In re Groban/Opinion of the Court
The question presented by this appeal is whether appellants had a constitutional right under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the assistance of their own counsel in giving testimony as witnesses at a proceeding conducted by the Ohio State Fire Marshal to investigate the causes of a fire.
After a fire occurred on the premises of a corporation owned and operated by appellants, the Fire Marshal started an investigation into the causes of the fire and subpoenaed appellants to appear as witnesses. The Fire Marshal refused to permit appellants' counsel to be present at the proceeding, relying on § 3737.13 of the Ohio Code, which provides that the 'investigation * * * may be private' and that he may 'exclude from the place where (the) investigation is held all persons other than those required to be present * * *.' [1] Appellants declined to be sworn and to testify without the immediate presence of their counsel, who had accompanied them to the hearing. Their refusal was treated as a violation of § 3737.12, which provides that 'No witness shall refuse to be sworn or refuse to testify * * *.' Section 3737.99(A) provides that 'Whoever violates section 3737.12 * * * may be summarily punished, by the officer concerned, by * * * commitment to the county jail until such person is willing to comply with the order of such officer.' The Fire Marshal accordingly committed appellants to the county jail until such time as they should be willing to testify. [2] Appellants' application for a writ of habeas corpus was denied by the Ohio Court of Common Pleas, and this denial was affirmed on appeal by the Ohio Court of Appeals and by the Ohio Supreme Court. [3]
We postponed further consideration of the question of jurisdiction to the hearing on the merits. 351 U.S. 903, 76 S.Ct. 693, 100 L.Ed. 1440. The Ohio Supreme Court construed § 3737.13 to authorize the Fire Marshal to exclude appellants' counsel from the proceeding. Since appellants' attack is on the constitutionality of that section, we have jurisdiction on appeal. 28 U.S.C. § 1257(2), 28 U.S.C.A. § 1257(2).
We note at the outset that appellants explicitly disavow making any direct attack on the Fire Marshal's power of summary punishment under § 3737.99(A). They challenge not the validity of the procedure by which they were committed to jail, but the constitutional sufficiency of the grounds on which they were so committed. Their sole assertion is that the Fire Marshal's authority to exclude counsel under § 3737.13 was unconstitutional because they had a right, under the Due Process Clause, to the assistance of their counsel in giving their testimony.
It is clear that a defendant in a state criminal trial has an unqualified right, under the Due Process Clause, to be heard through his own counsel. Chandler v. Fretag, 348 U.S. 3, 75 S.Ct. 1, 99 L.Ed. 4. Prosecution of an individual differs widely from administrative investigation of incidents damaging to the economy or dangerous to the public. The proceeding before the Fire Marshal was not a criminal trial, nor was it an administrative proceeding that would in any way adjudicate appellants' responsibilities for the fire. It was a proceeding solely to elicit facts relating to the causes and circumstances of the fire. The Fire Marshal's duty was to 'determine whether the fire was the result of carelessness or design,' and to arrest any person against whom there was sufficient evidence on which to base a charge of arson. [4]
The fact that appellants were under a legal duty to speak and that their testimony might provide a basis for criminal charges against them does not mean that they had a constitutional right to the assistance of their counsel. Appellants here are witnesses from whom information was sought as to the cause of the fire. A witness before a grand jury cannot insist, as a matter of constitutional right, on being represented by his counsel, [5] nor can a witness before other investigatory bodies. [6] There is no more reason to allow the presence of counsel before a Fire Marshal trying in the public interest to determine the cause of a fire. Obviously in these situations evidence obtained may possibly lay a witness open to criminal charges. When such charges are made in a criminal proceeding, he then may demand the presence of his counsel for his defense. Until then his protection is the privilege against self-incrimination. [7] U.S.Const., Amend. V.; Ohio Const., Art. I, § 10. See Adamson v. People of State of California, 332 U.S. 46, 52, 67 S.Ct. 1672, 1675, 91 L.Ed. 1903. This is a privilege available in investigations as well as in prosecutions. See In re Groban, 164 Ohio St. 26, 28, 128 N.E.2d 106, 108, and 99 Ohio App. 512, 515, 135 N.E.2d 477, 480; McCarthy v. Arndstein, 266 U.S. 34, 40, 45 S.Ct. 16, 17, 69 L.Ed. 158; Adams v. State of Maryland, 347 U.S. 179, 74 S.Ct. 442, 98 L.Ed. 608. We have no doubt that the privilege is available in Ohio against prosecutions as well as convictions reasonably feared. Cf. Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 431, 76 S.Ct. 497, 502, 100 L.Ed. 511. The mere fact that suspicion may be entertained of such a witness, as appellants believed existed here, though without allegation of facts to support such a belief, does not bar the taking of testimony in a private investigatory proceeding.
