Lamaster v. Keeler/Opinion of the Court

by Stephen Johnson Field

United States Supreme Court

123 U.S. 376

Lamaster  v.  Keeler

The contention of the plaintiff below, the defendant in error here, that the act of Nebraska of February 23, 1875, governed proceedings for the stay of money judgments in the federal courts of the Nebraska district equally as for the stay of such judgments in the courts of that state, and in like manner determined the liability of sureties upon bonds given for such stay, is founded upon the language of section 914 of the Revised Statutes, which is as follows: 'The practice, pleadings, and forms and modes of proceeding in civil causes, other than equity and admiralty causes in the circuit and district courts, shall conform, as near as may be, to the practice, pleadings, and forms and modes of proceeding existing at the time in like causes in the courts of record of the state within which such circuit or district courts are held, any rule of court to the contrary notwithstanding.'

This section is a re-enactment of section 5 of the act of June 1, 1872, 'to further the administration of justice,' (17 U.S. St. c. 255,) and was intended to assimilate the pleadings and the procedure in common-law cases in the federal courts to the pleadings and procedure used in such cases in the courts of record of the state within which the federal courts are held. Much inconvenience had been previously felt by the profession from the dissimilarity in pleadings, forms, and modes of procedure of the federal courts from those in the courts of the state, consequent upon the general adherence of the former to the common-law forms of actions, pleadings, and modes of procedure; while the distinctions in such forms of action and the system of pleading and the modes of procedure peculiar to them had been in many states abrogated by statute. The new codes of procedure did not require an accurate knowledge of the intricacies of common-law pleading; and to obviate the embarrassment following the use of different systems in the two courts the section mentioned of the act of 1872 was adopted. As said by this court in the case of Nudd v. Burrows, 91 U.S. 426, 441, its purpose 'was to bring about uniformity in the law of procedure in the federal and state courts of the same locality. It has its origin in the code enactments of many of the states. While in the federal tribunals the common-law pleadings, forms, and practice were adhered to, in the state courts of the same district the simpler forms of the local code prevailed. This involved the necessity, on the part of the bar, of studying two distinct systems of remedial law, and of practicing according to the wholly dissimilar requirements of both. The inconvenience of such a state of things is obvious. The evil was a serious one. It was the aim of the provision in question to remove it. This was done by bringing about the conformity in the courts of the United States which it prescribes.'

The general language of the section, in the absence of qualifying provisions, would comprehend all proceedings in a cause, from its commencement to its conclusion, embracing the enforcement of the judgment therein. The court which has jurisdiction of a cause has jurisdiction over the various proceedings which may be taken therein, from its initiation to the satisfaction of the judgment rendered. Any practice, pleading, form, or mode of proceeding which may be applicable in any stage of a cause in a state court would therefore, under the section in question, in the absence of other clauses, be also applicable in a like stage of a similar cause in a federal court. The section would embrace proceedings after judgment equally with those preceding its rendition.

The first process act of congress, passed September 29, 1789, (1 St. 93), provided 'that, until further provision shall be made * * * the forms of writs and executions, except their style, and modes of process, * * * in the circuit and district courts, in suits at common law, shall be the same in each state, respectively, as are now used or allowed in the supreme courts of the same.' The second process act, passed May 8, 1792, (1 St. 275,) provided 'that the forms of writs, executions, and other process, except their style, and the forms and modes of proceeding in suits, in those of common law, shall be the same as are now used in the said courts, respectively, in pursuance of the act entitled 'An act to regulate processes in the courts of the United States,"-the first process act mentioned above.

In Wayman v. Southard, 10 Wheat. 1, these statutes were considered and construed by this court. And in giving a meaning to the language, 'forms and modes of proceeding in suits,' the court, speaking by Chief Justice MARSHALL, said that it 'embraces the whole progress of the suit, and every transaction in it, from its commencement to its termination, which has been already shown not to take place until the judgment shall be satisfied. It may, then, and ought to be, understood as prescribing the conduct of the officer in the execution of process, that being a part of the proceedings in the suit.' 10 Wheat. 32.

