Erwin v. Parham/Dissent Nelson

by Samuel Nelson

United States Supreme Court

53 U.S. 197

Erwin  v.  Parham

Mr. Justice NELSON dissented.

I am unable to assent to the decision of a majority of the court in this case.

The complainant has purchased, at sheriff's sale, thirteen promissory notes, given as part of the purchase money upon a sale of a large plantation and slaves; and secured by mortgage on the same to an amount exceeding $260,000 for the small sum of $600; and asks the interposition of the extraordinary powers of this court on the equity side to aid him in realizing this enormous speculation.

I think he should be left to his remedy at law, and this, upon the established course of proceeding of a court of chancery in these cases.

In Seymour v. Delancey and others, (6 Johns. (N. Y.) Ch., 222,) Chancellor Kent held that a specific performance of a contract of sale is not a matter of course; but rests entirely on the discretion of the court, upon a view of all the circumstances. And that though mere inadequacy of price, independent of other circumstances, is not, of itself, sufficient to set aside the transaction, yet it may be sufficient to induce the court to stay the exercise of its discretionary power to enforce a specific performance. All the cases on this subject will be found reviewed in that case; and, also, by Chief Justice Savage in the Court for the Correction of Errors where the decree in that case was affirmed. 6 Cow., 445.

The Chancellor, after having referred to many of the cases particularly, observed that these cases show the antiquity of the doctrine of the court; and that the power of awarding the specific execution of contracts, for the sale of land, rested in sound judicial discretion, and was not to be applied to cases that were hard, or unfair, or unreasonable, or founded on very inadequate considerations.

The strong ground against enforcing a contract, where the consideration is so inadequate as to render it a hard bargain, and an unequal and unreasonable bargain, is that, if a court of equity acts at all, it must act ex vigore, and carry the contract into execution with unmitigated severity; whereas, if the party be sent to law, to submit his case to a jury, relief can be afforded in damages, with a moderation agreeable to equity and good conscience, and when the claims and pretensions of each party can be duly attended to, and be permitted to govern the assessment.

In the case before us, if the court undertakes to give relief, it would seem, from the established rules of proceeding in equity, that it will be bound to award to the complainant the full amount of the notes in question; and thus enable him to realize upwards of $260,000 upon a purchase at the price of $600; in other words, virtually awarding to him, for this small consideration, an estate, which Wall, one of the defendants, had sold for a sum exceeding $260,000, as the notes in question constitute part of the purchase-money and the payment secured upon this estate.

The inadequacy of the consideration is far beyond that of any case that has come under my observation in the course of this examination, and is such as to shock the common sense of mankind.

In many of the cases in which the court has refused to interfere, mainly on the ground of inadequacy of price, only half the value had been agreed to be given. That was considered as sufficient evidence of a hard and unconscionable bargain, to induce the court to pause, when its extraordinary powers were invoked to the aid of the party seeking to realize the advantage of the contract, and turn him over to a court of law.

The complainant in this case is not without a remedy. If he has got a legal right, he can go into a court of law and enforce it. But I do not think it a fit case for the interposition of a court of equity.

I do not regard the allegation of a fraudulent attempt on the part of the defendants, to prevent the complainant from realizing the benefit of his purchase; as the question, whether or not a court of equity should interfere and grant the relief prayed for, in my judgment, is wholly unaffected by any such considerations; for, assuming the fraud should be hereafter established, and this impediment to the enforcement of the claim set up under the purchase, removed, even then, according to the course of proceeding in a court of equity, as already stated, that court would withhold its extraordinary power from aiding the party to obtain so unjust and unconscionable advantage, and turn him over to a court of law. By entertaining the case, as presented in the bill, and directing an answer, the court assumes that, if the complainant can establish the fraud in the transfer of the notes as charged, he is entitled to its decree for the whole amount of his purchase; for, as we have seen, a court of equity must act, if at all, ex vigore, and carry into execution the purchase as it has been made. It cannot consistently, in the exercise of its power on this subject, carry the purchase into partial execution by separating it, granting the execution in part, and withholding it in part. This would be arbitrary, and unsupported by any rule or principle to guide the judgment of the court.

Whether the court will entertain the case at all, or not, and give the relief prayed for in these cases, is a question of judicial discretion; but, when once entertained, and held to be a proper case for the relief, there can be no other given, consistent with established principles, than such as the legal title or right set up carries along with it. If it gives to him an estate in land, the court cannot stop at a moiety of it; nor, in this case, in awarding any amont less than the $260,000. The legal title to the whole amount is as complete as to any portion of it.

For these reasons, thus briefly given, I am obliged to dissent from the decision in this case.