National Equipment Rental, Ltd. v. Szukhent/Dissent Brennan

by William J. Brennan, Jr.

United States Supreme Court

375 U.S. 311

National Equipment Rental, Ltd.  v.  Szukhent

 Argued: Nov. 20, 1963. --- Decided: Jan 6, 1964

Mr. Justice BRENNAN, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE and Mr. Justice GOLDBERG join, dissenting.

I would affirm. In my view, federal standards and not state law must define who is 'an agent authorized by appointment' within the meaning of Rule 4(d) (1). See Mississippi Pub. Corp. v. Murphree, 326 U.S. 438, 445-446, 66 S.Ct. 242, 246, 90 L.Ed. 185; Bowles v. J. J. Schmitt & Co., 2 Cir., 170 F.2d 617, 620; 1 Barron and Holtzoff, Federal Practice (Wright rev. 1960), at 701. In formulating these standards I would, first, construe Rule 4(d)(1) to deny validity to the appointment of a purported agent whose interests conflict with those of his supposed principal, see Hartsock v. Commodity Credit Corp., D.C., 10 F.R.D. 181, 183. Second, I would require that the appointment include an explicit condition that the agent after service transmit the process forthwith to the principal. Although our decision in Wuchter v. Pizzutti, 276 U.S. 13, 48 S.Ct. 259, 72 L.Ed. 446, dealt with the constitutionality of a state statute, the reasoning of that case is persuasive that, in fashioning a federal agency rule, we should engraft the same requirement upon Rule 4(d)(1). Third, since the corporate plaintiff prepared the printed form contract, I would not hold the individual purchaser bound by the appointment without proof, in addition to his mere signature on the form, that the individual understandingly consented to be sued in a State not that of his residence. We must bear in mind what was said in United States v. Rumely, 345 U.S. 41, 44, 73 S.Ct. 543, 545, 97 L.Ed. 770, that we must strive not to be 'that 'blind' Court, against which Mr. Chief Justice Taft admonished in a famous passage, * * * that does not see what '(a)ll others can see and understand." It offends common sense to treat a printed form which closes an installment sale as embodying terms to all of which the individual knowingly assented. The sales pitch aims solely at getting the signature on the form and wastes no time explaining or even mentioning the print. Before I would find that an individual purchaser has knowingly and intelligently consented to be sued in another State, I would require more proof of that fact than is provided by his mere signature on the form.

Since these standards were not satisfied in this case, the service of the summons and complaint was properly quashed.

Notes