Littell's Living Age/Volume 133/Issue 1716/The French Army in 1877
THE FRENCH ARMY IN 1877.
It seems to be so distinctly to the interest of France that knowledge of the realities of her military position should not be limited to special students — it appears to be so self-evident that she can but gain by the formation throughout the world at large of correct opinions as to her strengths and her weaknesses — that her friends may justly feel that they are forwarding her cause by openly scrutinizing her situation. That situation, as it now is, presents certain facts and certain probabilities which it will aid her to indicate distinctly. That situation, of course, may change; new circumstances may arise; but in its actual form it points to two unmistakable conclusions; the first, that France cannot attack Germany; the second, that, if invaded, she can now, most certainly, defend herself. In other words, the present evidence goes to show that the maintenance of peace between the two countries depends on the will of Germany alone; that it cannot be endangered by France; but that, all the same, Germany will have real hard work before her if she tries to conquer France again.
To set forth these probabilities, to point out these presumptions, cannot fail to render a service both to France and to the general cause of peace. With such an object in view, it is certainly permissible to carry further our investigation of the state of the French army.
Signal progress has been made since 1875; more vigor has been thrown into the management; in many directions energy has been substituted for routine; force has gone on steadily accumulating; and, though defects of system and of management are still terribly numerous, though a large variety of points are still open to just criticism, the organization is so advanced, the general improvement is so real, that it may now be said, at last, that France has indisputably an army.
The causes of this amelioration are distinctly evident. Abundance of money is the foremost of them all; France has been able to pay for what she needed. The steady, zealous action of the regimental officers is, as manifestly, the second source of strength. And next may be classed, successively, the influences of opinion, of time, of experience, and of accumulated labor.
The war minister has been changed. General Berthaut has replaced General de Cissey. The new-comer is a man of undeniable ability and of much scientific knowledge. His book "Des Marches et des Combats" is, perhaps, though rather too condensed, the cleverest composition which has been written by a French officer since the war. He is excessively laborious. But his great qualities are mixed up with little ones: he is constitutionally afraid of trusting anybody, and tries, therefore, to do everything himself; as a necessary consequence he gets into arrears with his work, and he is of course cordially disliked by his bureaux. Still, in the utter dearth of genius which so strangely distinguishes the present generation of Frenchmen, General Berthaut may be regarded as a valuable functionary.
He is struggling honestly to root out faults and to suppress abuses; he is fighting conscientiously not only against disorder, but also against — what is almost as bad — too much order. With time he may succeed; but he has still a tremendous deal to do. Many of the gravest of the old deficiencies remain unremedied. The Intendance, for instance, is still in the same unsatisfactory position as before. A law has been brought forward about it, but though that law has passed the Senate it has not yet been discussed in the Chamber. The Intendance is still the marrowless institution which we saw hobbling through its work in 1870; it still fondly clings to its immemorial feebleness and to its hereditary defects. Even at the last autumn manœuvres, where every movement was exactly known beforehand, it seems to have felt that it would be a disgrace to it to do its work properly; so, to keep up its traditions, the troops were left occasionally without food. Whether the proposed new law will change all this remains to be seen. Its principle is, that the Intendance shall be deprived of independent action, and that it shall work exclusively and entirely under the orders of the general commanding. It therefore introduces unity into the army, and destroys the duality of powers which has thus far existed. With generals who are really generals this change would indisputably be a progress; but it may most legitimately be doubted whether actual French commanders, taken as a whole, and excluding certain brilliant exceptions, will be able to direct the feeding of their soldiers any better than they direct their movements. The system is a wise one; but where are the men who are to apply it?
It is consoling to be able to turn one's eyes elsewhere, and to recognize that, in certain other directions, the march ahead has been prodigious. The system of tactics has been entirely changed; and in no army in the world is the substitution of open order for close formations likely to produce better results. The new règlement des manœuvres is considered to be the best in Europe. It is admirably fitted to the temperament of the French soldier, and will enable him to exercise his personal qualities. If that règlement had been in force on the 14th and 16th of August 1870, it is not impossible that the battles of Borny and of Rézonville would have been victories for France. The matériel is, at last, almost entirely reconstructed; the fortresses and the intrenched camps which have been established to defend the open frontier are nearly finished — some of them, indeed, are already armed, stored, and victualled for a siege; the more essential of the new forts round Paris are terminated, armed, and even garrisoned. To do all this, one hundred and sixty millions sterling have been laid out upon the army in the five years between 1872 and 1876; ninety millions thereof have gone in ordinary annual expenditure, and seventy millions for special outlay on matériel and defences. The result is, that France has now reached a point at which she can at last begin, if necessary, to use the instrument she has created.
What would happen if she needed it? How would she manage a mobilization of her forces? On previous occasions we have examined principles of direction and systems of organization; in 1875 we looked into actual details and immediate elements; this time, instead of appreciating the present, it will be more useful to gaze curiously at the future, and to try to estimate what a mobilization would produce. Mobilization alone would give the precise measure of the work done since 1871; it alone would indicate the ultimate realizable value of that work; it alone would supply a thorough, searching test of the military institutions of the country; it alone would furnish reliable evidence of the practical adequacy of the preparations made. How would it be carried through? Would everything break down again as in 1870? Would the results of the last war be reproduced under the present system? Would the helpless disorder of seven years ago be renewed all over again? Or has France at last developed not only an army, but also an organization which would enable her, in spite of the weak points of her system, to get that army rapidly, smoothly, and steadily into the field?
