge by way of Sudley ford and by the other routes on which they had advanced in the morning.
Having ordered all the troops on the field to pursue the retreating enemy, Beauregard rode to the Lewis house, turned over the immediate command of the field to Johnston, who had generously left it in his hands up to that time, and, mounting a fresh horse (the fourth on that day, one of them killed under him), rode to press the pursuit now being made by the infantry and cavalry, some of the latter having been sent by Johnston across the Lewis ford to intercept the Federal retreat on the turnpike. Before he had ridden far, a courier from Johnston's chief of staff at Manassas Junction reached him with a report that a large Federal force had broken through the right of the Bull run line and was moving on the depot of supplies at the Junction. Beauregard at once returned, and, after consultation with Johnston, it was decided that he should take the brigades of Ewell and Holmes, which were marching, from the extreme right, to the battlefield, but had not reached it, and fall on this threatened counterstroke of the enemy while other troops were called from the pursuit and sent to his assistance.
To gain time, Beauregard gathered all the cavalry at hand, and, mounting behind each an infantryman, started to head off the reported Federal movement. Nearing McLean's ford, by which the Federal attack must have come, he found the report a false alarm caused by the withdrawal of Jones to the south side of Bull run, whose men, in consequence of the color of their uniforms, had been mistaken for the enemy. It was now nearly dark and, in Beauregard's opinion, too late to resume the interrupted pursuit of the retreating army; so turning toward his headquarters and meeting the troops that had been recalled to his assistance, he ordered them to bivouac for the night where they were.
After caring for the wants of his men, Beauregard rode to his headquarters near Manassas Junction, where, at about 10 p. m., he found President Davis and General Johnston. The former had arrived from Richmond late in the afternoon and at once galloped to the battlefield with Colonel Jordan, Beauregard's chief of staff, and reached it in time to witness the last of the Federals retreating across Bull run. The next morning, at his breakfast table, President Davis handed Beauregard his commission, as full general in the army of the Confederate States, dated July 21, 1861, in recognition of his services in the magnificent victory which had been won under his immediate direction.
The Federal army lost in this battle 2,896 men, of which 460 were killed, 1,124 wounded and 1,312 captured or missing. The Confederate loss was 1,982 men, of which 387 were killed, 1,582 wounded and 13 captured or missing. The Confederates captured 26 pieces of artillery, 34 caissons and sets of harness, 10 battery wagons and forges, 24 artillery horses, several thousand stand of small-arms, and numbers of wagons and ambulances, as well as large quantities of army supplies of all kinds. In this Young's Branch or Henry Hill battle were engaged the First, Second and Third Federal divisions, with 18,000 men and 30 guns; and 18,000 men and 21 guns of Johnston's and Beauregard's Confederate divisions, the former furnishing 8,700 combatants and the latter 9,300. Jackson's brigade lost 488 of its 3,000, nearly one-third of the total Confederate loss, and more than that of any other Confederate brigade; and yet it was in good condition for service immediately after the battle.
The returns of the killed, wounded and missing of the entire Confederate army within the field of action at the battle of Bull Run, show that the most of the fighting was done by the army of the Shenandoah (Gen. J. E. Johnston's), as indicated in the following comparative table of losses: Army of the Shenandoah, 282 killed, 1,063 wounded and i missing; total loss, 1,346. Army of the Potomac, 105 killed, 519 wounded and 12 missing; total loss, 636.
The losses in the army of the Shenandoah by brigades were: In Jackson's brigade, 119 killed and 442 wounded; in Bartow's, 60 killed (among them Bartow himself) and 293 wounded; in Bee's, 95 killed (including General Bee), 309 wounded and 1 missing; in Smith's, 8 killed, 19 wounded (including General Smith). No separate returns are given of the losses in the batteries of Imboden, Stanard, Pendleton and Alburtis, of the army of the Shenandoah, all of which took a conspicuous part in this battle.
