Observations upon the United Provinces of the Netherlands/Chapter VIII
It must be avowed, That as This State, in the course and progress of its Greatness for so many years past, has shined like a Comet; So in the Revolutions of this last Summer, It seem'd to fall like a Meteor, and has equally amazed the World by the one and the other: When we consider such a Power and Wealth, as was related in the last Chapter, to have fallen in a manner prostrate within the space of one Month: So many Frontier Towns, renowned in the Sieges and Actions of the Spanish Wars, enter'd like open Villages by the French Troops, without defence or almost denial: Most of them without any blows at all, and all of them with so few: Their great Rivers, that were esteemed an invincible security to the Provinces of Holland and Utrecht, passed with as much ease, and as small resistances, as little Fords: And in short, the very hearts of a Nation so valiant of old, against Rome, so obstinate against Spain, now subdued, and, in a manner, abandoning all before their Danger appeared: We may justly have our recourse to the secret and fixed periods of all Human Greatness, for the account of such a Revolution: Or rather, to the unsearchable Decrees, and unresistable force, of Divine Providence; Though it seems not more impious to question it, than to measure it by our Scale; Or reduce the issues and Motions of that Eternal Will and Power, to a conformity with what is esteemed just, or Wise, or Good, by the usual Consent, or the narrow comprehension, of poor Mortal Men.
But, as in the search, and consideration, even of things natural and common, our Talent, I fear, is to Talk rather than to Know; So we may be allowed to Enquire and Reason upon all things, while we do not pretend to Certainty, or call that Undeniable Truth, which is every day denied by Ten thousand; Nor those Opinions Unreasonable, which we know to be held by such, as we allow to be Reasonable Men. I shall therefore set down such circumstances, as to me seem most evidently to have conspired in this Revolution; leaving the Causes less discernable, to the search of more discerning Persons.
And first, I take their vast Trade, which was an occasion of their Greatness, to have been One likewise of their Fall, by having wholly diverted the Genius of their Native Subjects, and Inhabitants, from Arms, to Traffique, and the Arts of Peace; Leaving the whole fortune of their later Wars, to be managed, by Foreign and Mercenary Troops; which much abased the Courage of their Nation, (as was observed in another Chapter,) and made the Burghers of so little moment towards the defence of their Towns; Whereas, in the famous Sieges of Harlem, Alcmar, and Leyden, They had made such brave and fierce defences, as broke the Heart of the Spanish Armies, and the fortune of their Affairs.
Next, was the Peace of Munster, which had left them now, for above Twenty years, too secure of all Invasions, or Enemies at Land; And so turn'd their whole application to the strength of their Forces at Sea; Which have been since exercised with two English Wars in that time, and enlivened with the small yearly Expeditions into the Streights against the Algerines, and other Corsairs of the Mediterranean.
Another was, their too great Parsimony, in Reforming so many of their best Foreign Officers and Troops, upon the Peace of Munster; whose Valour and Conduct had been so great occasions of inducing Spain to the Counsels and Conclusions of that Treaty.
But the greatest of all others, that concurr'd to weaken, and indeed break, the strength of their Land-Milice, was, the alteration of their State, which happen'd by the Perpetual Edict of Holland, and West-Friezland, upon the death of the last Prince of Orange, for exclusion of the Power of Stadtholder in their Province, or at least the separation of it from the Charge of Captain-General. Since that time, the main design, and application of those Provinces, has been, to work out, by degrees, all the old Officers, both Native and Foreign, who had been formerly Sworn to the Prince of Orange, and were still thought affectionate to the Interest of that Family; And to fill the Commands of their Army, with the Sons, or Kinsmen, of Burgomasters, and other Officers, or Deputies in the State, whom they esteemed sure to the Constitutions of their Popular Government, and good enough for an Age, where they saw no appearance of Enemy at Land to attaque them.
But the Humour of Kindness to the young Prince, both in the People, and Army, was not to be dissolved, or dispersed, by any Medicines, or Operations, either of Rigor or Artifice; But grew up insensibly, with the Age of the Prince[1], ever presaging some Revolution in the State, when he should come to the years of aspiring, and managing the general Affections of the People: Being a Prince, who joyned to the great Qualities of his Royal Blood, the popular Virtues of his Country; Silent and Thoughtful; Given to hear, and to enquire; Of a sound and steddy Understanding; Much firmness in what he once resolves, or once denies; Great Industry and Application to his Business; Little to his Pleasures: Piety in the Religion of his Country, but with Charity to others; Temperance unusual to his Youth, and to the Climate; Frugal in the common management of his Fortune, and yet magnificent upon occasion: Of great Spirit and Heart, aspiring to the Glory of Military Actions, with strong Ambition to grow Great, but rather by the Service, than the Servitude, of his Country. In short, A Prince of many Virtues, without any appearing mixture of Vice.
