Lectures on the Proofs of the Existence of God/Lecture 7
The necessity we feel of understanding the elevation of the spirit to God from the point of view of thought, is suggested by a formal characteristic which meets us at the very first glance when we consider what direction is taken by the proof of the existence of God, and which has to be taken notice of first of all. The study of a subject from the point of view of thought is an exposition, a differentiation of what in our very first experience we arrive at by a single stroke. In connection with the belief that God is, this analysis comes into direct contact with a point which has already been incidentally touched upon, and is to be dealt with more thoroughly here, namely, the question as to the distinction to be drawn between what God is and the fact that He is. God is; what then does this mean? what is it supposed to be? God is, to begin with, a figurative idea, a name. So far as the two determinations contained in the proposition, namely, God and Being, are concerned, the most important thing is to determine or define the subject for itself, all the more that here the predicate of the proposition which would otherwise be indicated by the peculiar determination of the subject, namely, what this subject is, contains merely dry Being. But then God is for us more than mere Being. And, conversely, just because He is an infinitely richer content than mere Being, and is infinitely different from it, the important thing is to add to it this determination as representing a determination which is different from that of Being. This content which is thus distinguished from Being is an idea, a thought, a conception which is to be explained for itself, and have its meaning determined afterwards. Thus in the Metaphysic of God, or what is known as natural theology, we start by unfolding the meaning of the notion or conception of God. This is in accordance with the ordinary mode of dealing with the subject, since we consider what our previously formed idea of God contains, and in so doing further presuppose that we all have this idea which we express by the term God. The notion, accordingly, for itself, and apart altogether from the question of its reality, brings with it the demand that it should be true in itself as well, and consequently, as being the notion, that it should be logically true. Since logical truth, in so far as thought takes the form of Understanding merely, is reduced to identity, to what does not contradict itself, nothing more is demanded than that the notion should not contradict itself, or, as it is otherwise expressed, that it be possible, since possibility is itself nothing more than the identity of an idea with itself. The second thing, accordingly, is to show that this notion exists, and this is the proof of the existence of God. But because that possible notion is, in this very matter of identity, of bare possibility, reduced to this the most abstract of categories, and becomes no richer by means of existence, the product thus reached does not answer to the fulness of the idea of God, and we have accordingly a third division of the subject, in which we treat still further of the attributes of God and of His relations to the world.
These are the distinctions which meet us when we begin to examine the proofs of the existence of God. It is the work of the Understanding to analyse what is concrete, to distinguish and to define the elements belonging to it, then to hold firmly to them and abide by them. If at a later stage it once more frees them from their isolation, and recognises that it is their union which constitutes the truth, still they are from this standpoint to be regarded as being true before their union as well, and consequently when outside of this condition of unity. It is accordingly the interest of the Understanding to show that Being essentially belongs to the notion or conception of God, and that this notion must necessarily be thought of as being or existing. If this is the case, then the notion must not be thought of as separate from Being; it has no real truth apart from Being. The result thus reached is opposed to the idea that the notion should be regarded as true in itself, and as something the existence of which must be assumed, to begin with, and then established. If the Understanding here declares that this first separation made by it and what arises from the separation have no truth, then the comparison, the other separation which further arises in connection with this, is proved to be without any foundation. The notion, that is to say, is to be first considered, and then afterwards the attributes of God are to be dealt with. It is the notion or conception of God which constitutes the content of Being; it can be, and ought also to be, nothing else than the “substance of its realities.” But how then should the attributes of God be anything but realities and His realities. If the attributes of God are supposed to express rather His relations to the world, the mode of His action in and towards an Other different from Himself, then the idea of God involves this much at least, that God’s absolute independence does not permit Him to come out of Himself, and shows us what happens to be the condition of the world, which is supposed to be outside of Him and to be contrasted with Him, and which we have no right to suppose is already separate from Him. Thus His attributes, His action and mode of existence, remain shut up within His notion, find their determination in it alone, and are essentially nothing more than its relation to itself; the attributes are merely the determinations of the notion itself. But, again, if we start from the world looked at in itself as something which is external so far as God is concerned, so that the attributes of God describe His relations to it, then the world, as a product of His creative power, gets a definite character only through His notion, in which