The losses in the army of the Potomac (Gen. G. T. Beauregard's) by brigades were: In Bonham's brigade, 10 killed and 66 wounded; in Ewell's, no losses; in Jones', 13 killed and 62 wounded; in Longstreet's, 23 killed and 12 wounded; in Cocke's, 23 killed, 79 wounded and 2 missing; in Early's, 12 killed and 67 wounded; in N. G. Evans', 20 killed, 118 wounded and 8 missing; in Holmes', no losses; in the Eighth Louisiana, Col. H. B. Kelly, 19 killed, 100 wounded and 2 missing; in the Hampton legion, 19 killed, 100 wounded and 2 missing; in the cavalry, consisting of the Thirtieth Virginia, Harrison's battalion and ten independent companies, 5 killed and 8 wounded; and in the artillery, consisting of the Washington artillery (Louisiana), the Alexandria (Virginia) battery, Latham's (Virginia) battery, Loudoun (Virginia) artillery, and Shields' (Virginia) battery, 2 killed and 8 wounded.
These figures show that the fighting by Beauregard's men was principally done by Bonham's, D. R. Jones', Cocke's, Early's, Evans' and Kelly's commands. Considering only numbers engaged in each Confederate command, the best fighting, judging by losses, was done by Kelly's Eighth Louisiana and the half brigade of Evans, in which were the First Louisiana battalion, Maj. R. C. Wheat; the Fourth South Carolina, Col. J. B. E. Sloan; Capt. W. R. Terry's cavalry, and Capt. Geo. S. Davidson's section of Latham's Virginia battery.
In the Federal army, the losses were well distributed through the three divisions that did the fighting, under Brigadier-General Tyler, Colonel Hunter and Colonel Heintzelman. Measured by the gauge of losses, the main fighting was done, in Tyler's division, by the brigades under Col. E. D. Keyes, Brig.-Gen. R. C. Schenck and Col. W. T. Sherman; in Hunter's division, by the brigades under Col. Andrew Porter and Col. A. E. Burnside; and in Heintzelman's division, by the brigades under Col. W. B. Franklin, Col. O. B. Willcox and Col. O. O. Howard; the greatest losses were in the brigades of Sherman, Porter and Willcox.
Longstreet states that after McDowell's forces were in full retreat from the Bull Run battlefield, orders came to the Confederate brigades at the lower fords, directing them to cross and strike the retreating enemy on the line of the Washington turnpike; that under these orders, Bonham's brigade advanced, with instructions to strike the enemy at the crossing of Cub run, about midway between stone bridge and Centreville; while Longstreet's brigade crossed at Blackburn's ford, with instructions to strike the enemy at Centreville. Obstructions in the road to Cub run diverted Bonham toward Centreville; so both these brigades sought the same objective and came under Bonham as the ranking officer. Their line of march led through the Federal camps which had been abandoned in retreat. In passing through these camps, says Longstreet:
We found their pots and kettles over the fire, with food cooking; quarters of beef hanging on the trees, and wagons by the roadside loaded, some with bread and general provisions, others with ammunition. When within artillery range of the retreating column passing through Centreville, the infantry was deployed on the sides of the road, under cover of the forests, so as to give room for the batteries ordered into action in the open, Bonham's brigade on the left, Longstreet's on the right. As the guns were about to open, there came a message that the enemy, instead of being in precipitate retreat, was marching around to attack the Confederate right. With this report came orders, or report of orders, for the brigades to return to their positions behind the run. I denounced the report as absurd, claimed to know a retreat, such as was before me, and ordered the batteries to open fire.