In the English War, begun the year 65. the States disbanded all the English Troops, that were then left in their Service, dispersing the Officers and Soldiers of our Nation, who staid with them, into other Companies, or Regiments, of their own. After the French Invasion of Flanders, and the strict Alliance between England and Holland in 68. they did the same by all the French that were remaining in their Service. So as the several Bodies of these two Nations, which had ever the greatest part in the Honour and Fortune of their Wars, were now wholly dissolved, and their standing-Milice composed in a manner, all of their own Natives, enervated by the long Uses and Arts of Traffique, and of Peace.
But they were too great a Match for any of the smaller Princes their Neighbours in Germany; And too secure of any danger from Spain, by the knowledge of their Forces, as well as Dispositions; And being strictly Allied both with England and Sueden, in two several Defensive Leagues, and in one common Triple Alliance; They could not foresee any danger from France, who, they thought, would never have the Courage, or Force, to enter the Lists with so mighty Confederates; and who were sure of a Conjunction, whenever they pleased, both with the Emperor and Spain.
Besides, They knew that France could not attaque them, without passing through Flanders, or Germany: They were sure Spain would not suffer it through the first, if they were backt in opposing it, as foreseeing the inevitable loss of Flanders, upon that of Holland: And they could hardly believe, the passage should be yielded by a German Prince, contrary to the express Will and Intentions of the Emperor, as well as the common Interests of the Empire: So that they hoped the War would, at least, open in their Neighbours Provinces, for whose Defence they resolved to employ the whole Force of their State. And would have made a mighty resistance, if the Quarrel had begun at any other Doors, but their own.
They could not imagine a Conjunction between England and France, for the ruine of their State; For, being unacquainted with our Constitutions, they did not foresee, how we should find our Interest in it, and measured all States, by that which They esteemed to be their Interest. Nor could they believe, that other Princes and States of Europe would suffer such an addition to be made to the Power of France, as a Conquest of Holland.
Besides these publick Considerations, there were others particular to the Factions among them; And some of their Ministers were neither forward nor supple enough to endeavour the early breaking, or diverting, such Conjunctures, as threatned them; Because they were not without hopes, they might end in renewing their broken Measures with France; Which those of the Commonwealth-Party were more enclin'd to, by foreseeing the influence that their Alliances with England must needs have in time, towards the restoring of the Prince of Orange's Authority: And they thought at the worst, that whenever a pinch came, they could not fail of a safe bargain in one Market or other, having so vast a Treasure ready to employ upon any good occasion.
These Considerations made them commit three fatal Oversights in their Foreign Negotiations: For they made an Alliance with England, without engaging a Confidence and Friendship: They broke their Measures with France, without closing new ones with Spain: And they reckon'd upon the Assistances of Sweden, and their Neighbour-Princes of Germany, without making them sure by Subsidiary Advances, before a War began.
Lastly, The Prince of Orange was approaching the Two and twentieth year of his Age, which the States of Holland had, since their Alliance with His Majesty in 1668, ever pretended, should be the time of advancing him to the Charge of Captain-General, and Admiral of their Forces, though without that of Stadtholder. But the nearer they drew to this period, which was like to make a new Figure in their Government; the more desirous some of their Ministers seemed, either to decline, or to restrain, it. On the other side, the Prince grew confident upon the former Promises, or, at least, Intimations, of Holland, and the concurring dispositions of the other Six Provinces to his advancement: And his Party, spirited by their hopes, and the great Qualities, of this young Prince, (now grown ripe for Action, and for Enterprise,) resolved to bring this point to a sudden decision; Against which, the other Party prepared, and united all their Defences; So, as this strong Disease, that had been so long working in the very Bowels of the State, seem'd just upon its Crisis; When a Conjunction of Two Mighty Kings brought upon them a sudden and furious Invasion by Land and Sea, at the same time, by a Royal Fleet, of above Fourscore Ships; and an Army, of as many thousand Men.
When the States saw this Cloud ready to break upon them, (after a long belief that it would blow over,) They began, not only to provide shelter at home, with their usual vigor; but to look out for it abroad, though both too late. Of the Princes that were their Allies, or concern'd in their danger, Such as were far off could not be in time; The nearer were unwilling to share in a danger they were not enough prepar'd for; Most were content to see the Pride of this State humbled; Some, the Injuries, they had received from them, revenged; Many would have them mortified, that would not have them destroyed; And so all resolved to leave them to weather the Storm, as they could, for one Campania; Which, they did not believe, could go far towards their ruin, considering the greatness of their Riches, number of their Force, and strength of their Places.
