Oregon Historical Quarterly/Volume 19/Federal Relations of Oregon, Part II

by Lester Burrell Shippee

THE FEDERAL RELATIONS OF OREGON II By LESTER BURRELL SHIPPEE, Ph. D. CHAPTER III OREGON AND THE DIPLOMACY OF 1821-1827 So far as there is any merit in a policy of consistency the treatment of the Oregon Question as a diplomatic issue enjoyed its benefits from the rise of the question after the War of 1812 and until 1827, when the renewal of the agreement of 1818 put an end to active discussion. It was under the guiding hand of John Quincy Adams as Secretary of State that the negotiations leading to the Convention of 1818 were con- ducted; so, too, when the affair came to the front in 1823-4, both with Russia and with Great Britain, the same secretary dictated the policy, while in 1826-7 Adams as President main- tained the stand which he had taken earlier in the controversy. During the period of about sixteen years, then, it was the will of the second Adams that dominated the whole question. The motives which animated Adams fall into two groups: if a division, as between the United States and Great Britain, equitable so far as American claims were concerned, could be obtained, let the matter be settled definitely upon such lines; if, to secure a definite arrangement, more must be ceded than the United States could clearly claim, the question might be allowed to rest in statu quo until it should be really vital to one or the other party. In following out a single line of activity, such as the one here under consideration, there is always a temptation to exalt each episode into a position out of perspective. To avoid such a charge it is well again to call attention to the fact that no magnifying of detail can serve to make of the Oregon Question in the period now under consideration a vital national issue. It is clear that the people at large were not interested in the Northwest Coast. Numerous other matters both domestic and involving international relations overshadowed the topic of the sovereignty over a transmontane district, known to a 190 LESTER BURRELL SHIPPEE few trappers and fur traders, and this despite the efforts of Floyd and a few others. Negotiations were proceeding simultaneously although intermittently between the United States and Russia on the one hand, and the United - States and Great Britain on the other, from 1822 to 1824. Since the Russian interest in that portion of the Northwest Coast coming to be known as Oregon ceased in 1824, that aspect of the diplomatic issue may well be treated first. On February 11 (N. S.) 1822, Pierre de Poletica, the Rus- sian minister to the United States, handed to the Secretary of State a copy of the Ukase of September 4, 1821 (O. S.). 1 Included in the long list of regulations dealing with the matter of trade in the North Pacific waters were two propositions which astonished Adams : 2 in the first place it was announced that all commerce, whaling, hunting, etc., along the coasts of Asia and America from Behring's Strait to the fifty-first degree of north latitude belonged exclusively to subjects of the Czar; secondly, all persons not Russian subjects were warned not to approach within 100 Italian miles of the coasts under penalty of confiscation of all property. Here was an unex- pected claim to the American continent to an extent of four degrees, and the pronouncement that the open sea was mare clausum; the first proposition assumed to treat as non-existent the claims of Great Britain and the United States to a portion of the region which these states considered a matter of con- cern to themselves alone ; the second would make a new rule as to the high seas. While de Poletica attempted to explain to Adams that the Russian pretensions were well founded 3 the latter could see no basis for the first assumption other than a settlement made at New Archangelsk on an island, on the strength of which the coast half way to the American settlement at the mouth of the Columbia was called Russian. 4 Even this assumption was nullified by the fact that the 1 Given in full in Am. S. P. For. Rel., IV, 857-61. 2 Adams to de Poletica, --- - - - * 5. f. for. Kel., IV, 857-61. , 25 Feb., 1822, Annals, 2152-3. 5, 28 Feb., & 2 Apr., Ibid., 2153-* 3 De Poletica to Adams, 28 Feb., & 2 Apr., Ibid., 2153-60. 4 Adams to de Poletica, 30 Mar., Ibid., 2157-8. FEDERAL RELATIONS OF OREGON 191 Emperor Paul, in 1799, granted to the Russian American Company only as far south as 55. As for making the North Pacific a closed sea, the idea was too absurd even for discus- sion. And the discussion closed, for de Poletica was not instructed to go further in his explanations. Nevertheless the pretentious claims of the Czar were received with more equanimity in America than elsewhere. 