At that moment one of Johnston's aides peremptorily ordered that the batteries should not open, and when asked whether General Johnston had sent such an order, replied that he gave it on his own responsibility. Longstreet claimed an equal right of responsibility, and was in the act of renewing the order to fire, when Bonham rode up and asked that the batteries should not open. As he was in command, that settled the question; and, as night was then at hand, the golden opportunity for completing the victory by following up the rout of the Federal army was lost. Longstreet continues:
Soon there came an order for the brigades to withdraw and return to their positions behind the run. General Bonham marched his brigade back, but, thinking that there was a mistake somewhere, I remained in position until the order was renewed, about 10 o'clock p. m. . . . My brigade crossed and recrossed the run six times during the day and night.
It was afterward learned that some one, seeing Jones' brigade recrossing the run from an advance under earlier orders, mistook it for Federal troops crossing at McLean's ford, as previously stated, and rushed and reported to headquarters a Federal advance, and staff officers took the responsibility of revoking the orders of the commanding generals for the pursuit of the enemy.
There has been not only well-nigh endless discussion, but crimination and recrimination, as well as excuses, regarding the responsibility for not following up the retreating Federal army after it had been so discomfited in the battle of the 21st. It appears to rest mainly upon General Johnston and President Davis, their excuses being the exhausted condition of the Confederate army, the lack of transportation, and the want of provisions. Longstreet, in his Memoirs, says:
The supplies of subsistence, ammunition and forage, passed as we marched through the enemy's camps toward Centreville, seemed ample to carry the Confederate army on to Washington. Had the fight been continued to that point, the troops, in their high hopes, would have marched in terrible effectiveness against the demoralized Federals. Gaining confidence and vigor in their march, they could well have reached the capital with the ranks of McDowell's men. The brigade (Longstreet's) at Blackburn's ford, five regiments, those at McLean's and Mitchell's fords, all quite fresh, could have been reinforced by all the cavalry and most of the artillery, comparatively fresh, and later by the brigades of Holmes, Ewell and Early. This favorable aspect for fruitful results was all sacrificed through the assumed authority of staff officers, who, upon false reports, gave countermand to the orders of their chiefs.
The medical director of Jackson's brigade, Dr. Hunter McGuire, says in a recent memorial:
While dressing his (Jackson's) wounded hand at the First Manassas, at the field hospital of the brigade near the Lewis house (Portici), I saw President Davis ride up from Manassas. He had been told by stragglers that our army had been defeated. He stopped his horse in the middle of the little stream, stood up in his stirrups, the palest, sternest face I ever saw, and cried to the great crowd of soldiers, "I am President Davis; follow me back to the field." General Jackson did not hear distinctly. I told him who it was and what he said. He stood up, took off his cap and cried, "We have whipped them—they ran like sheep. Give me 10,000 men and I will take Washington city to-morrow."
Maj.-Gen. James B. Fry, who at Bull Run was captain and adjutant-general on McDowell's staff, in an article in the Century Magazine,[2] describing this battle and what followed, says:
About half past three Beauregard extended his left to outflank McDowell's shattered, shortened and disconnected line, and the Federals left the field about half past four. Until then they had fought wonderfully well for raw troops. There were no fresh forces on the field to support or encourage them, and the men seemed to be seized simultaneously by the conviction that it was no use to do anything more, and they might as well start home. Cohesion was lost, the organizations with some exceptions being disintegrated, and the men quietly walked off. There was no special excitement except that arising from the frantic efforts of the officers to stop men who paid little or no attention to anything that was said. On the high grounds by the Matthews house, about where Evans had taken position in the morning to check Burnside, McDowell and his staff, aided by other officers, made a desperate but futile effort to arrest the masses and form them into line . . . but all efforts failed. Stragglers moved past guns in spite of all that could be done; . . . the men trooped back in great disorder across Bull run. There were some hours of daylight for the Confederates to gather the fruits of victory, but a few rounds of shell and canister checked all the pursuit that