Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China/Special Topics

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Chapter Six
Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China (2023)
the United States Department of Defense
Appendix I
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SPECIAL TOPIC: PLA SELF-ASSESSMENTS

The PLA highlights some self-assessed shortcomings publicly, likely to guide and accelerate force-wide modernization efforts. The PLA routinely use set slogans or phrases to describe these self-assessments to exhort the force to carry out specific campaigns. These evaluations also likely represent genuine anxieties among PRC leaders about the PLA's readiness and ability to conduct joint operations if tested under real combat conditions. The five PLA slogans are described on the next page.

  • Leadership and Command. The PLA has regularly identified concerns about the quality and ability of its commanders and officers. Numerous PLA slogans have addressed this issue most pointedly expressing concern that its forces will be unable to seize the operational initiative at the level necessary for modern warfare, with previous annual training mobilization orders explicitly referencing the "Five Incapables" and "Two Inabilities."
  • Lack of Combat Experience. The PLA's self-assessments often express insecurities about the fact that the military has not fought a war since 1979, with common references to the "peace disease" or “peacetime practices". For the PLA, the "peace disease" presents itself as both a lack readiness within the force and a lackadaisical attitude towards training and preparing for potential conflict.
  • Exercise and Training Realism. For decades, the PLA has identified poor and unrealistic training as a key problem for military modernization. . The PLA has focused on both "formalism" and "bureaucratism" as the leading causes of substandard training. This means that training is stilted and formal rather than being appropriate for dynamic and unpredictable real-world conditions.
  • Professional Military Education. The PLA has identified a lack of officers with knowledge of joint combat operations and is working to implement a true joint culture throughout the force. To rectify the gap in military education on joint warfighting, theater command headquarters have attempted to set up educational programs at headquarters to build joint proficiency. Additionally, the PRC's NDU launched the PLA's first training course for officers to receive joint post qualifications upon graduation.
  • Fighting and winning modern wars. The PLA has utilized the slogan the "Two Big Gaps" to underline enduring concerns about its true capability for warfighting despite the long ​modernization effort. It also is an acknowledgement that the PLA feels itself to be behind the world’s most capable militaries and that they have not yet achieved that standard.
    SLOGAN ARTICULATION
    “Five Incapables”
    • Cannot judge the situation
    • Cannot understand the intention of higher authorities
    • Cannot make operational decisions
    • Cannot deploy forces
    • Cannot deal with unexpected situations
    “Two Incompatibles”
    • Does not meet the requirements of winning local war under informatized conditions
    • Does not meet the requirements of carrying out its historic missions at the new stage of the new century
    “Two Big Gaps”
    • Does not meet the requirements for national security
    • Lack of capability compared to the level of the world’s most advanced militaries
    “Two Inabilities”
    • Inability to fight a modern war
    • Inability of officers at all levels to command in modern war
    “Three Whethers”
    • Whether the armed forces can constantly maintain the Party’s absolute leadership
    • Whether the armed forces can fight victoriously when needed by the Party and the people
    • Whether commanders at all levels are competent to lead forces and command in war

    SPECIAL TOPIC: PRC SUPPORT TO RUSSIA IN ITS WAR AGAINST UKRAINE

    The PRC probably was caught off guard by Russia’s war on Ukraine in February 2022, which occurred 20 days after Russian President Vladimir Putin’s visit to Beijing and the signing of a “no limits” partnership. Although Russia’s was on Ukraine has tested the strength of the elevated relationship, the PRC has sought to preserve its close ties with Russia while promoting its own image as a responsible great power and its “neutrality” in the war. Xi has also stood by Putin as the war entered its second year and resisted Western pressure to isolate and impose costs on Russia for violating Ukraine’s sovereignty. The PRC’s perception that Washington and NATO are responsible for starting the conflict, along with its sympathy for Russia’s security concerns, has driven the PRC’s response to the conflict.

    To provide diplomatic cover for Russia, Beijing has parroted Russian narratives when they align with the PRC’s criticism of the United States and refrained from condemning its conduct or ​referring to Russia’s invasion as a “war”. The PRC has also legitimized Russia’s role on the world stage by continuing to work with Russia in various multilateral fora such as the UN, BRICS, and ASEAN as well as by conducting routine bilateral meetings with Russian leaders. China has stepped up trade and become a willing buyer of Russian energy exports to buoy Russia’s sanction-battered economy. As of mid-2022, the PRC’s approach probably has shifted towards opportunistically advancing China’s interests, specifically to strengthen its international efforts to counter the United States.