5 It would take more than a question of title to a little land to disturb the amicable relations between Russia and the United States, was the feeling which seemed uppermost, as witness Niles : ". . . Even if the emperor of Russia should make good his claims to the 51st degree, we guess that there will be a region of country large enough left for us;" and the editors of the National Intelligencer : 6 ". . . Should any difference finally appear to ex- ist between Russia and the United States, there can be no doubt of its being amicably settled. When Russia and the United States fall out, it will not be about anything so unimportant, we hope, as the nominal title to a degree or two of almost undiscovered land." ' But Alexander discovered that his government had taken a position which was untenable so far as it attempted to close the Pacific Ocean to traders of other nations, and both Great Britain and the United States contested the territorial claim to 51. It was not, therefore, a surprise for Adams when he received from Henry Middleton late in 1822 a confidential dis- patch relating to the affair and announcing that Baron de Tuyl was coming as minister to the United States, especially charged with a mission on this subject. 7 Nothing was done immediately, however; a certain respect for the unquestioned power of Russia entered into the motives which discouraged hasty action, and, since Great Britain was also interested, it would be well to enlist her co-operation. 8 Rush was invited to sound the 5 See quotation from Paris Journal des Debats as to the French attitude, in Niles' Register, 29 Dec., 1821, after which comes the comment of Niles quoted above. 6 Niles' Register, 29 Dec., 1821, quotes from the Intelligencer. 7 Memoirs of J. Q. Adams, VI, 93. 8 Adams, in his Memoirs, (Vl, 159) says, after commenting on the cabinet discussion of the instructions to Middleton in June, 1823: "I can find proof enough, to put down the Russian argument; but how shall we answer the Russian cannon." 192 LESTER BURRELL SHIPPEE British government as to its attitude on joint negotiation, when the question was again actively taken up, 9 while at the same time Middleton, in St. Petersburg, was instructed to proceed with the preliminary steps looking toward a settlement with Russia in accordance with the suggestion of that government. 10 Joint action, however, was not accepted by Great Britain, for in Rush's instructions was incorporated a portion of that pro- nouncement, later known as the Monroe Doctrine, which seems to have been first made in a formal way by J. Q. Adams in discussing the Northwest situation with Baron Tuyl. After giving the Baron a hint as to the nature of the instructions which were being forwarded to Middleton, Adams says r 11 "I told him especially that we should contest any right to any territorial establishment on this continent, and that we should assume distinctly the principle that the American continents are no longer subject for any new European establishments." Baron Tuyl, although considering that there would be diffi- culties in the way of the negotiation, did not foresee that they would be insurmountable. But the difficulties with Great Britain for joint diplomatic action with the United States as regards the Russian stand were insurmountable after this assertion, although the proposi- tion had at first struck Canning as feasible, since he thought the negotiations would deal only with the matter of the closed sea. 12 The principle regarding further colonization on the American continents was inadmissible ; it not only met the dis- approval of the British government on general grounds, but it was peculiarly untenable as referring to the disputed Ore- gon region. 13 Although Middleton did not know that England would not join the United States in representations to Russia until the 9 Instructions to Rush, 22 July, 1823, Am. S. P. For. Rel., V. 791-3. 10 Instructions to Middleton. Ibid., 436-7. ii Memoirs, VI, 163. 12 See Stapleton, Life and Times of George Canning, III, 117-8 Stapleton was in a position to speak since he had long been Cannings secretary. The same idea is not only expressed in his official dispatches but in his reminiscences by Rush; see Residence at the Court of London, 2d Series, II, 82 seq. 13 This point is taken up in discussing the British negotiations. FEDERAL RELATIONS OF OREGON 193 middle of February, 1824, 14 he had a number of conferences with de Poletica, only to find that this gentlemen had no power to conclude anything. 15 Accordingly he was pleased when he learned that Bagot, the British minister to Russia, could discuss only the maritime situation, since this gave him an excuse to decline further unfruitful negotiations with de Poletica. While awaiting the pleasure of the Russian govern- ment he took the opportunity of drawing up and presenting to Count Nesselrode a full statement of the rights and claims of Spain, Russia, England and the United States to the dis- puted territory, as well as outlining the views of his govern- ment on the subject of Russian pretensions as given in the Ukase of 1821. 