The State, in the mean time, had encreased their Troops to Seventy thousand Men, and had begun to repair the Fortifications of their Frontier Towns: But so great a length of their Country lay open to the French Invasion, by the Territories of Colen and Liege; And to the Bishop of Munster, (their inveterate Enemy,) by Westphalia, that they knew not where to expect, or provide against, the first danger: And while they divided their Forces and Endeavours towards the securing of so many Garisons, they provided for none to any purpose but Maestricht; Which the French left behind them, and fell in upon the Towns of the Rhine, and the Heart of their Provinces.
Besides, Those Ministers, who had still the direction of Affairs, bent their chief application to the Strength and Order of their Fleet, rather than of their Army: Whether more peckt at England than France, upon the War, and manner of entring into it; Or, believing that a Victory at Sea would be the way to a Peace with this Crown; Or, hoping their Towns would not fall so fast, but that, before three or four were lost, the business at Sea would be decided; Or perhaps content, that some ill Successes should attend the Prince of Orange at his first entrance upon the Command of their Armies, and thereby contribute to their Designs of restraining the Authority, while they were forced to leave him the Name, of Captain-General. This, indeed, was not likely to fail, considering the ill constitution of their old Army, the hasty Levies of their new, and the heighth of the Factions now broken out in the State; Which left both the Towns and the Troops in suspence, under whose Banners they fought, and by whose Orders they were to be govern'd, the Prince's, or the States.
There happen'd, at the same time, an accident unusual to their Climate, which was a mighty Drowth in the beginning of the Summer, that left their waters fordable in places, where they used to be navigable for Boats of greatest burthen. And this gave them more trouble and distraction in the defence, as their Enemies more facility in the passage, of those great Rivers, which were esteemed no small security of their Country.
And in this posture were the Affairs of this Commonwealth, when the War broke out, with those fatal Events, that must needs attend any Kingdom, or State, where the violence of a Foreign Invasion happens to meet with the distracted estate of a Domestique Sedition or Discontent, which, like ill Humours in a Body, make any small wound dangerous, and a great one mortal. They were still a great Body, but without their usual Soul; They were a State, but it was of the Dis-united Provinces. Their Towns were without Order; Their Burgers without Obedience; Their Soldiers without Discipline; And all without Heart: Whereas, in all Sieges, The Hearts of Men defend the Walls, and not Walls the Men: And, indeed, it was the Name of England, joyning in the War against them, that broke their Hearts, and contributed more to the loss of so many Towns, and so much Country, than the Armies of Munster, or of France. So that, upon all circumstances consider'd, it seems easier to give an account, what it was that lost them so much, than what sav'd them the rest.
No Man at play sees a very great Game, either in his own, or another's, Hand, unexpectedly lost, but he is apt to consider, whether it could have been saved, and how it ought to have been play'd. The same Enquiry will be natural upon the Fall of this State, and very difficult to resolve.
After the mighty growth of the French, and decay of the Spanish Power, which drew on the Invasion of Flanders in 1667. This State had a very hard Game to play; Either they must see Flanders wholly lost, and France grown to confine upon them, (whom they liked as an Ally, but dreaded as a Neighbour;) Or else, they must join with France to divide Flanders between them; But they knew what it was to share with the Lion: Or, they must joyn with Spain to defend Flanders against France, that is, with their old Enemy, against their old Friend: Or lastly, They must joyn with England for the defence of Flanders; Neither breaking with France, nor closing with Spain; and frame an Arbitrage, but of somthing a rough nature; rather prescribing than mediating a Peace, and threatning a War upon that Crown that refused it.
They chose the last, and wisely, as all men thought; But though this Alliance was happily planted, yet it was unhappily cultivated, and so the Fruit came to fall, and the Root to wither upon the first change of seasons, in such a manner, and to such a degree, as we have lately seen. Whether they could have prevented a Conjunction of England with France, shall be no part of my Subject; For I pretend not to know, or to tell, Secrets of State; and intend these, not for the Observations of an Ambassador, but of a private man as I am, and such as any Gentleman might easily have made, who had resided above two years, as I did, in Holland; and had been, as I was, a little enclined to observe. I shall only say, That the Conjunction of England with France was to this State, like one of those Diseases, which, the Physicians say, are hard to discern, while they are easie to cure; but when once they come to be plainly discovered, they are past remedy.