In seeking a reply to these questions, it is of course essential to commence by examining the rules which determine the conditions under which a mobilization would now be conducted. Those rules are detailed in the third section of the law of 24th July 1873 on the general organization of the army, supplemented by the additional laws of 19th March and 18th November 1875. It is prescribed in those laws that the French army may be mobilized henceforth either by a direct written order addressed to each individual member of the reserves and delivered to him in person by the gendarmerie, or that it may be called out en masse by the far simpler and more expeditious process of "publication par voie d'affiches sur la voie publique, sans attendre la notification individuelle." By this latter plan (which is entirely new) every man liable to serve, whether in the active or the territorial army, may be directed to start off to the depot of his regiment without waiting for an individual summons; a simple posting-bill stuck up in his village will fix the day on which he is to join. This measure is so practical and so intelligent, that of course the Germans have just copied it from France. It cannot, indeed, be doubted that it will be successively adopted throughout Europe, and that it will be the only plan employed in all future mobilizations; for it implies a gain of two days in the joining of the reservists, and consequently in the concentration of troops. And, with war conducted as it is now, two days may mean a victory.
Unfortunately, however, the laws which set forth the duties of reservists are not all easy to be understood; they ought to be as clear as words can make them, but the latest and most important of them is, on the contrary, the least comprehensible of all the new military enactments. All the other laws, without exception, are to be carried into execution by some one in authority who can expound them to the soldiers under him; but the law of November 1875 relating to the functions of reservists, which is to be carried out, for a large part, by the reservists themselves, is couched in a language which must render it hopelessly unintelligible to laborers and peasants. And yet those laborers and peasants are supposed to be ready to obey it scrupulously, without any aid from anybody. It is true that extracts from this law are printed in the register-book which each reservist has in his possession; but what is the use of that if he cannot comprehend the extracts? Why, the mere title of the law is enough to frighten the best-intentioned soldier. It bears the scarcely credible heading of "Loi ayant pour objet de coordonner les lois du 27 Juillet 1872, 24 Juillet 1873, 12, 19 Mars et 6 Novembre 1875, avec le code de justice militaire." And yet all this means in reality "Law defining the duties of the reservists of the French army"!
There is no space here to point out all the defects of this law, but a couple of examples of them may be given at hazard. One is, that the two totally distinct words, "domicile" and "residence," are employed in it perpetually, without any definition of the meaning of either of them. The other is, that it establishes two sorts of military justice—one for the active army, and one for the territorial corps. If a fortress is surrendered by a regular officer, he is liable to be shot; but if its capitulation is signed by a territorial commander, he can only be imprisoned. Crime in one case becomes misdemeanor in the other. Furthermore, while the code of military justice adopts the universal principle of never admitting extenuating circumstances for military offences, this law of 1875 concedes them in certain cases. All this is in absolute contradiction to the law of general organization, which declares (Art. 35) that "the territorial army, when mobilized, is governed by the laws and regulations which apply to the active army."
This law must be made over again. It must be brought into harmony with the principles and the practice of the other pre-existing army laws; and what is almost more urgent still, it must be made comprehensible to uneducated intelligences: it must indicate with explicitness and lucidity the duties which it imposes.
And when the law shall have been redrafted—when it shall be rendered absolutely clear — it must be brought to the distinct knowledge of those who may have to execute it. On this point the military authorities have at their disposal a means of action of extreme simplicity, and of indisputable efficacy. Why do they not use the civil institutions for the purpose?
In France, as elsewhere, men occupy themselves more willingly about laws which assign rights to them than about those which impose duties on them. Every Frenchman knows, understands, and applies in his own person, the requirements of the electoral law. Why, then, should not that law and the mobilization law be made identical, so far as their prescriptions fit together, in all that concerns domicile and residence, for instance? Why not teach military duties by the very document which confers civil rights? The municipal, law, also, might be utilized for the same end; for the mayors have now to play a part in the matter, and are destined to act as agents of the state in certain details of mobilization. Yet when that interminable discussion about municipalities took place in the Chamber, not one single word was said on this point — not one line was introduced into the law with the object of drawing the attention of the mayors to the fact that new duties devolve upon them in consequence of the new military organization of the country.
It cannot be doubted that, under such defective conditions as these, with everything new, undeveloped, and unpractised, there would be many hitches and some disorder in a mobilization.
And now that we have got a rough idea of the conditions and the imperfections of the law, let us go on to the practical working out of the process itself.
The walls are covered all over France with placards calling up the men; the mayors and the other civil authorities are spreading in their villages the news of the order of mobilization; the gendarmerie and the employés of the military offices of each district (the bureaux de recrutement) are looking after the men to the best of their power, and are serving notices and feuilles de route on all the laggards they can find. The men get ready as fast as they can; short time is allowed to them; both the placards and the feuilles de route specify the day on which they are to reach their depot. How are they to travel to it? singly or in groups? Both plans have been tried during the partial callings-up of the reserves for the autumn manoeuvres in 1875 and 1876. For short distances the men have been grouped; for long distances they have generally been allowed to go singly. Grouping necessitates a muster at the office of one of the districts into which France is now divided,[1] and this means loss of time; but it produces order, and it facilitates the payment of travelling expenses to the men, an operation which becomes extremely difficult when they travel separately. The question varies in importance for the different branches of the service. Infantry reservists have rarely to migrate very far to join, for (with the exception mentioned hereafter of the men from Paris and Lyons) they almost always belong to regiments which are quartered in their own immediate neighborhood. But for reservists of the special arms the case is often different; it has been found impossible to attach them all to regiments in their districts, and they (as well as the men on leave of absence from the infantry) may have to cross half France to reach their corps. For such of them as have money no real difficulty would however, arise from this; but the greater part of them would probably be either unable or unwilling to advance their railway fare, and in all such cases time would be lost by going to the district office for money, or for one of the railway passes which the military authorities are now empowered by the minister to issue. But the sole object of this new plan of mobilization by proclamation is to obtain speed and to economize not only days but hours. Why, then, should it not be enacted that travelling expenses may be advanced to mobilized soldiers (as in Germany) by the municipal treasurers or by the local tax-receivers? It is true that this could only be done on the production of a feuille de route specifying the sum receivable by each man, and that waiting for the feuille might involve a delay of a day or two; but, after all, that delay would not arise in every case, and furthermore, it would only represent the time necessary for the delivery of the feuille by the gendarmerie, and not the additional time required for a journey to the district office to fetch money. By this plan each man would find at once, even in the smallest cantons, a resident local functionary prepared to pay him.
