Guns for Gold: The Wagner Network Exposed/A decade of entrenching Russian interests abroad

by the Foreign Affairs Committee

1 A decade of entrenching Russian interests abroad

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1. On 24 June 2023, thousands of Wagner fighters occupied Rostov-on-Don, the Russian military headquarters responsible for directing Russia’s renewed illegal invasion of Ukraine.^[1] Their leader, Yevgeny Prigozhin, then threatened to march on Moscow.^[2] The group came within 200km of the capital before Prigozhin and his fighters abandoned the mutiny,^[3] leaving significant questions over the future of the Wagner Group in Ukraine and abroad.

2. We began this inquiry in March 2022 to cast a light on what was (then) a shadowy and under-examined organisation. We aimed to expose the Wagner Group's modus operandi, its impact on UK interests and values, and how this impact was being addressed. This report draws on evidence gathered since that time to examine the nature and extent of the Wagner Group’s network and its expanding activities since 2014; the response of the UK Government; and how this response may affect what comes next. We used written and oral evidence;^[4] commissioned open-source research;^[5] reports from former members of the Wagner Network and drew on the many years’ investigative work of journalists and non-governmental organisations.^[6] Due to the secrecy and uncertainty that surround the Group’s deployments, we make clear our level of confidence when commenting on its countries of operation. We thank all those who contributed to our inquiry, sometimes at risk to themselves.

3. The remainder of this report largely refers to the ‘Wagner Network’, rather than the Wagner Group. This describes more accurately what Prigozhin has been allowed to build: a sprawling, decentralised network of individuals and commercial entities, which is active in several countries and for which the ‘membership’ is not always clear. Exploiting this web of entities is central to the network’s modus operandi.^[7] This network has benefited the personal financial interests of Prigozhin ^[8] and the interests of Russian political elites.^[9] It has often served and furthered Russian foreign policy goals,^[10] as shown by the significant funding,^[11] support^[12] and (in some cases) direction^[13] it received from the Russian state. Although complex to determine which individuals and entities sit within the ‘Wagner Network’, we consider that they all share an ultimate connection to Prigozhin’s financial interests and normally benefit the Russian state indirectly or directly.

4. Our inquiry also examined the Wagner Network through a wider lens, considering the legal and policy challenge of ‘Private Military Companies’ (PMCs) that states use as malign proxies (paragraphs 75–91). PMCs encompass a diverse set of organisations and are not clearly defined by international law (paragraph 77).^[14] We use ‘PMC’ in a general sense in this report to mean a private company (or set of companies) that sells military services in exchange for compensation. Although the Wagner Network is often described as a PMC, we acknowledge that it is not one in the conventional sense of the term in the UK, given the network’s i) illegal status in Russia;^[15] ii) close relationship with the Russian state,^[16] and iii) extensive activities outside the defence sphere, with evidence of economic, electoral and influencing operations (paragraph 14).

5. Russia’s renewed illegal invasion of Ukraine confirmed many long-standing but contested assumptions about the Wagner Network: namely, that it operated with a high level of support from, and co-operation with, the Russian Ministry of Defence (paragraph 8); that it has been primarily state-funded; and that the Russian government facilitated its activities directly,^[17] despite its illegal status as an arms-length body that has provided plausible deniability for the Russian Government. Wagner’s activities in Ukraine—although best-known—are not representative of the network’s wider spectrum of operations globally. Relative to other countries, the purpose, scale and nature of Wagner’s involvement in Ukraine are unique.^[18]

6. Given the scope of our inquiry, this report focuses primarily (but not exclusively) on the network’s military activities and the actions of ‘Wagner fighters’. The network’s military deployments raise questions over how hostile and competitor states may use commercial entities for offensive and deniable military operations in future and the implications for UK interests, the conduct of war and the rules-based international order (paragraphs 76–91)

Growth of the network

7. The Wagner Network was set up in 2014 by individuals close to the Russian military establishment,^[19] with the reported involvement of former GRU^[20] leader Dmitry Utkin.^[21] In September 2022, after many years’ obfuscation, including efforts to sue individuals linking him to the organisation,^[22] Yevgeny Prigozhin admitted that he founded Wagner.^[23] The network’s fighters began their first known military activities in late 2014 in Ukraine, after Russia invaded the east of the country.^[24] At this point, the idea of a “more structured” and “proxy actor” for the Russian state was attractive, due to its limited responsibilities (relative to the Russian army) and its “deniability in case of failure or of excesses”.^[25] The Dossier Center, an investigative NGO, has said of Wagner fighters that:

One of their first operations in Ukraine was the disarming of Crimea in 2014. They were also involved in the downing of the Ukrainian MOD IL-76 (resulting in 49 dead) and attacks on Luhansk airport and Debaltseve.^[26]

8. The Wagner Network then significantly expanded its military and non-military operations in many countries: a trend described by Transparency International as “increasingly alarming”.^[27] These interventions were often secretive^[28] and met with denials from host governments,^[29] the Russian government^[30] and Prigozhin himself.^[31] A former Wagner fighter told us that the Russian Government gave extensive military support to the Wagner Network from the time of its creation:

All that is necessary for combat- uniforms, equipment, weapons and ammunition, was received from Ministry of Defence stocks.^[32]

Even the standard issued weapon of Wagner fighters, a 5.45mm machine gun, relied on the supply of ammunition by the Russian state.^[33] The former Wagner fighter’s evidence—prepared in the first half of 2023—also noted the network’s continued use of the logistics of the Russian Ministry of Defence at that time. The fighter stated that the Ministry provides ammunition and weapons, and facilitates the transfer of Wagner operatives to Syria and Africa. There were also additional forms of support:

Military transport aircraft of the Russian Armed Forces deliver mercenaries and small dimension/weight cargo to the Khmeimim air base (Syria) and further to Africa. Air bases in the city of Chkalovsk (Moscow Region) and Krymsk (Krasnodar Territory) are used to transport operatives of PMC Wagner. Heavy duty cargo, equipment and ammunition for PMC Wagner are delivered to Syria by the Russian Navy.^[34]

9. Sources differ in their estimates of the number of countries where the network has been present.^[35] The network’s interest in exaggerating its global presence adds to the challenges of counting and classification.^[36]Due to these challenges, we used confidence assessments when commenting on countries of operation in this chapter and present these in Table 1

Table 1: Explanation of confidence assessments for countries of operation

High Confidence	Medium Confidence	Low Confidence
There are Prigozhin-affiliated structures in the country with verified images of Wagner mercenaries, official declaration/ recognition of Wagner operatives’ presence by host governments, and/or other official documents that point to a close-to-certain conclusion. We also treat information as reliable if it comes from highly trusted sources (for example, US Treasury designations)	There are multiple reports of Wagner presence, but data is of a lower quality or only partially verifiable, making conclusions likely but not certain.	Data is either entirely unverifiable or of much lower quality, making conclusions possible, but neither certain nor likely.

10. The evidence we received has given us high confidence that the Wagner Network has conducted military operations in at least seven countries since 2014: Ukraine; Syria; the Central African Republic (CAR); Sudan; Libya; Mozambique; and Mali. A primary purpose for authorities inviting Wagner onto their territories has been to help failing or fragile regimes retain power (paragraphs 16–17). Wagner’s interventions in African countries are “governed by agreements negotiated by Prigozhin’s staff”, which provide concessions for mineral deposits, in exchange for Wagner “military operations supporting the Kremlin’s regime of choice”, the protection of local infrastructure and military training.^[37] Further information about Wagner’s military involvement in these seven countries is summarised in Table 2, drawing on the open-source research we commissioned and other sources. Table 2: High-confidence countries where Wagner fighters have carried out offensive military operations (between 2014 and June 2023)

Year of first Involvment	Country	Nature of Involvment	Further Informatoon
2014	Ukraine	Sustained Involvement	Wagner fighters played a “decisive” role supporting pro-Russian separatists in the early battles of the war in Eastern Ukraine, including the seizure of Debaltseve in Donetsk (early 2015).[38] Wagner fighters have taken an active role as a conventional fighting force in the wider Russia-Ukraine war now underway, particularly the battle of Bakhmut.
2015	Syria	Sustained involvement	Wagner fighters have conducted ground operations in support of the Syrian government during the civil war, including a well-known (botched) attack in 2018 in the town of Deir al-Zour, which brought Wagner fighters into direct confrontation with the US military.[39] The Wagner Network has also carried out capacity-building of Syrian army personnel, and recruited Syrian soldiers to fight for it in Libya.[40] An allied PMC-style battalion named the Carpathians was attached to Wagner and fought in Syria.[41] Oil and gas revenues were part of the agreed payment for services to liberate and protect Syria’s oil fields.[42]
2017	Central African Republic (CAR)	Sustained Involvment	Wagner has a significant presence in CAR and so-called ‘Russian instructors’ have participated in military operations in support of President Touadéra.[43] The network also has significant business interests in the country (in particular, gold mining) and has made use of aggressive anti-Western propaganda to solidify Russia’s position as a dominant power in the country. Some have described Wagner’s involvement in CAR as “state capture” (paragraph 23).