was attempted, and the occasion called for no sacrifices or valorous deeds by the staunch regulars of the rear guard. There was no panic, in the ordinary meaning of the word, until the retiring soldiers, guns, wagons, congressmen, and carriages were fired upon, on the road east of Bull run. Then the panic began, and the bridge over Cub run being rendered impassable for vehicles by a wagon that was upset upon it, utter confusion set in; pleasure-carriages, gun-carriages and ammunition wagons which could not be put across the run were abandoned and blocked the way, and stragglers broke and threw aside their muskets and cut horses from their harness and rode off upon them. In leaving the field the men took the same routes in a general way by which they had reached it. Hence when the men of Hunter's and Heintzelman's divisions got back to Centreville, they had walked about 25 miles. That night they walked back to the Potomac, an additional distance of 20 miles; so that these undisciplined and unseasoned men within thirty-six hours walked fully 45 miles, besides fighting from about 10 a. m. until 4 p. m. on a hot, dusty day in July. McDowell, in person, reached Centreville before sunset, and found there Miles' division, with Richardson's brigade and three regiments of Runyon's division, and Hunt's, Tidball's, Ayres' and Greene's batteries and one or two fragments of batteries, making about 20 guns. It was a formidable force, but there was a lack of food and the mass of the army was completely demoralized. Beauregard had about an equal force which had not been in the fight, consisting of Ewell's, Jones' and Longstreet's brigades and some troops of other brigades. McDowell consulted the division and brigade commanders who were at hand upon the question of making a stand or retreating. The verdict was in favor of the latter, but a decision of officers one way or the other was of no moment; the men had already decided for themselves, and were streaming away to the rear in spite of all that could be done. They had no interest or treasure in Centreville, and their hearts were not there. Their tents, provisions, baggage and letters from home were upon the banks of the Potomac, and no power could have stopped them short of the camps they had left less than a week before. As before stated, most of them were sovereigns in uniform, not soldiers. McDowell accepted the situation, detailed Richardson's and Blenker's brigades to cover the retreat, and the army, a disorganized mass, with some creditable exceptions, drifted as the men pleased away from the scene of action. There was no pursuit, and the march from Centreville was as barren of opportunities for the rear guard as the withdrawal from the field of battle had been. [Fry might have added that several regiments of three months' men, whose time had expired, refused to stay longer.]
From Centreville, at 5:45 p. m. of the 21st, while the sun was yet an hour and a half high, McDowell telegraphed to Scott:
We passed Bull run. Engaged the enemy, who, it seems, had just been reinforced by General Johnston. We drove them for several hours, and finally routed them. They rallied and repulsed us, but only to give us again the victory, which seemed complete. But our men, exhausted with fatigue and thirst and confused by firing into each other, were attacked by the enemy's reserves, and driven from the position we had gained, overlooking Manassas. After this the men could not be rallied, but slowly left the field. In the meantime the enemy outflanked Richardson at Blackburn's ford, and we have now to hold Centreville till our men can get behind it. Miles' division is holding the town.
Later, from Fairfax Court House, he telegraphed:
The men having thrown away their haversacks in the battle and left them behind, they are without food; have eaten nothing since breakfast. We are without artillery ammunition. The larger part of the men are a confused mob, entirely demoralized. It was the opinion of all of the commanders that no stand could be made this side of the Potomac. We will, however, make the attempt at Fairfax Court House. From a prisoner we learn that 20,000 from Johnston joined last night, and they march on us to-night.
Early the next morning, from Fairfax Court House, he again wired:
Many of the volunteers did not wait for authority to proceed to the Potomac, but left on their own decision. They are now pouring through this place in a state of utter disorganization. They could not be prepared for action by to-morrow morning even were they willing. I learn from prisoners that we are to be pressed here to-night and to-morrow morning, as the enemy's force is very large and they are elated. I think we heard cannon on our rear guard. I think now, as all of my commanders thought at Centreville, there is no alternative but to fall back to the Potomac, and I shall proceed to do so with as much regularity as possible.
