How We Advertised America/Part 1/Chapter 2
II
The "Censorship" Bugbear
The initial disadvantages and persistent misunderstandings that did so much to cloud public estimation of the Committee had their origin in the almost instant antagonism of the metropolitan press. At the time of my appointment a censorship bill was before Congress, and the newspapers, choosing to ignore the broad sweep of the Committee's functions, proceeded upon the exclusive assumption that I was to be "the censor." As a result of press attack and Senate discussion, the idea became general and fixed that the Committee was a machinery of secrecy and repression organized solely to crush free speech and a free press.
As a matter of fact, I was strongly opposed to the censorship bill, and delayed acceptance of office until the President had considered approvingly the written statement of my views on the subject. It was not that I denied the need of some sort of censorship, but deep in my heart was the feeling that the desired results could be obtained without paying the price that a formal law would have demanded. Aside from the physical difficulties of enforcement, the enormous cost, and the overwhelming irritation involved, I had the conviction that our hope must lie in the aroused patriotism of the newspaper men of America.
With the nation in arms, the need was not so much to keep the press from doing the hurtful things as to get it to do the helpful things. It was not servants we wanted, but associates. Better far to have the desired compulsions proceed from within than to apply them from without. Also, for the first time in our history, soldiers of the United States were sailing to fight in a foreign land, leaving families three thousand miles behind them. Nothing was more important than that there should be the least possible impairment of the people's confidence in the printed information presented to them. Suspicious enough by reason of natural anxieties, a censorship law would have turned every waiting heart over to the fear that news was being either strangled or minimized.
Aside from these considerations, there was the freedom of the press to bear in mind. No other right guaranteed by democracy has been more abused, but even these abuses are preferable to the deadening evil of autocratic control. In addition, it is the inevitable tendency of such legislation to operate solely against the weak and the powerless, and, as I pointed out, the European experience was thick with instances of failure to proceed against great dailies for bold infraction.
Censorship laws, too, even though they protest that the protection of military secrets is their one original object, have a way of slipping over into the field of opinion, for arbitrary power grows by what it feeds on. "Information of value to the enemy" is an elastic phrase and, when occasion requires, can be stretched to cover the whole field of independent discussion. Nothing, it seemed to me, was more dangerous, for people did not need less criticism in tune of war, but more. Incompetence and corruption, bad enough in peace, took on an added menace when the nation was in arms. One had a right to hope that the criticism would be honest, just, and constructive, but even a blackguard's voice was preferable to the dead silence of an iron suppression.
My proposition, in lieu of the proposed law, was a voluntary agreement that would make every paper in the land its own censor, putting it up to the patriotism and common sense of the individual editor to protect purely military information of tangible value to the enemy. The plan was approved and, without further thought of the pending bill, we proceeded to prepare a statement to the press of America that would make clear the necessities of the war-machine even while removing doubts and distrusts. The specific requests of the army and the navy were comparatively few, and were concerned only with the movements of troops, the arrival and departure of ships, location of the fleet, and similar matters obviously secret in their nature. As illustrative of the whole tone of the discussion that accompanied the requests, these paragraphs are cited:
The European press bureaus have also attempted to keep objectionable news from their own people. This must be clearly differentiated from the problem of keeping dangerous news from the enemy. It will be necessary at times to keep information from OUT own people in order to keep it from the enemy, but most of the belligerent countries have gone much farther. In one of the confidential documents submitted to us there is, under Censorship Regulations, a long section with the heading, "News likely to cause anxiety or distress." Among the things forbidden under this section are the publication of "reports concerning outbreaks of epidemics in training-camps," "newspaper articles tending to raise unduly the hopes of the people as to the success" of anticipated military movements. This sort of suppression has obviously nothing to do with the keeping of objectionable news from the enemy.
The motive for the establishment of this internal censorship is not merely fear of petty criticism, but distrust of democratic common sense. The officials fear that the people will be stampeded by false news and sensational scare stories. The danger feared is real, but the experience of Europe indicates that censorship regulations do not solve the problem, A printed story is tangible even if false. It can be denied. Its falsity can be proven. It is not nearly so dangerous as a false rumor.