It may be that the number of people present in a grand jury proceeding gives greater assurance that improper use will not be made of the witness' presence. We think, however, that the presumption of fair and orderly conduct by the state officials without coercion or distortion exists until challenged by facts to the contrary. Possibility of improper exercise of opportunity to examine is not in our judgment a sound reason to set aside a State's procedure for fire prevention. As in similar situations, abuses may be corrected as they arise, for example, by excluding from subsequent prosecutions evidence improperly obtained.
Ohio, like many other States, maintains a division of the state government directed by the Fire Marshal for the prevention of fires and reduction of fire losses. [8] Section 3737.13, which has been in effect since 1900, [9] represents a determination by the Ohio Legislature that investigations conducted in private may be the most effective method of bringing to light facts concerning the origins of fires, and, in the long run, of reducing injuries and losses from fires caused by negligence or by design. We cannot say that this determination is unreasonable. The presence of advisors to witnesses might easily so far encumber an investigatory proceeding as to make it unworkable or unwieldy. And with so weighty a public interest as fire prevention to protect, we cannot hold that the balance has been set in such a way as to be contrary to 'fundamental principles of liberty and justice.' Hebert v. State of Louisiana, 272 U.S. 312, 316, 47 S.Ct. 103, 104, 71 L.Ed. 270. That is the test to measure the validity of a state statute under the Due Process Clause.
Appellants urge, however, that the Fire Marshal's power to exclude counsel under § 3737.13 must be considered in the light of his power of summary punishment under § 3737.99(A), and they would have us hold that, so considered, his power to exclude counsel was unconstitutional. We held in In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 68 S.Ct. 499, 92 L.Ed. 682, that a witness before a one-man grand jury, a judge, could not constitutionally be punished summarily for contempt of the grand jury without being allowed to be represented by his counsel. We see no relation between the premise that appellants could not be punished without representation by counsel and the conclusion that they could not be questioned without such representation. Section 3737.13 may contain a constitutional flaw if it should be construed to authorize the exclusion of counsel while the Fire Marshal determines that a witness has violated § 3737.12 and orders the witness committed. The sole assertion of a constitutional violation that appellants relied upon before the Ohio Supreme Court and the only one open on the record here-the authorization in § 3737.13 of the exclusion of counsel while a witness testifies-is not well founded. We hold that appellants had no constitutional right to be assisted by their counsel in giving testimony at the investigatory proceeding conducted by the Fire Marshal, and that § 3737.13, insofar as it authorizes the exclusion of counsel while a witness testifies, is not repugnant to the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Affirmed.
Mr. Justice FRANKFURTER, whom Mr. Justice HARLAN joins, concurring.
To whatever extent history may confirm Lord Acton's dictum that power tends to corrupt, such a doctrine of fear can hardly serve as a test, under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, of a particular exercise of a State's legislative power. And so, the constitutionality of a particular statute, expressive of a State's view of desirable policy for dealing with one of the rudimentary concerns of society-the prevention of fires and the ascertainment of their causes-and directed towards a particular situation, cannot be determined by deriving a troupe of hobgoblins from the assumption that such a particularized exercise of power would justify an unlimited, abusive exercise of power.
