Farnsworth v. Minnesota and Pacific Railroad Company

by Stephen Johnson Field

United States Supreme Court

92 U.S. 49

Farnsworth  v.  Minnesota and Pacific Railroad Company

APPEAL from the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Minnesota.

On the 3d of March, 1857 (11 Stat. 195), Congress passed an act granting certain lands to the Territory of Minnesota, for the purpose of aiding in the construction of several lines of railroad between different points in the Territory. These lands were to consist of the alternate sections, designated by odd numbers, for six sections in width, on each side of the several lines of road, and were to be selected within fifteen miles therefrom. The act declared that the lands should be exclusively applied to the construction of that road on account of which they were granted, and to no other purpose whatever; and that they should be disposed of by the Territory or future State only as the work progressed, and only in the manner following: that is to say, a quantity of land, not exceeding one hundred and twenty sections for each of the roads, and included within a continuous length of twenty miles of the road, might be sold; and when the governor of the Territory or the future State should certify to the Secretary of the Interior that any continuous twenty miles of any of the roads were completed, then another like quantity of the land granted might be sold; and so, from time to time, until the roads were completed; and that, if any of the roads were not completed within ten years, no further sales should be made, and the lands unsold should revert to the United States.

On the 19th of May of the same year the Territory accepted the grant thus made upon the terms, conditions, and restrictions contained in the act of Congress, and, on the 22d of the month, passed an act for the execution of the trust. By that act it authorized four different companies to construct the roads in aid of which the congressional grant was made, each company a distinct road. Three of these companies were at the time in existence: one of them, the Minnesota and Pacific Railroad Company, was created by the act. This latter company was authorized to construct the road from Stillwater, by way of St. Paul and St. Anthony, to the town of Breckenridge, on the Sioux Wood River, with a branch from St. Anthony to St. Vincent, near the mouth of the Pembina River; and, for the purpose of aiding in its construction, the act granted to the company the interest and estate present and prospective of the Territory and of the future State in the lands granted by Congress along the line of the road, subject, however, to the proviso that the title of the lands should vest in the company, as follows: Of the first one hundred and twenty sections, whenever twenty or more continuous miles of the road should be located, and the governor should certify the same to the Secretary of the Interior; and afterwards of a like number of sections, whenever and as often as twenty continuous miles of the road should be completed so as to admit of running regular trains, and the governor should certify the fact to the Secretary.

By the same act, the company was authorized to borrow money and to execute its bonds and mortgages and other obligations for the same, or for any liabilities incurred in the construction, repair, equipment, or operating of the line, upon any part of its railroad or branches, and upon the estate granted by the act, and upon any or all of its other property.

The company organized under the act, and accepted the grant made by its provisions upon the terms and conditions mentioned, and, during the year, had the greater part of the line of its road surveyed and located, and maps of the same filed with the governor of the Territory and the commissioner of the General Land-Office at Washington. The location was approved by the Secretary of the Interior; and, by his directions, the lands granted along the line were withdrawn from sale and settlement. A contract, as alleged, was also made with a responsible party for the construction of the main line of the road; but work under it was only prosecuted for a month, when it was abandoned. No portion of the road was completed; and the failure of the company in this respect was ascribed to the general embarrassed financial condition of the country, in consequence of which it was unable to raise the necessary funds to proceed with the work

