Monsieur Bossu's Treatise of the Epick Poem/Chapter 13
CHAP. XIII.
Aristotle's Thoughts of the Epick Fable.
WHat we have said concerning the Fable, is still more manifest, in the Method and Order which Aristotle prescribes for the preparation of the Ground-work of an Epick Action. He does not bid us to search at first in History for some great Action, and some Heroical Person: But on the contrary,[1] he bids us to make a general Action which has nothing in it particular; to impose Names on the Persons after this first Fiction, and afterwards to form the Episodes.
For the better conceiving of his Mind, we must take notice what he means by a general, what by a particular Action. [2]"There is this difference (says he) between a Poet and an Historian, that the One writes barely Matter of Fact, [the Other lays down things just as they ought to have been. For this Reason, Poetry is more serious and more philosophical than History; because Poetry tells us of general Things, and History rehearses singular Things. A general Thing, is that which either probably or necessarily ought to have been said or done; and is that to which the Poet ought to have a special regard, when he imposes the Names on his Personages. A singular thing is that which Alcibiades, for instance, has either done or suffered."
The Poetical Action then is neither singular nor historical, but general and allegorical: 'Tis not what Alcibiades has done, but 'tis in general what any one else ought to have done upon the like Occasion.
'Tis a material Point to take notice, that a thing must be done after one way or other, for its being either absolutely good, or for its being only probable, no matter whether it be good or bad. Xenophon has feigned the Actions of his Cyrus in the first way; and so have all the Poets, who in imitation of him have undertaken to describe the Actions of a great Prince panegyrically. On the other hand, the Hecuba of Seneca should not have made such fine Reflections upon the Destruction of Troy, and the Death of Priam. Not but these Reflections in themselves are very just and useful; but only 'tis not probable, that a Woman lying under such a weight of Afflictions, should have such Thoughts, as were only becoming the Tranquility of a great Philosopher, who had no manner of Interest in the History of these ancient Times.
'Tis in this last sence, that Aristotle orders Poets to feign their Actions such, as they either probably or necessarily ought to have been. If there still remains any doubt what he means by this Expression, 'tis very easie to give an entire solution of it. One need only consider the Instance of an Action that is just, and feigned regularly by the greatest of all the Poets: 'Tis that of the Iliad. Without doubt he knew that the Action of Achilles, made choice of by Homer,[3] is the Anger of this Hero, so pernicious to the Greeks, and not to the Trojans. We will not so much as suppose, that this great Philosopher ever thought, that the Extravagancies of a Man, who sacrifices his Friends and his Country to his own Revenge, was an Action any ways commendable, vertuous, or worthy the imitation of Princes. Certainly it had been more for the Honour of Homer's Country, if he had sung of the War and the taking of Troy. And yet, [4]Aristotle does not only not blame him for forgoing such a glorious Subject, and making choice of a more defective Theme: But he says that herein he has done something that is divine.
He is then perfectly of the same mind with Horace, who would have Achilles represented as cholerick, passionate, and unjust; just as Homer has made him. But that wherein Aristotle is more instructive than Horace, is his Method of giving Names to the Personages, that are introduced in a Poem. For how could one prepare the Ground-work of a particular Action of some illustrious Hero, that is not feigned; when one does not so much as know whether the Hero be Achilles, Æneas, Ʋlysses, Diomedes, or any other? And yet this is what Aristotle orders in the Composition of the Epick Fable, when he says, that one should not give Names to Personages till after the Action is invented.
One should indeed do that just before the forming of the Episodes: For if those, whose Names we borrow, have done any known Actions; the best way is to make use of them, and accommodate these real Circumstances to the Ground-work of the Fable, and to the Design of the Poet; to fill the Episodes with them; and to draw from them all the Advantages possible according to the Rules of Art. This management renders the feign'd Action more probable, and may likewise make it look like true History. Besides, Aristotle had said, that the Poet in giving particular Names to Persons, which at first he made general,[5] should take special care to make his Fiction probable.
This Precept is capable of another meaning, which does not at all contradict what has been said, but rather confirms the Doctrine which I proposed: 'Tis this, viz. "That when you have feigned an Action, if it be mild and moderate, you must not represent the chief Personage thereof under the Name of Achilles, Tydeus, Medea, or any other whose passionate Tempers are well known."
In this Doctrine, we shall with Aristotle meet with three sorts of Actions which the Poets make use of. In the first, the Things and the Names of the Persons are singular and true, and not feigned or invented by the Poet. The [6]Satyrists make use of this sort. In the second, both the Things and the Names are feigned and invented by the Poet; and this is the Practice of Comedians. We have laid down an Instance thereof in the Fable we made use of under the Names of Orontes, Pridamant, and Clitander. In the third sort, the Things are invented, but the Names are not. They are noted either by History, or by some Tradition or other. This is manifest in the Fable we proposed under the Names of Robert Earl of Artois, and Ralph Count of Nesle. We might say the same of the Iliad, the Odysseïs, and the Æneid. This sort of Action is proper for Tragedy, and the Epopéa.
Nor need we feign Instances to prove these things, or seek for them in Greece and old Italy; since we have enough of them nearer home, in the Satyrs, the Comedies, and the Tragedies, which are daily to be seen in the World.