Year of first involvement	Country	Nature of involvement	Further information
2017	Sudan	Sustained involvment	The network has mainly taken a non-combat role, providing a support force for the Bashir regime and guarding its business interests.[44]The network offered military training to intelligence and special forces and to the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF).[45] The network maintained closes ties to Sudan’s military after the fall of President Omar al-Bashir in 2019.[46] Despite the network’s denials,[47] it appears to remain active in Sudan, supporting rebel paramilitaries (the RSF) in the ongoing conflict[48] which broke out on 15 April 2023. Wagner’s gold-smuggling operations from Sudan are significant,[49] with one calling them “critical to Russia’s ability to withstand the significant sanctions deployed against it for its illegal invasion in Ukraine”.[50]

Year of first involvement	Country	Nature of involvement	Further information
2018	Libya	Sustained involvement	Wagner personnel were deployed in October 2018 to offer technical assistance and weapons to the Libyan National Army.[51] Up to 1,000 Wagner fighters took part in the advance of the leader of the Libyan National Army (LNA), General Khalifa Haftar, against the UN-backed government in Tripoli in 2019-20.[52] The offensive failed. After a ceasefire was agreed in October 2020, instead of leaving the country as stipulated,[53] Wagner became a “logistics platform” to serve Russian interests, retaining control of military bases like Al-Khadim, Jufra, Qardabiyah and Brak al-Shati.[54] There were estimated to be around 2,000 Wagner staff in the country in 2021.[55] Wagner has been heavily involved in holding and guarding oilfields, training the LNA and establishing air bridges.[56] The network’s activities in Libya “have been multifarious, ranging from specialised military operations, physical security provision at Libya’s oil facilities, political advisory services, and social media influence operations”.[57]

Year of first involvement	Country	Nature of involvement	Further information
2019	Mozambique	Temporary involvement	Wagner fighters started arriving in Mozambique in September 2019,[58] after an agreement on security and energy between Presidents Nyusi and Putin, shortly before the October 2019 Mozambique national election.[59] Wagner provided a personal protection force for the President, and was later deployed in an operation to counter Islamist extremists in Cabo Delgado.[60] This was a major failure[61] and Wagner fighters had to withdraw south by November that year.[62] In addition, the Wagner Network offered political assistance to Nyusi’s party via an illegitimate electoral monitoring mission conducted by the Association For Free Research And International Cooperation (AFRIC).[63] The International Anticrisis Centre (IAC),[64] another Prigozhin-linked entity, also carried out questionable polling in the country in support of Nyusi’s Frelimo party.[65]

Years of first Involvment	Country	Nature of Involvment	Further information
2021	Mali	Sustained involvment	2021 -Mali -Sustained - involvement - Wagner was invited by Mali’s military junta to provide security services against Islamist militant groups, following a coup by Colonel Assimi Goita in May 2021. Wagner operatives reportedly arrived in late 2021.[66] In December 2021, the UK and its international partners strongly condemned the deployment of Wagner fighters to Mali.[67] Before Wagner mercenaries were visible in Mali, Russian soft power had already played an important role in influencing public opinion on its involvement in Mali.[68] A Wagner/Prigozhin-affiliated entity, the Foundation for the Protection of National Values (FZNC), published surveys after the military coup in 2021, showcasing opinions in favour of Russian intervention and negative perceptions of the French military’s Operation Barkhane.[69] Following Colonel Assimi Goita’s accession to power, efforts continued to influence the perception of local populations in favour of an alliance with Russia and, in turn, to support the arrival of Wagner mercenaries.70[70]

11. In addition to these seven countries, there are a further four where we have high confidence of the Wagner Network’s non-military involvement since 2014: Zimbabwe, the DRC, Madagascar, and South Africa. These countries are presented in Table 3. Table 3: High-confidence countries where the Wagner Network has carried out non-military activities (between 2014 and June 2023)

Year of involvement	Country	Nature of involvement	Further information
2018	Zimbabwe	Unknown	We have high confidence that the Prigozhin-linked entity, AFRIC, has provided political services, including illegitimate election observation missions.[71] Meta took down inauthentic accounts in 2022 linked to Prigozhin’s Internet Research Agency.[72]
2018	Democratic Republic of Congo	Unknown	The Democratic Republic of the Congo, where we have high confidence that Prigozhin-linked AFRIC has sponsored illegitimate election monitoring missions.[73]
2018	Madagascar	Temporary	Madagascar, where we have high confidence of Wagner Network attempts at interference in the 2018 Presidential Election—including through AFRIC—and medium confidence of Prigozhin-linked mining interests.[74]
2018	South Africa	Temporary	South Africa, where we have high confidence that AFRIC attempted to interfere in elections[75] and that other Prigozhin-linked entities, the Foundation for National Values Protection (FZNC) and the International Anticrisis Center, have been involved.[76] Both entities are part of Prigozhin’s malign influence operations globally

12. In addition to these 11 countries (paras 9–10), there are six countries where we have medium confidence that entities within the Wagner Network have operated since 2014, but not as a fighting force. These countries are presented in Table 4. Companies registered in other countries have also facilitated the Wagner Network’s payments and operations.^[77]

Table 4: Medium-confidence countries where the Wagner Network has carried out non-military activities (between 2014 and June 2023)

Caption text

Years of first Involvment	Country	Nature of involvment	Further involvment
2021	Afghanistan	Unknown	Afghanistan - Unknown - We have medium confidence that Wagner has been recruiting former members of the Afghan army and that key figures linked to the Wagner Network have met with representatives of the Taliban since August 2021 to offer strategic communication services.[78]
2022	Burkina Faso	Durable	Durable -We have medium confidence that, since 2022, Prigozhin-affiliated media (RiaFan) organised pro-Russian campaigns on social media since mid-2022, in the build-up to a second coup.[79] unconfirmed reports of a deal between the national government and the Wagner Network.[80]
Allegedly 2017/2018	Cameroon	Durable	We have medium confidence that Wagner operatives have used Cameroon as a logistics corridor[81] and where we have medium confidence that the network uses the port at Douala to ship ‘blood diamonds’ and other mineral extracted products, constituting a durable presence in-country.[82]

Year of first involvment	Country	Nature of involvment	Further information
2021	Chad	Unknown	We have medium confidence that since 2021 the Prigozhin- linked entity, FZNC (sanctioned by the US Government), has conducted questionable polling in which it asked Chadians if they would be willing to participate in demonstrations. This polling was accompanied by commentary from Maxim Shugaley, an individual sanctioned for his links to Wagner in some jurisdictions (see Appendix 1). There are rumours that FACT has been trained by Wagner but these have not been verified.
Unknown	Serbia	Durable	In January 2023, Serbian President Aleksandar Vucic denied Wagner’s involvement in the country. We have high confidence that the network advertised in Serbia in January 2023[83] for fighters in the war against Ukraine. There have been reports of connections between the Serbian ‘People’s Patrol’ organisation and the Wagner Network
Unknown	Zambia	Unknown	We have medium confidence that FZNC has conducted polling, even though this was not publicly released.[84] PDF reports on polling in Chad that were released on 25 March 2021 contained the following title (translated) in their metadata: “Qualitative research on public opinion in Zambia”.[85]

Additionally, we have seen some evidence that Wagner operatives have been physically present in other countries since 2014. Due to our low confidence in the accuracy of this information, we have not named these countries.

13. The Wagner Network is a collection of individuals and entities linked to Yevgeny Prigozhin and undertaking military, economic, political and influencing operations internationally. It formed in 2014 and began its military activities in Ukraine, where it has had sustained involvement. The network subsequently expanded to several other countries in Africa and the Middle East. It has undertaken offensive military operations in at least seven countries since 2014: Ukraine; Syria; the Central African Republic (CAR); Sudan; Libya; Mozambique; and Mali. There are 10 further countries where we have medium or high confidence that it has been involved in a non-military capacity since 2014, and many more countries where the network’s presence is rumoured. The perceived benefits of Wagner

A direct and indirect tool of the Russian state

14. As shown by the above examples, the Wagner Network’s activities have gone beyond conventional military activities. Its services encompassed political advisory services, electoral services, media campaigns, mineral extraction and guarding/security services. It has also run “opportunistic” Russian disinformation campaigns via Prigozhin-affiliated media outlets,^[86] which can serve as a precursor to the involvement of Wagner fighters— as occurred in Mali (see Table 2 above). Mark Galeotti, Honorary Professor at the UCL School of Slavonic and East European Studies, has noted the network:

…shifts almost seamlessly between being an out and out proxy of the Kremlin, and an essentially commercial organisation driven by the search for profit. This not only makes it often difficult to grasp its motivations in any one theatre, it also highlights the challenges of dealing with regimes in which the boundaries between the private and the public are both porous and mobile.^[87]

He asserted that “while clearly Prigozhin would not deploy it […] without getting clearance from the Kremlin, in most cases it is [not] actively tasked by the Russian government”.^[88] He cited Ukraine and Libya as exceptions, where “Wagner is clearly and verifiably acting on Kremlin orders”.^[89] However, even in countries where the network operates solely for economic gain and receives payments from host governments (rather than the Russian state):

…clearly Moscow does accrue some influence and soft power [from the Network’s presence], especially by being demonstrably willing to work with corrupt and authoritarian governments […] Prigozhin’s contractors – not just mercenaries but also political technologists – can be a useful foot in the door. […] Wagner can act as a cover for intelligence and influence operations conducted by the SVR (Foreign Intelligence Service) and, especially, GRU (military intelligence).^[90]

Despite this symbiotic relationship, evidence from a former Wagner fighter indicates that operational tensions between the network and the Russian Ministry of Defence are long-standing.^[91]

15. The Wagner Network is highly opportunistic and not a straightforward proxy for Russia, even though the Russian state has sometimes directed, facilitated, and supported its military operations, notably in Libya and Ukraine. Even when the network has acted purely in its own economic interests, Russia is likely to have benefited financially or in geopolitical influence from its presence. Its guiding hand has been the Russian state.