The atmosphere created by common knowledge that news is being suppressed is an ideal "culture "for the propaganda of the bacteria of enemy rumors. This state of mind was the thing which most impressed Americans visiting belligerent countries. Insane and dangerous rumors, some of obvious enemy origin, were readily believed, and they spread with amazing rapidity. This is a greater danger than printing scare stories. No one knows who starts a rumor, but there is a responsible editor behind every printed word. But the greatest objection to censoring of the news against the home population is that it has always tended to create the abuse of shielding from public criticism the dishonesty or incompetency of high officials. While it certainly has never been the policy of any of the European press bureaus to accomplish this result, the internal censorship has generally worked out this way. And there are several wellestablished instances where the immense power of the censor has fallen into the control of intriguing cliques. Nominally striving to protect the public from pernicious ideas, they have used the censorship to protect themselves from legitimate criticism.
A proof of the statement was sent to every member of the press gallery, and after sufficient time for proper study a meeting was called at which Mr. Arthur Bullard, Mr. Edgar G. Sisson, and I presented ourselves for questioning and full examination. We explained that as the agreement was to be both public and voluntary, their assent must not be qualified by any doubt, and that we stood ready to make any proper changes, either in phraseology or principle. The temper of the gathering, hostile at first, grew more friendly as understandings were reached, and when we left it seemed a certainty that the plan would be approved. Unfortunately, however, the papers of the following morning contained a letter from the President in which he entered denial of the report that he had withdrawn his support from the proposed censorship law. This was the position of the military authorities, and as the President had agreed to their suggestions in the beginning, he felt, without doubt, that his pledge of approval could not be canceled while the various generals and admirals were still unchanged in their insistence that they must have the protection afforded by an explicit statute.
Even though we knew the utter hopelessness of it, we went ahead with our plans and issued the statement to the press exactly as presented to the Washington correspondents. What followed quickly was another act in the serio-tragic drama of misunderstanding. The Secretaries of State, War, and the Navy had each been asked to give his views, and those that came from the office of Mr. Lansing read as follows:
The Department of State considers it dangerous and of service to the enemy to discuss differences of opinion between the Allies and difficulties with neutral countries.
The protection of information belonging to friendly countries is most important. Submarine-warfare news is a case in point. England permits this government to have full information, but as it is England's policy not to publish details, this government must support that policy.
Speculation about possible peace is another topic which may possess elements of danger, as peace reports may be of enemy origin put out to weaken the combination against Germany.
Generally speaking, articles likely to prove offensive to any of the Allies or to neutrals would be undesirable.
Convinced that a trick had been attempted and eager to find something to sustain their suspicions, the papers seized upon Mr. Lansing's ideas and held them up to heaven in witness of the Administration's dark plot. Not one took into account that the whole proposal rested upon voluntary agreement entirely, not upon law, and that the suggestions of the Department of State were advisory only and without larger power to bind than that allowed by the individual editor. Equally did every paper ignore the fact that the statement itself, in the outline of fundamental principles, contained these explicit guaranties:
Nearly all the European belligerents have also tried to prevent the publication of news likely to offend their allies or create friction between them. The Committee is of the opinion that the more full the interally discussion of their mutual problems the better. Matters of high strategy, and so forth, will of course have to be kept secret by the war council, but the more the people of the Allied countries get acquainted with one another through their newspapers the better. If any case arises where one of our papers uses insulting or objectionable language against our comrades in arms it had best be dealt with individually. But so far as possible this Committee will maintain the rule of free discussion in such matters.
The clamor refused to be stilled, however, and Mr. Hearst and the Republican Senators reached the stage of hysteria in their passionate defense of the "freedom of the press," that "guardian of liberty," that "palladium," etc. The bill, brought again into consideration, was defeated decisively and finally. And with this irritation out of the way, we had hope of a return to common sense and so, without more ado, we issued the following card:
What the Government Asks of the Press
The desires of the government with respect to the concealment from the enemy of military policies, plans, and movements are set forth in the following specific requests. They go to the press of the United States directly from the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy and represent the thought and advice of their technical advisers. They do not apply to news despatches censored by military authority with the expeditionary forces or in those cases where the government itself, in the form of official statements, may find it necessary or expedient to make public information covered by these requests.