    On the one-year anniversary of Russia’s further invasion of Ukraine, the PRC Foreign Ministry released a 12-point proposal discussing the PRC’s approach to the political settlement of Russia’s war of aggression in Ukraine. Although Beijing touted the proposal as a major diplomatic statement, it largely recycled and consolidated previous PRC statements and proposals on the war, which probably indicates that Beijing primarily aims to exploit the peace plan as a messaging tool to advance China and Russia’s interests. Beijing probably views the proposal as an opportunity to advance China’s desired image as a responsible great power, deflect international criticism of Sino-Russian relations, and reemphasize the PRC narrative that blames the United States and NATO for causing and perpetuating the war; this messaging is probably intended to primarily target developing countries in the Global South.

    Similarly, the PRC’s ambiguous public messaging about the potential use of nuclear weapons probably is intended to portray China as a responsible and peaceful great power and signal its discomfort about the prospect of nuclear escalation to relevant parties in the war in Ukraine. In November 2022, during German Chancellor Olaf Scholz’s visit to Beijing, Xi said that nuclear weapons must not be used, nuclear wars should not be fought, and the international community should come together to prevent a nuclear conflict in Eurasia.

    Beijing probably has taken a discreet, flexible, and cautious approach to providing materiel assistance to Russia. To date, PRC officials have publicly denied providing any lethal assistance to Russia. However, as Beijing deliberates the scale and scope of materiel commitments, it probably will seek to balance its strategic partnership with Russia while avoiding reputational or economic costs that could result from its assistance. Russian customs data revealed that Chinese companies, including state-owned enterprises under the purview of Beijing, have sold civilian, dual-use, and some minor military items to Russian military end users, such as small arms, spare parts, navigation equipment, and protective gear. Additionally, the United States announced sanctions in 2023 against specific PRC companies for their role in sharing imagery to the private Russian military company, Wagner.

    China and Russia have continued to increase the frequency of combined military exercises and maneuvers despite Russia’s war on Ukraine. These maneuvers typically are scripted and parallel rather than integrated, suggesting that both countries are not capable of operational or tactical interoperability. During the past five years, China has increasingly participated in several Russian capstone exercises and both countries have undertaken a number of combined air and naval patrols. Beijing has probably benefitted from hands on training with Russian command and control systems ​and from Russia’s more recent combat experience, given that China has not conducted active combat operations in several decades. In 2021, both countries signed a defense cooperation roadmap pledging to expand military exercises and carry out more patrols, probably to feed their narrative about a strengthening defense partnership. PRC-Russia military exercises since Russia’s war on Ukraine include the following:

    • In 2022, China and Russia conducted two combined bomber patrols—their fourth- and fifth-ever—during the same year for the first time. In May 2022, the first coincided with the Quad Summit in Tokyo and the United States, Japan, India, and Australia. The second was carried out on November 30th in the vicinity of the Sea of Japan, ECS, and Philippine Sea and included practicing the landing of bombers at each other’s airfields.
    • China and Russia conducted their second-ever combined naval patrol in September directly after VOSTOK-22, which preceded the annual bilateral naval JOINT SEA exercise in December. For the first time, the security patrol occurred in the Bering Sea along Alaska’s Aleutian Island chain.
    • China also participated in Russia’s capstone VOSTOK-22 exercise in September but decreased the number of personnel it sent. During the exercise, the PLA and Russian navies performed multiple combined maneuvers.

    Although Chinese and Russian leaders appear to assess that the benefits of cooperation outweigh the costs of working together, the relationship is still colored by latent tensions and strategic mistrust. The PRC’s strategic mistrust is probably fueled by the perception of the more powerful Russian Empire and Soviet Union historically taking advantage of a weaker China. Despite normalization of Sino-Soviet relations in 1989 and the resolution of longstanding border disputes, China remains suspicious of Russia’s intentions. The CCP still draws on Russia’s past humiliation of China—such as the signing of unjust border treaties that ceded large swaths of Chinese territory to the Russians Far East—as a source of nationalism. For Russia, enduring structural inequities, such as geography and its declining population in the Far East, stoke fears that China may encroach on its interests, exploit Russian weaknesses, or relegate Russia as the inferior partner in their relationship.

    China’s rise, growing ambitions to establish a military presence in the Arctic, and lackluster economic and military support to Russia during the war in Ukraine probably all contribute to ongoing tensions in the relationship.

    SPECIAL TOPIC: PRC BUILDING “A STRONG STRATEGIC DETERRENT SYSTEM”

    In President Xi’s report to the 20th Party Congress in 2022, he set a goal for the PLA to “build a strong strategic deterrent system.” This expands on PLA doctrinal writings from 2020 urging the construction of a “strategic deterrence system with Chinese characteristics” and the PRC’s 2021 ​guidance to create a high-level strategic deterrence system in its 14th Five-Year Plan. The PRC views a “strong strategic deterrent force system” as a set of advanced military capabilities across various domains to maintain national security and play a strategic deterrent role. Building this system consists of two parts: the development of traditional nuclear deterrent force building and the construction of conventional strategic deterrent forces in emerging fields and technologies. The PRC’s pursuit of a “strong strategic deterrent force system” is probably driven by threat perceptions of the United States and by specific concerns over Taiwan.