Let us, however, suppose that all these difficulties have been surmounted, and let us now follow the men to the depots of their regiments. Their arms, uniforms, and equipments are ready for them there; the men receive them, put them on, and then wait until the number of each article is inscribed in the books. The crowding is tremendous; the men are all on each other's backs, and in each other's way. According to the loi des cadres, the depot consists of two companies — that is to say, in peace time of about one hundred and fifty men; but the mobilization of the whole regiment brings in more than twenty-five hundred men on the same day! Where are they to be put? — where are they even to stand? There is another danger here, and it will be well to look to it in time.
Each of the sixteen companies of the regiment sends a cadre de conduite to the depot to fetch the men which belong to it. Each cadre is composed of one officer and a few non-commissioned officers and steady privates. Directly each group is complete, the men are marched away to the company.
But where is the company? In certain cases the depot is quartered with the service companies; but as a rule it is detached from them, and may be even at some distance. Until the late war they were always separated from each other; but such extreme inconvenience resulted from this cause during the mobilization of 1870, that the principle of keeping the service and depot companies together has been laid down since. In consequence, however, of the new distribution of the army into permanent regional corps, many regiments are quartered in places where no garrisons previously existed, and where, consequently, there are no barracks. The army, on its peace footing, is more numerous than it used to be. The abundant barracks which existed in Alsace-Lorraine have disappeared. For these various reasons, therefore, though the building of new barracks has gone on actively — though about nine millions sterling have been voted for them from State and municipal sources — it has not yet been found practicable to provide room enough in the casernes of each region to lodge the depots with the regiments. Two years must still pass before the change can be completely effected. It is only in the 1st and 7th corps (Lille and Besançon) that the measure is thus far regularly applied. In the 2d corps, two regiments out of eight are separated from their depots; four regiments are in the same condition in the 3d and 4th corps: and so on with the others.
Another cause of difficulty in bringing together the depots and the regiments arises from the special organization which has been adopted for the garrisons of Paris and Lyons. The French active army is recruited all over the territory; conscripts from all the provinces are mixed up in the same regiment; and not only is no attempt made to group together men of the same department, but care is even taken to prevent that result, it being considered, for both special and general reasons, that great inconvenience would accrue from the bestowal of a local character on the regiments of the active army. But with the men of the reserve, as has been explained, the exactly opposite system is employed; they are attached exclusively (for the infantry, at least) to regiments permanently quartered in their own region; and the territorial army is composed on the same principle. For the troops of Paris, however (and to some extent for those of Lyons), an exception has been made; the reservists of the departments of the Seine and Seine-et-Oise are attached to corps d'armée of four different regions, whose headquarters and regimental depots are not in Paris, but in those regions. The result is that, in the event of a mobilization, all the reservists in Paris would have first to start off to their depots at Amiens, Orleans, Rouen, Laval, Le Mans, and all sorts of equally distant places, in order to get them equipped, and then to return to Paris, or go elsewhere, to their regiments. When it is remembered that the garrison of Paris and its neighborhood amounts to 120,000 men (more than a quarter of the whole active army), it will be recognized that a serious cause of delay will arise here. And there exists no present reason for supposing that this difficulty will ever be got over. It should, however, be added that, in peace time, this system presents many serious advantages: 'it mixes up the Parisians with the rural soldiers; it does not encumber the Paris barracks (where there is no space to spare), with the extra men belonging to the depots; and it keeps the system of corps d'armée intact and separate from the huge mixed garrison of Paris, which does not form a permanent corps d'armée by itself, but is almost entirely composed of regiments temporarily detached from the surrounding corps.
As an attempt will presently be made to calculate the time which would be required for a mobilization, it is essential to complete, as far as can be foreseen, the list of the apparent causes of possible delay, so as to be able to allow approximately for their effect. It is, for this reason necessary to add to the catalogue of difficulties already enumerated, the observation that the rapidity of the first stage of mobilization may somewhat depend on the degree of organization of the regional and district magazines of stores. The organization of those magazines is determined by Articles 3 and 4 of the law of 24th July 1873: decentralization is its essential principle; not only must each region suffice for its own needs and borrow nothing from its neighbors, but each subdivision of each region is to be equally complete. Each subdivision corresponds to a regiment of infantry, and possesses two magazines. Those magazines are now ready everywhere. But several of the corps d'armee have no regional stores yet, and are still dependent for their supplies on the great central magazines. Thus, the 2d, 3d, and 5th corps draw their equipment from Paris; the 9th from Nantes; the 12th from Bordeaux; and the 13th from Lyons. All this is of course provisional, but how much longer is the provisional to last? France will not be really ready until it has disappeared for good.
It must, however, be acknowledged that, according to the experience supplied by the partial calling out of the reserves during the last two years, these provisional arrangements have worked fairly well. The men on those two occasions were dressed with sufficient rapidity: from five to six hours were required to equip the reservists of each company, and the only serious defect revealed was that the clothes in store were not sufficiently varied in size to fit all the new-comers, some of whom, consequently, could not be put into uniform at all. It is probable that the ministry of war has taken measures to remedy this, for the military newspapers took up the question energetically at the time.