For the protection of our military and naval forces and of merchant shipping it is requested that secrecy be observed in all matters of—
1. Advance information of the routes and schedules of troop movements. (See Par. 5.)
2. Information tending to disclose the number of troops in the expeditionary forces abroad.
3. Information calculated to disclose the location of the permanent base or bases abroad.
4. Information that would disclose the location of American units or the eventual position of the American forces at the front.
5. Information tending to disclose an eventual or actual port of embarkation; or information of the movement of military forces toward seaports or of the assembling of military forces at seaports from which inference might be drawn of any intention to embark them for service abroad; and information of the assembling of transports or convoys; and information of the embarkation itself.
6. Information of the arrival at any European port of American war-vessels, transports, or any portion of any expeditionary force, combatant or non-combatant.
7. Information of the time of departure of merchant ships from American or European ports, or information of the ports from which they sailed, or information of their cargoes.
8. Information indicating the port of arrival of incoming ships from European ports or after their arrival indicating, or hinting at, the port at which the ship arrived.
9. Information as to convoys and as to the sighting of friendly or enemy ships, whether naval or merchant.
10. Information of the locality, number, or identity of vessels belonging to our own navy or to the navies of any country at war with Germany.
11. Information of the coast or anti-aircraft defenses of the United States. Any information of their very existence, as well as the number, nature, or position of their guns, is dangerous.
12. Information of the laying of mines or mine-fields or of any harbor defenses.
13. Information of the aircraft and appurtenances used at government aviation-schools for experimental tests under military authority, and information of contracts and production of air material, and information tending to disclose the numbers and organization of the air division, excepting when authorized by the Committee on Public Information.
14. Information of all government devices and experiments in war material, excepting when authorized by the Committee on Public Information.
15. Information of secret notices issued to mariners or other confidential instructions issued by the navy or the Department of Commerce relating to lights, lightships, buoys, or other guides to navigation.
16. Information as to the number, size, character, or location of ships of the navy ordered laid down at any port or shipyard, or in actual process of construction; or information that they are launched or in commission.
17. Information of the train or boat schedules of traveling official missions in transit through the United States.
18. Information of the transportation of munitions or of war material.
Photographs.—Photographs conveying the information specified above should not be published.
These requests to the press are without larger authority than the necessities of the war-making branches. Their enforcement is a matter for the press itself. To the overwhelming proportion of newspapers who have given unselfish, patriotic adherence to the voluntary agreement the government extends its gratitude and high appreciation.
Committee on Public Information,
By George Creel, Chairman.
Will any American deny that these requests proceeded properly and inevitably from the necessities of war, and that each one had its base in common sense? Do they suggest any attempt on the part of the government to curb, influence, or confine the right of criticism? Even to-day, when the war is a thing of the past, can it be said that the card contained a word or a phrase to which any decent American could take objection? Newspaper men, it must be remembered, were holding peace-time jobs while others sacrificed or fought. Should it not have been their glad duty to aid enthusiastically in the provision of a veil of secrecy that meant larger safety for American ships and troops and larger chances for American military success?
Our European comrades in arms viewed the experiment with amazement, not unmixed with anxiety, for in every other belligerent country censorship laws established iron rules, rigid suppressions, and drastic prohibitions carrying severe penalties. Yet the American idea worked. And it worked better than any European law. Troop-trains moved, transports sailed, ships arrived and departed, inventions were protected, and military plans advanced, all behind a wall of concealment built upon the honor of the press and the faith of the individual editor. Yet while the thing itself was done there was no joy and pride in the doing. Never at any time was it possible to persuade the whole body of Washington correspondents to think of the voluntary censorship in terms of human life and national hopes. A splendid, helpful minority caught the idea and held to it, but the majority gave themselves over to exasperation and antagonism, rebelling continuously against even the appearance of restraint. Partizanship, as a matter of course, played a larger part in this attitude, but a great deal of it proceeded from what the French call "professional deformation." Long training had developed the conviction that nothing in the world was as important as a "story," and not even the grim fact of war could remove this obsession.
In face of the printed card, with its simple requests unsupported by law, the press persisted in spreading the belief that I was a censor, and with mingled moans and protests each paper did its best to make the people believe that the voluntary censorship was not voluntary, and that the uncompelled thing the press was doing was not really uncompelled at all.