16 When at last Nesselrode ascertained that Bagot was in- structed to proceed alone in his negotiations with Russia, he was ready to enter conferences with Middleton with the object of reaching a definite goal. From the middle of February to the end of March these conferences were held from time to time; de Poletica took the leading part for Russia, although Count Nesselrode was frequently present and joined in the discussion. In accordance with his instructions Middleton proposed at the outset 17 (1) mutual freedom of navigation and fishing in the waters of the Pacific, that is, a withdrawal by Russia so far as the United States was concerned from her position in the Ukase; (2) that citizens of the United States should not land at places actually occupied by Russian settle- ments without permission of the authorities, and that Russian subjects should likewise be restricted; as to their use of es- tablishments of the United States; (3) that the United States should neither authorize nor allow any settlement by its citizens north of 55 N. Lat., and that Russia should observe the 14 Middleton resented the implication that the delay was caused by his sug- gestion; he asserted that he had merely protested against any agreement between Russia and England over territorial limits that the claims of the United States must not be ignored. Middleton to Adams, 19 Apr., 1824, Am. S. P. For. Rel. V. 457 seq., 463. Also Middleton to Adams, 17 Feb. 1824, and Rush to Middleton, 9 Jan., 1824. 15 Middleton to Adams, 17 Oct., 1823, Ibid., 449. 1 6 Confidential Memoir to the Russian Emperor, Ibid., 449-57. 17 For his notes and the projects of each party see Am. S. P. For. Rel. V, 458-70. There were no protocols of the conferences, but Middleton wrote out noUa on each aesaion. 194 LESTER BURRELL SHIPPER same rule south of that line. These were the extreme demands of the United States, and pretensions which the Administration did not hope to obtain in full, since Middleton was authorized, on the territorial side of the issue, to conclude an agreement similar to that made with Great Britain in 1818. Neverthe- less these were the stipulations essentially as they appeared in the treaty which closed the negotiations. Russia did not grant these terms without a struggle, although the doctrine of mare clausum was dropped at the beginning without a comment. As to the second proposal the Russian commissioners would prohibit trade not alone at the points where Russian establishments existed, but at all points north of the line of delimitation, agreeing to recognize the same principle for the benefit of the United States south of the line. Moreover a Russian settlement, Port Bucarelli, ex- isted upon an island south of 55 and no agreement could be reached which placed this outside Russian jurisdiction. Middle- ton, although it exceeded his instructions, was not unwilling to allow the line to run on 54 40' instead of 55, but on the matter of trade he was obdurate. His tenacity was rewarded by having included in the treaty an article whereby for ten years the citizens and subjects of each of the two powers respectively might frequent the coasts claimed by the other, except where there were settlements, for the purpose of fishing and trading with the natives. He agreed, however, to a proviso that "all spirituous liquors, firearms, other arms, powder and munitions of war of every kind" should not be legitimate articles of trade, and that both powers should exert themselves to prevent such trade. Nesselrode flatly stated that the Emperor would never agree to a treaty if the trading provisions did not prevent the sale of arms to the natives, and he added that the prohibition of the sale of liquor was a matter near to his sovereign's heart. To Middleton's objection that other traders, English and Dutch for instance, would sell the prohibited articles and so place themselves at an advantage over the Russians and Americans, Nesselrode replied that Great Britain was ready to agree to the proposition and that the FEDERAL RELATIONS OF OREGON 195 Emperor would use all his influence to bring other nations to the same view. The treaty may be considered as practically embodying the utmost American demands : the Russian pretension of making the Pacific a closed sea was definitely abandoned; only 20 minutes of latitude lay between what the United States de- manded and what was obtained as a line of delimitation; and, most difficult task of all, freedom to trade with the natives on the coasts clearly within Russian control was secured for ten years. With reference to this last concession Middleton wrote Adams, in explaining his course : we must hold that this iright is always held subject to extinguishment whenever maritime dominion is acquired by the nation upon those shores ; when the liberty of trading expires (according to the limitation in the treaty) and the coasts remain unoccupied, then they fall into the general category of unoccupied coasts of the great ocean, for, said he, he had always resisted the introduction of the Russian proposal of a substantive stipulation that the trad- ing privilege should cease after ten years. Even such con- cessions as were made, said Middleton, were yielded because he feared England and Russia would settle their delimitation question first and then the United States would have had no equivalent to offer for the trade. 