The Territory of Minnesota became a State in October, 1857, though not admitted into the Union until May, 1858. Its constitution prohibited the loan of the State credit in aid of any corporation; but the first legislature assembled under it, being desirous of expediting the construction of the lines of the road in aid of which the congressional grant was made, proposed, in March, 1858, an amendment to the constitution, removing this prohibition so far as the four companies named in the act of May 22, 1857, were concerned. The amendment was submitted to the people, and, on the 15th of April of the same year, was adopted. This amendment provided that the governor should cause to be issued and delivered to each of the four companies special bonds of the State to the amount of $1,250,000, in instalments of $100,000, as often as any ten miles of its road was ready for placing the superstructure thereon, and an additional instalment of the same amount as often as that number of miles of the road was fully completed and the cars were running thereon, until the whole amount authorized was issued. The bonds were to be denominated Minnesota State Railroad Bonds; were to draw interest at the rate of seven per cent per annum, payable semi-annually in the city of New York; were to be transferable by indorsement of the president of the company, and redeemable at any time after ten and before the expiration of twenty-five years from their date; and for the payment of the interest and the redemption of the principal the faith and credit of the State were pledged. The amendment at the same time with this pledge declared that each company should make provision for the redemption of the bonds received by it, and payment of the interest accruing thereon, so as to exonerate the treasury of the State from any advances of money for that purpose; and, as security therefor, required the governor, before any bonds were issued, to take from each company an instrument pledging the net profits of its road for the payment of the interest, and a conveyance to the State of the first two hundred and forty sections of land, free from prior incumbrances, which the company was or might be authorized to sell, to protect the treasurer against loss on the bonds; and also required, as further security, that an amount of first-mortgage bonds on the roads, lands, and franchises of the company, corresponding in amount to the State bonds issued to it, should be transferred to the treasurer of the State with the issue of the State bonds. The amendment declared, that, in case either company made default in the payment of the interest or principal of the bonds issued to it, no more State bonds should be thereafter issued to that company, and that the governor should proceed to sell, in such manner as might be prescribed by law, its bonds, or the lands held in trust, or require a foreclosure of the mortgage executed to secure the bonds. The amendment further provided, that, in consideration of the loan, each company which accepted the bonds should, as a condition thereof, complete not less than fifty miles of its road on or before the expiration of the year 1861, and not less than one hundred miles before the year 1864, and four-fifths of the entire length of its road before the year 1866; and that any failure on the part of the company to complete the number of miles of its road in the manner and within the several times thus prescribed should forfeit to the State all the rights, title, and interest of any kind whatsoever in and to any lands granted by the act of May 22, 1857, together with the franchises connected with the same, not pertaining or applicable to the portion of the road by it constructed, and a fee-simple to which had not accrued to the company by reason of such construction.

The Minnesota and Pacific Railroad Company, after the proclamation of the governor of its adoption, accepted the amendment, and gave notice to the governor of its acceptance, and that it proposed to avail itself of the loan which the amendment provided.

On the 31st of July, 1858, the company executed to certain trustees named therein a deed of all that portion of its lines of road in aid of which the lands had been granted, and of the lands and alienable franchises connected therewith, in trust for the holders present and prospective of twenty-three millions of bonds to be issued under certain restrictions. Nine hundred of these bonds were subsequently issued as therein provided, and some of them were put in circulation. The present suit is brought by the surviving trustees to obtain a decree that this deed is a valid and subsisting lien prior to all other liens and incumbrances upon all the lands, property, and franchises described therein, and to enforce the same.

Subsequently, during that year, the company graded thirty miles of its road, and made it ready for the superstructure, and thereupon executed the pledge of net profits, and the conveyance of two hundred and forty sections as provided by the constitutional amendment. But, in place of first-mortgage bonds secured by a separate deed of trust, the company offered $300,000 of its bonds secured by the trust-deed mentioned of July 31, 1858, and applied for State bonds of an equal amount. The governor refused to issue the State bonds until a deed of trust was executed specifying a priority of lien of the bonds which the company might deliver to the State. This refusal led to a great deal of controversy and some litigation with the governor; but ultimately, on the 27th of November, 1858, a supplemental deed of trust was executed by the company, authorizing and directing, in case of default in the payment of the interest or principal of its bonds delivered to the State, a foreclosure and sale by the trustees upon the demand of the governor, and, in case of their failure or refusal upon his demand, authorizing the governor to make such foreclosure and sale. The governor then issued to the company bonds of the State to the amount of $300,000. Subsequently, during that and the following year (1859), thirty-two and one-half miles more of the road were graded and ready for its superstructure, and $300,000 more of bonds of the State were issued to the company, and a corresponding amount of the first-mortgage bonds of the company were delivered to the treasurer. The interest on the State bonds was payable on the first days of June and December, and the interest on the company's bonds was payable on the first days of February and August, of each year.