When one paper violated the agreement, as many did in the beginning, all the others were instant in their clamor that the Committee should straightway inflict some sort of "punishment." This was absurd, for we had no authority, and they knew that we had none, yet when we made this obvious answer, a general cry would arise that the "whole business should be thrown over." Never at any time did it occur to the press to provide its own discipline for the punishment of dishonor.
All through the first few months it was a steady whine and nag and threat. Every little triviality was magnified into an importance, and the manufacture of mole-hills into mountains was the favorite occupation. The following letter, written on July 12, 1917, to the editor of a great metropolitan daily may serve to give some idea of the general attack:
Your signed article on censorship, "What We, and You, Are Up Against," is written so fairly, and in such evident honesty of purpose, that I feel sure you will be glad to have me inform you with respect to its various inaccuracies.
1. Never at any time did this Committee ask suppression of the name of the monitor Amphitrite that rammed the steamer Manchuria. It is the policy of the navy to give instant and complete publicity to all accidents and disasters, and a full report of the ramming was sent out at once. Your own correspondent argued that the name of the Amphitrite should not be used, and if you did not get the information it was because he did not send it. Even so, you had the name in the Associated Press despatches with full permission to use it.
2. With regard to the closing of the port of New York, this was done by order of the port commandant. The Navy Department was not informed officially, and when queried by the press asked that the news be withheld until an explanation could be gained from the New York authorities. This was at 11 A.M. At one o'clock this Committee gave out a complete statement as to the closing and reopening, and all the afternoon papers, in their later editions, carried the story. No request of any kind was made upon the morning papers.
3. You state that your paper applied to the Committee for permission to print that the Root Mission was passing through Chicago on its way to Russia, and that it was given. Your Washington correspondent cannot tell us the name of the man that answered the telephone, nor have I been able to discover it myself. I do not doubt for a minute that the call was made, but the fact remains that it was not until a full week after the Root incident that this Committee commenced its day and night reference service. At the time we were about ten days old and trying to get offices.
4. The facts regarding the landing of the first contingent of the Pershing expedition are few and simple. The War Department had requested that no announcement of any kind be made until the arrival in port of the last troop-ship. The Associated Press released the news from its New York office. This was done without the consent or knowledge of this Committee or of the War Department.
Our first intimation was a telephone-call from the United Press, stating the action of the Associated Press, and informing us that the United Press felt itself released from its word, and was sending the news out over its own wires. I told the United Press manager that the War Department still insisted upon secrecy, and he straightway issued a bulletin asking a "kill."
I called up the Associated Press at once, and was informed that the story had been released from the New York office an hour before, that it was "on the street," and that a "kill" was impossible. I then telephoned the United Press that it was at liberty to disregard my request for the "kill." I have no apology whatever to make for this honest attempt to protect good faith.
5. With regard to Secretary Daniels's statement of encounter with submarines, any doubt you may have had as of its accuracy should have been dispelled by a careful reading of your own paper. In the same issue that carried your article on censorship there appeared a front-page story that told of two separate attacks by submarines, making the claim that two U-boats were sunk. If you should be worried again as to the truth of Secretary Daniels's statement, I would urge you to read your own vivid, convincing narrative.
So much, then, for what you term "hodge-podge official handling of information." In view of my explanations, will you still insist that we are to blame for the "hodge-podge"? But if all that you allege were true, if we had been guilty of the blunders that you charge, what of it?
The secrecies sought to be obtained by the War and Navy Departments have concern with the lives of America's youth. Irritation and impatience are the worst that can possibly befall you and your readers, but death may be the fate of the soldiers and sailors that are called upon to run the gantlet of submarines. When men are going forth to fight and die, surely it is not a time for those who remain at home in ease and safety to wax angry over things that, even if true, are essentially trivial.
Very sincerely,
[Signed] George Creel.
This voluntary agreement, having no force in law, and made possible only by patience, infinite labor, and the pressure of conscience upon the individual, was the Committee on Public Information's one and only connection with censorship of any kind. At no time did the Committee exercise or seek authorities under the war measures that limited the peace-time freedom of individuals or professions. Not only did we hold aloof from the workings of the Espionage law, operated by the Postmaster-General and the Attorney-General, but it was even the case that we incurred angers and enmities by incessant attempt to soften the rigors of the measure.