History of the 305th Field Artillery/Spies and the Advance

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The Cost of Battle

History of the 305th Field Artillery
by Charles Wadsworth Camp

Spies and the Advance

The Argonne

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3698622History of the 305th Field Artillery — Spies and the AdvanceCharles Wadsworth Camp

XIX

SPIES AND THE ADVANCE

Chèry Chartreuve did not prove to be the ideal command post the Second Battalion had hoped. The Huns undoubtedly knew the town was thick with headquarters, and, logically, shelled it a good deal. So Major Wanvig decided to move to a cave in dead space in the steep hillside to the cast of Chery.

The move was originally planned for August 24th. On the morning of the 23rd Regiinental Headquarters called for a number of barrages, then abruptly shortened the lines. This meant to everyone a strong enemy attack; perhaps that vast effort we had sometimes looked for to recapture the lost ground in another drive for Paris. As a matter of fact the enemy did get La Tannerie and portions of the south bank of the river that morning, but they were unable to hold their gains for very long.

In the midst of the confusion born of this rapid and unexpected work Major Wanvig telephoned from Regimental Headquarters to move the P. C. at once. Al that time the battalion staff was really too small for its routine work. Lieutenant Feno gave the difficult task of wiring the new P. C. to Sergeant Froede, and tried to keep things going from the old headquarters.

All afternoon and evening the batteries continued their firing. At midnight a complete programme came in from Regimental Headquarters for a rolling barrage to accompany a counter attack by our infantry. It was hurriedly figured, and rapid firing went on until 5 A.M. Word came then to cease firing. It was also explained that there had been a misunderstanding and that the infantry had not counter-attacked. So much ammunition was expended that night that stray dumps were scoured for serviccable shells. Still before many hours a counter-attack was staged that reached its objectives. Without interfering with its programme the Second Battalion got into its cave where it was never once shelled.

That night was exceptional, but every day and every night an enormous quantity of ammunition was fired. Under such conditions there were inevitably charges of short firing. The Germans had a number of guns in the vicinity of Rheims that occasionally treated infantry and artillery to a few shells. These seemed to drop from behind us, although what we suffered was really only enfilade fire. It is not extraordinary that the infantry should have thought some of these puzzling shells were shorts from their own artillery.

One day Captain Whclpley was sent from Regimental Headquarters to investigate such a charge, which had been advanced by Captain C. W. Harrington of the 308th Infantry.

Captain Whelpley lost some time at Les Près Farm waiting for a guide, so that it was dark when, after a hazardous walk, he reached Captain Harrington's command post to the north of the Vesle. It seemed impracticable to return that night, but Captain Whelpley had intended to start at daybreak. With the first light, however, the Huns put down an intensive barrage which lasted for an hour, and made a shell hole a pleasanter place than the open. This was followed by an infantry attack in strength. Captain Whelpley picked up a rifle and told Captain Harrington he would help. With a party of men he moved to the edge of a patch of woods to observe and cover Harrington's left flank. He also maintained liaison with neigliPage:History of the 305th field artillery (IA historyof305thfi01camp).pdf/280 Page:History of the 305th field artillery (IA historyof305thfi01camp).pdf/281 of a lamp on Boston Ridge. The infantry there had seen it, too. Many efforts were made lo calch the operator, yet none met success. If he was a spy he was an amazingly clever one. If he was a telephone linesman, carelessly us- ing, against all orders, a light as he worked on a wire, he was lucky far beyond his due. At any rate after a few nights the flashing ceased.

The order from General Bullard, which follows, tells its own story:

P. C. Third Army Corps S1 August 1918--21:30 Hr. G-3 Order No. 56

1. During the attack of the enemy against Fismelle, August 27th someone mer ran among our troops shouting that further resistance was useless and that one of our oflicers advised everybody lo surrender. These state- ments were absolutely incorrect because further resistance was not useless and no officer had advised surrender. Never- theless, because of lack of training and understanding, the results were as follows: Out of 190 of our troops engaged in this fight, a few were killed or wounded, about 30 retreated fighting and escaped, and perhaps 140 surrendered or were captured

A person who spreads such an aların is either an enemy in our uniforın, or one of our own troops who is disloyal and a traitor, or one of our own troops who has become a panic- stricken coward. WHOEVER HIC IS, HE SHOULD BE KILLED ON THE SPOT.