But, as Holland had ever defended it self against Spain, by England and France; So it ought to have done against France, by England and Spain, and provided early against their own danger, as well as that of Flanders, by improving and advancing their Confederate League with England and Sweden, into a strict Defensive-Alliance with Spain, as a Principal in the League. And by agreeing with that Crown, to furnish between them some constant Subsidiary Payments to Sweden, for the support of their standing-Forces, even in time of Peace. This was the desire of Spain, the Interest of all that meant to secure the Peace of Christendom; and the opinion of some of the Dutch Ministers, though not of the Chiefest, till it was too late: And the omission of This, was the greatest fault ever committed in their Politicks; and proceeded in a great measure from their ancient animosity to Spain; Which as it was the beginning, so, by this effect, it almost prov'd the end of their State.
When the War began in the mid'st of the Conjunctures related, 'Tis hard to say, what could have defended them; But as men in a Town, threatned with a mighty Siege, abandon their Suburbs, and slight those Out-works which are either weak of themselves, or not well defensible for want of Men; and resolve onely to make good those Posts which they are able fully to man, and easily to relieve; because the loss of every small Out-work does not only weaken the Number, but sink the Courage, of the Garison within.
So this State, which came to be in a manner besieged by the mighty and numerous Armies of France and of Munster, ought, in my opinion, to have left themselves but three Out-works to maintain; (I mean, three Posts standing without the Lines, that enclosed the main Body of their Provinces:) These should have been Maestricht, Wesel and Coeverden. They should have slighted all the rest of their places, that lay without these upon the Rhine, or in Overyssel; and drawn the Men into these Towns, so as to have left them rather like Camps, than Garisons, that is, Eight thousand Foot, and two thousand Horse in Maestricht, as many in Wesel, and half the number in Coeverden, if the place would contain them; if not, they might have formed and fortified a Camp, with something a greater number, upon the next Pass into Friezland and Groninguen.
Of the rest of their Horse, (which were, I suppose, about Five thousand) with at least Fifteen thousand Foot, they should have formed a great standing Camp, within their Rivers, somewhere near Arnhem; Fortifi'd it with Canon, and all the Art that could be; Furnisht it with the greatest care, and Plenty of Provisions. The remainder of their Infantry would have been enough for the rest of their Garisons; Of which the Towns upon the Yssel, Doesburgh, Zutphen, Daventer, and Swoll, would have been in a manner flankt (though at some distance) by the strong Garisons of Wesel and Coeverden; and breasted by the main Camp.
If, with this disposition of their Forces, they had provided well for the strength and defence of Skinksconce, Nimmeguen and Grave, (which would likewise have lien all within the cover of these out-Posts:) They might, for ought I know, have expected the War without losing the heart and steddiness of their Counsels, and not without probability of making a defence worthy the former Greatness and Atchievements of their State.
For a Siege of Maestricht or Wesel (so garrison'd and resolutely defended,) might not onely have amused, but endanger'd, the French Armies; As Coeverden might have done that of Munster. The resistance of one of these Towns would have encreased the strength of all the rest: For the Fortune of Battels, and Sieges, turns upon the hearts of men, as they are more or less capable of general Confidences or Fears, which are very much raised by Accidents and Opinions. It would not have been within any common Rules, to march so far into the Country, as to attacque the Burse or Breda, Nimmeguen or Grave, leaving such Camps behind, as those at Wesel and Maestricht, and having so much a greater before them, as that about Arnhem. If any of these three Posts had been lost, yet it could not have happen'd without good Conditions, and so retiring the men to strengthen either the more inward Garisons, or the main Camp, which would have laen ready to defend the Passes of their Rivers. And if at the worst, they had fail'd in this, yet the French Army must afterwards, either have attacqued a fortifi'd Camp of Twenty thousand men, or left such an Army behind them, when they marcht towards Utrecht, and into the heart of the Provinces; Both of which would have been Attempts, that, I think, have hardly been enterprised with success upon any Invasion.
There seems at least some appearance of Order and Conduct in this Scheme of Defence; Whereas there was none, in theirs: But perhaps the greatness of the Tempest from abroad, and of the Factions at home, either broke the heart, or distracted the course, of their Counsels. And besides, such old Sea-men in so strong a Ship, that had weathered so many Storms without loss, could not but think it hard, to throw over-board so much of their Lading before This began. After all, I know very well, That nothing is so hard, as to give wise Counsel before Events; and nothing so easie, as, after them, to make wise Reflections. Many things seem true in Reason, and prove false in Experience: Many, that are weakly consulted, are executed with Success. Therefore, to conclude, We must all acknowledg, That wisdom and Happiness dwell with God alone; And, among mortal men, (both of their Persons and their States,) Those are the wisest, that commit the fewest Follies; and those the happiest, that meet with the fewest Misfortunes.
FINIS
- ↑ Crevit occulto velut arbor aevo, Fama Marcelli.