Incentives for buyers

16. A former Wagner fighter was positive about the role of the Wagner Network, saying, “the Wagner Group has real autonomy and, in my view, has earnt its well-developed brand.”^[92]This individual provided detailed examples from CAR to demonstrate the point.^[93] We received little other evidence that defended the record of Wagner fighters. However, it is logical to assume that the host governments perceived benefits from engaging with the Wagner Network. Many governments sought military protection against security threats, sometimes disillusioned with the international community’s efforts.^[94]Accordingly, the network has offered counter-terrorism/counter-insurgency operations, provided training unrestrained by human rights obligations, and supplied weapons and military equipment. It offered one or more of these services in CAR,^[95] Mozambique,^[96] Sudan,^[97] Syria^[98] and Mali.^[99] The network also offered a personal protection detail for leaders; suppressed 'security threats' in the form of political protests and opposition;^[100] and offered political 'consultancy' services to strengthen an incumbent regime.^[101] The former Wagner fighter asserted that, except for Ukraine, Wagner operates "only by agreement with the current government",^[102] However, we note that rebel military leaders have also sought the network's services to further their campaigns,^[103] which appears to contradict the fighter's claim. The network's counter-terrorism services may have sometimes furthered stability. In CAR, its fighters helped the army to repel a major Islamist offensive in early 2021 and retake swathes of territory.^[104] Growing concerns over terrorism in the Sahel region of Africa^[105] may lead other national governments in the region to engage the network's services.

17. Host governments and other non-regime actors must perceive benefits from engaging with the Wagner Network, because they consider it the most effective form of protection and security. There are examples of its fighters furthering a regime's security objectives, even if this meant neutering political opposition.

The price of Wagner military deployments

Operating with impunity

18. The brutality of Wagner fighters when offering military services is notorious and well-documented, violating the norms of international law and taking the lives of civilians. Dr Sorcha MacLeod, Chair of the UN Working Group on Mercenaries, warned of the "trends of widespread violence and grave human rights violations" that surround them.^[106] Wagner fighters stand accused of atrocities in virtually all of the countries where they have operated militarily since 2014.^[107] Examples include:

• In Ukraine, the German foreign intelligence service intercepted messages in April 2022 suggesting Wagner fighters played a leading role in the massacre in Bucha.^[108] Within the wider Russia-Ukraine war, Wagner fighters and regular members of the Russian Armed Forces are "given a free hand to conduct cruelty", according to Bellingcat's Christo Grozev.^[109] The Ukrainian Prosecutor General is processing more than 93,000 incidents of potential war crimes in Ukraine; he said on 3 July 2023 that Wagner forces had committed "among the most severe crimes" within this number.^[110]
• UN experts have said Wagner fighters in the Central African Republic carried out grave human rights abuses, including summary executions, torture and gender-based violence.^[111] The Sentry, an investigative and policy NGO, accused Wagner fighters of creating "a climate of terror and fear".^[112] In October 2021, the CAR national authorities admitted Wagner fighters' role in atrocities.^[113]
• A UN fact-finding mission verified the involvement of Wagner fighters in an 'anti-terrorist' operation in Mali from December 2021, which, in March 2022, led to the death of 500 people over five days in the rural town of Moura.^[114] Corinne Dufka, Sahel director at Human Rights Watch, called this the “worst [atrocity] in Mali in a decade”.^[115] UK Government officials directly linked the arrival of Wagner fighters to Mali’s deteriorating human rights situation in early 2022.^[116]

In CAR and Mali, Wagner fighters are documented as having targeted civilians at a significantly higher rate than both state forces and major insurgent or terrorist groups in those countries.^[117]The destabilising effects of Wagner engagement have been underlined by the United States^[118] and European Union.^[119] The UK Government stated that Wagner fighters [emphasis added]:

…undermine security and do not offer any kind of credible long-term approach […] Wagner has also interfered in African politics by protecting and supporting military regimes and weakening democratic processes […] The deployment of proxy military forces such as Wagner undermines international law and […] The Wagner Group is a driver of conflict and capitalises on instability for its own interests [...] Wagner has committed human rights abuses, undermined the work of international peacekeepers, and sought control of mineral resources, to the detriment of local citizens and their economy.^[120]

19. Dr Sorcha MacLeod, Chair of the UN Working Group on the Use of Mercenaries, told us it is “almost impossible” to hold “mercenaries and mercenary-type actors” to account for their crimes.^[121] Wagner deployments foster a “context of impunity”.^[122] This is because:

• These actors lack the accountability systems of ordinary militaries123^[123]—”deliberately so”.^[124] According to an ex-Wagner fighter, mercenaries “can act outside the law” and each is “forced to establish his own moral norms.”^[125]

• Victims and investigatory bodies cannot easily determine the identity and organisation of mercenary fighters,^[126] and ‘Wagner’ itself is not a single legal entity^[127] with easily identifiable individuals and hierarchies;^[128]

• Other than Ukraine, the Wagner Network often holds political sway in the countries where its fighters operate.^[129] It is also usually present at the explicit request of the host Government, which can result in a desire by national authorities to hide atrocities. This situation undermines the independence of national investigations and makes complaints less likely,^[130] especially where judicial independence is poor;

• The Russian Government (and Russian courts^[131]) have repeatedly obstructed efforts to investigate^[132] and/or challenge^[133] Wagner alleged crimes;

• Wagner-like bodies and PMCs generally do not fit easily into the existing

international legal framework.^[134] Many have not subscribed to international voluntary initiatives promoting responsible activity (paragraph 79).

The response of the UK Government to the de facto impunity of Wagner fighters is discussed later in this report (paragraph 81) Delivering unreliable results

20. Although many host governments enter agreements with the Wagner Network to shore up their own power, or to tackle insurgencies or terror groups that threaten their control, the presence of the Wagner Network rarely delivers those outcomes. Wagner fighters frequently failed to fulfil many military objectives for which they were contracted. They were unsuccessful in countering Islamist extremists in Mozambique in 2019 and their extremely early departure appears to have further undermined national security.^[135] Wagner fighters faced “decimation” at the hands of the US military after the failed assault on Deir al-Zour, Syria, in 2018.^[136] Furthermore, the assistance and battle support offered by Wagner fighters in the Tripoli offensive (2019–20) were insufficient to ensure victory for the LNA.^[137]

21. The invitation of the Wagner Network in the first place is a sign of weakness and openness to extreme violence and corruption.

Thriving in instability

22. Witnesses noted Wagner’s vested interest in maintaining conflict^[138] and impeding democratic processes. For instance, Wagner fighters have:

• Undermined international efforts to promote peace and security. Wagner fighters—along with other actors—have made the UN’s arms embargo for Libya “ineffective”, due to their continued supply of arms and military material to the country.^[139] The persistent presence of its operatives violates the terms of Libya’s October 2020 ceasefire.^[140]
• Weakened democratic governance and fostered corruption. Wagner’s gold-smuggling activities in Sudan enabled huge quantities of gold to bypass the state and relied in part on an illegal commercial arrangement; civilian officials attempting to challenge these practices have effectively been censured.^[141]The network also advised then-President Bashir on how to suppress protests.^[142] The Prigozhin-linked entity AFRIC has been involved in illegitimate election monitoring processes in several countries. Undermining democracy has been directly linked to the pursuit of profit through the weakening of government capacity, processes and controls.^[143]
• Gained access to natural resources on preferential terms, to the detriment of the national economy. In Sudan, Wagner-linked gold mining companies have benefited from generous concessions.^[144] The network appears to have a “chokehold” over Libya’s natural resources and export facilities; consequently, “Libyan oil output has drastically decreased”.^[145]

23. The consequences of the network’s involvement in the Central African Republic are particularly far-reaching. The Sentry’s many years of investigation led it to warn that CAR is “a successful testing ground for Wagner to perfect the art of state capture with a view to outsourcing it to more vulnerable countries”.^[146] The deep involvement of the Wagner Network in the country is examined in Box 1 and shows the growing reliance of the CAR national government on the network for security. In the process, this undermines freedom of the press, political opposition, good governance, international engagement and even potentially the national constitution.

Box 1: Case study on the Wagner Network’s involvement in the Central African Republic

In 2017, President Touadéra signed a number of security agreements with the Russian government and requested military support in exchange for access to diamonds, gold and uranium.^[147] In December 2017, the Russian Foreign Ministry successfully lobbied for an exemption to the United Nations’ (UN) arms embargo,^[148] and Russia was permitted to provide weapons and ‘trainers’ to support CAR forces. It announced that 170 instructors would be deployed to CAR.^[149]

Between 2018 and 19, Prigozhin negotiated mining access in exchange for Wagner services to secure the President’s re-election,^[150] which the Wagner Network achieved using a combination of bribery, intimidation and “aggressive anti-Western and pro-Russian propaganda”.^[151] The network is now seeking to secure a third term for the President, including by forcing a change to the country’s constitution if necessary.^[152]

In April 2022, it was estimated that up to 2,000 Wagner fighters were in CAR, although Russia maintained it was a lower number of ‘instructors’.153</ref>Q6 [Sorcha MacLeod</ref> The departure of French stabilisation troops in late 2022 means that the CAR government is now more dependent on the Wagner Network for maintaining security.154^[153]

The Wagner Network has protected President Touadéra against rebel forces, in addition to securing key economic locations such as Lobaye and Haute-Kotto (sites of exploration and mining).^[154] Wagner operatives have also trained the national armed forces (FACA).^[155] The network has significant political influence in CAR and a key Wagner representative, Valery Zakharov, served as the President’s security advisor in Wagner’s first three years in the country.^[156]

The investigative and policy NGO The Sentry has said that the Network is primarily financed and operated via security and mining activities, which are carried out via three CAR-registered companies,^[157] which “operate in total opacity”.^[158] One of these, Midas Resources, has facilities in the gold mine of Ndassima in central CAR, to which Wagner operatives have prevented access by Central African mining authorities.^[159] US cables and internal documents from the Wagner Network suggested that it had at least 13 bases in the country in 2021, and revealed US concern over Wagner’s dramatic expansion of the production area of Ndassima mine in the nine-month run-up to February 2023. US officials estimate that this mine could, in the long term, “produce rewards upward of $1 billion”.^[160]

The Sentry has shown “how Wagner’s top command structure has diverted political and security processes sponsored by international donors (e.g., elections, peace agreements, disarmament programs, and UN-backed operations) to serve Russia’s geostrategic objectives and the financial interests of the organization.”^[161] Propaganda is key to how Wagner seeks to expand. For example, Prigozhin reportedly sponsored

the film ‘Tourist’ (May 2021), which glorifies Wagner mercenaries in CAR.^[162]

24. The African Union has long sought to eliminate the “scourge” of mercenarism within the continent of Africa of the type exemplified by the Wagner Network.^[163]However, despite this multilateral commitment, there is a lack of will from some individual member states to reverse the proliferation of Wagner activities across the continent of Africa.

