Leach v. Carlile/Dissent Wendell Holmes, Jr.

by John Hessin Clarke

United States Supreme Court

258 U.S. 138

Leach  v.  Carlile

 Argued: Jan. 18, 1922. --- Decided: Feb 27, 1922

Mr. Justice HOLMES dissenting.

The statute under which fraud orders are issued by the Postmaster General has been decided or said to be valid so many times that it may be too late to expect a contrary decision. But there are considerations against it that seem to me never to have been fully weighed and that I think it my duty to state.

The transmission of letters by any general means other than the postoffice is forbidden by the Criminal Code, §§ 183-185 (Comp. St. §§ 10353-10355). Therefore, if these prohibitions are valid, this form of communication with people at a distance is through the postoffice alone; and notwithstanding all modern inventions letters still are the principal means of speech with those who are not before our face. I do not suppose that anyone would say that the freedom of written speech is less protected by the First Amendment than the freedom of spoken words. Therefore I cannot understand by what authority Congress undertakes to authorize anyone to determine in advance, on the grounds before us, that certain words shall not be uttered. Even those who interpret the Amendment most strictly agree that it was intended to prevent previous restraints. We have not before us any question as to how far Congress may go for the safety of the nation. The question is only whether it may amke possible irreparable wrongs and the ruin of a business in the hope of preventing some cases of a private wrong that generally is accomplished without the aid of the mail. Usually private swindling does not depend upon the postoffice. If the execution of this law does not abridge freedom of speech I do not quite see what could be said to do so.

Even if it should be held that the prohibition of other modes of carrying letters was unconstitutional, as suggested in a qualified way in Matter of Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, 24 L. Ed. 877, it would not get rid of the difficulty to my mind, because the practical dependence of the public upon the postoffice would remain. But the decision in that case admits that possibly at least the prohibition as to letters would be valid. That case was not dealing with sealed letters. The decisions thus far have gone largely if not wholly on the ground that if the Government chose to offer a means of transportation which it was not bound to offer it could choose what it would transport; which is well enough when neither law nor the habit that the Government's action has generated has made that means the only one. But when habit and law combine to exclude every other it seems to me that the First Amendment in terms forbids such control of the post as was exercised here. I think it abridged freedom of speech on the part of the sender of the letters and that the appellant had such an interest in the exercise of their right that he could avail himself of it in this case. Buchanan v. Warley, 245, u. S. 60, 38 Sup. Ct. 16, 62 L. Ed. 149, L. R. A. 1918C, 210, Ann. Cas. 1918A, 1201.

Mr. Justice BRANDEIS concurs in this opinion.

Notes