Health and Hospital Corporation of Marion County v. Talevski/Opinion of Justice Barrett
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 21–806
HEALTH AND HOSPITAL CORPORATION OF MARION COUNTY, ET AL., PETITIONERS v. IVANKA TALEVSKI, AS PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ESTATE OF GORGI TALEVSKI, DECEASED
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT
[June 8, 2023]
Justice Barrett, with whom The Chief Justice joins, concurring.
Today’s opinion makes three important points. First, Maine v. Thiboutot remains good law. 448 U. S. 1 (1980). Second, Gonzaga University v. Doe sets the standard for determining when a Spending Clause statute confers individual rights, and the Federal Nursing Home Reform Act (FNHRA) satisfies it. 536 U. S. 273 (2002). Third, courts must carefully consider whether individual rights established by a Spending Clause statute are enforceable through 42 U. S. C. §1983—in the FNHRA’s case, they are.
As to the first point: Section 1983 provides a cause of action against “[e]very person” who, under color of state law, violates “any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws.” In Thiboutot, we held that the plain language of the statute was not limited to “some subset of laws.” 448 U. S., at 4. Rather, the term “laws” encompasses all federal laws, including those passed pursuant to Congress’s Spending Clause authority. Ibid. Like the Court, I would not abandon that holding based on petitioners’ novel contract-law theory.
Second, our decision in Gonzaga establishes the standard for analyzing whether Spending Clause statutes give rise to Page:Health and Hospital Corp. of Marion Co. v. Talevski.pdf/30 comprehensive enforcement scheme that is incompatible with individual enforcement under §1983.’ ” Gonzaga, 536 U. S., at 284–285, n. 4.
As the Court notes, the presence of an “express private judicial right of action” typically demonstrates that a §1983 suit is not also available. Ante, at 19; see Rancho Palos Verdes v. Abrams, 544 U. S. 113, 121 (2005) (express cause of action “is ordinarily an indication that Congress did not intend to leave open a more expansive remedy under §1983”). When the statutory cause of action restricts available remedies or imposes procedural hurdles to obtaining relief, the inference is even stronger. See Fitzgerald v. Barnstable School Comm., 555 U. S. 246, 254 (2009) (considering whether a §1983 suit “would have circumvented these procedures and given plaintiffs access to tangible benefits—such as damages, attorney’s fees, and costs—that were unavailable under the statut[e]”); Rancho Palos Verdes, 544 U. S., at 122–123 (similar).
But an actual clash—one private judicial remedy against another, more expansive remedy—is not required to find that a statute forecloses recourse to §1983. Our cases have looked to a wide range of contextual clues, like “enforcement provisions” that “confe[r] authority to sue … on government officials,” Sea Clammers, 453 U. S., at 13, 20, and any “administrative remedies” that the statute offers, Smith v. Robinson, 468 U. S. 992, 1012 (1984). We have noted the relevance of a centralized review mechanism that would be undermined by piecemeal litigation. Gonzaga, 536 U. S., at 289–290 (statute directed the Secretary of Education to establish a review board to investigate and adjudicate alleged violations). And we have regularly taken account of the overall comprehensiveness of the statute’s enforcement scheme. The more comprehensive the scheme, the less likely that it leaves the door open for §1983 suits. Sea Clammers, 453 U. S., at 20 (“When the remedial devices provided in a particular Act are sufficiently comprehensive, they may suffice to demonstrate congressional intent to preclude the remedy of suits under §1983”); Smith, 468 U. S., at 1011–1012 (§1983 suits unavailable “[i]n light of the comprehensive nature of the procedures and guarantees set out” in the statute). None of these features is necessarily determinative, but each is part of the larger picture that courts must assess.
Courts must tread carefully before concluding that Spending Clause statutes may be enforced through §1983. In this case, however, the Seventh Circuit correctly allowed Talevski’s §1983 suit to proceed. I therefore join the Court’s opinion in full.