Final Report of the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol/Appendix 4/Endnotes

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ENDNOTES

  1. Taking the Trump conspiracy theory of manipulated Venezuelan voting machines head-on in an overarching assessment, the Intelligence Community's definitive post-election assessment stated: "We have no information suggesting that the current or former Venezuelan regimes were involved in attempts to compromise US election infrastructure." National Intelligence Council, "Intelligence Community Assessment: Foreign Threats to the 2020 US Federal Elections," ICA 2020–00078D, (Mar. 10, 2021), p. 8, available at https:// www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/assessments/ICA-declass-16MAR21.pdf (archived).
  2. For case studies illustrating how such efforts may have manifested at the Capitol on January 6th, see Staff Memo, "Case Studies on Malign Foreign Influence," (Dec. 19, 2022).
  3. National Intelligence Council, "Intelligence Community Assessment: Foreign Threats to the 2020 US Federal Elections," ICA 2020–00078D, (Mar. 10, 2021), Definitions, available at https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/assessments/ICA-declass-16MAR21.pdf (archived).
  4. National Intelligence Council, "Intelligence Community Assessment: Foreign Threats to the 2020 US Federal Elections," ICA 2020–00078D, (Mar. 10, 2021), Definitions, available at https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/assessments/ICA-declass-16MAR21.pdf (archived).
  5. National Intelligence Council, "Intelligence Community Assessment: Foreign Threats to the 2020 US Federal Elections," ICA 2020–00078D, (Mar. 10, 2021), pp. i, 1, available at https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/assessments/ICA-declass-16MAR21.pdf (archived) (emphasis removed).
  1. National Intelligence Council, "Intelligence Community Assessment: Foreign Threats to the 2020 US Federal Elections," ICA 2020–00078D, (Mar. 10, 2021), p. i, available at https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/assessments/ICA-declass-16MAR21.pdf (archived) (emphasis removed).
  2. National Intelligence Council, "Intelligence Community Assessment: Foreign Threats to the 2020 US Federal Elections," ICA 2020–00078D, (Mar. 10, 2021), p. 1, available at https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/assessments/ICA-declass-16MAR21.pdf (archived).
  3. National Intelligence Council, "Intelligence Community Assessment: Foreign Threats to the 2020 US Federal Elections," ICA 2020–00078D, (Mar. 10, 2021), p. 1, available at https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/assessments/ICA-declass-16MAR21.pdf (archived).
  4. The U.S. Intelligence Community is well aware of these foreign influence campaigns, including in the context of elections. See, e.g., National Intelligence Council, "Intelligence Community Assessment: Foreign Threats to the 2020 US Federal Elections," ICA 2020– 00078D, (Mar. 10, 2021), pp. 4–5, 7, available at https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/assessments/ICA-declass-16MAR21.pdf (archived) ("Russian state media, trolls, and online proxies, including those directed by Russian intelligence, published disparaging content about President Biden, his family, and the Democratic Party, and heavily amplified related content circulating in US media …", p. 4; "Iran's election influence efforts were primarily focused on sowing discord in the United States and exacerbating societal tensions …", p. 5; "China has long sought to influence US policies by shaping political and social environments to press US officials to support China's positions and perspectives." p. 7). Over the next 20 years, the Intelligence Community assesses that "China and Russia probably will try to continue targeting domestic audiences in the United States and Europe, promoting narratives about Western decline and overreach." National Intelligence Council, "Global Trends 2040: A More Contested World," (March 2021), p. 94, available at https://www.dni.gov/files/images/globalTrends/GT2040/GlobalTrends_2040_for_web1.pdf (archived).
  5. The National Intelligence Council notes that "some foreign actors may perceive influence activities around US elections as continuations of broad, ongoing efforts rather than specially demarcated campaigns." National Intelligence Council, "Intelligence Community Assessment: Foreign Threats to the 2020 US Federal Elections," ICA 2020–00078D, (Mar. 10, 2021), p. 1, available at https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/assessments/ICAdeclass-16MAR21.pdf (archived).