If the Ohio legislation were directed explicitly or by obvious design toward secret inquisition of those suspected of arson, we would have a wholly different situation from the one before us. This is not a statute directed to the examination of suspects. It is a statute authorizing inquiry by the chief guardian of a community against the hazards of fire into the causes of fires. To be sure, it does not preclude the possibility that a suspect might turn up among those to be questioned by the Fire Marshal. But the aim of the statute is the expeditious and expert ascertainment of the causes of fire. The Fire Marshal is not a prosecutor, though he may, like others, serve as a witness for the prosecution. In various proceedings, as for instance under some workmen's compensation laws, the presence of lawyers is deemed not conducive to the economical and thorough ascertainment of the facts. The utmost devotion to one's profession and the fullest recognition of the great role of lawyers in the evolution of a free society cannot lead one to erect as a constitutional principle that no administrative inquiry can be had in camera unless a lawyer be allowed to attend.
The assumption that as a normal matter such an inquiry carries with it deprivation of some rights of a citizen assumes inevitable misuse of authority. For good reasons, and certainly for constitutional purposes, the contrary assumption must be entertained. The potential danger most feared is that it will invade the privilege against self-incrimination in States where it is constitutionally recognized. But that privilege is amply safeguarded by the decision of the Supreme Court of Ohio in this case. We are not justified in invalidating this Ohio statute on the assumption that people called before the Fire Marshal would not be aware of their privilege not to respond to questions the answers to which may tend to incriminate. At a time when this privilege has attained the familiarity of the comic strips, the assumption of ignorance about the privilege by witnesses called before the Fire Marshal is too farfetched an assumption on which to invalidate legislation.
What has been said disposes of the suggestion that, because this statute relating to a general administrative, non-prosecutorial inquiry into the causes of fire is sustained, it would follow that secret inquisitorial powers given to a District Attorney would also have to be sustained. The Due Process Clause does not disregard vital differences. If it be said that these are all differences of degree, the decisive answer is that recognition of differences of degree is inherent in due regard for due process. We are admonished from time to time not to adjudicate on the basis of fear of foreign totalitarianism. Equally so should we not be guided in the exercise of our reviewing power over legislation by fear of totalitarianism in our own country.
For these reasons I join the opinion of the Court.
Mr. Justice BLACK, with whom The CHIEF JUSTICE, Mr. Justice DOUGLAS and Mr. Justice BRENNAN join, dissenting.
Notes[edit]
- ↑ Page's Ohio Rev.Code, § 3737.13.
- ↑ Appellants were released on bond and have never in fact been incarcerated.
- ↑ In re Groban, 99 Ohio App. 512, 135 N.E.2d 477; 164 Ohio St. 26, 128 N.E.2d 106.
- ↑ Page's Ohio Rev.Code, §§ 3737.08, 3737.10.
- ↑ In re Black, 2 Cir., 47 F.2d 542; accord, United States v. Blanton, D.C., 77 F.Supp. 812; see United States v. Scully, 2 Cir., 225 F.2d 113, 116.
- ↑ Bowles v. Baer, 7 Cir., 142 F.2d 787; United States v. Levine, D.C., 127 F.Supp. 651. Note, Rights of Witnesses in Administrative Investigations, 54 Harv.L.Rev. 1214, 1216-1217.
- ↑ Cf. Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 76 S.Ct. 497, 100 L.Ed. 511; Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486, 71 S.Ct. 814, 95 L.Ed. 1118; Smith v. United States, 337 U.S. 137, 150, 69 S.Ct. 1000, 1007, 93 L.Ed. 1264; Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 66-67, 26 S.Ct. 370, 375-376, 50 L.Ed. 652.
- ↑ See National Fire Protection Association Handbook of Fire Protection (10th ed. 1948) 41-45; Annual Report of the Division of (Ohio) State Fire Marshal for 1955.
- ↑ Ohio Laws 1900, Senate Bill No. 51.
This work is in the public domain in the United States because it is a work of the United States federal government (see 17 U.S.C. 105).
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