The company made default in the payment of interest on the State bonds delivered to it, falling due in December, 1859; and the governor demanded of the trustees, in the deed of July 31, 1858, that they should proceed to foreclose the same, and sell the trust-property. With this demand the trustees never complied.

The company also made default in the payment of interest upon its own bonds delivered to the State, due on the 1st of February, 1860. The legislature accordingly, in March following, passed an act making it the duty of the governor to foreclose the deed of trust, if in his opinion the public interest required it, and, upon a sale of the property, rights, and franchises covered by the deed, to bid in the same for the State.

The legislature at about the same time proposed an amendment of the constitution of the State prohibiting any law, which levied a tax or made other provisions for the payment of interest or principal of the State bonds issued to the company, from taking effect until the same had been submitted to a vote of the people and been adopted; and also prohibiting any further issue of bonds to the company under the amendment of April 15, 1858, and abrogating that amendment with a reservation to the State of all rights, remedies, and forfeitures accorning thereunder. This amendment was adopted in November, 1860. Whilst it was pending before the people, the governor proceeded under the act of the legislature, and had the property covered by the trust-deed of the company, with the connected franchises, advertised and sold, the same being purchased on behalf of the State. The sale took place on the 23d of June, 1860.

In March, 1861, the legislature passed an act, by which the road, lands, rights, and franchises possessed by the company previous to the sale, and all bonds and securities of the company held by the State, were upon certain conditions 'released, discharged, and restored' to the company, free from all liens or claims of the State. These conditions required the construction and equipment of certain portions of the road within designated periods. One of the conditions provided that the company should construct and put in operation, and fully equip for business, that portion of the main line extending from St. Paul to St. Anthony, on or before the first day of the following January, in default of which all the rights and benefits conferred upon the company by virtue of the act should be 'forfeited to the State absolutely, and without further act or ceremony whatever;' and, in case the company should fail to construct the other and further portions of the road and branches within the time or times designated, it should forfeit to the State, in like manner, all the lands, property, and franchises pertaining to the unbuilt portions of the road and branch; and in either case, or in any forfeiture under the provisions of the act, the State should hold and be possessed of all the lands, property, and franchises forfeited, 'without merger or extinguishment, to be used, granted, or disposed of, for the purpose of aiding and facilitating the construction of said road and branch.'

This act the company accepted with all its conditions; but it never completed the portion of the road there designated to be put into operation before the first of the following January, or any portion of its road, as there provided, or as provided in the constitutional amendment of 1858; and on the 10th of March, 1862, the legislature, acting upon the forfeiture accruing, or supposed to be accruing, from the failure of the company in this respect, passed an act creating the St. Paul and Pacific Railroad Company, and granted to it all the rights, benefits, privileges, property, franchises, and interests of the Minnesota and Pacific Railroad Company acquired by the State by virtue of any act or agreement of the company, or any thing done or suffered by it, or by virtue of any law of the State or Territory, or of the constitution of the State, or from the sale made by the governor, and also all the rights, privileges, franchises, lands, and property granted to the company by the act of May 22, 1857. The new company, and a division company subsequently created out of it, have since constructed the main line of the road and a portion of the branches, and, to enable them to do so, have made various deeds of trust and mortgages upon the assumption that the rights of the old Minnesota and Pacific Railroad Company had ceased. These deeds of trust and mortgages amount to many millions of dollars, and are outstanding. These companies and the holders of their bonds, of course, resist the enforcement of the deed of trust in suit. The questions for determination relate, first, to the validity of this deed at the time it was executed, or rather to the right of the company to include therein and bind all the lands granted by the act of the Territory of May 22, 1857; and, second, to the effect of the act of March 10, 1862, upon the title of the property and connected franchises embraced in the deed of trust.

Mr. Henry F. Masterson for the appellant.

The court below erred in holding, that, under the act of Congress, the legislature could not authorize the trust-deed, in advance of the construction of the road, so as to give a lien on all the lands, as against the State and her subsequent grantees 'who actually built the road and earned the land,' with notice of said deed.

