On the Economy of Machinery and Manufactures/Chapter 30

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CHAP. XXX.
ON COMBINATIONS AMONGST MASTERS OR WORKMEN AGAINST EACH OTHER.

(353.) There exist amongst the workmen of almost all classes, certain rules or laws which govern their actions towards each other, and towards their employers. But, besides these general principles, there are frequently others peculiar to each factory, which have derived their origin, in many instances, from the mutual convenience of the parties engaged in them. Such rules are little known except to those actually pursuing the several trades; and, as it is of importance that their advantages and disadvantages should be canvassed, we shall offer a few remarks upon some of them.

(354.) The principles by which such laws should be tried are,

1st. That they conduce to the general benefit of all the persons employed.

2dly. That they prevent fraud.

3dly. That they interfere as little as possible with the free agency of each individual.

(355.) It is usual in many workshops, that, on the first entrance of a new journeyman, he shall pay a small fine to the rest of the men. It is clearly unjust to insist upon this payment; and when it is spent in drinking, which is, unfortunately, too often the case, it is injurious. The reason assigned for the demand is, that the new comer will require some instruction in the habits of the shop, and in the places of the different tools, and will thus waste the time of some of his companions until he is instructed. If this fine were added to a fund, managed by the workmen themselves, and either divided at given periods, or reserved for their relief in sickness, it would be less objectionable, since its tendency would be to check the too frequent change of men from one shop to another. But it ought, at all events, not to be compulsory; and the advantages to be derived from the fund to which the workman is invited to subscribe, ought to be his sole inducement to contribute.

(356.) In many workshops, the workmen, although employed on totally different parts of the objects manufactured, are yet dependent, in some measure, upon each other. Thus a single smith may be able to forge, in one day, work enough to keep four or five turners employed during the next. If, from idleness or intemperance, the smith neglects his work, and does not furnish the usual supply, the turners (supposing them to be paid by the piece), will have their time partly unoccupied, and their gains consequently diminished. It is reasonable, in such circumstances, that a fine should be levied on the delinquent; but it is desirable that the master should have concurred with his workmen in establishing such a rule, and that it should be shown to each individual previously to his engagement; and it is very desirable that such fine should not be spent in drinking.

(357.) In some establishments, it is customary for the master to give a small gratuity whenever any workman has exercised a remarkable degree of skill, or has economized the material employed. Thus, in splitting horn into layers for lanterns, one horn usually furnishes from five to eight layers; but if a workman split the horn into ten layers or more, he receives a pint of ale from the master. These premiums should not be too high, lest the material should be wasted in unsuccessful attempts: but such regulations, when judiciously made, are beneficial, as they tend to produce skill amongst the workmen, profit to the masters, and diminished cost to the consumers.

(358.) In some few factories, in which the men are paid by the piece, it is usual, when any portion of work, delivered in by a workman, is rejected by the master on account of its being badly executed, to fine the delinquent. Such a practice tends to remedy one of the evils attendant upon that mode of payment, and greatly assists the master, since his own judgment is thus supported by competent and unprejudiced judges.

(359.) Societies exist amongst some of the larger bodies of workmen, and others have been formed by the masters engaged in the same branches of trade. These associations have different objects in view; but it is very desirable that their effects should be well understood by the individuals who compose them; and that the advantages arising from them, which are certainly great, should be separated as much as possible from the evils which they have, unfortunately, too frequently introduced. Associations of workmen and of masters may, with advantage, agree upon rules to be observed by both parties, in estimating the proportionate value of different kinds of work executed in their trade, in order that time may be saved, and disputes be prevented. They may also be most usefully employed in acquiring accurate information as to the number of persons working in the various departments of any manufacture, their rate of wages, the number of machines in use, and other statistical details. Information of this nature is highly valuable, both for the guidance of the parties who are themselves most interested, and to enable them, upon any application to Government for assistance, or with a view to legislative enactments, to supply those details, without which the propriety of any proposed measure cannot be duly estimated. Such details may be collected by men actually engaged in any branch of trade, at a much smaller expense of time, than by persons less acquainted with, and less interested in it.

(360.) One of the most legitimate and most important objects of such associations as we have just mentioned, is to agree upon ready and certain modes of measuring the quantity of work done by the workmen. For a long time a difficulty upon this point existed in the lace trade, which was justly complained of by the men as a serious grievance; but the introduction of the "rack," which counts the number of holes in the length of the piece, has entirely put an end to the most fertile cause of disputes. This invention was adverted to by the Committee of 1812, and a hope was expressed, in their report, that the same contrivance would be applied to stocking-frames. It would, indeed, be of great mutual advantage to the industrious workman, and to the master-manufacturer in every trade, if the machines employed in it could register the quantity of work which they perform, in the same manner as a steam-engine does the number of strokes it makes. The introduction of such contrivances gives a greater stimulus to honest industry than can readily be imagined, and removes one of the sources of disagreement between parties, whose real interests must always suffer by any estrangement between them.