    Strategic deterrence is a core component of the PRC’s objectives of securing its status as a great power, achieving “the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation,” and developing a world class military by 2049. Beijing considers building a “strong strategic deterrent force system” as necessary to defend its national sovereignty, security, and development interests. It also views it as necessary to increase the PRC’s ability to manage escalation in a conflict by deterring and preventing an adversary from escalating confrontation at will.

    As of 2022, the PRC perceives an erosion of strategic stability in the US-PRC relationship. PLA academics and PRC government officials also perceive that the United States is interfering in the PRC’s periphery. The PRC views building a “strong strategic deterrence force system” as a “trump card” for safeguarding the PRC’s core interest of achieving unification with Taiwan.

    The PRC views development of nuclear and conventional capabilities as necessary components of its “asymmetric countermeasures” approach to defeat strong enemies seeking to by developing capabilities that exploit PRC strengths and take advantage of its weaknesses. In addition to improving nuclear and conventional capabilities, Xi has urged the PLA to speed up development of other non-traditional capabilities—such as in the space and cyberspace domains—to support modern warfare, further “intelligentization” of the PLA, and “win local wars.”

    The PRC is committed to maintaining deterrence against its nuclear rivals, and PRC experts view a survivable second-strike capability as crucial to national security. The PRC’s understanding of nuclear deterrence has focused on maintaining a sufficient capability to inflict unacceptable destruction against its potential adversaries. Chinese think tanks are concerned about the credibility of its nuclear deterrent due to its smaller nuclear force, which may note be seen by adversaries as sufficiently survivable in a nuclear conflict.

    The PLA views space superiority, the ability to control the space-enabled information sphere and to deny adversaries their own space-based information gathering and communication capabilities, as critical components to conduct modern “informatized warfare.” The PLA expects space to play an important role in future conflicts by enabling long-range precision strikes and in denying other militaries the use of overhead C4ISR systems.

    The development of cyber warfare capabilities is consistent with PLA writings, which identify IO—comprising cyber, EW, space, and psychological warfare—as integral to achieving information superiority early in a conflict as an effective means to counter a stronger foe. The ​PRC has publicly identified cyberspace as a critical domain for national security and declared its intent to expedite the development of its cyber forces.

    SPECIAL TOPIC: PLA RECRUITMENT AND PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT SITUATION

    PLA RECRUITMENT

    Traditional PRC military recruitment is dependent on two-year enlisted conscripts, requiring about 400,000 young citizens must voluntarily join the PLA or be compulsorily inducted annually. The ratio of volunteer versus non-volunteer conscripts is unknown, and likely varies by year and place depending on local conditions and individual motivations. As of 2020, PLA officers and civilian personnel probably numbered approximately 450,000 personnel (23 percent), NCOs roughly 850,000 (42 percent), and conscripted recruits about 700,000 (35 percent).

    Two-year conscripts are assessed to comprise about one-third of all active-duty personnel. Continuing practices implemented since at least 2016, the updated national conscription law focuses on encouraging college students, both recent graduates and current senior students, to voluntarily enlist. College students are offered incentives to serve, and those who have not yet graduated may return to school to finish their education after their time in service. Prior to this push for college-educated personnel, as recently as 2011, most of the new PLA recruits were high school graduates. In 2021, the PRC adopted a revised version of the Military Service Law to improve the system of military service registration and highlight the predominant role of volunteers in the military service system.

    The PLA also recruits civilian personnel to acquire specific skillsets. Civilian personnel are those who work in management or professional technical military posts but are not in active service unless deemed necessary. In 2018, the PLA launched its first written examination for recruiting civilian personnel; among the more than 140,000 participants, 86 percent held a bachelor’s degree or above, and 16 percent graduated with a master’s degree or above.

    In 2022, the PLA extended the recruitment age for university graduates. Compared to the usual age requirements—between 18 and 22—for new recruits, male applicants who were in their final year of university or held a bachelor’s or associate degree, could enlist at age 24, and all applicants who were postgraduate students or held a master’s degree could list up to age 26. The Ministry of National Defense’s Recruitment Office instructed recruitment officers to focus on recent university and college graduates, with preference given to degree holders in the fields of science, technology, or engineering. Xi has continually urged the military to improve its human resources efforts to recruit and train more talented professionals to help achieve its key goals.

    ​CONSCRIPTION CYCLE

    In 2020, the PRC announced its plan to modify its single annual military conscription cycle to a two-phase system. Under the new system, conscription is held in both the spring and autumn instead of just once in the autumn, to account for the academic school year and allow for more efficient enlistment. The COVID-19 pandemic postponed the implementation of the biannual conscription cycle, which was delayed to early 2021. The change did not represent an increase in the total number of recruits, but rather a staggering of the overall intake process. The new system is intended to give military units greater flexibility by reducing the total number affected by turnover at a given time.

