Evaluation of the Handling of the Branch Davidian Stand-off in Waco, Texas/The Negotiation Strategy
B. WAS THE FBI'S NEGOTIATION STRATEGY AND ITS IMPLEMENTATION ADEQUATE TO RESOLVE THE CONFRONTATION WITH THE BRANCH DAVIDIANS?
The Negotiation Strategy
The first briefing book presented to the Attorney General states that the strategy was to "secure the surrender and arrest of all adult occupants of the compound while providing the maximum possible security for the children within the compound." (Tab B, p. 4). The negotiators knew they were faced with religious group fanatically devoted to Koresh and his teachings. It was not certain, however, whether Koresh truly believed his own religious message or whether he was exploiting his control over his followers for personal gain.
Initially the FBI tried to work within the framework of the Davidians' beliefs to convince Koresh the standoff was not the apocalyptic event he had prophesied. Evidently Koresh was the only "expert" in his branch of Branch Davidianism, and so even with advice from religious scholars, the FBI was unable to influence Koresh's unique interpretation of scripture. The frustration of working within Koresh's religious framework became apparent when on March 2, after promising to leave the compound, Koresh said that God had told him to wait. Koresh was improvising his own theology and was completely beyond the influence of religious arguments or religious scholars.
Koresh knew that he and other Davidians would be arrested and charged with murder of the ATF agents. Koresh and others in the compound were acutely aware of the secular consequences of their acts. Texas has the death penalty by lethal injection. At one point in the negotiations Koresh joked, "When they give me the lethal injection, give me the cheap stuff, huh?". Efforts were aimed at convincing Koresh that if he and the others exited the compound they would be treated well and that they might "beat the rap." Needless to say this tactic was not popular since it implicitly criticized ATF and could be viewed as disparaging of the four dead ATF agents. However, the tactic was completely proper in the context of negotiating a nonviolent end to the standoff.[1]
In the face of Koresh's intransigence the final negotiating strategy was developed called the "trickle, flow, gush" strategy. The objective was to undermine the devotion of individual members to Koresh. The FBI began speaking to the other members on the phone, playing tapes of the negotiations and the statements of released members and family members back into the compound over loud speakers, sending videotapes and pictures of the released children into the compound and sending in messages from family members. For example, a taped passage from the negotiations in which Special Agent Byron Sage outwitted Koresh was played over the loudspeakers for this purpose. The objective was to move the pace of the exodus from the compound from a trickle to a flow to a mass desertion of Koresh by his followers.
Although others left the compound, this strategy also failed. The number of people leaving the compound slowed rather than accelerated and the exit of members from the compound stopped altogether after March 23rd, nearly a month before the final assault. There is evidence that Koresh was purging his group and therefore these departures from the compound did not represent defections from Koresh's ranks. Many of the adults leaving the compound appeared to remain loyal to Koresh.
Koresh broke his promises to leave the compound, and the pace of the releases did not significantly increase. Koresh had promised to come out on March 2nd if the government played his tape. The government complied and Koresh reneged. Koresh said he was waiting for a sign from God. On March 12 he considered the guitar nebula as a possible sign, but decided it was not the sign he was waiting for. Koresh told his lawyers he would come out after Passover, but when Passover ended, Koresh said he had not committed to a specific date to come out.[2] Koresh continued to make excuses to stay in the compound thus reinforcing the view that he was not devout, only manipulative.[3]
Dr. Park Dietz, a Clinical Professor of Psychiatry and Behavioral Sciences at the University of California, was consulted by the FBI. Dr. Dietz is under contract with the FBI as a forensic psychiatrist. The FBI flew Dr. Dietz to Mt. Carmel to give his assessment of Koresh. On March 2nd Dr. Dietz expressed the opinion that Koresh would not voluntarily leave the compound. He considered Koresh to be suicidal and stated that Koresh might have made a suicide pact with his followers. Dr. Dietz described Koresh's personality as manipulative.
Dr. Dietz made a number of recommendations based on his review of documents and the negotiations up to that point. He recommended that the FBI distance itself from ATF and express sympathy with Koresh's anti-BATF views. Dr. Dietz expressed the opinion that Koresh would choose death over losing power, and therefore the negotiation strategy should create the illusion that Koresh would not go to prison but would emerge with more followers than he had before.
Footnotes[edit]
- ↑ Koresh and a number of his followers had avoided convictions for attempted murder in a 1987 shootout with George Roden, the previous leader of the compound. Sheriff Jack Harwell was involved in the Roden case. Koresh spoke very highly Harwell in the negotiations.
- ↑ Some in the FBI may have felt that Koresh also broke promises on March 12 and March 21, when there was discussion about people coming out but they did not. However, it is not clear that in the context of the negotiating posture these discussions actually rose to the level of promises.
- ↑ Indeed, the "negotiations" are characterized as "communicating" with Koresh or "talking" to Koresh because the Davidian situation lacked so many of the elements typically present in hostage barricade situations. Koresh made no threats, set no deadlines and made no demands. Koresh and his followers were at Mount Carmel where they wanted to be and living under conditions that were only marginally more severe than they were accustomed to.