3. In a batilo there is no lime lo inquire into the identity or motives of persons who create panic, disorganization or surrender. It is the duty of every officer and soldier to kill the spot any person who in a fight urges or advises anyone to swtender or lo slop fighting. It makes no difference whether the person is a stranger or a friend, or whether he is

an officer or a private,

Drawn by Corporal Roos, Battery D

"The Artillery Would Follow in Support."

4. The day before the attack on Fismette a German soldier was seen and mortaliy wounded by our men in Fismes, far inside our lines. He was well stocked with food. He had lived many years in America. It is possible that he was to get himself an American uniform and, because of his knowl- edge of our language and customs, was to be used to create doubt and disorganization among our men.

5. Division Commanders will cause this order to be read to each company or platoon in such manner as will insure that every member of the command thorongbly understands its contents. By Conmand of Major General Ballard: F. W. CLARK Lieut. Col., G, S., A. C. of S., G-3

The attack against Fismette, mentioned in the foregoing order, was one of the last determined offensive efforts of the enemy on this front. It became clear about the same time that a vast German retrograde movement was in contemplation. Any change from Les Près Farm would be a welcome one.

The intensity of our firing incrcased, while Jerry's waned. Undoubtedly we were making his plans difficult to carry through.

For days shells of all calibers had fallen about the place without accomplishing any more damage than tearing up the soil. Then this one arrived. It fell at the picket line. The horses stood in a row. Private Almer M. Aasgard groomed a horse near the end of the line. Near him sat a group of telephone men, winding wire on makeshift reels-a necessary diversion of the telephonc detail when there was nothing else to do. The men heard the whine of the approaching shell and realized from their acquired judgment that it would fall very near. They called out a warning and ducked. Aasgard wasn't quick enough. A tiny fragment cut into his neck, severing the jugular vein. Dr. Cronin hurried to the doomed man. Aasgard died within a few minutes.

The same shell caught Corporal Leonard Cook of the telephone detail in the knee, disabling him and putting him out of the war. An ambitious telephone man, he was evacuated grumblingly, and was never returned to the regiment. Other fragments cost the detail eight more of its vanishing horses.

But these serious moments were the exception. Life north of the Vesle was far less complicated than it had been about Les Près. There were, of course, minor casualties.

First Class Private McGranaghan gave Sergeant Hickey an opportunity to distinguish himself. McGrahaghan was hit while working on the Serval line. Hickey, who had been on duty in the observatory, picked him up and carried him over a crest exposed to machine gun fire to the first aid station.

These individual instances of courage were innumerable. Men, however, don't say much about what they do themselves. Unless someone happened to see their bravery it drifted into that vast blurred background of devotion and sacrifice against which the American soldier fought.

Between the Vesle and the Aisne the Second Battalion was even more fortunate than the First. Major Wanvig's command didn't have a single casualty in the Perles positions. Hun airmen gave it one bad night, and might have done a lot of damage.

A bomber created the impression that he had located the emplacements, for he dropped a number of flares over them, and followed with two bombs in the ravine, which missed Battalion Headquarters, and one on the slope close to the guns, which splintered a number of trees.

A group of men from Battery D had a close run of it. They had made themselves comfortable in a large German dugout whose only overhead cover was a sheet of elephant iron. At the first flare they decided there might be safer places, and sought one. When they returned a few moments later, after the plane had throbbed away, they found their pleasant home, a mass of twisted elephant iron, ploughed up dirt, and ruined equipment. The third bomb had made a direct hit on the dugout in which they had just before been crowded for warmth.

The regiment fired as persistently here as it had done in the Les Près and Chery positions. Barrage after barrage was thrown ahead of our infantry on La Petite Montagne, which because of its pivotal situation was of great strategic importance. Before it was captured the order came for the regiment to move to other pastures.

History of the 305th Field Artillery/Spies and the Advance

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