As the lands were granted 'to aid in the construction of the road,' they could not effectually be so used except as a basis of credit and security. All previous grants for similar purposes, covering a period of over thirty years, had been made available and used in this way. Trustees of Wabash & Erie Canal Co. v. Beers, 2 Black, 448. Congress must, therefore, have intended such use.

The act of March 3, 1871 (16 Stat. 588), is a construction by Congress of the act making the grant, and shows that it was understood as authorizing the incumbering of the lands in advance of the construction of the road. A like legislative construction will be found in the act of March 3, 1873. 17 id. 634.

If, therefore, by the true construction of the act of March 3, 1857 (11 Stat. 195), it was lawful to mortgage, or to convey in trust, the lands, in order to raise money with which to construct the road, it then follows that such an instrument is an effectual and valid security for such money, whether the road was wholly completed with it or not; otherwise a subsequent lender and junior mortgagee would not only have the first lien, but the whole security. Galveston Railroad v. Cowdrey, 11 Wall. 459; United States v. New Orleans Railroad, 12 id. 362; Dunham v. Railroad Company, 1 id. 254. The true construction, however, of the act of Congress, in this regard, is immaterial. The United States does not complain, and no other party can. Baker v. Gee, 1 Wall. 333-337; 2 Bl. Com. 155; 4 Kent, 127; Nicoll v. N. Y. & Erie Railroad Co., 2 Kern. 121-140; Lamb v. Davenport, 18 Wall. 307.

If the lenders took the risk of losing their security by reason of a forfeiture or a reversion to the United States, they assumed no such risk toward the State. Such title as she might acquire by forfeiture would be subject to the lien, (2 Bl. Com. 267; 4 id. 381-384; 4 Kent, 427); and the twenty-first section of the act incorporating the Minnesota and Pacific Railroad Company especially estopped her from claiming adversely to the trust any of the fund. A contract at once arose between the lenders and the State that she would not withdraw any of the fund, or impair their security. Curran v. Arkansas, 15 How. 304; Hawthorn v. Calef, 2 Wall. 10; Von Hoffman v. City of Quincy, 4 id. 535; Woodruff v. Trapnal, 10 How. 190; Barings v. Dabney, 19 Wall. 9; Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheat. 518.

The State having, by the sixteenth section of the charter, granted all her expectant or prospective interest in the land, she and her subsequent grantees are estopped from denying her title or that of her original grantee. If these sections have no other force and effect, they operate as a lawful and sufficient power to create the lien; and the State is equally bound as if the trust had been made by one of her executive officers acting under like legislative authority.

The court erred in holding that the State of Minnesota, or any one but the United States, could take advantage of the breach of conditions of the congressional grant, or be heard to object that said trust-deed was not authorized by the act. The United States was the grantor. Conditions can only be reserved for the benefit of the grantor and his heirs: these conditions will be held to have been waived, unless re-entry or its equivalent is made. 2 Bl. Com. 155; 4 Kent, 127; Baker v. Gee, 1 Wall. 333; Smith v. Sheeley, 12 id. 358; Lamb v. Davenport, 18 id. 307; Nicoll v. N. Y. & E. R.R. Co., 2 Kern. 121-140.

The estoppel which precluded the State from denying the validity of the trust-deed extended to her subsequent grantees, because they not only took with notice, but paid nothing for the franchises, road-bed, and property acquired before the passage of the act of 1862.

The court was in error in holding, in effect, that the legislature could not authorize such trust-deed in advance of the construction of the road and the acquisition of other property than that derived through the United States, so as to be a lien upon the road when constructed, and upon said other property when acquired.

It is settled law, that a railroad mortgage like that in question, although made before the construction of the road, attaches itself thereto as the work thereon is built, and to all subsequently acquired property of the company. Galveston Railroad v. Cowdrey, and Dunham v. Railway Company, supra.

The court was also in error in holding that there was or could be any forfeiture under or by force of the constitutional amendment in any way when taken in connection with the facts stated in the bill, and in holding, that, in any event, title could be acquired by such forfeiture without judicial process and judgment.