Another fault which still remains uncured is the tendency of the officials of the ministry of war to delay things till the last moment, instead of doing as much as possible beforehand. The officers, for instance, have not yet got their cantines ready, either for luggage or for food. On I this particular point the arrangements are positively less forward than they were in 1870; for then each officer had his cantines de campagne at his own disposal, whereas now they have all been collected, into store, and are kept there empty. The filling them at the last moment will be a source of delay and difficulty, and of much personal annoyance. As a mobilization can only be successfully performed on condition that every detail of it has been thoughtfully worked out beforehand, it is quite worth while to allude even to such seeming trifles as these. The minister of war does really seem, however, to be giving his attention to small questions of this kind. For instance, it has just been ordered that, in the event of a mobilization, each vivandière shall receive a horse for her cart, and that all carts shall be of the same model.
It was stated in a previous article that, during a small private trial of mobilization made some time ago, three days had been absorbed by the registration of the equipments supplied to two companies. It was obligatory, according to the rules then in force, to write down in three separate books, for each man, the number of every article supplied to him — of his pouch, his waist-belt, knapsack, cartridge-box, sword-strap, and gun-strap. Each number was composed, on an average, of six figures, so that each man required 108 figures, or 16,200 figures for the one hundred and fifty reservists of a company. The ministry has at last given its attention to this absurd abuse of red tape. Simplifications have been introduced into the system of registration, and the time required for the work has been reduced one-half.
Let us now suppose that all the men have passed through successive stages, from their homes to their company. The mobilization, properly so called, is terminated. Concentration is about to begin. The time has come to ask what is the strength of the army. How many men has the mobilization produced?
As military service, in various degrees, for successive terms of years, has become a universal obligation in France, it follows theoretically that all the young men between the ages of 20 and 25 ought to be found in the active army; that all those from 26 to 29 should form part of the reserve; and that all the men between 30 and 40 ought to be found in the territorial army and its reserve. But fact, in this case, does not quite correspond with theory. In reality, not more than about half the available men of each year appear in the ranks of the active army. In order to explain completely the causes of this great difference let us take the last-published report of an annual conscription. It refers to the contingent of the year 1875.
| The total number of young men available in that year was | 283,768 | |
| Of these — | ||
| 29,797 | were physically unfit. | |
| 42,268 | were dispersed during peace, for family and other reasons. | |
| 19,508 | were postponed. | |
| 25,778 | were already in the army as volunteers. | |
| 4,295 | were conditionally released, as professors, teachers, etc. | |
| 121,646 | 121,646 | |
| There remained, therefore, for service, | 162,122 | |
These men were dealt with as follows: they were divided (according to the numbers they had drawn) into two unequal parts, called the first and second portions of the contingent. The first portion was incorporated in the regiments for five years; the second — from motives of economy, and for want of barrack-room — was called up only for six months,[2] and was then sent home on leave. The respective numbers of these portions were as follows: —
| 1st portion, for combatant services (including 7040 marines), | 95,788 |
| Do., for auxiliary services (Intendance, stores, etc.), | 21,259 |
| 2d portion, for combatant services, | 45,075 |
| Total, | 162,122 |
Furthermore, 8,345 men who had been postponed from preceding years were called up in 1875; 5,142 of them were placed in the first portion of the contingent, and 3,203 in the second portion, so carrying the exact numbers of the year to the following totals: —
| 1st portion: combatants, | 100,930 |
| Do., auxiliary services, | 21,259 |
| 2d portion: combatants, | 48,278 |
| 170,467 |
It happened that the numbers of 1875 were rather below the average; but, taking them as a minimum, they indicate that the combatant part of the French army, deducting the seven thousand marines, is recruited in peace time at the rate of 93,000 men per annum, all of whom are supposed to remain for five years under the colors. But in consequence of the delay of about six months which takes piace each year in calling up the conscripts, and of the fact that men are habitually discharged from their regiments six months before the expiration of their time, the term of real service is practically reduced to four years; so that in peace time the army is composed of four times 93,000 men — that is to say, 372,000 men, plus 45,000 men for one year's second portion of the contingent, and plus, also, 25,000 men already in the ranks as volunteers. The general total of combatants, in time of peace, is therefore 442,000 men; or, allowing for deaths, about 425,000. No deduction is, however, made here for men away on leave, who usually represent a considerable number.
And to this again must be added the portion permanente, which includes such members of the army as are independent of the annual contingent; that is to say, the officers, the gendarmerie, the foreign troops in Algeria, the re-engaged men, bandsmen, and certain special workmen. This portion amounts, altogether, to 85,000 men, so carrying the final total to 510,000.
The reserve of the active army includes: —
| 1 | Four classes of the 2d portion of the contingent, of 50,000 men each on an average, | 200,000 |
| 2 | Four classes of the reserve men from 26 to 29, at 150,000 each, | 600,000 |
| 3 | Four classes of the men dispersed during peace, at 40,000 each, | 160,000 |
| Total, | 960,000 |
But, allowing for mortality and other causes, this total cannot be counted to produce more than 920,000 men. Adding thereto the 510,000 men under the colors, the general total available for the active army (not including the territorial corps) when all the reserves are called up, is 1,430,000 men. It may, however, be supposed that this total, though theoretically exact, would not be altogether realized in practice, and that the effective number would not exceed 1,300,000.