18 Well might President Monroe say, in his Annual Message of 1824, in speaking of the treaty which he was about to lay before the Senate for ratification : "It is proper to add, that the manner in which this negotiation was invited and con- ducted on the part of the Emperor has been satisfactory." And something of official relief that the issue was cleared up is expressed by Adams in his diary : "Brown mentions a letter from H. Middleton of May 2/14, saying he has con- cluded a satisfactory Convention on the North West Coast question. Blessed be God, if true!" 19 The trading privilege was not renewed when the ten year limit had expired, for, not only did Russian traders object to this encroachment upon 1 8 The treaty is given in No. 58 H. Ex. Doe, 18th Cong., 2d Ses. 19 Memoirs, VI, 400. Nevertheless Adams had some anxious moments over the question of ratification, and at times feared there would be trouble in the Senate. 196 LESTER BURRELL SHIPPEE their field but the government of the United States laid itself open to criticism for the laxity with which it enforced the stipulations about arms and liquors. As little comment outside of the State Department was caused by the promulgation of the Ukase of 1821, so the news that a treaty had been completed eliminating the whole con- troversy aroused little excitement. 20 Congress naturally found no cause for criticizing the treaty which was not at variance with the spirit of the Floyd bill which passed the House that session. At first the satisfaction was not quite so universal among the Russians who were likely to be affected by the convention. Baron Tuyl told Adams that the Russian American Company was extremely dissatisfied, and that this group had prevailed upon the Russian government to send a note of instruction to him on two points : ( 1 ) that the convention did not give liberty of trade to Americans on the Siberian coast and on the Aleutian Islands; (2) that he was to propose a modifica- tion of the agreement whereby the United States should pro- hibit vessels under its registry from trading north of 57 N. Lat. Adams told the Baron that there would be no trouble on the second point, and that it was better not to put the other notion into the heads of American traders, but let the treaty go to the Senate as it stood; Tuyl saw the significance of the hint and requested that the conversation be considered as not to have taken place. 21 While there is no reason to believe that the British govern- ment was disturbed by the conclusion of the agreement between Russia and the United States, nevertheless the fact was not viewed with the same complacency which obtained in American official circles. It was the continuing policy of the British 20 The National Intelligencer, 2 July, 1823, thought that the matter could easily be arranged with a man of Alexander's friendly disposition toward the United States. In the issue of 22 July, 1824, it quotes a paragraph from a Hamburg paper to the effect that the treaty had been concluded, and passes over the note without comment. Miles' Register contained three or four quotations re- specting the fact, but no editorial comment was added. The Intelligencer, 5 Aug. compliments Middleton on his success. Monroe (to Madison, 2 Aug., 1824, Writ- ings, VII, 33) thought that the Emperor had shown great respect for the United States by entering upon the negotiations alone, when England refused joint nego- tiations. See also Monroe to Madison, 8 Oct., Ibid,, 41. 21 Memoirs of J. Q. Adams, VI, 435-7; ntry of 2 December, 1824. FEDERAL RELATIONS OF OREGON 197 government, instituted by Lord Castlereagh and definitely formulated by George Canning, to let the question rest as it was so long as the situation did not jeopardize British in- terests upon the Northwest Coast, although there was always a perfect willingness to discuss the issue whenever the govern- ment of the United States so desired. Adequately to review the situation as between the United States and Great Britain in 1823-4, it is necessary to recur to an incident taking place in January of 1821. Stratford Canning, then minister from Great Britain, sat, as he frequently did for he found the social life of the American capital very tedious and to be relieved by any kind of diversion in the diplomatic gallery of the House of Representatives, and from there heard some portion of the debate on the proposition to form an establishment on the South Sea. Soon after he saw the account of the debate in the National Intelligencer together with some editorial comment not hostile to the project. Since the Intelligencer was considered