Of McDowell himself, Fry, his adjutant-general, wrote: "When the unfortunate commander dismounted at Arlington next forenoon in a soaking rain, after thirty-two hours in the saddle, his disastrous campaign of six days was closed. The first martial effervescence of the country was over. The three months' men went home, and the three months' chapter of the war ended—with the South triumphant and confident, the North disappointed but determined."
Blenker remained in position at Centreville, as rear guard, until about midnight, when he was ordered to fall back on Washington. He reported that the retreat of "great numbers of flying soldiers continued until 9 o'clock in the evening, the great majority in wild confusion, but few in collected bodies." He mentioned that he was several times attacked by squadrons of Confederate cavalry, before he left Centreville.
Walt Whitman, a noted Northern writer, says:[3]
The defeated troops commenced pouring into Washington, over the long bridge, at daylight on Monday, 22d—a day drizzling all through with rain. The Saturday and Sunday of the battle (the 20th and 21st) had been parched and hot to an extreme. . . . But the hour, the day, the night passed; and whatever returns, an hour, a day, a night like that can never again return. The President, recovering himself, begins that very night—sternly, rapidly sets about the task of reorganizing his forces, and placing himself in position for future and surer work. . . . He endured that hour, that day, bitterer than gall—indeed a crucifixion day—but it did not conquer him—he unflinchingly stemmed it and resolved to lift himself and the Union out of it.
Colonel Henderson, of the British Staff college, in his life of Stonewall Jackson, says:
Before twenty-four hours had passed reinforcements had increased the strength of Johnston's army to 40,000. Want of organization had doubtless prevented McDowell from winning a victory on the 10th or 20th, but pursuit is a far less difficult business than attack. There was nothing to interfere with a forward movement There were supplies along the railway, and if the mechanism for their distribution and the means for their carriage were wanting, the counties adjoining the Potomac were rich and fertile. Herds of bullocks were grazing in the pastures, and the barns of the farmers were loaded with grain. It was not a long supply train that was lacking, nor an experienced staff, nor even well-disciplined battalions; but a general who grasped the full meaning of victory, who understood how a defeated army, more especially of new troops, yields at a touch, and who, above all, saw the necessity of giving the North no leisure to develop her immense resources. For three days Jackson impatiently awaited the order to advance, and his men were held ready with three days' cooked rations in their haversacks. But his superiors gave no sign, and he was reluctantly compelled to abandon all hope of reaping the fruits of the victory.
When McClellan, summoned in hot haste from north-western Virginia to avert further disaster, reached Washington, on the 26th of July, he rode around the city inspecting the existing conditions. Of these he wrote:
I found no preparations whatever for defense, not even to the extent of putting the troops in military positions. Not a regiment was properly encamped, not a single avenue of approach guarded. All was chaos, and the streets, hotels and bar-rooms were filled with drunken officers and men, absent from their regiments without leave—a perfect pandemonium. Many had even gone to their homes, their fright from Bull Run terminating in New York, or even New Hampshire and Maine. There was really nothing to prevent a small cavalry force from riding into the city. A determined attack would doubtless have carried Arlington heights and placed the city at the mercy of a battery of rifled guns. If the secessionists attached any value to the possession of Washington, they committed their greatest error in not following up the victory of Bull Run.
That same day, Secretary of War Stanton wrote:
The capture of Washington seems now to be inevitable; during the whole of Monday and Tuesday (July 22d and 23d) it might have been taken without resistance. The rout, overthrow, and demoralization of the whole army were complete.
Of the attitude of the Southern people after this great victory, which might have been decisive, Colonel Henderson says:
When the news of Bull Run reached Richmond, and through the crowds that thronged the streets passed the tidings of the victory, there was neither wild excitement nor uproarious joy. No bonfires lit the darkness of the night; no cannon thundered out salutes; the steeples were silent till the morrow, and then were heard only the solemn tones that called the people to prayer. It was resolved, on the day following the battle, by the Confederate Congress: "That we recognize the hand of the Most High God, the King of kings and Lord of lords, in the glorious victory with which He has crowned our arms at Manassas, and that the people of these Confederate States are invited, by appropriate services on the ensuing Sabbath, to offer up their united thanksgivings and prayers for this mighty deliverance."