Here, however, we meet with a difficulty. The French army is now composed of nineteen corps d'armée, and of a certain number of unattached brigades, regiments, and battalions, consisting especially of cavalry and foot-chasseurs. The precise war-footing of a corps d'armée is not yet determined by any special law; but as regards its main element — the infantry — no doubt is possible, for everybody knows that the companies are to be composed of two hundred and fifty men each. It is only as regards the cavalry, artillery, and train that any real uncertainty exists, and for those special arms the margin of possible error is limited. We may consequently adopt with tolerable confidence the following approximate computation of the fighting force of a French corps d'armee: —
It will contain —
| 8 regiments of infantry, of three battalions each (the 4th battalion being kept in reserve); 24 battalions of 1000 men, | 24,000 |
| 1 battalion of foot-chasseurs, | 1,000 |
| 2 regiments of cavalry, say | 1,600 |
| 2 regiments of artillery, 23 batteries, at say 250 men each, | 5,750 |
| 1 battalion of engineers, say | 1,200 |
| Artillery train, 3 companies, say | 750 |
| Train, 3 companies, say | 600 |
| Total, | 34,900 |
Say 35,000
| So that on this showing, the 19 corps d'armee at their full war strength, would absorb | 665,000 |
| To which must be added the following troops, not included in the corps d'armée: — | |
| 32 regiments of cavalry, at 800 sabres, | 25,600 |
| 11 battalions of foot-chasseurs, | 11,000 |
| 57 batteries of garrison artillery, | 14,250 |
| 144 4th battalions of the line, | 144,000 |
| Depots of the 144 line regiments, at 2 companies each, | 72,000 |
| Depots of foot-chasseurs, | 7,500 |
| Depots of artillery, 76 batteries, | 19,000 |
| Depots of cavalry, 70 squadrons, | 14,000 |
| Depots of engineers, train, etc., | 6,000 |
| Railway and telegraph services, artificers, and sundries, | 5,000 |
| Pontoon-train, 28 companies, | 7,000 |
| General total of the active army and depots, | 990,350 |
It results, therefore, from these figures, that although 1,300,000 men would be available in the event of a mobilization, only 990,000 of them could be utilized in the ranks in the first instance. The other 310,000 would remain en disponibilité at the depots, to fill up gaps as they arose.
An additional force of 25,000 excellent soldiers would be supplied by the coast and forest guards, all of whom have now received a military organization.
As regards mere numbers, therefore, the result is clear: France has positively more men than she can use. Measured by quantity alone, a mobilization would produce too much.
But quantity and quality are not identical. The new army laws have not been in force long enough to have made all Frenchmen into capable soldiers; and out of the 1,300,000 men who form the mobilizable total, it is certain that, at this moment, not more than 750,000 are really educated. Of the remainder it may be estimated that about 300,000 have had six months' drilling, while 250,000 have never served at all. Still, as all the men of the two latter categories would of course be placed, in the first instance, in the reserves, it is quite possible that they would have time to learn their business, partially, at least, before they were sent out to fight. Consequently we may fairly say, not only that quantity is abundant, but also that quality is sufficient.
And now we reach the second part of the mobilization — the concentration. On this point we are altogether in the dark; for it is impossible to foresee the political or strategic conditions under which a war-mobilization might have to. be effected. The minister of war himself could not speak with any certainty on the question, especially as, in the case of a defensive campaign (and that is the sole theory admissible in the present case), the defender can initiate nothing and must necessarily adapt his own movements to those of the invader. It will, however, surprise nobody to learn that the French Staff Office has at last applied the Prussian system of drawing up a plan of action at the commencement of each year — an "academical" project, as the Germans call it. An attack is supposed; its possible conditions are conjectured and weighed, and, according to the then situation of the French army and to the available information of the state of the other side, a scheme of resistance is prepared. An imaginary mobilization is composed on paper; the probable points of concentration are indicated; the corps d'armée are grouped up into fighting armies; their commanders are selected; everything is prepared. It is scarcely necessary to add, that the details of all this are kept profoundly secret; but the fact that it is done is known, and that fact supplies a striking proof of the progress which has been effected.
As regards the exact nature of the concentration, therefore, nothing whatever can be said. But as regards the time it would occupy, we are able to make reasonable guesses. Could both mobilization and concentration be completed in nineteen days as it was by the Germans in 1870 — or in fifteen days, as it is believed that they could do now? Perhaps not. It is prudent to admit at once — but without attempting to be precise — that France would be slower than Germany. Yet notwithstanding the possible and even very probable causes of delay which have been set forth here, there is no just reason for supposing that the difference would be considerable. It could hardly exceed three or four days. This opinion is based upon a calculation which can easily be verified. In 1870, according to the official reports, the order of mobilization was sent out on 14th July; it was calculated that the arrival of the men at their regiments would be terminated on the 31st — not including the concentration into corps d'armée and armies, which was to be effected afterwards. Now, however, according to the actual plan of keeping the infantry reservists in the same regions as their regiments, a notice issued on the 14th could order the reservists to be at their depots on the evening of the 17th. The 18th would be passed in equipping them. They could start the same night for their regiments (which in most cases would not be very far off), and on the morning of the 19th each company could be on its war footing. Counting, however, another forty-eight hours, to compensate for the possible delays which have been enumerated, it follows that it is now possible to do in seven days the same work that took seventeen days in 1870. It is true that, as regards the special arms, whose reservists would have greater distances to travel, the time might be a little longer; but, allowing largely for that contingency, there seems to be no fair ground for doubting that the mobilization (properly so called) could be finished in a time which could scarcely exceed twelve days in all.
The concentration of the regiments into brigades, divisions, and corps d'armée, and of the corps d'armée into armies, could probably be effected in ten days more, for everything is ready.
It may therefore be asserted — so far, at least, as apparent probabilities can guide us — that the entire process might be completed in a time which would range between eighteen and twenty-two days.
And even if France were a little longer over it than Germany would be, no perceptible disadvantage to her could result from the delay; for, as it is morally certain (as will be shown presently) that France cannot attack Germany, and that, if another war takes place, the attack must be made by Germany, it follows that the invader would have to travel a greater distance to the fighting ground than the defender would have to cover, and would therefore lose in distance what he might gain in time. Consequently, as regards speed, the two sides would probably find themselves on a footing of virtual equality.