This Doctrine of Aristotle is so important, that it deserves to be consulted in the Original. After he had informed us that the Poetical Action is not singular, but general and universal; and after he had explained what he means by these Terms, as we observed at the beginning of this Chapter, he then goes on after this manner:
[7]"This in Comedy is very manifest. For after the Poet has prepared his Fable, upon what is probable, he then gives his Actors what Names he pleases: And he does not as the Satyrists, who speak only of particular Things. But in Tragedy they make use of Names ready made to their hands. This makes us more readily believe the thing to be possible; for Things that have never yet been done, we are not obliged to think possible: But what has been already done, is without all Dispute possible; since it would never have been done, had it been impossible. Yet in some Tragedies, there is but one or two known Names, and all the rest are feigned. Nay, in some others there is not one known Name, as in the Tragedy of Agathon, call'd The FLOWER, where all the Names, as well as Things, are feigned and invented. And yet it came off with Applause."
In favour of our Subject 'tis, that we cite what Aristotle says in this passage, concerning the Tragick Fable. Nor is this a wresting of the Text, since this great Master lays it down as his first [8]Precept in the Epopéa, That we ought to prepare the Fable thereof as for Tragedy.
'Tis to be observ'd, that to make the thing probable, and to perswade Men of its Possibility, from its having been done already, Aristotle orders us to put the Fable not under a known Action, but only under known Names. This makes good what we before alledged, viz.[9]That the Poet should think of making his Action probable, when he gives Names to the Actors. This is the practice of those who make Histories of their own Inventions. The better to perswade the World of the Truth of what they say, they name the Places and the Persons; and the more these Names are known, the more Credit they meet with. Homer has acquitted himself so very handsomely in this Matter, that the Art he had of feigning the best of any Man in the World, is one of the Commendations he deserved from the mouth of [10]Aristotle himself.
We conclude then that Homer in his Practice, and Aristotle in his Precepts, are exactly of the same mind; that Homer had no other Design but to form the Manners of his Country-men, by proposing to them, as Horace says, what was profitable or unprofitable, what was honourable or dishonourable: But that he did not undertake to rehearse any particular Action of Achilles or Ulysses. He made his Fable, and laid the Design of his Poems, without so much as thinking on these Princes; and afterwards, he did them the Honour to bestow their Names on the Heroes he had feign'd.
In other Histories of the Trojan War we do not indeed read of this Quarrel between Achilles and Agamemnon, which Homer has taken for the Subject-Matter of his Iliad: And what is no less considerable is, that this very Design and Action which the Poet has form'd under the name of Achilles at the Siege of Troy, might with the same Probability have went under the Name of Tydeus, Capaneus, or any other at the Siege of Thebes. One might have made Adrastus the General, and given him some occasion of exasperating the cholerick Nature of Capaneus. He, by withdrawing into his Tent only for a few days, might have given the Thebans some Advantages over his Party. Afterwards one might have made this furious Person return to his Duty: and then fighting with the rest, he might have gain'd the Victory to his own side, and reveng'd in one single day, the Affront and Loss they had suffer'd the three or four days before: And this is all we contend for in the Iliad.
The same might be said of Ulysses. All the Adventures we read of him in the Odysseïs, might with altogether as much Probability have been rehears'd under the Name of any other Prince returning from an Expedition. For the better Proof of which, we need only cast an eye upon the Platform which Aristotle himself has left us thereof: and 'tis as follows.
[11]A Man is absent from his own home for several Years. Neptune persecutes him, destroys all his Retinue, and only he himself escapes. In the mean time his Family is in disorder, his Estate is made away with by his Wives Suitors, and his Son is plotted against. But at last, after many Storms at Sea, he returns home, discovers himself to his Friends, conceals himself from others, sets all things to rights again, and puts his Enemies to death. This (concludes Aristotle) is all that is proper, the Episodes make up the rest. This, in my mind, gives us absolutely such an Idea of a Fable as I proposed: And in this Model Ulysses seems to have as little to do as any other.
But after the Model is pitch'd upon, the Action invented, and the Names given, then if those whose Names are borrow's have done any known Actions, the Poet ought to make use of them, and to accommodate these true Circumstances to his own Design. With these he must fill his Episodes, and from these he should draw all the Advantages possible, according to the Rules of Art. Thus Aristotle gives no Orders for making the Episodes till the Names are pitch'd upon.
He therefore transgresses the Precepts of Aristotle, and the Practice of Homer, and spoils the Essence of the Epick Fable in particular, as well as of other Fables in general, who begins by looking for his Hero in some History or other, and undertakes to rehearse a particular Action this Hero has done, as we see in Silius Italicus, Lucan, Statius, and in the Authors of the Adventures of Hercules and Theseus, which Aristotle takes notice of. They did not make any general or universal Platform without Names, but made it altogether singular. For how could any one write like Silius, without thinking on the particular Action and Name of Hannibal? Call him as much as you will, in your Platform, a Certain Man, yet still this Certain Man is determinately Hannibal. You are so far from taking away his Name, that after you have once nam'd him, you afterwards use a Pronoun or some other Word which signifies him, instead of the Term Hannibal, which you are loth to repeat. Thus Aristotle does not order the Names to be taken away (which can never be done) but he only orders to feign an Action without Names, to make it at first universal, as he instances in the Odysseïs and Iphigenia.