Highway Needs of the National Defense/Substance of the 1941 Report
SUBSTANCE OF THE 1941 REPORT
The section of the Federal-aid Highway Act of 1948, to which this report is responsive, directs first that a study be made of the status of improvement of the National System of Interstate Highways, and further requests that the report to be submitted shall supplement the report dated February 1, 1941, entitled “Highways for the National Defense,” to reflect current conditions and deficiencies.
GENESIS OF 1941 REPORT
The results of the study that has been made of the status of improvement and deficiencies of the interstate highway system are presented in the foregoing pages. Fully to supplement the 1941 report, a good deal more is required, and in order that the purposes of what follows may be clearly understood it is desirable at this point to refer to the inception of the earlier report and briefly summarize its principal findings and recommendations.
The 1941 report was requested by President Franklin D. Roosevelt in a letter to John M. Carmody, Administrator, Federal Works Agency, under date of June 21, 1940, in which the President wrote as follows:
In order that we may be assured of the adequacy of our highway system to meet the needs of our national defense, I would like you, in cooperation with the Advisory Commission to the Council of National Defense and the War and Navy Departments, to have the Public Roads Administration of your Agency make a survey of our highway facilities from the viewpoint of national defense and advise me as to any steps that appear necessary.
I suggest that particular attention be paid to the strength of bridges, the width of strategic roads, adequacy of ingress to and egress from urban centers, and the servicing of existing and proposed Army, Navy, and Air bases. * * *
The report, Highways for the National Defense, prepared by the Public Roads Administration in response to this request of the President, was submitted to the Federal Works Administrator by the Commissioner of Public Roads under date of February 1, 1941. On the same day it was transmitted to the President.
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR SPECIFIC DEFENSE OPERATIONS
The report recommended two general programs of highway improvement as necessary to correct deficiencies then current. The first, and more urgent of the two, was a program intended to supply needed highway facilities for specific defense operations then developing. The needed facilities were classified as (1) reservation roads, (2) access roads, and (3) tactical roads.
Reservation roads consisted of company streets and other roads within the Federal reservation areas of Army cantonments, depots, and bases, and the various shore establishments of the Navy.
Access roads included numerous roads, each of relatively short mileage, required to give local access from main highways, railroads, and waterways to Army and Navy reservations, and industrial plants engaged in the defense production program. Roads to civil airports and landing fields were also included in this category.
Tactical roads included certain small mileages of roads giving access to isolated points of strategic importance, generally in coastal or border regions, and larger mileages near military reservations and in other areas that might become theaters of tactical maneuvers.
On roads of these classes, previously of little or no importance from the viewpoint of civil traffic needs, the report anticipated the development of a considerable defense usage which would necessitate substantial improvements attributable primarily to the defense needs.
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE STRATEGIC NETWORK
The second general program recommended was to consist of essential improvements of the strategic network, a connected system of highways which had been previously designated by the War and Navy Departments as the routes of principal importance from the standpoint of national defense. At the date of the report this network consisted of a system of main trunk routes totaling approximately 74,600 miles, and auxiliary roads approximately paralleling the main lines on each side, with cross-connections at frequent intervals.
The network included routes joining all important centers of defense industry and all military and naval concentration points. Its main lines, with few exceptions embraced within the Federal-aid highway system, included routes of the interregional highway system previously recommended by the Public Roads Administration in its report, Toll Roads and Free Roads.[1] The auxiliary lines consisted in considerable part of State and local roads not included in the Federal-aid system.
The report recognized that the strategic network, in its main lines at least, was heavily used by civil traffic. Its service of purely military traffic would necessitate few if any improvements not required for the accommodation of civil needs. Its development to complete adequacy for the service of both classes of traffic was viewed as a long-time operation and practically continuous undertaking. Improvements of certain sections, partaking of the character of access and tactical roads, and elimination of a number of the more serious weaknesses, particularly substandard bridges, were recommended as urgent necessities. Otherwise the improvement of the strategic network was reported as of less urgency than the provision of reservation, access, and tactical roads.
SURVEY OF NEEDS
Surveys and studies made antecedent to the report, by the Public Roads Administration in cooperation with military and naval authorities and the State highway departments, indicated improvement needs in respect to each of the classes of roads described, as follows:
Reservation roads.—Improvement or outright construction of 1,500 miles entirely within Federal reservations. Since roads of this class were subject to the jurisdiction of the War and Navy Departments, the cost of their improvement was not estimated and no recommendation was offered concerning the authorization or appropriation of essential funds.
Access roads.—Determined need of the improvement of 2,830 miles, to serve 192 military reservations, at an estimated cost of $220,000,000; and additional needs, of indeterminate but substantial extent and cost, to serve vital defense industries.
Tactical roads.—Damage of local roads by military training maneuvers, reported as already occurring, was cited as indicative of an eventual need of construction or reconstruction, the extent of which could not be estimated.
Strategic network.—Determined needs consisted of the strengthening or reconstruction of 2,436 bridges of load capacity inferior to the H15 design standard, a minimum for both civil and defense traffic; the widening of 5,090 miles of roads surfaced less than 18 feet wide; and the strengthening of approximately 14,000 miles of surfaces incapable of supporting in all weather 9,000-pound wheel loads. It was estimated that these deficiencies could be eliminated by an expenditure of approximately $458,000,000.
APPROPRIATIONS RECOMMENDED
To permit a reasonsbly satisfactory accomplishment of the most urgent improvements of the several classes of roads, the report recommended immediate appropriations by the Federal Government in the following amounts:
1. For access roads, including new sections of highway to replace existing highway connections broken by necessary closures at military reservations and industrial sites, $150,000,000.
- ↑ H. Doc. No. 272, 76th Cong., 1st sess., Apr. 27, 1939.
2. For tactical roads, including the repair of damage caused by tactical maneuvers, $25,000,000.
3. For the strategic network, including the replacement of substandard bridges and the correction of other critical deficiencies, not less than $100,000,000, to be apportioned among the States in accordance with the existing Federal-aid formula, and made available to pay costs of projects on a basis of Federal participation somewhat higher than the existing 50-percent limitation.
REVISION OF FEDERAL HIGHWAY ACT PROPOSED
Finally, to facilitate the accomplishment of necessary improvements, the report recommended amendment of the Federal Highway Act (1) to authorize addition to the Federal-aid system of any roads conforming to the main lines of the strategic network, as designated by the War and Navy Departments; (2) to make roads and bridges on auxiliary lines of the network eligible for improvement with Federal-aid secondary road funds; and (3) to permit the use of Federal-aid funds in payment of part of the cost of acquiring necessary rights-of-way and attendant property damage.