  6. House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Europe, Eurasia, Energy and the Environment, Hearing on Undermining Democracy: Kremlin Tools of Malign Political Influence, Testimony of Laura Rosenberger, 116th Cong., 1st sess., (May 21, 2019), p. 1, available at https://docs.house.gov/meetings/FA/FA14/20190521/109537/HHRG-116-FA14-WstateRosenbergerL-20190521.pdf. Ms. Rosenberger was, at the time, Director of the Alliance for Securing Democracy and Senior Fellow at the German Marshall Fund of the United States. In an August 2018 briefing for the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Dr. John Kelly, the chief executive officer of Graphika, an analytics firm that studies online information flows, stated: "The data now available make it clear that Russian efforts are not directed against one election, one party, or even one country. We are facing a sustained campaign of organized manipulation, a coordinated attack on the trust we place in our institutions and in our media—both social and traditional." Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Open Hearing on Foreign Influence Operations' Use of Social Media Platforms, Statement of Dr. John W. Kelly, 115th Cong., 2d sess., (Aug. 1, 2018), p. 1, available at https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/document/17963-john-w-kelly-chief-executive-officer-graphika.
  1. National Intelligence Council, "Intelligence Community Assessment: Foreign Threats to the 2020 US Federal Elections," ICA 2020–00078D, (Mar. 10, 2021), p. i, available at https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/assessments/ICA-declass-16MAR21.pdf (archived). But see, John Ratcliffe, Director of National Intelligence, "Views on Intelligence Community Election Security Analysis," (Jan. 7, 2021), available at https://contextcdn.washingtonpost.com/notes/prod/default/documents/6d274110-a84b-4694-96cd6a902207d2bd/note/733364cf-0afb-412d-a5b4-ab797a8ba154 (archived). In this memorandum, DNI Ratcliffe, who had been in office seven months and lacked any prior intelligence experience, said he felt the need to "lead by example and offer my analytic assessment." He argued that the ICA majority's "high confidence" view that "China considered but did not deploy influence efforts intended to change the outcome of the US presidential election" did not "fully and accurately reflect[ ] the scope of the Chinese government's efforts to influence the 2020 U.S. federal elections." Aside from the DNI's very willingness to conclude, in conformity with then-President Trump's contention but without reference to any supporting data, that the IC's combined analytic judgment on China was wrong, this seems a very odd document for the DNI to have chosen to issue the day after the January 6th attack on the U.S. Capitol.
  1. National Intelligence Council, "Intelligence Community Assessment: Foreign Threats to the 2020 US Federal Elections," ICA 2020–00078D, (Mar. 10, 2021), p. i, available at https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/assessments/ICA-declass-16MAR21.pdf (archived).
  2. Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, "Annual Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community," (Feb. 2022), at p. 12, available at https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/assessments/ATA-2022-Unclassified-Report.pdf (emphasis removed).
  3. The National Intelligence Council's comprehensive post-election assessment covers the spectrum, including not only Russia, but also China, Iran, and others, as well as certain non-state actors. See generally, National Intelligence Council, "Intelligence Community Assessment: Foreign Threats to the 2020 US Federal Elections," ICA 2020–00078D, (Mar. 10, 2021), available at https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/assessments/ICA-declass16MAR21.pdf (archived). See also, "Dual U.S. / Russian National Charged With Acting Illegally As A Russian Agent In The United States," Department of Justice, U.S. Attorney's Office, S. Dist. N.Y., (Mar. 8, 2022), available at https://www.justice.gov/usao-sdny/pr/dualus-russian-national-charged-acting-illegally-russian-agent-united-states (archived); "Russian National Charged with Conspiring to Have U.S. Citizens Act as Illegal Agents of the Russian Government," Department of Justice, Office of Public Affairs, (July 29, 2022), available at https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/russian-national-charged-conspiring-have-uscitizens-act-illegal-agents-russian-government (archived).