    2023 REFORMS

    Beijing has moved to update its national conscription law by enacting revisions in May 2023. The new law reflects this updated system and recent developments in the PLA, particularly advances in information technology and population shifts. It calls for establishing an “inter-ministerial joint conference system for conscription work” intended to improve efficiency by formalizing the system already in operation through the CMC’s National Defense Mobilization Department and Ministry of National Defense Recruitment/Conscription Office. After national-level inter-agency coordination, conscription quotas for every province are sent down the military chain of command and to the local governments for execution.

    The law also provides further incentives for recently demobilized personnel to volunteer for a “second enlistment.” Second enlistments refer to enlisted personnel who were not promoted to a higher rank, but later decided to return to service. The law specifies that personnel who enlist for a second time and meet the qualifications to be a NCO may be “directly recruited as sergeants” (a general term for NCOs at the rank of corporal or higher). Another option for demobilized personnel is to enter the expanding ranks of non-active-duty contract civilians, some of whom are assigned to the system of local headquarters responsible for conscription.

    In pursuit of Xi’s vision of achieving a “world-class” military by 2049, the PLA is focusing on the personnel reform of its NCOs, which are expected to be the PLA’s “backbone” in future wars. Recognizing that small military units have played an increasingly important role in regional wars, the PLA is seeking to strengthen NCOs’ strategic and leadership capabilities, as well as improve their professional skills through academic and technical training. In March 2022, PLA implemented new regulations aimed at increasing “combat effectiveness,” such as allowing intermediate and senior sergeants to stay in service longer to have more professional NCOs in the military. The regulations aimed at enhancing professionalism and stability among NCOs, while allowing conscripts to play a more fundamental role in the development of the PRC’s military talent. They also intended to improve the management of PLA personnel by progressing the recruitment, training, rank promotion, benefits and demobilization system for NCOs and conscripts, and to play a key role in building a high-quality military.

    ​SPECIAL TOPIC: PRC PERCEPTIONS OF THE INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

    Beijing views its international security environment as becoming increasingly complex, with intensifying confrontation with the United States raising the danger of conflict during this decade. PRC leaders believe that the United States is engaging in a systematic effort to suppress China’s development, prevent Taiwan’s unification with mainland China, and maintain U.S. global hegemony. This perception is driving the PRC to accelerate efforts to increase its economic and technological self-reliance, strengthen its ability to secure interests internationally, and continue to modernize its military.

    In October 2022, the 20th Party Congress Political Work Report described the PRC’s external landscape as undergoing drastic changes unseen in a century and called on the Party to increase its sense of urgency to prepare for danger in an increasingly severe and complex international environment. In a speech to PRC industry leaders in March 2023, Xi explicitly accused Western countries led by the United States as containing, encircling, and suppressing the PRC and seeking to bring severe challenges to its development, further emphasizing the PRC’s view that the international environment has become increasingly hostile.

    The PRC probably is increasingly concerned about Washington’s efforts to cultivate an international coalition willing to disrupt the PRC’s rise. PRC leaders almost certainly view the announcement of AUKUS as well as the expansion of QUAD-related activities in the Indo-Pacific as the latest examples of the United States seeking to use its political and military power to threaten the PRC’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. In response, Beijing has sought to strengthen PRC relations with Global South countries and promote PRC-backed incentives such as the GSI. PRC leaders and officials aim to internationally isolate Washington and cultivate support for the PRC’s priorities such as diminishing international support for Taiwan and condemning U.S. activities in the Indo-Pacific.

    Russia’s war against Ukraine also represented a major, unexpected challenge for Beijing. Despite multiple warnings of Russia’s intentions, Beijing was caught off guard by the full scope and scale of Russia’s war, resulting in PRC officials scrambling to protect PRC interests. As Russia’s war of aggression in Ukraine has continued, PRC leaders have increasingly viewed the war through the lens of U.S.-PRC strategic competition and sympathized with Russia’s rationale for waging a war against Ukraine. This conclusion has translated into Beijing remaining steadfast in its defense of Sino-Russian strategic cooperation, continuing to support Russia’s involvement in diplomatic forums, and opposing international economic sanctions. The PRC has also echoed Russian messaging on the war, claiming that the United States and NATO are responsible for causing and prolonging the war. Beijing also probably views assistance to Russia as an opportunity to maintain the positive trajectory in Sino-Russia ties and improve Russia’s willingness to support PRC efforts to counter the United States and reshape the international order. At the same time, PRC leaders have sought to emphasize the PRC’s “neutral narrative” on Russia’s war of aggression in Ukraine, primarily to protect its reputation and deflect international criticism of Sino-Russian relations.

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