The constitutional amendment is not a deed or a legislative grant. Its conditions are, therefore, not conditions in deed. It created no estate whatever in any thing embraced by the trust-deed, as the condition of forfeiture is not attached to and does not accompany the grant upon which it is to operate, and cannot be taken advantage of by re-entry or legislative act. Litt., sect. 325; 2 Bl. Com. 154; 4 Kent, 123. Nor is it a condition in law in the sense that it is implied (Litt., sect. 378; 2 Bl. Com. 153; 4 Kent, 120; Davis v. Gray, 16 Wall. 223), or one which the State may in its own right annex to any or all property which a person has or may acquire, whether from her or another source; ex. gr., a condition of forfeiture for crime or negligence. 2 Bl. Com. 267, 420; 4 Kent, 426. Even if it were a condition in law, in this sense, the forfeiture would not avoid the incumbrance. 2 Bl. Com. 421; 4 id. 381, 387; 4 Kent, 427.

The amendment was a contract of lending. The thing loaned was the credit of the State. The security was a pledge of the net profits of the road, a conveyance in trust of the first two hundred and forty sections of land under the congressional grant, and a portion of the first-mortgage bonds of the company to be issued under sect. 21 of its charter. The provision, that, in consideration of the loan, the company should construct its roads within a specified time, was intended as a penal provision in terrorem, and not for the purpose of further security and indemnity against loss on account of the loan, but as security for an extra diligent user of the franchises, and indemnity for a non-extra diligent use.

The forfeiture being for a non-extra diligent use, and no special remedy or mode of taking advantage of it provided, the State was left to the common-law remedy of judicial process and judgment. It could be enforced in no other way. Davis v. Gray, 16 Wall. 232; Curran v. Arkansas, supra; Mumma v. Potomac Co., 8 Pet. 281.

Conceding that this provision for forfeiture was of the nature of a condition in deed, and could be taken advantage of without judicial action, it still remains true that the State lost the right to it, and barred even the judicial remedy, by her own illegal acts, and first and continued breach of the contract which created the condition.

The act of March 8, 1861, with its acceptance by the company, was a mutual rescission, and an agreed abandonment of all prior contracts, engogements, and obligations; a waiver and release of all previous defaults and forfeitures, if any there were; and a new contract in the premises, taking the place of the constitutional amendment.

The court erred in holding that the act of March 10, 1862, was intended as an enforcement or taking advantage of the condition of forfeiture in the constitutional amendment, because the State wished and intended to take under the act of 1861 'without merger or extinguishment.'

This act of 1862 cannot stand as an equivalent for re-entry for a breach of condition in a deed, because the constitutional amendment was not such an instrument. It is not competent for the legislature, by its own act, to seize property for a breach of conditions which are imposed by a statute. While a legislative declaration may be equivalent to re-entry, a re-entry will not avoid a grant from strangers; nor an estate from the grantor, except it be conveyed by his deed containing the condition.

The only ground upon which the act of 1862 can be upheld is, that it was taking advantage of the forfeiture provided in the act of 1861, which took effect of itself, upon the happening of the event. This forfeiture, it is conceded, would not affect the rights of bondholders secured by the prior deed of 1858.

The court erred in holding that the act of March 10, 1862, created a new corporation; and that the St. Paul and Pacific Company is not the same corporate entity as the Minnesota and Pacific Company, and so liable for its debts. The State, by the act of March, 1861, evidently intended, if she should take by forfeiture at all, to take under the provisions of that act. A change in the succession of corporators does not change the corporation in its existence or liabilities, no matter how such change is brought about; and because the St. Paul and Pacific Railroad Company and its successors have succeeded to and hold the franchise to be a corporation, created by the charter of May 22, 1857, they are in law the same being; the same invisible, incorporeal, personal entity; and so liable for its debts. 2 Kent Com., Lect. 33; 2 Bl. Com. c. 18; id. c. 3, p. 37. Story, J., in Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, supra.

Notes