Intelligence and Security Committee Russia report/A Hard Target
92. As already noted, the Russian government is an accomplished adversary with well-resourced and world-class offensive and defensive intelligence capabilities. The well-publicised mistakes Russian operatives made in Salisbury, and later in trying to infiltrate the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), have led to public speculation about the competence of the Russian Intelligence Services (RIS), and the GRU in particular. Whilst these attacks demonstrate that the RIS are not infallible, it would be foolhardy to think that they are any less dangerous because of these mistakes. Indeed, the likelihood is that the RIS will learn from their errors, and become more difficult to detect and protect against as a result.
93. All witnesses agreed that Russia is one of the hardest intelligence challenges that there is. There are a number of reasons for this. While some are generic problems that are heightened by Russian ability to exploit them (for example, ***), others are unique to Russia (for example, ***).
94. The Russian decision-making apparatus is concentrated on Putin and a small group of trusted and secretive advisers (many of whom share Putin's background in the RIS). The limited number of individuals who are 'in the know' makes decision-making hard to understand, compared with systems where power and influence are dispersed among a great number of political players. Moreover, the President can make swift decisions that even his inner circle are not aware of – further complicating any ability to understand or predict Russian government intent.
95. This centralised decision-making allows the Russian government to carry out decisions at speed. Putin's inner circle appear to be willing and able to make and enact major decisions (for example, on the deployment of troops) within days, and they retain tight command and control over the whole government infrastructure – which can be put in the service of Russia's foreign policy goals at a moment's notice. It is difficult for the UK's democratic and consensus-based structures to match this pace. Putin appears to value surprise and the unexpected, and has therefore consciously retained and cultivated this 'decision-advantage' as a way of outmanoeuvring adversaries.
96. It is not clear to the Committee whether HMG and our allies have yet found an effective way to respond to the pace of Russian decision-making. This has severely undermined the West's ability to respond effectively to Russian aggressions in the past – for example, the annexation of Crimea in 2014.[1] By contrast, the pace of the response to the Salisbury attack was impressive. However, ***: a way must be found to maintain this momentum across Government.
97. Advancements in technology and data analytics present a range of challenges for all of the organisations the Committee oversees. In relation to signals intelligence (SIGINT), increasing privacy protection – including ubiquitous encryption – presents particular problems for GCHQ, and in the case of Russia it faces a real SIGINT challenge with the use by the Russian government of ***.
98. In terms of human intelligence (HUMINT) operations, technological advancements that gather and analyse data on individuals have generally increased the difficulty ***. The expansion of smart city technology (such as CCTV, smart sensors and mobile device tracking), and the capability that this provides, has increased the ability of ***.[2] ***.
99. Covert activity against any state carries the potential for conflict, and action against a nuclear hostile state even more so given the risk of escalation into diplomatic, economic or even military conflict. The Agencies and Defence Intelligence must therefore be particularly discerning ***.
100. In the case of Russia, the potential for escalation is particularly potent: the Russian regime is paranoid about Western intelligence activities and "is not able to treat objectively" international condemnation of its actions.[3] It views any such moves as Western efforts to encourage internal protest and regime change. The risk is compounded by limitations on UK engagement with the Russian government at official and political levels, making deciphering Russian leadership intent even more difficult.
101. Due to the difficulty of ***, the Intelligence Community have focused their effort on *** main strategic targets, which they assess will provide insight on the most important strategic topics, with intelligence on the lowest priorities collected on an 'opportunity-only' basis. These key targets are ***.
102. ***.[4]
103. SIS told us that this means operating with "strategic patience" in terms of both recruiting agents and increasing staff.[5] Whilst there are a *** group of staff working on this issue, SIS was clear that a sudden surge in numbers would not yield results more quickly.[6] It is the difficulty of recruiting Russian agents with the right accesses, and the careful planning, tradecraft and operational security around any prospective agents – so as to ensure their safety and minimise any political risk to HMG – which means that it takes a relatively long time for intelligence efforts to produce results.
104. Russia is a particularly hard operating environment for other countries' intelligence officers, so ***.[7] ***.[8] As a result, HUMINT opportunities need to be sought elsewhere. This may be ***.[9]
105. Due to the difficulties in finding and operating HUMINT sources on Russia, the Intelligence Community rely on the "bringing together of a range of intelligence disciplines" in order to get the best possible picture of the Russian threat.[10] In relation to SIGINT, GCHQ has focused on not only deploying a broad range of capabilities against Russia, but in joining up with others to use their capabilities in tandem, allowing them to ***.
106. Defence Intelligence brings to the table a range of specialised geospatial intelligence (GEOINT) and measurement and signature intelligence (MASINT) capabilities, which can be used to observe Russian targets at a distance, with a focus on military capabilities and organisations. Defence Intelligence has sought to *** "try to understand how they think and why they think".[11] Defence Intelligence is also involved in the expansion of HMG's open source intelligence capabilities (i.e. the analysis of information that can be accessed freely on the internet, or bought through commercial providers) through the Defence Intelligence Open Source Hub. Analysis of open source information is being increasingly used by the Agencies and Defence Intelligence to enhance their overall situational awareness, and can be fused with a smaller proportion of secret intelligence to provide a richer picture.
107. The Committee was struck by the relatively small proportion of *** work that is carried out by the Agencies in relation to Russia, compared with the intelligence coverage of Russia that is undertaken. For example, SIS usually deploys only *** of its overall operational Russia effort in support of ***, whilst GCHQ uses approximately ***.[12]
108. We were told that, since the overall cross-Whitehall Russia Strategy aim, in relation to Russia, is to develop "a Russia that chooses to co-operate, rather than challenge or confront", any work must be proportionate to this outcome – notably HMG does not deploy effects with the goal of effecting organisational collapse, in the way that they might be deployed against international terrorist groups, for example.[13] However, of equal concern, it appears, is the need to tread carefully so as not to provoke unexpected escalation. As a result, the Agencies' effects work primarily concentrates on ***; capability-building (the sharing of knowledge and capabilities with partners); and counter-intelligence work to disrupt *** operations.
109. We note that the focus on *** work increased significantly following the events in Salisbury as HMG *** engaged in a substantive and concerted diplomacy effort to coordinate a strong international response to the use of chemical weapons against civilians on UK soil.[14] This raises the question of whether return now to a 'normal', relatively low, level of *** effort against Russia would undermine this, or whether it would now be more appropriate for HMG to capitalise on its strengthened international relationships and push forward with greater emphasis on exposing Russian Hostile State Activity multilaterally; in our view it must be the latter.
- ↑ This is, partly, a result of the inherent differences between Russian and Western political systems.
- ↑ Oral evidence – GCHQ, *** December 2018.
- ↑ Oral evidence – MI5, *** November 2018.
- ↑ Written evidence – 2018 ICE Plan requirements for Russia.
- ↑ Oral evidence – SIS, *** December 2018.
- ↑ Oral evidence – SIS, *** December 2018; we note that SIS *** and has a "series of protections" around the people who do go into the team.
- ↑ GCHQ and Defence Intelligence staff working on Russia are UK based.
- ↑ Oral evidence – SIS, *** December 2018.
- ↑ ***
- ↑ Oral evidence – Defence Intelligence, *** December 2018.
- ↑ Oral evidence – Defence Intelligence, *** December 2018.
- ↑ Oral evidence – SIS and GCHQ, *** January 2019.
- ↑ More information on this is included in the Strategy, Co-ordination and Tasking section of this Report.
- ↑ The international response to Salisbury is discussed in more detail in the International Partnerships section of this Report.