again, consequently, we find, after having followed this unnecessary and roundabout road through the world to God, that the attributes get their definite character, while the notion, if it is not to be something empty, but, on the contrary, is to be something full of content, is made explicit only through them. It results from this that the differences which we have met with are so formal that they cannot be taken as the basis of any substantial element, or of any particular spheres of existence which, if regarded apart from each other, could be considered as representing something true. The elevation of the spirit to God is found in one thing, in the determination of His notion, of His attributes, and of His Being; or God as notion or idea is the absolutely Indeterminate, and it is only when there is a transition, namely, to Being—and this is the transition in its very first and most abstract form—that the notion and the idea enter on the stage of determinateness. This determinateness, to be sure, is poor enough, but the reason of this just is that the Metaphysic referred to begins with possibility, a possibility which, although it is meant to be that of the notion of God, comes to be the mere possibility of the Understanding, which is devoid of all content, simple identity. Thus we find that in reality we are dealing merely with the final abstractions of thought in general and Being, and with their opposition as well as with their inseparableness, such as we have seen these to be. Since we have pointed out the nullity of the differences with which the metaphysical principle in question starts, we have to remember that only one result follows so far as the process involved in them is concerned, this, namely, that along with the differences we give up the process. One of the proofs which we have to consider will have for its content the very contrast of thought and Being, which we already see making its appearance here, and which will therefore be examined in its proper place in accordance with the value which it itself possesses. Here, however, we might give prominence to the affirmative element which it contains for the knowledge of the at first absolutely general and formal nature of the notion. We must pay attention to this so far as it has reference to the speculative basis and connection of our treatment of the subject in general. This is an aspect of the question which we merely indicate, whereas in itself it can indeed be nothing else but the truly leading one; but it is not our intention to follow it out in our treatment of the subject, or to confine ourselves to it alone.
It may therefore be remarked by way of preliminary, that what was previously called the notion or conception of God for itself and its possibility, is now to be called thought simply, and indeed abstract thought. A distinction was drawn between the notion of God and the possible existence of God. It was only such a notion which was in harmony with possibility, with abstract identity; and so, too, of what was intended to be taken not as the Notion in general but as a particular notion, in fact as the notion of God, nothing remained but simply this very abstract characterless identity.
It is already implied in what has been said that we cannot take any such abstract determination of the Understanding as applicable to the Notion, but rather that we must simply regard it as concrete in itself, as a unity which is not indeterminate but essentially determinate, and thus only as a unity of determinations; and this unity itself, which is thus joined on to its determinations, is therefore nothing but the unity of itself and its determinations, so that apart from the determinations the unity is nothing and disappears, or, more strictly speaking, it is even degraded to the condition of what is merely an untrue determinateness, and requires to get into relation in order to be true and real. To what has just been said, we may further add that such a unity of determinations—and it is they which constitute the content—is therefore not to be taken as a subject to which they are attached as representing several predicates which would have their bond of union only in it as in a third thing, but would be in themselves outside of this unity and mutually opposed. On the contrary, their unity is to be regarded as belonging essentially to them, that is to say, as a unity which is constituted solely by the determinations themselves, and, conversely, the separate determinations as such are to be considered as in themselves inseparable from each other, and able to pass over into each other, and as having no meaning taken by themselves apart from one another, so that as they constitute the unity this latter is their soul and substance.
It is this which constitutes the concrete element of the Notion in general. We cannot engage in philosophical speculation regarding any object whatever without employing universal and abstract categories of thought, least of all when God, the profoundest subject of thought, the absolute Notion, is the object, so that it was not possible to avoid pointing out what the speculative notion or conception of the Notion itself is. Here it will be possible to develop this notion only in the way of an historical sketch; that its content is true in-and-for-itself is shown in the logical part of philosophy. Some examples might make it plainer for ordinary thought, and not to go too far—and Spirit, certainly, is always what is nearest—it is sufficient to think of the life-force which is the unity, the simple unit of the soul, and which is at the same time so concrete in itself that it appears only in the form of the process of its viscera, of its members and organs, which are essentially different from it and from each other, and which, yet, when separated from it, perish, and cease to be what they are, namely, life, that is, they no longer have the meaning and signification which belong to them.