(361.) The effects arising from combinations amongst the workmen, are almost always injurious to the parties themselves. There are numerous instances, in which the public suffer by increased price at the moment, but are ultimately gainers from the permanent reduction which results; whilst, on the other hand, the improvements which are often made in machinery in consequence of "a strike" amongst the workmen, most frequently do injury, of greater or less duration, to that particular class which gave rise to them. As the injury to the men and to their families is almost always more serious than that which affects their employers, it is of the utmost importance to the comfort and happiness of the former class, that they should themselves entertain sound views upon this question. For this purpose a few illustrations of the principle which is here maintained, will probably have greater weight than any reasoning of a more general nature, though drawn from admitted principles of political economy. Such instances will, moreover, present the advantage of appealing to facts known to many individuals of those classes for whose benefit these reflections are intended.

(362.) There is a process in the manufacture of gun-barrels for making what, in the language of the trade, are called skelps. The skelp is a piece or bar of iron, about three feet long, and four inches wide, but thicker and broader at one end than at the other: and the barrel of a musket is formed by forging out such pieces to the proper dimensions, and then folding or bending them into a cylindrical form, until the edges overlap, so that they can be welded together.

About twenty years ago, the workmen, employed at a very extensive factory in forging these skelps out of bar-iron, "struck" for an advance of wages; and as their demands were very exorbitant, they were not immediately complied with. In the meantime, the superintendent of the establishment directed his attention to the subject; and it occurred to him, that if the circumference of the rollers, between which the bar-iron was rolled, were to be made equal to the length of a skelp, or of a musket barrel, and if also the groove in which the iron was compressed, instead of being of the same width and depth throughout, were cut gradually deeper and wider from a point on the rollers, until it returned to the same point, then the bar-iron passing between such rollers, instead of being uniform in width and thickness, would have the form of a skelp. On making the trial, it was found to succeed perfectly; a great reduction of human labour was effected by the process, and the workmen who had acquired peculiar skill in performing it ceased to derive any advantage from their dexterity.

(363.) It is somewhat singular that another and a still more remarkable instance of the effect of combination amongst workmen, should have occurred but a few years since in the very same trade. The process of welding the "skelps," so as to convert them into gun-barrels, required much skill, and after the termination of the war, the demand for muskets having greatly diminished, the number of persons employed in making them was very much reduced. This circumstance rendered combination more easy; and upon one occasion, when a contract had been entered into for a considerable supply to be delivered on a fixed day, the men all struck for such an advance of wages as would have caused the completion of the contract to be attended with a very heavy loss.

In this difficulty, the contractors resorted to a mode of welding the gun-barrel, for which a patent had been taken out by one of themselves some years before this event. The plan had not then succeeded so well as to come into general use, in consequence of the cheapness of the usual mode of welding by hand-labour, combined with some other difficulties with which the patentee had to contend. But the stimulus produced by the combination of the workmen, induced him to make new trials, and he was enabled to introduce such a facility in welding gun-barrels by rollers, and such perfection in the work itself, that, in all probability, very few will in future be welded by hand-labour.

This new process consisted in folding a bar of iron, about a foot long, into the form of a cylinder, with the edges a little overlapping. It was then placed in a furnace, and being taken out when raised to a welding heat, a triblet, or cylinder of iron, was placed in it, and the whole was passed quickly through a pair of rollers. The effect of this was, that the welding was performed at a single heating, and the remainder of the elongation necessary for extending the skelps to the length of the musket barrel, was performed in a similar manner, but at a lower temperature. The workmen who had combined were, of course, no longer wanted, and instead of benefiting themselves by their combination, they were reduced permanently, by this improvement in the art, to a considerably lower rate of wages: for as the process of welding gun-barrels by hand required peculiar skill and considerable experience, they had hitherto been in the habit of earning much higher wages than other workmen of their class. On the other hand, the new method of welding was far less injurious to the texture of the iron, which was now exposed only once, instead of three or four times, to the welding heat, so that the public derived advantage from the superiority, as well as from the economy of the process. Another process has subsequently been invented, applicable to the manufacture of a lighter kind of iron tubes, which can thus be made at a price which renders their employment very general. They are now to be found in the shops of all our larger ironmongers, of various lengths and diameters, with screws cut at each end; and are in constant use for the conveyance of gas for lighting, or of water for warming, our houses.