Well, we will now suppose the concentration to be completed, conformably to the exigencies of the situation as it may present itself at the time. The troops have formed up into three or four fighting armies, and have drafted off the frameworks of the garrisons of the great intrenched camps, and of the forces destined to guard Paris and Lyons. In estimating that six corps d'armée would be required for these latter purposes, and that the other elements of the garrisons would be supplied by the reserves and the territorial army, we shall not, probably, be very wide of the truth; if so, thirteen corps d'armée, out of the total of nineteen (the nineteenth having of course been brought over from Algeria, where it is habitually stationed), would be disposable for action in the field. It has been shown that each corps d'armée would number about 35,000 men, so that on this calculation the army on the frontier would amount to 455,000 men — a figure which would most cerrainly be amply sufficient to begin with. It would be backed up by the rest of the 1,300,000 men of the active army — that is to say, by 210,000 in the intrenched camps, by an unconcentrated second line of 325,000, and by an unutilized depot reserve of 310,000 more.
And it must be borne in mind, that if instead of leaving the 144 fourth battalions unconcentrated, they were at once developed into regiments, a large part of the unincorporated reservists could be immediately thrown into them, and a second series of complete armies, amounting, with cavalry and artillery, to at least 350,000 men, could be got together. Plenty of non-commissioned officers could be found amongst the one-year volunteers who would have rejoined. Forty-five thousand of those young gentlemen have now passed through the army; and though the institution which has produced them is most objectionable, and is on the point of being abandoned, they would, at all events, serve a useful purpose in this case. The front army would of course require part of them to keep up its supply of sous-officiers, but eight or ten thousand of them could easily be spared to start the extra companies suggested here. This second series of armies could be established either by grouping two fourth battalions to form a new regiment, or by converting each fourth battalion, with the addition of the two depot companies, into a separate regiment. In either case the unutilized reservists of the original regiment would be at once incorporated into the new regiment thus formed.
This general scheme of action would fit in equally with either of the hypotheses of victory or defeat, provided always that the garrisons of the intrenched camps were constituted at the very commencement of the concentration, and not at the moment of a disaster. The troops which occupy them would have fighting to do, for the great space covered by these camps, especially by the fortifications round Paris, would render investment very difficult, if not, indeed, impossible, and would in all probability oblige the Germans to try to storm them. For the same reason, sorties on a large scale against extended circles of attack might confidently be looked for. It is therefore of extreme importance that the defence of these positions should be organized at the very origin of the campaign, and that it should be intrusted to thoroughly solid troops.
The successful holding of fortifications depends, however, in these days, almost as much on the power of the artillery on the ramparts as on the vigor and tenacity of the garrison; and in the organization of their artillerie de forteresse the French have still a great deal to do. Each of their nineteen brigades of gunners includes three dismounted batteries, making fifty-seven batteries in all. It is, then, with the men of these fifty-seven batteries that, thus far, the French army is supposed to be able to serve the immense defensive works which have been constructed at so much cost! There is here one of those strange negligences which puzzle foreigners. Why has this essential point been so neglected? Why, after six years of organization, is France still unable to completely man her ramparts? The mixing up of garrison and field batteries in the same brigades is an inexcusable error; they ought to be separated at once; and the fifty-seven batteries of heavy guns ought to be carried as rapidly as possible to two or three times as many. Until this is done, the question of the practical defensibility of the new forts will remain somewhat in doubt; for though, of course, it may be said that sailors can be called up to work the batteries, yet still, from a military point of view, that solution settles nothing.
It is now time to go on to the territorial army and its reserves, of neither of which has anything been said yet.
The territorial army includes, theoretically, all Frenchmen between the ages of thirty and thirty-four, and its reserve takes all those between thirty-five and forty. But as no attempt whatever has been made, even on paper, to organize the reserve of the territoriale, it may be left out of the account, for the present at all events, as a non-existing force. The territorial army, properly so called, is, however, on the contrary, a progressing reality. It is composed, nominally, like the active army, of five annual contingents. As there are scarcely any exemptions, each of those contingents may be roughly guessed at two hundred thousand men; its general total would seem therefore to reach one million. But that figure is illusory; it allows nothing for mortality or for other causes of diminution; and furthermore, the one hundred and forty-five regiments of infantry into which the tetritoriale is divided, are composed, by law, of three battalions of one thousand men each, and can only absorb, therefore, 435,000 men; so that, allowing the additional proportion of 120.000 more for cavalry, artillery, engineers, and auxiliary services, the utilizable total of this force would not exceed — or, perhaps, not even attain — 555,000 men. Practically, indeed, it would be wiser not to count on the mobilization of more than 500,000 — the surplus men, if any, remaining disposable for ulterior needs. Of that number it may be calculated that, at the present moment, about 280,000 are old soldiers of the active army, that 120,000 served in the last war as mobiles, and that the remaining hundred thousand have had no military training. The ratio of old soldiers is, however, increasing now each year with the regular application of the universal service law, and from and after 1886 every man in the territorial regiments will have passed through the active army. Meanwhile those regiments contain a large proportion of men who have been non-commissioned officers, and who would, for that reason, contribute to the rapid instruction of the others.
As regard the officers of the territoriale, the situation is not very satisfactory. About two-thirds of them (8000 out of 12,000) are appointed. They have been selected after a personal examination, and such of them as happen to be retired officers of the active army will of course do their work well. But it is notorious that political and social considerations have been largely consulted in choosing these officers, and that most of them have been named, not because they were soldiers, but because they were gentlemen in position or Conservatives in opinion. Certain applicants who were professionally capable have been excluded because they were too Republican. Furthermore, it is becoming more and more difficult to find candidates for commissions both in the territorial regiments and in the reserve of the active army. It is absolutely forbidden to officers of those two services to wear uniform off duty; consequently the applicants who thought it would be agreeable to them to swagger about in red trousers find their dream unrealizable, and no longer pursue it. Then, again, though there is no pay (except when under arms), officers have to provide their own clothes and equipment. Finally, almost all the great financial and industrial institutions of the country, with the Bank of France at their head, have very practically, but not very patriotically, announced to their employés that if any of them accept a grade in either the reserve or the territorial army, they will instantly be dismissed from their places. The result is, that by refusing the permission to wear uniform when not convoked for service, all the vain-glorious aspirants have been discouraged; by obliging officers to pay for their dress and arms, all the fortuneless are driven away (and the fortuneless are numerous); and by proclaiming incompatibility between clerkship and soldiering, a great part of the lower bourgeoisie is shut out.