There would, therefore, be good reason for the contention of the plaintiff below, that the general words of section 914 of the Revised Statutes, 'forms and modes of proceeding,' apply to proceedings for the enforcement of judgments, as well as to proceedings before the judgments were rendered, but for the provisions of section 916, which is section 6 of the same act of June 1, 1872, from which section 914 was taken. Section 916 is as follows: 'The party recovering a jedgment in any common-law cause, in any circuit or district court, shall be entitled to similar remedies upon the same, by execution or otherwise, to reach the property of the judgment debtor, as are now provided in like causes by the laws of the state in which such court is held, or by anysuch laws hereafter enacted which may be adopted by general rules of such circuit or district court; and such courts may, from time to time, by general rules, adopt such state laws as may hereafter be in force in such state in relation to remedies upon judgments, as aforesaid, by execution or otherwise.'

This section shows that, in pursuing the remedies for the enforcement of a judgment in a common-law cause recovered in a federal court, the 'forms and modes of proceeding' provided for the enforcement of a like judgment in a state court are not to be followed, unless they were prescribed by a law of the state, at the time the provisions of the section took effect, or, if subsequently prescribed by such law, until they have been adopted by a general rule of the court. In providing for remedies upon judgments, the section not only excludes the application of the provisions of section 914 to such remedies, but also indicates the extent to which remedies upon judgments furnished by state laws may be used in the federal courts. Congress, which alone can determine the remedies which may be pursued for the enforcement of judgments in the federal courts, as well as the procedure to be adopted in the progress of a suit, has declared its will with respect to both. The procedure in civil causes, other than those in equity and admiralty, from their commencement to final judgment, must conforn, as near as may be, to the procedure existing at the time in like causes in the courts of record of the state in which the federal courts are held. It must, therefore, follow subsequent changes in the procedure in like causes in the state courts. But to enforce judgments in common-law causes, only such remedies can be pursued 'as are now provided in like causes by the laws of the state,'-that is, when the act of congress on the subject, the above section, was passed or re-enacted,-or, if provided by subsequent laws of the state, such as have been adopted by the federal courts.

It matters not that the remedies designated in section 916 are stated to be to reach by execution or otherwise the property of the judgment debtor; and that proceedings under the stay-law of Nebraska are only to secure, where a stay is obtained, the personal liability of the sureties for the amount of the judgment, in the absence of a designation of any other remedies, the section is a declaration that, until adopted by a rule of the court, no other remedies prescribed by state law shall be permitted in the federal courts. The extent to which the authority of the federal courts may go in the enforcement of judgments, by resort to remedies provided by state laws in similar cases, is thus defined and limited.

Section 916, as mentioned, is taken from the act of congress of June 1, 1872, and is re-enacted in the Revised Statutes, which took effect as of December 1, 1873. The act of Nebraska of February 23, 1875, had not been adopted by any rule of the federal court when the judgment of Seymour v. Young was rednered in the circuit court of the United States, November 12, 1875, or when that judgment was extended by the clerk of that court, December 2, 1875, so as to embrace the sureties on the bond given to stay execution. That act was not adopted as a rule of procedure of that court until December 30, 1876.

It follows from this construction of the two sections, 914 and 916, that the act of Nebraska did not govern proceedings for the stay of execution upon that judgment, or determine the liability of the sureties on the bond or undertaking given for such stay; and that the act of the clerk extending that judgment against the sureties was without authority and void. The sale, under the execution of the property of Lamaster, one of the sureties, and the deed of the marshal to the purchaser at such sale, therefore conferred no title. The confirmation of the sale by the order of the court did not cure the invalidity of the execution upon which it was made. The extension of the judgment against Young, so as to embrace the sureties, being a void proceeding, no subsequent action upon the sale could give it validity. A confirmation of a sale may cure mere irregularities not affecting its fairness, but not an infirmity growing out of the nullity of the judgment under which it was had.

The judgment below must therefore be reversed, and the cause remanded for a new trial; and it is so ordered.

Notes