Jessup v. United States/Opinion of the Court

by William Burnham Woods

United States Supreme Court

106 U.S. 147

Jessup  v.  United States

The answer of the defendants admits the execution of the bond which is the basis of the suit. The finding by the court below in favor of the United States of all the issues of fact raised by the pleadings, establishes beyond the reach of controversy that Jessup did not perform the condition of his bond; that he did not pay to the United States the sum due for revenue stamps advanced to him; and that the United States, or some of its officers, did not make a new contract with him, without the knowledge or consent of his sureties, whereby credits for stamps furnished him were extended indefinitely and beyond the said term of 60 days. The findings of the court also show that Jessup was indebted to the United States for stamps received by him, the payment of which was secured by his bond, in the sum for which judgment was rendered against his sureties.

The findings have eliminated from the case some of the questions discussed by the counsel for plaintiffs in error. The facts found by the circuit court are not open to review in this court, and we can only consider questions of law arising upon the trial and duly presented by bill of exceptions or errors of law apparent on the face of the pleadings. Ins. Co. v. Folsom, 18 Wall. 237; Cooper v. Omohundro, 19 Wall. 65.

These questions we shall now consider. It appears from the bill of exceptions that counsel for defendants moved to dismiss the action on the ground that the bond in suit was given to the United States, and not to the treasurer of the United States, as provided by section 161 of the act of June 30, 1864, as amended, and on the ground that the suit was brought in the name of the United States, as plaintiff, and not in the name of the treasurer of the United States, as provided in the same section. The first of these grounds is based on the assumption that the section referred to requires the bond to be given to the treasurer of the United States, and not the United States, and as the bond in suit is payable to the United States that it is absolutely void; the contention of the plaintiff in error being that the United States cannot take a valid bond except when and in the terms directed by the statute. But section 161 does not expressly require the bond to be made payable to the treasurer. It may be payable directly to the United States, and conditioned that payment for stamps advanced shall be made to the treasurer and not depart from any express provision of the law. But conceding the section to mean that the bond shall be payable to the treasurer, still we are of opinion that a bond in which the United States is the obligee, and which is conditioned that payment for stamps advanced shall be made to the treasurer, is a valid and binding obligation.

In the case of the U.S. v. Tingey, 5 Pet. 115, the question was made how far a bond voluntarily given to the United States and not prescribed by law, is a valid instrument and binding upon the parties; in other words, whether the United States have in their political capacity a right to enter into a contract or to take a bond in cases not previously provided for by some law. And the court declared:

'Upon full consideration of this subject, we are of opinion that the United States have such a capacity to enter into contracts. It is, in our opinion, an incident to the general right of sovereignty, and the United States being a body-politic may, within the sphere of the constitutional powers embodied in it, enter into contracts not prohibited by law and appropriate to the just exercise of these powers.'

To the same effect is the case of U.S. v. Bradley, 10 Pet. 343.

In the case of the U.S. v. Hodson, 10 Pet. 395, is was held in substance that when a distiller's bond was given, under section 53 of the act of June 30, 1864, (13 St. 242,) which required the bond to be conditioned for the performance of several particular acts which it specifically stated, and the agent of the government took the bond conditioned, not in the specific way directed by the statute, but for the parties' compliance with all the provisions of the act, and such other acts as were then or might thereafter be in that behalf enacted, the bond was binding on the parties.

The case of U.S. v. Linn was an action against a receiver of public moneys and his sureties. The statute required the receiver to give bond for the faithful discharge of his trust. The instrument given and sued on was without seal, and therefore not the security required by the statute. The court, nevertheless, held it to be a valid and binding obligation.

These authorities show that the United States can, without the authority of any statute, make a valid contract, and that when the form of a contract is prescribed by the statute a departure from its directions will not render the contract invalid. The bond is a good bond at common law. The circuit court was, therefore, right in overruling the motion of the defendants to dismiss the suit on the ground that the bond was given to the United States and not to the treasurer of the United States.

This conclusion disposes also of the second ground upon which the motion to dismiss was based; for if the United States can, without the authority of any statute, take a valid bond payable to the United States, they can maintain a suit upon it in their own name. It would be absurd to hold a bond to be valid on which a suit in the name of the obligee could not be maintained. The objection to the admissibility of the bond in evidence, which the bill of exceptions shows was taken, on the ground that the condition of the bond did not conform strictly to the condition prescribed by the statute, falls for the same reasons and upon the same authorities. It further appeared from the bill of exceptions that on the trial of the case the United States, to prove the breach of the condition of the bond by Jessup, offered in evidence the account kept by the treasurer of the United States at San Francisco, from which it appeared that on January 1, 1876, there was due from Jessup to the United States, for adhesive stamps advanced to him by the treasurer, the sum of $8,000. The court admitted the account in evidence notwithstanding the objection of defendants, and this is now assigned for error.

The first ground of objection urged to the admissibility of this evidence was that the account appeared to be for stamps supplied by the assistant treasurer, and the law under which the bond was given contemplated that the stamps should be furnished by the commissioner of internal revenue. But the penalty of the bond was payable directly to the United States, and its condition was that Jessup should pay or cause to be paid to the treasurer of the United States, for the use of the United States, all and every such sum or sums as he might owe the United States for adhesive stamps. This being a valid bond, any evidence which tended to show that Jessup was indebted to the United States for adhesive stamps was competent, and it was quite immaterial whether the stamps were furnished by the assistant treasurer or by the commissioner of interanal revenue.

The account was objected to on the further ground that it appeared on its face that the credits were continuously for a greater period than 60 days, and therefore that the account was not within the statute, and was incompetent and irrelevant to the issue in the action. The contention of the plaintiffs in error is that the operation of the bond extended to but one credit of 60 days; that by the security for stamps advanced on credit required by section 161, is meant a new security for each and every advance of stamps, and that manufacturers needing stamps from time to time must give security as often as a lot of stamps is advanced, and consequently that the bond in suit was security only for the first advance of stamps, and that all subsequent advances were made entirely without security. But the language of the condition of the bond clearly excludes any such construction. The condition is that Jessup shall pay such sum or sums of money as he may owe to the United States for adhesive stamps which have been or shall be deliverred to him, or which have been or shall be forwarded to him, according to his request or order, within the time prescribed for payment for the same, and shal. and will pay or cause to be paid to the said treasurer, for the use aforesaid, each and every such sum of money as shall become due or payable to the United States at the time and on the days such sums shall respectively become due and payable. The idea that the bond secured the payment of but one sum of money due for stamps purchased at one time on a single credit of 60 days, finds no support in the language of the bond. The payment of sums due at different times, for stamps purchased at different times, is expressly secured in the condition of the bond. The bond in this respect conforms to the statute, which authorizes the commissioner of internal revenue from time to time to supply and deliver to any manufacturer of friction matches a suitable quantity of adhesive or other stamps, without prepayment therefor, on a credit not exceeding 60 dyas. What we have said covers all the errors assigned.

We find no error in the record. The judgment of the circuit court must, therefore, be affirmed.

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