25. There is a significant gap between perception and capability when it comes to the Wagner Network. Despite the continued belief by some that inviting them into a country will result in benefits, the reality is that regimes pay a high price for working with the Wagner Network. The original outcomes are rarely achieved. During the past 10 years, Wagner fighters have left behind a trail of atrocities in virtually all theatres where they have operated, with limited accountability. They may present themselves as a highly trained, professional fighting force but their indiscipline, their excessive violence and their financial motivation mean that the network has functioned like an international criminal mafia, fuelling corruption and plundering natural resources. Some regimes’ reliance on the network for survival means that Wagner actors show little respect for the citizens or the laws of the countries where they operate. The network’s military and political involvement in the Central African Republic is all-encompassing and should serve as a warning of what may happen elsewhere. Even when Wagner’s deployments do not result in benefits for the host country, they are often a great success for the network itself due to the lucrative resources it accesses, particularly in the Central African Republic and Sudan.

Coming out of the shadows: Renewed Illegal Invasion of Ukraine

26. Before February 2022, Wagner offered to a great extent a “deniable military capability” for the Russian Government.^[164]Their role and visibility transformed over the subsequent year and a half. They have played an increasingly visible role in the renewed illegal invasion by Russia of Ukraine, particularly in the battles of Soledar and Bakhmut. Wagner became a “key node within Russian’s fighting force in Ukraine”^[165]—in what a UK Minister called a “sign of wholesale institutional failure on the part of Putin’s military”.Q197[Leo Docherty</ref>Support from the Russian Ministry of Defence to the network increased significantly.^[166] British defence chiefs stated in January 2023 there were up to 50,000 Wagner fighters in Ukraine;^[167]the United States Government provided further detail, estimating around 10,000 contractors and 40,000 convicts.^[168]

27. Prigozhin’s willingness to admit his role in founding the Wagner Group^[169]and his arguments with the Russian Ministry of Defence over the supply of ammunition to Wagner fighters^[170] were some of the most public signs that the network no longer felt the need to exist in the shadows.^[171] The Russian state celebrated Wagner fighters as patriots. In November 2022, the Russian dissident, Mikhail Khodorkovsky, told of their increased popularity in the war, as “people believe that the alternative to this [using a PMC] would be conscripts”.^[172] 28. The high rate of attrition among Wagner fighters in battles in Ukraine led some to call them “cannon fodder”^[173] and to highlight their “suicidal tactics”.^[174] In January 2023, the head of the charity Russia Behind Bars estimated that, of the fighters that the network had recruited from Russian prisons, around 80% were dead or missing.^[175] Speaking of Wagner fighters’ activities in Ukraine, the Parliamentary Under Secretary of State (Europe), Leo Docherty MP, said:

Their appalling and obvious brutality, which they themselves celebrate, diminishes their status, their deniability and their brand, and therefore their utility and attractiveness as a partner.^[176]

He added, however, that Wagner’s business model remains “potent”.^[177] Even if that is the case, Wagner fighters do not always appear to be particularly competent.

National security implications

29. The Wagner Network’s activities affect the UK’s national security. Looking first to our near neighbourhood, its fighters are directly participating in the renewed illegal invasion of Ukraine. The network’s activities in other countries are also believed to be assisting the financing of the Russian war machine (paragraph 50). The Prime Minister has said that

Ukraine’s security is all of our security. Russia’s invasion and continuing occupation of Georgia, invasion and occupation of Crimea, threats to the UK homeland and attempts to destroy Ukraine are assaults on European security^[178]

Wider security consequences of the Wagner Network’s activities include:

• Risk to relations with nations that uphold the rules-based international order: Wagner activities may undermine the viability of UK Embassies, particularly in Africa. Russian influence—including via likely Wagner influence operations—significantly degraded France’s diplomatic relations with many African countries.^[179] The FCDO acknowledged that “Wagner have had a clear effect on our ability to partner” in Mali.^[180] Anti-France campaigns built on pre-existing opposition to the country, due to its colonial legacy. The UK may be similarly vulnerable.
• Regional instability: The breakdown of national order can have major regional consequences and Wagner activities can make this more likely. In April, conflict broke out in Sudan, which resulted in the displacement of nearly 3 million people internally and across borders.^[181] Wagner activities were a contributory factor to the breakdown of order in Sudan. Within Africa, where the network has its most extensive geographic footprint, the presence of Wagner troops increases the likelihood of violence (including gender-based violence), corruption, autocracy, conflict escalation, the displacement of people, and greater competition over resources.^[182] All of these go against the desire of the UK Government to enhance stability, reduce fragility and counter threats to UK nationals abroad. Migratory flows can increase pressures on neighbouring countries, which themselves may be fragile or conflict-affected.
• Threats to the international order: The UK Government believes that countries have a “shared higher interest in an open and stable international order”,^[183] but use of malign proxy groups in warfare weakens this. There may also be risks to the UK of being seen not to stand up for its values.
• Emboldening of violent groups: The failure of the Wagner Network to effectively counter terrorist or insurgent groups can allow hostile groups to obtain further advantage, secure more weapons and consolidate (or even gain) territories. We also received evidence from a former Wagner fighter suggesting that Prigozhin once bought a batch of weapons and ammunition directly from Hezbollah.^[184]

30. There are serious national security threats to the UK and its allies of allowing the network to continue to thrive, not to mention devastating human consequences, including contributing to the refugee crisis for example, Sudan.

31. Over the past year and a half, Russia's illegal invasion of Ukraine has eroded the Wagner Network’s deniability and Prigozhin’s public arguments with the Russian Ministry of Defence confirmed the network’s long-suspected links to the Russian state. The brutality of its fighters in Ukraine is appalling but not atypical. So long as the network survives in some form, we believe that countries may still turn to it in future. Many leaders—mostly in insecure environments in Africa—are likely already to have known the price of engaging the network when they decided to work with it.

32. We recommend that the Government explicitly states that it opposes the co-operation of any country with the Wagner Network, or future iterations thereof, due to the security threats of the ‘Wagner model’ of business and governance. Where countries can be incentivised not to partner with the network or to re-engage after partnering with it, they should be. National governments that collude with the Wagner Network to breach UN sanctions, or that take no steps to protect their populations from Wagner-perpetrated atrocity crimes, should face financial and diplomatic consequences, where appropriate.