(364.) Similar examples must have presented themselves to all those who are familiar with the details of our manufactories, but these are sufficient to illustrate one of the results of combinations. It would not, however, be fair to push the conclusion deduced from these instances to its extreme limit. Although it is very apparent, that in the two cases which have been stated, the effects of combination were permanently injurious to the workman, by almost immediately placing him in a lower class (with respect to his wages) than he occupied before; yet they do not prove that all such combinations have this effect. It is quite evident that they have all this tendency; it is also certain that considerable stimulus must be applied to induce a man to contrive a new and expensive process; and that in both these cases, unless the fear of pecuniary loss had acted powerfully, the improvement would not have been made. If, therefore, the workmen had in either case combined for only a small advance of wages, they would, in all probability, have been successful, and the public would have been deprived, for many years, of the inventions to which these combinations gave rise. It must, however, be observed, that the same skill which enabled the men to obtain, after long practice, higher wages than the rest of their class, would prevent many of them from being permanently thrown back into the class of ordinary workmen. Their diminished wages will continue only until they have acquired, by practice, a facility of execution in some other of the more difficult operations:—But a diminution of wages, even for a year or two, is still a very serious inconvenience to any person who lives by his daily exertion. The consequence of combination has then, in these instances, been, to the workmen who combined—reduction of wages; to the public—reduction of price; and to the manufacturer—increased sale of his commodity, resulting from that reduction.

(365.) It is, however, important to consider the effects of combination in another and less obvious point of view. The fear of combination amongst the men whom he employs, will have a tendency to induce the manufacturer to conceal from his workmen the extent of the orders he may at any time have received; and, consequently, they will always be less acquainted with the extent of the demand for their labour than they otherwise might be. This is injurious to their interests; for instead of foreseeing, by the gradual falling-off in the orders, the approach of a time when they must be unemployed, and preparing accordingly, they are liable to much more sudden changes than those to which they would otherwise be exposed.

In the evidence given by Mr. Galloway, the engineer, he remarks, that, "When employers are competent to show their men that their business is steady and certain, and when men find that they are likely to have permanent employment, they have always better habits, and more settled notions, which will make them better men, and better workmen, and will produce great benefits to all who are interested in their employment."

(366.) As the manufacturer, when he makes a contract, has no security that a combination may not arise amongst the workmen, which may render that contract a loss instead of a benefit; besides taking precautions to prevent them from becoming acquainted with it, he must also add to the price at which he could otherwise sell the article, some small increase to cover the risk of such an occurrence. If an establishment consist of several branches which can only be carried on jointly, as, for instance, of iron mines, blast furnaces, and a colliery, in which there are distinct classes of workmen, it becomes necessary to keep on hand a larger stock of materials than would be required, if it were certain that no combinations would arise.

Suppose, for instance, the colliers were to "strike" for an advance of wages;—unless there was a stock of coal above-ground, the furnaces must be stopped, and the miners also would be thrown out of employ. Now the cost of keeping a stock of iron ore, or of coals above-ground, is just the same as that of keeping in a drawer, unemployed, its value in money, (except, indeed, that the coal suffers a small deterioration by exposure to the elements.) The interest of this sum must, therefore, be considered as the price of an insurance against the risk of combination amongst the workmen; and it must, so far as it goes, increase the price of the manufactured article, and, consequently, limit the demand which would otherwise exist for it. But every circumstance which tends to limit the demand, is injurious to the workmen; because the wider the demand, the less it is exposed to fluctuation.

The effect to which we have alluded, is by no means a theoretical conclusion; the proprietors of one establishment in the iron trade, within the author's knowledge, think it expedient always to keep above-ground a supply of coal for six months, which is, in that instance, equal in value to about 10,000l. When we reflect that the quantity of capital throughout the country thus kept unemployed merely from the fear of combinations amongst the workmen, might, under other circumstances, be used for keeping a larger number at work, the importance of introducing a system in which there should exist no inducement to combine becomes additionally evident.

