Cox v. United States (332 U.S. 442)/Dissent Murphy

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Dissenting Opinions
Douglas
Murphy

United States Supreme Court

332 U.S. 442

Cox  v.  United States (332 U.S. 442)

 Argued: Oct. 14, 15, 1947. --- Decided: Nov 24, 1947


Mr. Justice MURPHY, with whom Mr. Justice RUTLEDGE concurs, dissenting.

With certain limitations, this Court has recognized that a person on trial for an alleged violation of the Selective Training and Service Act has the right to prove that the prosecution is based upon an invalid draft board classification. But care must be taken to preclude the review of the classification by standards which allow the judge to do little more than give automatic approval to the draft board's action. Otherwise the right to prove the invalidity of the classification is drained of much of its substance and the trial becomes a mere formality. Such empty procedure has serious connotations, especially when we deal with those who claim they have been illegally denied exemptions relating to conscientious beliefs or ministerial status.

Specifically, I object to the standard of review whereby the draft board classification is to be sustained unless there is no evidence to support it. Less than a substantial amount of evidence is thus permitted to legalize the classification. Whatever merit this standard may have in other situations, I question the propriety of its use in t is particular setting. This differs from an ordinary civil proceeding to review a non-punitive order of an administrative agency, an order which is unrelated to freedom of conscience or religion. This is a criminal trial. It involves administrative action denying that the defendant has conscientious or religious scruples against war, or that he is a minister. His liberty and his reputation depend upon the validity of that action. If the draft board classification is held valid, he will be imprisoned or fined and will be branded as a violator of the nation's law; if that classification is unlawful, he is a free man. Moreover, he has had no previous opportunity to secure a judicial test of this administrative action, no chance to prove that he was denied his statutory rights. Everything is concentrated in the criminal proceeding.

These stakes are too high, in my opinion, to permit an inappreciable amount of supporting evidence to sanction a draft board classification. Since guilt or innocence centers on that classification, its validity should be established by something more forceful than a wisp of evidence or a speculative inference. Otherwise the defendant faces an almost impossible task in attempting to prove the illegality of the classification, the presence of a mere fragment of contrary evidence dooming his efforts. And such a scant foundation should not justify brushing aside bona fide claims of conscientious belief or ministerial status. If respect for human dignity means anything, only evidence of a substantial nature warrants approval of the draft board classification in a criminal proceeding.

It is needless to add that, from my point of view, the proof in these cases falls far short of justifying the conviction of the petitioners. There is no suggestion in the record that they were other than bona fide ministers. And the mere fact that they spent less than full time in ministerial activities affords no reasonable basis for implying a non-ministerial status. Congress must have intended to exempt from statutory duties those ministers who are forced to labor at secular jobs to earn a living as well as those who preach to more opulent congregations. Any other view would ascribe to Congress an intention to discriminate among religious denominations and ministers on the basis of wealth and necessity for secular work, an intention that I am unwilling to impute. Accordingly, in the absence of more convincing evidence, I cannot agree that the draft board classifications underlying petitioners' convictions are valid.

Notes

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This work is in the public domain in the United States because it is a work of the United States federal government (see 17 U.S.C. 105).

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