Indo-Pacific Strategy of the United States/4

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Conclusion

We have entered a consequential new period of American foreign policy that will demand more of the United States in the Indo-Pacific than has been asked of us since the Second World War. Our vital interests in the region have become ever-clearer just as they have become more difficult to protect; we will not have the luxury of choosing between power politics and combatting transnational threats; we will rise to our leadership charge on diplomacy, security, economics, climate, pandemic response, and technology.

The Indo-Pacific’s future depends on the choices we make now. The decisive decade before us will determine if the region can confront and address climate change, reveal how the world rebuilds from a once-in-a-century pandemic, and decide whether we can sustain the principles of openness, transparency, and inclusivity that have fueled the region’s success. If, together with our partners, we can reinforce the region for 21st-century challenges and seize its opportunities, the Indo-Pacific will thrive, bolstering the United States and the world.

As we enter a decisive decade that holds considerable promise and historic obstacles for the Indo-Pacific, the American role in the region must be more effective and enduring than ever.

Our considerable strategic ambitions derive from the belief that no region will be of more consequence to the world and to everyday Americans than the Indo-Pacific—and that the United States and our allies and partners hold a common vision for it. By pursuing a strategy whose foundational pillars are shared, and by strengthening the region’s capacity to realize them, the United States can lead with others toward an Indo-Pacific that is free and open, connected, prosperous, secure, and resilient for generations to come.