Johnston wrote as follows of the Confederate army after Bull Run:
The Confederate army was more disorganized by victory than that of the United States by defeat. The Southern volunteers believed that the objects of the war had been accomplished by their victory, and that they had achieved all that their country required of them. Many, therefore, in ignorance of their military obligations, left the army—not to return. Some hastened home to exhibit the trophies picked up on the field; others left their regiments without ceremony to attend to wounded friends, frequently accompanying them to hospitals in distant towns. Such were the reports of general and staff officers, and railroad officials. Exaggerated ideas of the victory, prevailing among our troops, cost us more men than the Federal army lost by defeat.
On the 25th of July, Johnston and Beauregard united in a congratulatory proclamation to the "Soldiers of the Confederate States," of which the beginning and conclusion are quoted:
One week ago a countless host of men, organized into an army, with all the appointments which modern and practical skill could devise, invaded the soil of Virginia. Their people sounded their approach with triumphant displays of anticipated victory. Their generals came in almost royal state; their great ministers, senators, and women came to witness the immolation of our army and the subjugation of our people, and to celebrate the result with wild revelry. It is with the profoundest emotions of gratitude to an overruling God, whose hand is manifest in protecting our homes and our liberties, that we, your generals commanding, are enabled, in the name of our whole country, to thank you for that patriotic courage, that heroic gallantry, that devoted daring, exhibited by you in the actions of the 18th and 21st, by which the hosts of the enemy were scattered and a signal and glorious victory obtained. . . . Comrades, our brothers who have fallen have earned undying renown upon earth, and their blood, shed in our holy cause, is a precious and acceptable sacrifice to the Father of Truth and of Right. Their graves are beside the tomb of Washington; their spirits have joined with his in eternal communion. . . . We drop one tear on their laurels and move forward to avenge them. Soldiers, we congratulate you on a glorious, triumphant and complete victory, and we thank you for doing your whole duty in the service of your country.
In this first great battle in Virginia many officers served, on both sides, who afterward became distinguished, or famous. On the Confederate side were Johnston, Beauregard, "Stonewall" Jackson, Stuart, Fitz Lee, Longstreet, Kirby Smith, Ewell, Early, Whiting, D. R. Jones, Sam Jones, Holmes, Evans, Elzey, Radford and Jordan—all graduates of West Point. Among those holding inferior positions, but subsequently distinguished, were Munford, Kirkland, Kershaw, Rodes, Featherston, Skinner, Garland, Corse, Cocke, Hunton, Withers, William Smith, Hays, Barksdale, Kemper, Wheat, Terry, Hampton, Shields, Imboden, Allen, Preston, Echols, Gumming, Steuart, A. P. Hill, Pendleton, and others.
Stuart, on the 21st, followed the retreating Federals 12 miles beyond Manassas, when his command was so depleted by sending back detachments with prisoners, that he gave up the pursuit and returned to encamp near Sudley church. He advanced to Fairfax Court House on the morning of the 23d, and a little later established his pickets along the Potomac, and in front of Washington, in sight of the dome of the capitol. The infantry of the army was moved to new camps beyond Bull run, with advanced detachments in support of the cavalry. McClellan took command at Washington on the 27th, and at once proceeded to make that city an intrenched camp, to which large numbers of troops were hurried from all the Union States.
- ↑ Beauregard states, in a paper published since the war, that the combined Confederate army at Manassas mustered 29,188 men, rank and file, and 55 guns; that of these, 21,923 men, infantry, cavalry and artillery, and 29 guns, belonged to his army of the Potomac.
- ↑ See "Battles and Leaders," Century Co., New York.
- ↑ In his volume, "Specimen Days and Collect."