  4. National Intelligence Council, "Intelligence Community Assessment: Foreign Threats to the 2020 US Federal Elections," ICA 2020–00078D, (Mar. 10, 2021), p. i, available at https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/assessments/ICA-declass-16MAR21.pdf.
  5. National Intelligence Council, "Intelligence Community Assessment: Foreign Threats to the 2020 US Federal Elections," ICA 2020–00078D, (Mar. 10, 2021), p. 4, available at https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/assessments/ICA-declass-16MAR21.pdf.
  6. Department of Homeland Security, "Russia Likely to Continue to Undermine Faith in U.S. Electoral Process," Intelligence in Focus, (Sept. 3, 2020), at p. 1, available at https://publicintelligence.net/dhs-russia-undermining-election/.
  7. Department of Homeland Security, "Russia Likely to Continue to Undermine Faith in U.S. Electoral Process," Intelligence in Focus, (Sept. 3, 2020), at p. 1, available at https://publicintelligence.net/dhs-russia-undermining-election/ (emphasis removed).
  8. National Intelligence Council, "Intelligence Community Assessment: Foreign Threats to the 2020 US Federal Elections," ICA 2020–00078D, (Mar. 10, 2021), pp. 4–5, available at https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/assessments/ICA-declass-16MAR21.pdf.
  9. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, "Russian Active Measures Campaigns And Interference In The 2016 U.S. Election," Volume 2, (Nov. 10, 2020), pp. 18–19, available at https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/publications/report-select-committee-intelligence-unitedstates-senate-russian-active-measures.
  10. National Intelligence Council, "Intelligence Community Assessment: Foreign Threats to the 2020 US Federal Elections," ICA 2020–00078D, (Mar. 10, 2021), p. 4, available at https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/assessments/ICA-declass-16MAR21.pdf.
  1. Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, "Annual Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community," p. 12, (Feb. 7, 2022), available at https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/assessments/ATA-2022-Unclassified-Report.pdf.
  2. National Intelligence Council, "Intelligence Community Assessment: Foreign Threats to the 2020 US Federal Elections," ICA 2020–00078D, (Mar. 10, 2021), at p. 1, available at https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/assessments/ICA-declass-16MAR21.pdf.
  3. National Intelligence Council, "Intelligence Community Assessment: Foreign Threats to the 2020 US Federal Elections," ICA 2020–00078D, (Mar. 10, 2021), at p. i, Key Judgment 2, available at https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/assessments/ICA-declass-16MAR21.pdf (emphasis removed).
  4. National Intelligence Council, "Emerging Dynamics – International: More Contested, Uncertain, and Conflict Prone – Contested and Transforming International Order – Increasing Ideological Competition," Global Trends 2040, 7th ed., (Mar. 2021), p. 95, available at https://www.dni.gov/files/images/globalTrends/GT2040/GlobalTrends_2040_for_web1.pdf.
  5. National Intelligence Council, "Emerging Dynamics – International: More Contested, Uncertain, and Conflict Prone – Contested and Transforming International Order – Increasing Ideological Competition," Global Trends 2040, 7th ed., (Mar. 2021), p. 94, available at https://www.dni.gov/files/images/globalTrends/GT2040/GlobalTrends_2040_for_web1.pdf.
  6. National Intelligence Council, "Intelligence Community Assessment: Foreign Threats to the 2020 US Federal Elections," ICA 2020-00078D, (Mar. 10, 2021), p. 4, available at https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/assessments/ICA-declass-16MAR21.pdf.
  7. National Intelligence Council, "Intelligence Community Assessment: Foreign Threats to the 2020 US Federal Elections," ICA 2020-00078D, (Mar. 10, 2021), p. 4, available at https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/assessments/ICA-declass-16MAR21.pdf.

Introductory Material to the Final Report of the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol first page logo
Introductory Material to the Final Report of the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol first page logo

Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol

Introductory Material to the Final Report of the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol first page logo
Introductory Material to the Final Report of the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol first page logo