1. Russian insurrection: Prigozhin’s failed mutiny and the fallout, Financial Times, 6 July 2023
2. Yevgeny Prigozhin (also called Evgeny Prigozhin) is the self-professed founder of the Wagner Group, often referred to as ‘Putin’s chef’ for his catering contracts.
3. Crisis Group, ‘Assessing the Wagner Group’s Aborted Run on Moscow: What Comes Next?’. 29 June 2023 (accessed 10 July 2023); see also Instability in Russia: Prigozhin’s armed rebellion, Research Briefing 9823, House of Commons Library, 27 June 2023
4. We published 16 pieces of written evidence and received further confidential submissions. We held three public evidence sessions, taking oral evidence from nine witnesses: experts, representatives of Bellingcat, the Dossier Center and the UN Working Group on the Use of Mercenaries; and the Government.
5. The Committee commissioned small-scale open-source research into the Wagner Group’s network and operations, which was carried out by the not-for-profit Centre for Information Resilience (CIR). The results of this research are integrated into this report (with citation) and in particular inform Appendix 2, in which we name individuals and entities who are not sanctioned by the UK but who we have strong reason to believe are associated with the Wagner Network. CIR used open-source intelligence triangulated with information collected by investigators from closed sources, and previous (academic) research. No deception was involved in this research.
6. This work is often highly dangerous. Three journalists in the Central African Republic doing relevant work were assassinated. Mikhail Khodorkovsky, founder of the Dossier Center, stated that “we demonstrated convincingly that people working for Mr Prigozhin participated in the murders”. Q96
7. For example, the bank accounts of front/cover companies reportedly store the money for paying Wagner fighters. Anonymous (WGN0026)
8. Verified by the CIR open-source research.
9. Anonymous (WGN0026)
10. Speaking in relation to network’s previous activities, the Center on Terrorism, Extremism, and Counterterrorism noted that its objectives “are the Russian Federation’s objectives. Wagner pursues its activities with an eye towards advancing Russia’s national security interests in two primary ways: 1) undermining democracy, and; 2) benefiting from the profits derived from the exploitation the natural resources it has gained access to. […] In doing this, the Wagner Group gains access to important resources that advance Russia’s geopolitical interests.” Center on Terrorism, Extremism, and Counterterrorism - Middlebury Institute of International Studies (WGN0023)
11. President Putin recently stated that the Russian state “fully financed” the Group and provided over 86 billion rubles (approx. $940 million) from May 2022 to May 2023. ‘Putin admits Kremlin gave Wagner nearly $1 billion in the past year’, POLITICO, 27 June 2023
12. In 2021, UN experts detailed the Russian military cargo flights that had “become routine” since Wagner’s first deployment to Libya in October 2020 and judged that Wagner “does not have indigenous logistic resources to allow the organization to operate independently on major deployments. It requires external hybrid commercial and military logistic support, in particular aviation and maritime assets, to deploy and sustain its operations.” Letter dated 8 March 2021 from the Panel of Experts on Libya established pursuant to resolution 1973 (2021) addressed to the President of the Security Council S/2021/229, Annex 77, para 10
13. For instance, see Qq34–35 [Christo Grozev]. Also see this investigation by Bellingcat, The Insider and Der Spiegel, which showed Prigozhin’s disinformation, political and military operations to be integrated with the Russian Military of Defence and its intelligence arm, the GRU. Bellingcat, ‘Putin Chef’s Kisses of Death: Russia’s Shadow Army’s State-Run Structure Exposed’, 14 August 2020 (accessed 16 July 2023). On the many links between Wagner and the Russian military establishment, see CSIS, ‘Band of Brothers: The Wagner Group and the Russian State | Center for Strategic and International Studies’, 21 September 2020 (accessed 16 July 2023)
14. The same goes for the broader term, ‘Private Military and Security Companies’ (PMSCs).
15. Qq8–9 [Christo Grozev]; Q96 [Mikhail Khodorkovsky]
16. Henry Jackson Society (WGN0020)
17. For example, its recruitment of fighters from Russian prisons and the Russian Ministry of Defence’s supply of ammunition to Wagner fighters.
18. Wagner fighters have directly served Russia’s (aggressive) military goals in Ukraine, unlike in other countries where its engagement has benefited the Russian state more indirectly. Furthermore, in other countries, the network appears to have been present with the consent of the host government. The nature and scale of Wagner’s engagement in other countries also differs from the large-scale, conventional fighting force it has provided in Ukraine
19. The Wagner Network was pre-dated by Slavonic Corps, which was registered in 2012 by Russian ex-servicemen and had links to Moran Security Group. Dossier Center (WGN0009) paras 18–21. Christo Grozev of Bellingcat noted that Wagner’s predecessor had acted as a for-profit fighting organisation in Syria in 2013 but “it did not act on behalf of or as a proxy of the Russian Government”. It was in 2014 that “what we know currently as the Wagner private military company was organised”.Q9.
20. The GRU is Russia’s military intelligence service
21. Dmitry Utkin is a former GRU leader who many, including the United States Government, have previously described as Wagner’s founder. It is likely that this is at least partly because Utkin started using ‘Wagner’ as his personal callsign in 2014. However, the investigative organisation Bellingcat has said “there is ample data suggesting that his role was more of a field commander, and that the “Wagner Group” mercenaries are integrated in an overall chain of command under central Kremlin control with its military intelligence (GU/GRU) apparatus”. Similarly, a former Wagner fighter told us that the first detachments of Wagner mercenaries were created in 2014 under the leadership of the Russian Ministry of Defence, and that Dmitry Utkin commanded one of these detachments. See Anonymous (WGN0026); US Department of the Treasury, ‘Treasury Designates Individuals and Entities Involved in the Ongoing Conflict in Ukraine’, 20 June 2017 (accessed 16 July 2023); Mr D White (Risk/Crisis Management Advisor at Freelance) (WGN0001); CSIS, ‘Band of Brothers: The Wagner Group and the Russian State | Center for Strategic and International Studies’, 21 September 2020 (accessed 16 July 2023); Dossier Center (WGN0009) para 21; Bellingcat, ‘Putin Chef’s Kisses of Death: Russia’s Shadow Army’s State-Run Structure Exposed’, 14 August 2020 (accessed 16 July 2023
22. For example, see Henry Jackson Society (WGN0020) para 7; Matrix Chambers, ‘Defamation claim against Bellingcat founder struck out’ (accessed 16 July 2023)
23. Originally in a post on Russia social media site, VKontakte. For analysis, see Putin ally Yevgeny Prigozhin admits founding Wagner mercenary group, The Guardian, 26 September 2022; Russian oligarch Yevgeny Prigozhin admits he created the mercenary Wagner Group, POLITICO, 26 September 2022.
24. Q9 [Christo Grozev].
25. Q9 [Christo Grozev].
26. “Utkin and Wagner might also have been involved in the assassination of at least 10 Luhansk People’s Republic warlords.” Dossier Center (WGN0009) paras 22–23.
27. Transparency International Defence & Security, Transparency International UK (WGN0021) para 5.1
28. Q39 [Dr Sorcha MacLeod]. Occasionally, Wagner deployments are referred to as visiting ‘Russian instructors’. Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (WGN0025) section 1
29. For example, Sudan’s foreign ministry denies presence of Russian Wagner Group, Reuters, 22 March 2022; Mali denies deployment of Russian mercenaries from Wagner Group, France 24, 25 December 2021. In conversations, ministers and officials in one country where we are confident Wagner fighters have been deployed were extremely cagey when we asked them whether they invited Wagner to operate in the country
30. For example, see Sergei Lavrov quote in ‘Russian mercenaries behind Central African Republic atrocities’, BBC News, 3 May 2022; see the Russian delegate’s comments on Mali at ReliefWeb, ‘Amid Executions, Forced Disappearances in Mali, Mission Head Tells Security Council Little Progress Made towards Implementing Peace Agreement’, 7 April 2022 (accessed 10 July 2023)
31. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, ‘Putin’s Not-So-Secret Mercenaries: Patronage, Geopolitics, and the Wagner Group’, 8 July 2019 (accessed 16 July 2023); Leaked documents reveal Russian effort to exert influence in Africa | World news, The Guardian, 8 June 2019
32. Anonymous (WGN0026)
33. The fighter added: “In the Middle East and Africa, the standard for the army is a 7.62 mm assault rifle and these countries do not produce/have ammunition for a 5.45 mm rifle.” Anonymous (WGN0026)
34. Anonymous (WGN0026)
35. This is likely due to varying methodologies when it comes to what qualifies as a Wagner operation, as well as the limited transparency surrounding the network. Examples of varying estimates:
    In 2022, the Government listed the Wagner’s countries of operation as Ukraine, Sudan, Mozambique, Syria, CAR, Libya and Mali. Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (WGN0025) section 1
    The Dossier Center noted that Prigozhin’s staff were interested in Syria and over 50 African countries, which are “ranked into three categories – the first being the countries most vulnerable and beneficial to the Kremlin […] and the third being the least interesting with high levels of cooperation with other foreign powers (according to 2018 internal documents). Since then, more than ten countries listed have hosted Russian mercenaries and political technologists (CAR, Sudan, Mali, Zimbabwe, Madagascar, South Africa, Mozambique, DRC, Angola, Guinea).” Dossier Center (WGN0009) para 31
36. As an example of possible inflation, in September 2022, Prigozhin praised Wagner “heroes” and alluded to their role in Latin America. However, the open-source research we commissioned for this inquiry could not verify with high or medium confidence that the Wagner Network had conducted operations in Latin America since 2014. The UK Government has not recognised the group’s presence in Latin America. Although it is not possible to verify at this stage, that does not mean that the Group has no operations in the continent. Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (WGN0025)
