Information derived from Mohammed Mansour Jabarah

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Information derived from Mohammed Mansour Jabarah (2002)
Federal Bureau of Investigation
424349Information derived from Mohammed Mansour Jabarah2002Federal Bureau of Investigation

The following information concerning Father Rahman Al Ghozi, aka Saad, aka Mike, and the Jemaah Islamiyah, was obtained during FBI interviews of Mohammed Mansour Jabarah, aka Sammy. This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside of your agency.

During early September 2001, Jabarah traveled to Malaysia to meet with individuals who were planning an operation against the U.S. and Israeli Embassies in the Philippines. Jabarah advised that he (Jabarah) was in charge of the financing for the operation. After arriving in Kuala' Lumpur, Jabarah contacted Azzam, aka Zulkifli Marzuki, about arranging a meeting with Mahmoud aka Faiz Bafana, and Saad. Azzam told Jabarah that Mahmoud was on a business trip and Saad was in the mountains in the Philippines training with the rebels.

Once Mahmoud returned to Malaysia, he met with Jabarah. Jabarah told Mahmoud that he needed to go to the Philippines, and Mahmoud said he would get in touch with Saad, as he is the person who would obtain any of the needed explosives. Mahmoud told Jabarah and his associate Ahmed Sahagi to go to the Philippines to meet with Saad. Mahmoud said Saad would E-mail them when they arrived in the Philippines. Jabarah stated that Ahmed's role in the mission was to be the one of the suicide bombers.

When Jabarah and Ahmed reached the Philippines, they checked into the Horizon Hotel in Makati. After a couple of days, Saad e-mailed Jabarah and provided a telephone number in Manila: Saad spoke fluent Arabic. After talking to Saad on the phone they arranged for Saad to come to the hotel in two days. When Saad arrived at the hotel, Saad informed Jabarah that he only bad 300 KG Of TNT and he needed additional time and money. Saad informed Jabarah he wanted four tons of explosives. Saad, who was the explosive expert, also explained to Jabarah and Ahmed that the U.S. Embassy in Manila is not a good target since the set back from the road was too far. Saad took Jabarah to the U.S. Embassy and the office building where the Israeli Embassy is located. Saad told Jabarah that he wanted to go to Malaysia and discuss with Mahmoud the situation. Jabarah and Ahmed spent 10 days in Manila.

After the trip to the Philippines with Saad, Jabarah and Ahmed returned to Malaysia separately from Saad in October 2001. - Jabarah informed Azzam that they needed to meet with Mahnioud when Saad returned from the Philippines. Azzam e-mailed Jabarah when Saad returned to Kuala Lumpur and they arranged for a meeting. Attending this meeting were Jabarah, Ahmad, Azzarn, Mahmoud, Saad, and an unknown Malaysian. Saad spoke to Azzam and Mahmoud in Malay and explained to Jabarah that he told Mahmoud and Azzam that the targets in the Philippines were not good. Mahmoud then suggested Jabarah go to Singapore, meet with Saad and a couple of other Singaporeans, and videotape targets in Singapore.

During November 2001, Saad returned to the Philippines to inquire about obtaining the TNT.

During early December-200 1, Hambali advised Jabarah that they should cancel the Singapore operation and-move the target back to the U.S. and Israel Embassies in the Philippines. Hambali believed that operations in the Philippines could be accomplished sooner since the explosives would not have to be shipped. Hambali stated that. if the targets in the Philippines were unacceptable-, they should find better targets in the Philippines. Hambali and Azzam told Jabarah to contact Saad, who was in Manila at this time, and tell him to cancel the Singapore operation and attack targets, in the Philippines;

The last contact Jabarah had with Hambali was in mid January. 2002, in Thailand. During his time Hambali discussed carrying out attacks with his group. His plan was to conduct small bombings in bars, cafes or nightclubs frequented by westerners' in Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, Philippines and Indonesia.

Jabarah stated that there were code words used by Al Qaeda. The code words were generally established by the individual cells. Some of the code words they used in Asia were

Market = Malaysia
Soup = Singapore
Terminal =-Indonesia
Hotel= Philippines
Book = Passport
American = White Meat

Jabarah stated that Saad told him that he (Saad) was a member of Jemaah Islamiyah that he trained with explosives in Afghanistan in 1995 with Abu Khabab.

When asked about the potential targets in Asia, Jabarah noted that the planned attack n Singapore would not have been difficult. This embassy is very close to the street and did not have many barriers, to prevent the attack. An attack on the U.S. Embassy in Manila would have been much more difficult, requiring at least two operations. Jabarah added that this would most likely not been successful, adding that a plane would be needed to attack this building because the security was very tough.

Jabarah and Ahmad were arrested in Oman during March 2002. . Jabarah was in Oman to assist Al Qaeda operatives traveling through Oman to Yemen. Jabarah believes that Ahmed was deported to Yemen.