We have still to trace in detail the result of the notion or conception of the speculative Notion in the same fashion in which we have dealt with the conception itself. That is to say, since the characteristics of the Notion exist only in its unity, and are therefore inseparable—and in conformity with the character of our object we shall call it the Notion of God—each of these characteristics themselves, in so far as it is taken in itself, and as distinct from any other, must be regarded not as an abstract characteristic, but as a concrete notion or conception of God. But God is at the same time one only, and accordingly no other relation exists between these notions except the relation which was previously declared to exist among them as characteristics; that is to say, they are to be regarded as moments of one and the same notion, as being necessarily related to each other, as mutually mediating each other, as inseparable, so that they exist only in virtue of their relationship to each other, and this relation is the living unity which comes into existence through them, and is regarded as their hypothetical basis. It is with a view to their thus appearing in different forms that they are implicitly the same notion, only posited differently, and that, in fact, this different way in which they are posited, or different mode of appearance, is in necessary connection with the other, so that the one comes out of the other, and is posited by means of it.
The difference between the Notion in this form and the Notion as such consists, accordingly, merely in this, that the latter has in it abstract determinations representing the aspects it presents, while the Notion in its more determinate form, the Idea namely, has itself concrete aspects within itself for which those universal determinations merely supply a basis. These concrete aspects or sides are, or rather seem to be, a complete whole existing for itself. When it is conceived of as differentiated in them, within the sphere which constitutes their specific determinateness, and likewise in itself, then we get the further determination of the Notion, a multiplicity not only of determinations, but a wealth of definite forms which are accordingly purely ideal, and are posited and contained in the one Notion, in the one subject. And the unity of the subject with itself becomes the more intensive the greater the number of differences developed in it. The further continuous determination or specification which takes place is at the same time a going into itself on the part of the subject, a going down into or absorption of itself in itself.
When we say that it is one and the same Notion which is merely further determined, we are employing a formal expression. Any further and continued determination of what is one and the same adds several determinations to what is thus further defined. This richness in increased determination or specification must not, however, be thought of simply as a multiplicity of determinations, but rather as concrete. These concrete aspects regarded in themselves even take on the form of a complete self-existing whole. But when posited in one notion, in one subject, they are not independent and separate from one another in it, but rather exist ideally, and the unity of the subject accordingly becomes all the more intensive. The greatest intensity of the subject in the ideality of all concrete determinations, of the most complete antitheses, is Spirit. By way of giving a clearer conception of this, we shall refer to the relation of Nature and Spirit. Nature is contained in Spirit, is created by it, and spite of its apparently immediate Being, of its apparently independent reality, it is in itself something merely posited or dependent, something created, something having an ideal existence in Spirit. When in the course of knowledge we advance from Nature to Spirit, and Nature is defined as simply a moment of Spirit, we do not reach a true multiplicity, a substantial two, the one of which would be Nature, and the other Spirit; but, on the contrary, the Idea which is the substance of Nature, having taken on the deeper form of Spirit, retains in itself that content in this infinite intensity of ideality, and is all the richer because of the determination of this ideality itself, which is in-and-for-itself, self-conscious, or Spirit. In connection with this mention of Nature regarded in reference to the several characteristics which we have to treat of in the course of our investigation, we may mention, by way of preface, that it does indeed appear in this shape as the totality of external existence, but at the same time as one of those characteristics above which we are to raise ourselves. Here we do not go on either to consider that speculative ideality, nor to a study of the concrete shape in which the thought-determination in which it has its root, appears as Nature. The peculiar feature of the stage it occupies certainly forms one of the characteristics of God, a subordinate moment in the same notion. Since in what follows we mean to confine ourselves to its development, and to how the differences continue to be thoughts as such, moments of the Notion, the stage referred to will be regarded not as Nature but as necessity, and life as a moment in the notion or conception of God, which, however, may further be conceived of as Spirit, and possessed of the deeper quality of freedom, in order that it may be a notion or conception of God which would be worthy of Him and also of us.
What has just been said regarding the concrete form of a moment of the notion reminds us of a peculiar aspect of the matter, according to which the characteristics or determinations increase in the course of their development. The relation of the characteristics of God to one another is a difficult subject in itself, and is all the more difficult for those who are not acquainted with the nature of the Notion. But without some acquaintance at least with the notion of the Notion, or, at all events, without having some idea of it, it is not possible to understand anything about the Essence of God as representing Spirit in general. What has been said, however, will get its direct application in that part of our treatment of the subject which immediately follows.