37. Dossier Center (WGN0009) para 29. See also Anonymous (WGN0026)
38. CSIS, ‘Moscow’s Mercenary Wars: The Expansion of Russian Private Military Companies’, September 2020 (accessed 16 July 2023)
39. Andrew Linder, ‘Russian Private Military Companies in Syria and beyond’, 2018 (accessed 10 July 2023); How a 4-Hour Battle Between Russian Mercenaries and US Commandos Unfolded in Syria, New York Times, 24 May 2018
40. CIR open-source research; Letter dated 8 March 2021 from the Panel of Experts on Libya established pursuant to resolution 1973 (2021) addressed to the President of the Security Council S/2021/229, Annex 77, para 28
41. CIR open-source research
42. Dossier Center (WGN0009) para 25; Mr D White (WGN0001)
43. Q6 [Sorcha MacLeod]
44. Although the Wagner Group temporarily became “an actual direct player in trying to repress the demonstrations” during the 2019 protests against Bashir, expert Samuel Ramani notes that it was pushed back into its ‘guardianship’ role after his overthrow. Russian mercenaries in Sudan: What is the Wagner Group’s role?, Al Jazeera, 17 April 2023
45. According to Sudanese officials and documents shared with the Associated Press. US pressures allies to expel Russia’s Wagner mercenaries from Libya, Sudan, France 24, 3 February 2023
46. Leaked documents published by Le Monde and the Organised Crime and Corruption Reporting Project in November 2022 shed further light on the close relationship between the Wagner Group and the Sudanese military. OCCRP, ‘Documents Reveal Wagner’s Golden Ties to Sudanese Military Companies’, 2 November 2022 (accessed 16 July 2023)
47. Several media outlets (for example, Russia’s private Wagner Group denies it is operating in Sudan, Reuters, 20 April 2023) reported the group’s statement on its Telegram channel on 19 April 2023: “Due to the large number of inquiries from various foreign media about Sudan, most of which are provocative, we consider it necessary to inform everyone that Wagner staff have not been in Sudan for more than two years.”
48. In February 2023, Sudanese officials anonymously told France24 that the group still has “dozens of operatives in the country” and that at that time the group was still providing training and guardianship services. All Eyes on Wagner, an open-source voluntary initiative tracking the Group’s activities, reported evidence on 20th April that a plane associated with the Wagner Group was used to deliver weapons to the RSF on 17th April 2023, days after the fighting broke out. The initiative reports that the flight came via the Libyan military bases, Al-Khadim, Jufra. US pressures allies to expel Russia’s Wagner mercenaries from Libya, Sudan, France24, 3 February 2023; All Eyes on Wagner, ‘Libya: Wagner Group’s logistics platform’ (accessed 16 July 2023
49. A CNN investigation released in July 2022 showed the sophisticated gold-smuggling network, drawing on “interviews with high-level Sudanese and US officials and troves of documents”. It concluded that at least 16 flights in 2021 involved a military plane to and from Latakia, the Syrian port city that hosts a significant Russian airbase. According to the investigation, “at least seven sources familiar with events accuse Russia of driving the lion’s share of Sudan’s gold smuggling operations – which is where most of Sudan’s gold has ended up in recent years, according to official statistics”. A whistleblower from the Sudanese Central Bank shared data suggesting that 32.7 tons of gold were unaccounted for in 2021, equating to around $1.9 billion of extracted gold. Some insiders told CNN the amount of Sudanese gold being smuggled from the country was higher, at approximately of 90% of the production. This would equal as much as $13.4 billion, although CNN could not verify this number. Russia is plundering gold in Sudan to boost Putin’s war effort in Ukraine, CNN, 29 July 2022
50. Center on Terrorism, Extremism, and Counterterrorism - Middlebury Institute of International Studies (WGN0023)
51. All Eyes on Wagner, ‘Libya: Wagner Group’s logistics platform’ (accessed 16 July 2023)
52. Anonymous (WGN0014)
53. CIR open-source research. See also Democracy & Human Rights Foundation (WGN0011); Anonymous (WGNO0014); Letter dated 8 March 2021 from the Panel of Experts on Libya established pursuant to resolution 1973 (2021) addressed to the President of the Security Council 5/2021/229, para 97
54. All Eyes on Wagner, ‘Libya: Wagner Group’s logistics platform’ (accessed 16 July 2023)
55. All Eyes on Wagner, ‘Libya: Wagner Group’s logistics platform’ (accessed 16 July 2023)
56. CIR open-source research
57. Anonymous (WWGN0014)
58. CIR open-source research, which also cites ‘Tropas russas em Cabo Delgado’, Moz24Hors, 13 September 2019 (accessed via The Internet Archive)
59. CIR open-source research, which also cites ‘Mozambique, Russia sign energy, security deals’, France24, 22 August
60. Crisis Group, ‘Stemming the Insurrection in Mozambique’s Cabo Delgado’, 11 June 2021 (accessed 11 July 2023)
61. Geopolitical Monitor, ‘Russian Mercenaries: A String of Failures in Africa’, 24 August 2020 (accessed 11 July 2023)
62. ‘Bloodshed and retreat from Mozambique for Putin's private army the Wagner Group’, The Times, 25 November 2019
63. US Department of the Treasury, ‘Treasury Escalates Sanctions Against the Russian Government's Attempts to Influence US Elections’, 15 April 2021 (accessed 16 July 2023)
64. US Department of the Treasury, ‘Treasury Escalates Sanctions Against the Russian Government’s Attempts to Influence US Elections’, 15 April 2021 (accessed 16 July 2023)
65. Mozambique elections: Russians help Frelimo backers to break the law—CIP Eleicées, Club of Mozambique, 10 October 2019
66. CSIS, ‘Tracking the Arrival of Russia’s Wagner Group in Mali’, 2 February 2022 (accessed 16 July 2023)
67. UK Government, UK and international partners condemn Wagner Group’s plan to deploy mercenaries in Mali, 23 December 2021 (accessed 16 July 2023)
68. CIR open-source research
69. CIR open-source research. Note FZNC has been sanctioned by the US Government. See Appendix 1.
70. CIR open-source research
71. AFRIC is under sanction by the US Government. When the sanction was announced, the US Treasury stated: “The Association For Free Research And International Cooperation (AFRIC), [...] facilitate[s] Prigozhin’s malign operations in Africa and Europe while primarily operating from Russia. AFRIC has served as a front company for Prigozhin’s influence operations in Africa, including by sponsoring phony election monitoring missions in Zimbabwe, Madagascar, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, South Africa, and Mozambique. Despite posing as an African-led initiative, AFRIC serves to disseminate Russia’s preferred messaging, often related to disinformation. AFRIC works in coordination with other elements of the Prigozhin network, including FZNC and the International Anticrisis Center, a fraudulent think tank controlled by Prigozhin’s operatives.” US Department of the Treasury, ‘Treasury Escalates Sanctions Against the Russian Government’s Attempts to Influence US Elections’, 15 April 2021 (accessed 16 July 2023)
72. Meta, ‘January 2022 Coordinated Inauthentic Behavior Report’, 16 February 2022 (accessed 17 July 2023)
73. US Department of the Treasury, ‘Treasury Escalates Sanctions Against the Russian Government’s Attempts to Influence US Elections’, 15 April 2021 (accessed 16 July 2023); EPDE, ‘Fake election observation as Russia’s tool of election interference: The Case of AFRIC’, 26 March 2020 (accessed 16 July 2023
74. US Department of the Treasury, ‘Treasury Escalates Sanctions Against the Russian Government’s Attempts to Influence US Elections’, 15 April 2021 (accessed 16 July 2023); see also YouTube, ‘Russia’s Madagascar Election Gamble - BBC Africa Eye documentary’ (accessed 16 July 2023)
75. US Department of the Treasury, ‘Treasury Escalates Sanctions Against the Russian Government’s Attempts to Influence US Elections’, 15 April 2021 (accessed 16 July 2023); EPDE, ‘Fake election observation as Russia’s tool of election interference: The Case of AFRIC’, 26 March 2020 (accessed 16 July 2023)
76. Daily Maverick, ‘Exclusive: Did Putin’s ‘Chef’ attempt to interfere in South African election?’, 7 May 2019 (accessed 16 July 2023)
77. Assessing US sanctions notices, Professor Jason Blazakis judged it “highly likely” that Asia-based companies in Thailand and Hong Kong (Shine Drago Group Limited, Shen Yang Jing Cheng Machinery Imp&Exp. Company, and Zhe Jiang Jiayi Small Commodities Trade Company Limited) “facilitated transactions on behalf of Prigozhin and the Wagner Group.” See Center on Terrorism, Extremism, and Counterterrorism - Middlebury Institute of International Studies (WGN0023)
78. CIR provided this assessment, noting, “Complaints by Afghan forces that Wagner have been recruiting ex-soldiers exiled in Iran to fight in Ukraine are unconfirmed. HUMINT sources with networks in Afghanistan have reported the same, but cannot be verified. Supposedly, these are being recruited from the former elite National Army Commando Corps, and represent some of the best US-trained forces in the former Afghan army.” See also Foreign Policy, ‘Russia Is Recruiting Afghan Soldiers for the War in Ukraine’, 25 October 2022 (accessed 16 July 2023)
79. CIR open-source research
80. PQ UIN 108126 [on Burkina Faso], Answered on 20 December 2022
81. Jeune Afrique, ‘Comment Wagner se finance: enquête sur l’eldorado d’Evgueni Prigojine en Centrafrique et au Cameroun’ (French), 12 January 2023 (accessed 16 July 2023)
82. CIR open-source research
83. Russia’s Wagner group denies recruiting Serbs to fight in Ukraine, Reuters, 20 January 2023
84. CIR open-source research.
85. Wayback Machine (Archive.org)
86. Inside the stunning growth of Russia’s Wagner Group - POLITICO, POLITICO, 18 February 2023
87. Prof. Mark Galeotti (Managing Director at Mayak Intelligence Ltd) (WGN0005) para 3
88. Prof. Mark Galeotti (Managing Director at Mayak Intelligence Ltd) (WGN0005) para 8
89. Prof. Mark Galeotti (Managing Director at Mayak Intelligence Ltd) (WGN0005) para 9. He also cited Venezuela, but there is doubt over whether Russian operatives in this country were Wagner-affiliated. We have not named this as a country where we have high or medium confidence that the network has operated.
90. Prof. Mark Galeotti (Managing Director at Mayak Intelligence Ltd) (WGN0005) para 12