The result of all this has been, that the enthusiasm of 1873 — when crowds of men of all ranks petitioned to be made officers of the territoriale — began to die out in 1874. In 1875 it became necessary to reduce the difficulties of admission; non-commissioned officers of the mobile were admitted to the examinations for the reserve artillery; soon afterwards the same measure was extended to all other arms. It was constantly declared that each examination would be the last, and that the list was on the point of being closed; but more examinations followed all the same. Their level was lowered; and only last month the Journal Officiel of the army published another new programme, still less developed than its predecessors, for another series of examinations in April.
These insufficiencies are, however, of no very serious importance; they supply some further evidence of the want of military administrative power which is so strangely evident in the present generation of Frenchmen, but they will not do much real damage. If a war broke out, it would at once be seen that the armee territoriale is not a mere imaginary corps; officers would then be forthcoming in any numbers, for everybody would have to serve. The resources of France would not be limited to the active army and its reserves; the territorial troops would rapidly acquire value, and would present a very different character from the mobiles of 1870. It is true that they are not yet in a state of cohesion which would permit them to render immediate service as a separate army; but they may certainly be relied on as auxiliary forces, the more so as they would not, in all probability, be needed so much for campaign work as for guarding étapes, for keeping open communications, and for aiding to supply garrisons for the intrenched camps, and for Paris and Lyons. And it should be particularly remarked that the engineering element of the Territoriale will be most useful, for it will include the most effective part of the corps of ponts et chaussées.
The organization of the Territoriale is now quite complete on paper, but the men have only been called together once, for one day, to receive their register-books. At least a month would be required (supposing even that their arms and uniform are really ready, which does not appear to be quite certain) before the battalions could be formed into regiments and brigades.
Still, notwithstanding, it must be repeated that the Territoriale presents sufficient elements of number, of solidity, and of reality, to justify its admission henceforth into the list of the disposable forces of France.
Recapitulating the figures at which we have now successively arrived for the various elements of those forces, it appears that the entire combatant strength of which France could now dispose (one-half of it within three weeks, and the rest successively), would be made up as follows: —
| Field armies, | 455,000 |
| Camps and garrisons, | 210,000 |
| Unconcentrated troops, | 325,000 |
| Unincorporated men at depots, | 310,000 |
| Total of active army, | 1,300,000 |
| Brought forward, | 1,300,000 |
| Forest and coast guards, | 25,000 |
| Territorial army, | 500,000 |
| General total, | 1,825,000 |
In 1870 only 250,000 men could be concentrated in a month, while the reserves and garrisons did not, at first, reach 300,000. The position is therefore completely changed; money, work, and time have, in spite of obstacles and incapacities, converted the French army into a machine of power.
For what purpose can this machine be used?
Can it possibly be employed for attacking Germany?
Or is it, by the force of things, utilizable solely and exclusively for defence?
To obtain answers to these questions it is essential to look at them from three different standpoints — to measure the strategical, the material, and the political considerations which seem likely to influence the action of France.
When the Germans took the Alsace-Lorraine fortresses, and surrounded them with additional fortifications, which have rendered them impregnable without a long siege, they thereby rendered it virtually impossible for France to undertake an offensive campaign. The annexation of those fortresses has turned out to mean something more than territorial conquest, something else than homage to a German sentiment; it is now proved to be an act of the profoundest military wisdom. They close the road to Germany.
The experience of recent campaigns, and especially of 1870, has clearly shown, that though an army can advance into hostile territory without immediately investing the fortresses on its way (unless, indeed, they contain a numerous garrison, in which case that garrison must of course be watched by a more than equal force), it is scarcely possible to advance at all — with the masses of men which modern war puts in motion — unless the invader has a railway at his complete disposal for the carriage of his supplies. It happens, however, that the new German strongholds between France and the Rhine would, in consequence of the space covered by their fortifications, be, of necessity, heavily garrisoned in the event of a French attack, and that it would therefore be indispensable to invest them at once. Such an investment would mean the immobilization, for an undetermined period, of a force which can scarcely be estimated at less than 400,000 men. But the loss of the Alsace-Lorraine fortresses means much more than this; it means, also, the total stoppage of all traffic on the railways which pass through and are commanded by those fortresses. Consequently, supposing even that France were able to devote 400,000 men to the merely secondary task of reducing the lateral obstacles in her path — supposing that she had enough men to besiege several first-class fortresses, and to simultaneously conquer all the German armies in the field — she would not, even then, have the command of a single railway until one or more of the fortresses were taken, and would have to contend, meanwhile, against difficulties of transport, which it is impossible to suppose that she could overcome. The holding out for a few weeks of a little place like Toul caused the very gravest difficulties to the Germans in 1870, because it deprived them of the use of the line to Paris, which passed under the guns of that fortress. What would happen then to the French, with their inferior organization, if such an obstacle arose in every direction at the very origin of the campaign, if they had to try to fight their way ahead without a railway? Turn and twist this difficulty as you like, you cannot get over it. There it is, absolute and unchangeable. If, then, we follow up the idea of an attack by France on Germany, we are bound to suppose, first, that all, or nearly all, the 1,300,000 men of the French active army can be brought on to German soil at the very commencement of the campaign; secondly, that the supplies for, say, 800,000 men (no weaker army could be supposed to force a road against united Germany), could be carried regularly to constantly increasing distances in carts.