(367.) That combinations are, while they last, productive of serious inconveniences to the workmen themselves, is admitted by all parties; and it is equally true, that, in most cases, a successful result does not leave them in so good a condition as they were in before "the strike." The little capital they possessed, which ought to have been hoarded with care for days of illness or distress, is exhausted; and frequently, in order to gratify a pride, at the existence of which we cannot but rejoice, even whilst we regret its misdirected energy, they will undergo the severest privations rather than return to work at their former wages. With many of the workmen, unfortunately, during such periods, bad habits are formed which it is very difficult to eradicate; and, in all those engaged in such transactions, the kinder feelings of the heart are chilled, and passions are called into action which are permanently injurious to the happiness of the individual, and destructive of those sentiments of confidence which it is equally the interest of the master-manufacturer and of his workman to maintain. If any of the trade refuse to join in the strike, the majority too frequently forget, in the excitement of their feelings, the dictates of justice, and endeavour to exert a species of tyranny, which can never be permitted to exist in a free country. In conceding therefore to the working classes, that they have a right, if they consider it expedient, to combine for the purpose of procuring higher wages (provided always, that they have completed all their existing contracts), it ought ever to be kept before their attention, that the same freedom which they claim for themselves they are bound to allow to others, who may have different views of the advantages of combination. Every effort which reason and kindness can dictate, should be made, not merely to remove their grievances, but to satisfy their own reason and feelings, and to show them the consequences which will probably result from their conduct: but the strong arm of the law, backed, as in such cases it will always be, by public opinion, should be instantly and unhesitatingly applied, to prevent them from violating the liberty of a portion of their own, or of any other class of society.

(368.) Amongst the evils which ultimately fall heavy on the working classes themselves, when, through mistaken views, they attempt to interfere with their employers in the mode of carrying on their business, may be mentioned the removal of factories to other situations, where the proprietors may be free from the improper control of their men. The removal of a considerable number of lace-frames to the western counties, which took place, in consequence of the combinations in Nottinghamshire, has already been mentioned. Other instances have occurred, where still greater injury has been produced by the removal of a portion of the skill and capital of the country to a foreign land. Such was the case at Glasgow, as stated in the fifth Parliamentary Report respecting Artizans and Machinery. One of the partners in an extensive cotton-factory, disgusted by the unprincipled conduct of the workmen, removed to the state of New York, where he re-established his machinery, and thus afforded, to rivals already formidable to our trade, at once a pattern of our best machinery, and an example of the most economical methods of employing it.

(369.) When the nature of the work is such that it is not possible to remove it, as happens with regard to mines, the proprietors are more exposed to injury from combinations amongst the workmen: but as the owners are generally possessed of a larger capital, they generally succeed, if the reduction of wages which they propose is really founded on the necessity of the case.

An extensive combination lately existed amongst the colliers in the north of England, which unfortunately led, in several instances, to acts of violence. The proprietors of the coal mines were consequently obliged to procure the aid of miners from other parts of England who were willing to work at the wages they could afford to give; and the aid of the civil, and in some cases of the military, power, was requisite for their protection. This course was persisted in during several months, and the question being, which party could support itself longest on the diminished gains, as it might have readily been foreseen, the proprietors ultimately succeeded.

(370.) One of the remedies employed by the masters against the occurrence of combinations, is to make engagements with their men for long periods and to arrange them in such a manner, that these contracts shall not all terminate together. This has been done in some cases at Sheffield, and in other places. It is attended with the inconvenience to the masters that, during periods when the demand for their produce is reduced, they are still obliged to employ the same number of workmen. This circumstance, however, frequently obliges the proprietors to direct their attention to improvements in their works; and in one such instance, within the author's knowledge, a large reservoir was deepened, thus affording a more constant supply to the water-wheel, whilst, at the same time, the mud from the bottom gave permanent fertility to a piece of land previously almost barren. In this case, not merely was the supply of produce checked, when a glut existed, but the labour was, in fact, applied more profitably than it would have been in the usual course.

(371.) A mode of paying the wages of workmen in articles which they consume, has been introduced into some of our manufacturing districts, which has been called the "truck system." As in many instances this has nearly the effect of a combination of the masters against the men, it is a fit subject for discussion in the present chapter: but it should be carefully distinguished from another system of a very different tendency, which will be first described.

(372.) The principal necessaries for the support of a workman and his family are few in number, and are usually purchased by him in small quantities weekly. Upon such quantities, sold by the retail dealer, a large profit is generally made; and if the article is one whose quality, like that of tea, is not readily estimated, then a great additional gain is made by the retail dealer selling an inferior article.

