Hotchkiss v. National Banks/Opinion of the Court

by Stephen Johnson Field

United States Supreme Court

88 U.S. 354

Hotchkiss  v.  National Banks

Mr. Justice FIELD, having stated the case, delivered the opinion of the court, as follows: The character and form of the instruments which are the subject of controversy in the present suit, would seem to furnish an answer to the questions that are raised before us. The agreement respecting the scrip preferred stock is entirely independent of the pecuniary obligation contained in the instrument. The latter recites an indebtedness in a specific sum, and promises its unconditional payment to bearer at a specified time. It leaves nothing optional with the company. Standing by itself it has all the elements and essential qualities of a negotiable instrument. The special agreement as to the scrip preferred stock in no degree changes the duty of the company with respect either to the principal or interest stipulated. It confers a privilege upon the holder of the bond, upon its surrender and the surrender of the certificate attached, of obtaining full preferred stock. His interest in and right to the full discharge of the money obligation is in no way dependent upon the possession or exercise of this privilege.

Whether the privilege was of any value at the time the bonds were received by the defendants we are not informed, nor in determining the negotiability of the bonds is the value of the privilege a circumstance of any importance. Its value can in no way affect the negotiable character of the instrument. An agreement confessedly worthless, providing that upon the surrender of the bonds the holder should receive, instead of full paid-up stock in the railway company, stock in other companies of doubtful solvency, would have had the same effect upon the character of the instrument.

In Hodges v. Shuler, ^[1] which was decided by the Court of Appeals of New York, we have an adjudication upon a similar question. There the action was brought upon a promissory note of the Rutland and Burlington Railway Company, by which the company promised, four years after date, to pay certain parties in Boston one thousand dollars, with interest thereon semi-annually, as per interest warrants attached, as the same became due; 'or, upon the surrender of this note, together with the interest warrants not due, to the treasurer, at any time until six months of its maturity, he shall issue to the holders thereof ten shares in the capital stock in said company in exchange therefor, in which case interest shall be paid to the date to which a dividend of profits shall have been previously declared, the holder not being entitled to both interest and accruing profits during the same period.'

It was contended that the instrument was not in terms or legal effect a negotiable promissory note, but a mere agreement, and that the indorsement of it operated only as a mere transfer, and not as an engagement to fulfil the contract of the company in case of its default. But the Court of Appeals held otherwise. 'The possibility seems to have been contemplated,' says the court, 'that the owner of the note might, before its maturity, surrender it in exchange for stock, thus cancelling it and its money promise, but that promise was nevertheless absolute and unconditional, and was as lasting as the note itself. In no event could the holder require money and stock. It was only upon a surrender of the note that he was to receive stock, and the money payment did not mature until six months after the holder's right to exchange the note for stock had expired. We are of opinion that the instrument wants none of the essential requirements of a negotiable promissory note. It was an absolute and unconditional engagement to pay money on a fixed day, and although an election was given to the promisees, upon a surrender of the instrument six months before its maturity, to exchange it for stock, this did not alter its character or make the promise in the alternative in the sense in which that word is used in respect to promises to pay.'

In Welch v. Sage, ^[2] the effect of the certificate attached to the bonds issued by the Milwaukee and St. Paul Railway Company, identical with those in this case, was considered by the same Court of Appeals, and the court there held that the certificate constituted no part of the bond; that the latter was entire and perfect without it, and that the admission of the debt and the promise to pay were in no degree qualified by it.

The absence of the certificates, at the time the bonds were received by the defendants, was not of itself a circumstance sufficient to put the defendants upon inquiry as to the title of the holder. There is no evidence in the case, as already observed, that the privilege which the certificates conferred was of any value; and if it had value no obligation rested upon the holder to preserve the certificates. He was at liberty to abandon the privilege they conferred and rely solely upon the absolute obligation of the company to pay the amount stipulated. The absence of the certificates when the bonds were offered to the defendants amounted to little if anything more in legal effect than a statement by the holder that in his judgment they added nothing to the value of the bonds. In the case of Welch v. Sage, already cited, it was held that the absence of the certificate from the bond when taken by the purchaser would not of itself establish the fact that the purchaser was guilty of fraud or bad faith, although it would be a circumstance of some weight in connection with other evidence.

The law is well settled that a party who takes negotiable paper before due for a valuable consideration, without knowledge of any defect of title, in good faith, can hold it against all the world. A suspicion that there is a defect of title in the holder, or a knowledge of circumstances that might excite such suspicion in the mind of a cautions person, or even gross negligence at the time, will not defeat the title of the purchaser. That result can be produced only by bad faith, which implies guilty knowledge or wilful ignorance, and the burden of proof lies on the assailant of the title. It was so expressly held by this court in Murray v. Lardner, ^[3] where Mr. Justice Swayne examined the leading authorities on the subject and gave the conclusion we have stated.

In the present case it is not pretended that the defendants, when they took the bonds in controversy, had notice of any circumstances outside of the instruments themselves, and the absence of the certificates referred to in them, to throw doubt upon the title of the holder.

We see no error in the rulings of the court below, and its judgment is, therefore,

AFFIRMED.

Notes

1. 22 New York, 114.
2. 47 New York, 143.
3. 2 Wallace, 110; see also Goodman v. Simonds, 20 Howard, 343.