It is surely needless to pursue such an hypothesis as this.
Yet, all the same, let us go one step further, in order to exhaust the wildest possibilities of the case. Let us conceive (if we are capable of so mad an imagining) that the armies are forthcoming, that all the fortresses are invested, that the Germans are defeated and are driven across the Rhine, and that the French follow them and advance into pure German ground. An offensive war under such conditions, with the prodigious quantities of men which would be employed on both sides, — with all the Fatherland in arms in front, and with all the men of France surging onwards from behind, — would necessitate a vigor of command, a unity of action, a perfection of administration, which would imply not mere ordinary capacity, but the very highest genius, in the chiefs. But are we justified in presuming, from what the world has seen of the French army since Waterloo, that the needed genius would be there? Can the most earnest, the most enthusiastic, the least reasoning friend of France pretend that the experience of the last fifty years justifies the hope that there is one single soldier in the French army who is capable of discharging so tremendous a task?
No.
It may, however, be urged — it has, indeed, been urged occasionally in private talks — that though, in scientific war, Germany is, for the moment, incontestably superior to France; though, in this generation, the thinking power of battle appears to lean most heavily to her side; yet that France has sometimes shown a might of an altogether special kind, a might peculiar to herself alone, a might which rides down obstacles and which extorts success from impossibility. Twice, in recent centuries, has that outbreaking potency revealed itself; it was awakened for the first time by Joan of Arc, for the second time by the French Revolution. It was the potency of an idea, of glowing ardors, of hot passions; it was resistless then: but would it conquer now? Are fervors capable of overthrowing science? The contrary result is probable. The conditions of war are so radically changed that emotions would only be in the way, and the more fervid they were the more cumbersome would they be. If some totally fresh sentiment, some unknown and uninvented quantity, some new "French fury," were to unveil itself tomorrow, it would simply break its heated head against the cold wall of science.
Neither strategically nor materially, nor even emotionally, can France expect, then, to fight her way into Germany in our time.
And the political obstacles in the way of an offensive war are not less important or less real. By the constitutional law of 16th July 1875, it is enacted that war can only be declared with the consent of the two Chambers. Under what conceivable circumstances is it to be imagined that the two Chambers would vote a voluntary attack on Germany? Where is the minister of war who will dare to proclaim once more that "France is ready"? Where is the president of the council who, "with a light heart," will mount into the tribune and call on France to fight again? No conditions are reasonably supposable under which all this could happen; and certainly? so long as the republic lasts, the world will see nothing of the kind. The republic has no dynastic interests to serve — no personal or special reasons for desiring a revanche. On the contrary, it has everything to lose by war: for if war produced victory, a successful general might make himself dictator; while, if it produced defeat, a Bonapartist quatre Septembre would immediately become possible.
And then, again, France longs earnestly for peace; she shrinks instinctively from all idea of conquest. Of course she would take back Alsace and Lorraine if she could get them; but would she provoke a war (even if she believed herself to be quite ready) for the sole purpose of regaining them? Solferino, Mexico, Mehtana, would not be voted now by the Parliament at Versailles — nor "Berlin" either.
One more point should be looked at, France has vainly sought for an ally since 1871. She has not found one in Europe: and perhaps it is lucky for her that she has failed; for we may rest assured that, if she had succeeded, the very instant the news got out that she had signed an offensive and defensive alliance — no matter with whom — the German armies would instantaneously have been mobilized and France have been invaded. She has, though, one unprovoking ally at her disposal — an ally who is waiting for her at home, and whose precious aid she would lose the very instant she crossed the frontier. - That ally is not a nation or a monarch, it is simply — distance.
France at home has every man at hand; France in Germany would be forced to leave a constantly increasing proportion of her soldiers behind her to guard the road she has followed. And, as the argument applies equally to both sides, it follows that just as France would lose by distance if she attacked Germany, so would she profit by it if she were herself attacked. It cannot be argued that the transfer of the German frontier to this side of the Vosges in any way diminishes the difficulty of distance for Germany; if she were to enter France again, she would have at once to contend with it — and it is in that fact that France would find her only probable ally.
These reasons are evident, simple, and real. Nobody will deny their truth. France cannot attack Germany.
But if she is attacked, she can, most certainly, defend herself. After six years of loitering, hesitating, and bungling, she has at last — almost in spite of herself — manufactured an enormous army. She may be incapable of using it to the best effect, or of extracting from it all that it is susceptible of producing; but, however weak may be her management of it, the material force is there. She still needs two years to finish up the details; she has still "to finally terminate her matériel and her fortresses, to re-model her garrison artillery, to re-organize her Intendance and her staff corps. But all the really heavy work is done. She is ready now to fight upon her own ground if needful. At home, one-half of her difficulties would disappear. Her fortresses and her entrenched camps would supply her armies with magazines and solid points d'appui. Her railways would furnish ample means of transport from the rear. Of course she will grow stronger with each year; of course with time her army will steadily improve; of course its faults will gradually diminish, — at least it may be hoped so. But it is an army now; and it is useful not only to declare that fact, but to add to it the distinct statement that if Germany were to once more raise the menace of two years ago, France would no longer depend for her existence on the intervention of Europe. She would, most assuredly, accept that intervention gratefully and heartily, in order to avoid war; but she no longer imperiously needs it, as she did in 1875, to save her from destruction. If another "scare'" burst out to-morrow, it would find her, at last, in a situation to efficaciously protect herself. She would no longer talk of withdrawing her useless soldiers behind the Loire, and of leaving the invader to overrun an undefended country. If Germany again proclaimed the wish to crush up France for good, before she is fit to fight, France would, this time, look her calmly in the face, and would say to her, in the consciousness of sufficient' strength, —
It is too late.