91. “In 2017, before the start of the operation to seize oil fields in Syria, Prigozhin tried to organise the deployment of combat units of the PMC Wagner to Syria and the supply of weapons and ammunition, bypassing the Ministry of Defence. On account of this, Prigozhin’s relations with Shoigu deteriorated […] the Russian Minister of Defence sabotaged implementation of the agreed plan of co-operation […] The military refused to transport PMC Wagner units on board their aircraft or by the navy’s ships. In addition, the military, under various pretexts, did not supply weapons and ammunition […] Prigozhin could not buy enough weapons, then he was not given the power to acquire weapons and ammunition abroad in the amounts needed for large-scale military operations. After Putin intervened in this conflict between Shoigu and Prigozhin, the previous scheme of liaison between PMCs and military departments was restored. The mercenaries were delivered on military transport aircraft, and the PMC was again integrated with the Ministry of Defence, and received weapons and ammunition in the required quantities, although not of the latest designs.” Anonymous (WGN0026)
92. Anonymous (WGN0026)
93. “Since the suppression of rebel activity in the Central African Republic by the PMC Wagner detachments, the level of violence in this country has significantly decreased and the situation has stabilised. At the moment, there is no movement back to escalating tension or exacerbated civil conflict. The civil war subsided. This is a fact. PMC Wagner, as a result of assisting expansion of the zone of control of the central government in parallel with the displacement of rebel (in other words, criminal) formations in the interior, has contributed to stabilisation of this country. In Mali, Russian mercenaries are fighting against al-Qaeda and anti-government groups, erroneously implementing the same gameplan, but nevertheless without negative consequences for the civilian population.” Anonymous (WGN0026)
94. For example “Mali’s Foreign Minister Abdoulaye Diop said that interventions by the international community had not worked and the country had to consider new options.” Wagner Group: Why the EU is alarmed by Russian mercenaries in Central Africa, BBC News, 19 December 2021
95. In 2018, Wagner offered services to defend the President against rebel attacks on the capital. It also helped the army to repel a major Islamist offensive in early 2021. Wagner trained the army against further coup attempts. There are 1,890 'Russian instructors' supporting government troops in the ongoing civil war, according to the Russian Ambassador (DW) and 1,500 according to Western officials (FT). Sources: Council on Foreign Relations, 'What Russia's Wagner Group Doing in Africa?', May 2023 (accessed 17 July 2023); Diamond-rich African country is a zombie host for Wagner Group, The Times, 19 May 2023; Wagner mercenaries will not be withdrawn from Africa, says Russia, The Guardian, 26 June 2023; How Russia's Wagner Group Is Expanding in Africa, The New York Times, 31 May 2022; United States Institute of Peace, 'In Africa, Here's How to Respond to Russia's Brutal Wagner Group', 6 April 2023 (accessed 16 July 2023); DW, 'Russia's Wagner Group in Africa: More than mercenaries', 24 June 2023 (accessed 16 July 2023); Wagner's future in Africa in question after Russian mutiny, Financial Times, 28 June 2023
96. In Mozambique, it offered to fight self-proclaimed Islamic State in northern Cabo Delgado province. Council on Foreign Relations, 'What Is Russia's Wagner Group Doing in Africa?', May 2023 (accessed 17 July 2023)
97. In Sudan, Wagner provided advisers and riot control gear. How Russia's Wagner Group Is Expanding in Africa, The New York Times, 31 May 2022; United States Institute of Peace, 'In Africa, Here's How to Respond to Russia's Brutal Wagner Group', 6 April 2023 (accessed July 2023); Wagner's future in Afri in question aft Russian mutiny, Financial Times, 28 June 2023
98. Wagner forces attempted to drive Islamist State forces out of the city of Palmyra in 2016 and 2017. Middle East Institute, 'Syria is where the conflict between Wagner and the Russian government began', 14 July 2023 (accessed 16 July 2023)
99. From December 2021, Wagner acted to counter "complex set of numerous jihadi terrorist groups and regional Tuareg and other self-autonomy movements operates in the country" (including al-Qaida Sahel affiliates such as Jama'a Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin (JNIM) and the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (IS-GS)). Wagner operatives also carried out training. Brookings, 'Russia's Wagner Group in Africa: Influence, commercial concessions, rights violations, and counterinsurgency failure', February 2022 (accessed 16 July 2023)
100. In CAR, the Network offered personal protection to the President. Sudan, the Network suppressed dissent against the government of President Bashir. Council on Foreign Relations, 'What Is Russia's Wagner Group Doing in Africa?', May 2023 (accessed 17 July 2023)
101. For example, in CAR and Sudan. CIR open-source research
102. Anonymous (WGN0026)
103. In Sudan, Wagner were contracted by Bashir, but they then supported the generals who ousted him (including Dagalo/Hemedti). In Eastern Libya, Wagner assisted General Haftar to take control of oil fields and supported the failed assault on Tripoli. Council on Foreign Relations, 'What Is Russia's Wagner Group Doing in Africa?', May 2023 (accessed 17 July 2023); Brookings, 'Russia's Wagner Group in Africa: Influence, commercial concessions, rights violations, and counterinsurgency failure', February 2022 (accessed 16 July 2023); How Russia's Wagner Group Is Expanding in Africa, The New York Times, 31 May 2022
104. How Russia's Wagner Group Is Expanding in Africa, The New York Times, 31 May 2022; Diamond-rich African country is a zombie host for Wagner Group, The Times, 19 May 2023
105. Inside the stunning growth of Russia's Wagner Group, POLITICO, 18 February 2023; HM Government, Integrated Review Refresh 2023: Responding to a more contested and volatile world, CP 811, March 2023, para 9 Council on Foreign Relations, 'What Is Russia's Wagner Group Doing in Africa?', May 2023 (accessed 17 July 2023).
106. Q42. See also Center on Terrorism, Extremism, and Counterterrorism - Middlebury Institute of International Studies (WGN0023)
107. A BBC documentary found that Wagner fighters in Libya had been involved in suspected war crimes, including the intentional killing of civilians. There are accusations of Wagner-linked civilian attacks in the Um Dafuq region of western Sudan. The lost tablet and the secret documents, BBC, August 2021 (accessed 16 July 2023); To counter Russia in Africa, Biden deploys a favored strategy, POLITICO, 7 May 2023. For Syria, see Man who filmed beheading of Syrian identified as Russian mercenary, The Guardian, 21 November 2019; Dossier Center (WGN0009) para 35
108. Possible Evidence of Russian Atrocities: German Intelligence Intercepts Radio Traffic Discussing the Murder of Civilians in Bucha, DER SPIEGEL, 7 April 2022
109. Qq40-41 [Christo Grozev]. On the involvement of both Wagner fighters and ordinary Russian armed forces in atrocities in Ukraine, see also Q41 [Sean McFatel, where he describes the "Russian policy" of "massacring civilians", and Q197 [Leo Docherty]
110. 'Putin's comment on funding Wagner shows link to Ukraine, prosecutor says', Reuters, 3 July 2023
111. Specifically, UN experts noted (among others) reports of mass summary executions, arbitrary detentions, torture, forced disappearances and displacement and indiscriminate targeting of civilian facilities and attacks on humanitarian actors. OHCHR, 'CAR: Experts alarmed by government's use of "Russian trainers", close contacts with UN peacekeepers', 31 March 2021 (accessed 8 July 2023). There are also reports of sexual and gender-based violence: Q6 [Sorcha MacLeod]. See also the Final report of the UN Panel of Experts on the Central African Republic extended pursuant to Security Council resolution 2536 (2020), paras 89-93, available in Letter dated 25 June 2021 from the Panel of Experts on the Central African Republic extended pursuant to resolution 2536 (2020) addressed to the President of the Security Council, 25 June 2021.
112. The Sentry (WGN0017) para 18. See also Annex 2 in this evidence for further Wagner-alleged atrocities.
113. 'Russia's Wagner Group committed atrocities in Central African Republic', The Times, 4 October 2021. See also Human Rights Watch, Central African Republic: Abuses by Russia-Linked Forces', 3 May 2022 (accessed 10 July 2023)
114. OHCHR, ‘Rapport sur les évènements de Moura du 27 au 31 mars 2022’ (French only), May 2023, paras 20–21, 77. See also United States Department of State, The Release of the UN Report on Moura, Mali, 15 May 2023 (accessed 10 July 2023): “We commend the UN’s Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights for its diligence and tenacity in investigating these abuses, which include gang rape and other sexual violence, torture, and extrajudicial killings.”
115. Russian mercenaries and Mali army accused of killing 300 civilians, The Guardian, 5 April 2022. Note there have been allegations of Wagner-linked violence in other towns: Nioni, Hombori, Mondoro and Boni. See Russian mercenaries linked to civilian massacres in Mali, The Guardian, 4 May 2022
116. Russian mercenaries linked to civilian massacres in Mali, The Guardian, 4 May 2022
117. Civilian targeting accounted for 52% and 71% of Wagner involvement in political violence in CAR and Mali respectively. By comparison, in CAR, 17% of state forces’ political violence events targeted civilians and 42% of rebels’ political violence events targeted civilians. ‘Rebels’ in CAR refers to CPC/UPC. In Mali, 20% of states forces’ political violence events targeted civilians and 27% of rebels’ political violence events targeted civilians. ‘Rebels’ in Mali refers to the Al Qaeda-affiliated JNIM. Data collected by the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED), covering the timeframe between 1 December 2021 and 31 July 2022 for Mali and the timeframe between 1 January 2018 and 31 July 2022 for CAR. The data is presented in Wagner Group Operations in Africa: Civilian Targeting Trends in the Central African Republic and Mali, ACLED, 30 August 2022
118. “The Wagner Group is a destabilizing force whose personnel have engaged in an ongoing pattern of abuses, including execution-style killings, sexual violence, and torture in Mali and other nations struggling with instability.” United States Department of State, The Release of the UN Report on Moura, Mali, 15 May 2023 (accessed 10 July 2023)
119. Council of the EU, ‘Wagner Group: Council adds 11 individuals and 7 entities to EU sanctions lists’, 25 February 2023 (accessed 10 July 2023)
120. Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (WGN0025) section 7
121. Q19 [Sorcha MacLeod]
122. Stated in the context of Libya: ReliefWeb, Libya: Violations related to mercenary activities must be investigated, 17 June 2020 (accessed 10 July 2023)
123. Q40 [Christo Grozev]
124. The regular armed forces have “systems of accountability, clear chains of command, military codes of justice and courts martial”. Among mercenary groups, “the chains of command are not clear. There is opacity and lack of transparency around these types of actors—deliberately so.” Q19 [Sorcha MacLeod]
125. A former fighter stated this in an interview with the Guardian. See ‘Mercenaries have skills armies lack’: former Wagner operative opens up, The Guardian, 10 February 2022
126. Mercenary groups “operate in the shadows for good reason. They do not wear clear uniforms or clear insignia. It is very difficult to identify who they are, […] if you are a victim or the family of a victim or a human rights defender”. Q19 [Sorcha MacLeod]
127. A new entity has been registered in Russia, however.
128. Q25 [Sorcha MacLeod].
129. Proelium Law (WGN0016) para 16. For examples from CAR and Sudan, see The Sentry (WGN0017) para 15; OHCHR, ‘CAR: Experts alarmed by government’s use of “Russian trainers”, close contacts with UN peacekeepers’, 31 March 2021 (accessed 8 July 2023); Dossier Center (WGN0009) para 36.
130. This is well-documented in the Central African Republic, where victims, journalists and human rights defenders have faced harassment and intimidation. Wagner operatives have worked closely with police and/or local authorities to undermine investigations. Q42 [Sorcha MacLeod]; Dossier Center (WGN0009) para 56; Final report of the UN Panel of Experts on the Central African Republic extended pursuant to Security Council resolution 2536 (2020), para 95, available in Letter dated 25 June 2021 from the Panel of Experts on the Central African Republic extended pursuant to resolution 2536 (2020) addressed to the President of the Security Council, 25 June 2021.
131. A civilian in Homs, Syria, was tortured and murdered in 2017, with likely Wagner involvement. The victim’s family tried to bring a claim via Russian courts and “the decision not to investigate was upheld at all levels”. The UN Working Group on the Use of Mercenaries is “extremely concerned about the delays and obstacles that were put in the path of access to justice for the family of the victim”. Q20 [Sorcha MacLeod]
132. Russia vetoed efforts to establish an independent UN investigation into atrocities in Mali. Russian mercenaries linked to civilian massacres in Mali, The Guardian, 4 May 2022
133. The UN Working Group on the Use of Mercenaries sent allegation letters to the Russian government on Libya and CAR, but Russia responded that mercenaries and private military and security companies are illegal under Russian law, meaning the allegations were impossible. Q23 [Sorcha MacLeod]
134. The UN Working Group on the Use of Mercenaries sent allegation letters to the Russian government on Libya and CAR, but Russia responded that mercenaries and private military and security companies are illegal under Russian law, meaning the allegations were impossible. Q23 [Sorcha MacLeod]
135. Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (WGN0025) section 7
136. Prof. Mark Galeotti (Managing Director at Mayak Intelligence Ltd) (WGN0005) para 7
137. Anonymous (WGN0014) paras 10, 14
138. Sorcha MacLeod noted these kinds of actors “have a tendency to prolong the armed conflict, because they are motivated by financial gains, so they have no incentive to end the conflict. They tend to be very heavily armed and we see resulting asymmetric warfare”. Q4. See also Q103 [Mikhail Khodorkovsky] on their political influence in Russia being linked to the war in Ukraine.
139. Letter dated 24 May 2022 from the Panel of Experts on Libya established pursuant to resolution 1973 addressed to the President of the Security Council S/2022/427, Annex 26, Tables 26.1 and 26.2
140. Civilian officials involved in these efforts included Sudan’s anti-corruption committee (disbanded after the military coup) and officials overseeing flights (many of whom were redeployed). Russia is plundering gold in Sudan to boost Putin’s war effort in Ukraine, CNN, 29 July 2022
141. Civilian officials involved in these efforts included Sudan’s anti-corruption committee (disbanded after the military coup) and officials overseeing flights (many of whom were redeployed). Russia is plundering gold in Sudan to boost Putin’s war effort in Ukraine, CNN, 29 July 2022
142. Dossier Center (WGN0009) para 36
143. “The Wagner Group contributes to Russia’s efforts to undermine efforts of individuals and organizations to democratize by backing authoritarians and engaging in human rights abuses. In doing this, the Wagner Group gains access to important resources that advance Russia’s geopolitical interests. In essence, objective one, undermining democracy naturally feeds into profiteering, the second objective”. Center on Terrorism, Extremism, and Counterterrorism - Middlebury Institute of International Studies (WGN0023)
144. The Wagner-linked company, Meroe Gold has been instrumental. The Sudanese government waived its 30% stake in gold mining by Meroe in 2018 and provided the company with other benefits. See OCCRP, ‘Documents Reveal Wagner’s Golden Ties to Sudanese Military Companies’, 2 November 2022 (accessed 16 July 2023)
145. Center on Terrorism, Extremism, and Counterterrorism - Middlebury Institute of International Studies (WGN0023)
146. The Sentry (WGN0017) para 27. See The Sentry, ‘Architects of Terror’, June 2023
147. Wagner Group: Why the EU is alarmed by Russian mercenaries in Central Africa, BBC News, 19 December 2021
148. LSE, Russian mercenaries in the Central African Republic create problems for democratic actors, 5 May 20211
149. CIR open-source research
150. The Sentry (WGN0017) para 11
151. The Sentry (WGN0017) para 11
152. How Wagner Group rode roughshod over the law to keep control of its African ‘client state’, The Times, 21 May 2023
153. Inside the stunning growth of Russia’s Wagner Group, POLITICO, 18 February 2023
154. Dossier Center (WGN0009) para 32
155. Dossier Center (WGN0009) para 15
156. The Sentry (WGN0017) para 14
157. Sewa Security Services, Lobaye invest, and Midas Resources. These are all under sanction by the United States, the first two are under sanction by the European Union and none are under sanction by the United Kingdom, as of 7 July 2023.
158. The Sentry (WGN0017) para 21
159. The Sentry (WGN0017) para 21
160. Inside the stunning growth of Russia’s Wagner Group, POLITICO, 18 February 2023
161. The Sentry (WGN0017) para 14
162. The Sentry (WGN0017) para 25
163. OAU CONVENTION FOR THE ELIMINATION OF MERCENARISM IN AFRICA, CM/817 (XXIX), Annex II Rev.
164. Stated in the designation of the Wagner Group in UK Government, The UK Sanctions List (ODT format accessed 7 July 2023). See also Q99 [Mikhail Khodorkovsky]; Dossier Center (WGN0009) paras 6–8
165. Center on Terrorism, Extremism, and Counterterrorism - Middlebury Institute of International Studies (WGN0023). Similarly, Ben Fender (Director, Eastern Europe and Central Asia, FCDO) stated: “it is even more front and centre than it has been”. Q143
166. A former fighter told us, since February 2022, “… the scale and volume of deliveries to PMC Wagner from the Russian Ministry of Defence has increased significantly. Moreover, the regular forces have provided Prigozhin with combat aircraft and the opportunity to use airfields and the air traffic control service of the Russian Aerospace Forces.” Anonymous (WGN0026)
167. Ministry of Defence (via Twitter), ‘Defence Intelligence update on the situation in Ukraine - 20 January 2023’(accessed 17 July 2023)
168. Wagner Group: Putin’s ‘private army’ has up to 50,000 troops fighting in Ukraine, say UK defence chiefs | Evening Standard, 20 January 2023
169. Putin ally Yevgeny Prigozhin admits founding Wagner mercenary group, The Guardian, 26 September 2022
170. Timeline: Prigozhin’s Escalating Standoff With Russia’s Military - The Moscow Times, 24 June 2023
171. Russia’s private military contractor Wagner comes out of the shadows in Ukraine war | Russia | The Guardian, 7 August 2022
172. Q102
173. Wagner POW recruited from Russian prison ‘used as cannon fodder’: Life on the frontline, The Telegraph, 20 May 2023; Cannon Fodder for “Putin’s Chef” | Wilson Center, 9 January 2023
174. Wagner Group insider reveals desperate tactics as convicted prisoners are sent to die in waves | Daily Mail Online, 4 February 2023
175. Meduza, ‘Russia Behind Bars: Wagner Group’s losses 80 percent of 50K inmate-recruits’, 23 January 2023 (accessed 17 July 2023)
176. Q223
177. Q223
178. HM Government, Integrated Review Refresh 2023: Responding to a more contested and volatile world, CP 811, March 2023, p 3
179. French troops have been deployed to West Africa since 2013 as part of efforts to fight jihadist groups. However, in June 2021, France suspended its aid and military cooperation with the Central African Republic, citing “massive disinformation campaigns” against the French. It withdrew its final troops from CAR in December 2022. In Mali, following deteriorating relations with the Government since 2020, France announced that it would withdraw all its troops from Mali in 2022. In April 2022, France accused the Wagner Network of staging a ‘French atrocity’ in Mali, which falsely implicated France in leaving behind mass graves. In January 2023, the French government announced that it would withdraw its forces from Burkina Faso within a month, following a request from the national government. It also stated that it would withdraw its ambassador there. France suspends aid, military support for Central African Republic, Reuters, 9 June 2021; CAR citizens react to departure of French troops, Africanews, 16 December 2022; UN ends peacekeeping force in Mali, Research Briefing 9827, House of Commons Library, 3 July 2023, p 9; France says Russian mercenaries staged ‘French atrocity’ in Mali, The Guardian, 22 April 2022; Burkina Faso: France recalls ambassador and will withdraw military forces, CNN, 26 January 2023
180. Q219 [Ben Fender]
181. IOM, ‘Nearly 3 Million Displaced by Conflict in Sudan’, 6 July 2023 (accessed 17 July 2023)
182. On these general effects, see Q60 [Sorcha MacLeod]
183. HM Government, Integrated Review Refresh 2023: Responding to a more contested and volatile world, CP 811, March 2023, para 13
184. Anonymous (WWGN0026)

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