Where the number of workmen living on the same spot is large, it may be thought desirable that they should unite together and have an agent, to purchase by wholesale those articles which are most in demand, as tea, sugar, bacon, &c., and to retail them at prices, which will just repay the wholesale cost, together with the expense of the agent who conducts their sale. If this be managed wholly by a committee of workmen, aided perhaps by advice from the master, and if the agent is paid in such a manner as to have himself an interest in procuring good and reasonable articles, it may be a benefit to the workmen: and if the plan succeed in reducing the cost of articles of necessity to the men, it is clearly the interest of the master to encourage it. The master may indeed be enabled to afford them facilities in making their wholesale purchases; but he ought never to have the least interest in, or any connexion with, the profit made by the articles sold. The men, on the other hand, who subscribe to set up the shop, ought not, in the slightest degree, to be compelled to make their purchases there: the goodness and cheapness of the article ought to be their sole inducements.

It may perhaps be objected, that this plan is only employing a portion of the capital belonging to the workmen in a retail trade; and that, without it, competition amongst small shopkeepers will reduce the articles to nearly the same price. This objection would be valid if the objects of consumption required no verification; but combining what has been already stated on that subject[1] with the present argument, the plan seems liable to no serious objections.

(373.) The Truck system is entirely different in its effects. The master-manufacturer keeps a retail shop for articles required by his men, and either pays their wages in goods, or compels them by express agreement, or less directly, by unfair means, to expend the whole or a certain part of their wages at his shop. If the manufacturer kept this shop merely for the purpose of securing good articles, at fair prices, to his workmen, and if he offered no inducement to them to purchase at his shop, except the superior cheapness of his articles, it would certainly be advantageous to the men. But, unfortunately, this is not always the case; and the temptation to the master, in times of depression, to reduce in effect the wages which he pays (by increasing the price of articles at his shop), without altering the nominal rate of payment, is frequently too great to be withstood. If the object be solely to procure for his workmen better articles, it will be more effectually accomplished by the master confining himself to supplying a small capital, at a moderate rate of interest; leaving the details to be conducted by a committee of workmen, in conjunction with his own agent, and the books of the shop to be audited periodically by the men themselves.

(374.) Wherever the workmen are paid in goods, or are compelled to purchase at the master's shop, much injustice is done to them, and great misery results from it. Whatever may have been the intentions of the master in such cases, the real effect is, to deceive the workman as to the amount he receives in exchange for his labour. Now, the principles on which the happiness of that class of society depends, are difficult enough to be understood, even by those who are blessed with far better opportunities of investigating them: and the importance of their being well acquainted with those principles which relate to themselves, is of more vital consequence to workmen, than to many other classes. It is therefore highly desirable to assist them in comprehending the position in which they are placed, by rendering all the relations in which they stand to each other, and to their employers, as simple as possible. Workmen should be paid entirely in money;—their work should be measured by some unbiassed, some unerring piece of mechanism;—the time during which they are employed should be defined, and punctually adhered to. The payments they make to their benefit societies should be fixed on such just principles, as not to require extraordinary contributions. In short, the object of all who wish to promote their happiness should be, to give them, in the simplest form, the means of knowing beforehand, the sum they are likely to acquire by their labour, and the money they will be obliged to expend for their support: thus putting before them, in the clearest light, the certain result of persevering industry.

(375.) The cruelty which is inflicted on the workman by the payment of his wages in goods, is often very severe. The little purchases necessary for the comfort of his wife and children, perhaps the medicines he occasionally requires for them in illness, must all be made through the medium of barter; and he is obliged to waste his time in arranging an exchange, in which the goods which he has been compelled to accept for his labour are invariably taken at a lower price than that at which his master charged them to him. The father of a family perhaps, writhing under the agonies of the toothache, is obliged to make his hasty bargain with the village surgeon, before he will remove the cause of his pain; or the disconsolate mother is compelled to sacrifice her depreciated goods in exchange for the last receptacle of her departed offspring. The subjoined evidence from the Report of the Committee of the House of Commons on Framework-Knitters' Petitions, shows that these are not exaggerated statements.

"It has been so common in our town to pay goods instead of money, that a number of my neighbours have been obliged to pay articles for articles, to pay sugar for drugs out of the druggist's shop; and others have been obliged to pay sugar for drapery goods, and such things, and exchange in that way numbers of times. I was credibly informed, that one person paid half a pound of tenpenny sugar and a penny to have a tooth drawn; and there is a credible neighbour of mine told me, that he had heard that the sexton had been paid for digging a grave with sugar and tea; and before I came off, knowing I had to give evidence upon these things, I asked this friend to inquire of the sexton, whether this was a fact: the sexton hesitated for a little time, on account of bringing into discredit the person who paid these goods; however, he said at last, 'I have received these articles repeatedly—I know these things have been paid to a great extent in this way.'"

  1. See Chap. XV.