the official organ of the Administration, Canning was disturbed. He sought an in- terview with the Secretary of State not, as was his custom, to talk over informally the topic which brought him to the executive offices, but for "official conversation." In the course of a long interview 22 he protested that the Convention of 1818 prevented any such action as that which appeared to be contemplated by the, United States; he recalled the episode of the Ontario and the surrender of Astoria, and said that the action of the United States as reported by Bagot had not been looked upon by the British government as a laughing matter. Adams explained to him that such was the relation between the executive and the legislative under the Constitution of the United States that the former was not held accountable for discussions which might take place in Congress, although, 22 Adams reports at length the conversation in his Memoirs, V 241-0 and fthe nd interview) 249-59. In A" :1 ' Tu:J - *-* "-- - ? the conversation to paper i

red it in his Diary. He en<

he conversation) will certain prepared. Let me remember it.' 198 LESTER BURRELL SHIPPEE he added as his personal opinion, the establishment upon the Pacific was likely to be increased in the not remote future. Canning lost his temper and made some hasty remarks, al- though he was disinclined to reduce his views to writing. A second interview the following day was held at the suggestion of President Monroe, who, while he felt that it was impos- sible that the British were seeking at that time causes for dispute, thought that no possible opening should be left for a misunderstanding of the contention of the United States. Accordingly Adams,, in a long and rather acrimonious con- versation, plainly stated to Canning where the United States stood both in respect to its claims upon the Northwest Coast and to its understanding of the Convention of 1818. Entries in his diary both at the time and afterwards show that never again did his relations with the British minister resume the friendly and informal footing which existed before this event. But the topic was dropped. Canning had become involved in an altercation over an issue which the British government did not desire to press at the time, and he was notified ex- plicitly to this effect, and told that he was not upon his own initiative to reopen the subject without instructions from London. 23 Furthermore Adams was equally willing to let the affair rest. 24 He did not mention the interviews when draft- ing instructions to Rush in London, for he was sure that Canning would report to his government, and, if the question should be brought up, it would be from the English side and Castlereagh would be forced to disclose himself. He reviewed in his mind the whole course of events from the time Monroe first made the request for the restoration of Astoria down to the time of Canning's outburst ; from it all he thought he perceived in the British policy the intention to prevent the acquisition by the United States of the disputed coast and at the same time no indication that Great Britain intended to take an unequivocable stand. Moreover, Canning's "zeal and vehemence" had, in Adams' opinion, brought his government 23 F. O. Am. 156, quoted by Schafer in Am. Hist. Rev., Jan., 1911, 288 note. 24. Memoirs, V, 260, i. FEDERAL RELATIONS OF OREGON 199 into an awkward situation where, if the matter were followed up, Castlereagh must abandon his temporizing policy. As we have noted above the events of 1822 and 1823 had brought to the surface the whole question of the relation of European states to the American continent, and this relation was being weighed by American statesmen, especially by Adams. Russian claims upon the Northwest Coast and the Holy Alliance's plans for the revolting American colonies of Spain conceivably might form parts of a single scheme, since the Emperor Alexander was a potent factor in European coun- cils. Russia had invited a discussion looking toward a settle- ment of the issue on the Pacific and Baron Tuyl had stated to Adams that Bagot, the British minister at St. Petersburg, was empowered to take up the same question so far as it affected England. Up to a certain point the, interests of the United States and of Great Britain marched together so far as they tended to combat the pretensions of the Czar hence nothing was more logical than combined action in settling as much as possible of the controversy. So, too, since the Northwest Coast was the bone of contention, nothing could be more rea- sonable than that the whole matter be cleaned up at once; with Spain out of the way, there remained but three interested nations and if these could jointly agree it would be indeed an occasion for mutual congratulation. Not only was Adams ready for joint negotiation but he was prepared to outline the plan which, in his mind, should be satisfactory for all certainly it met with the approval of the United States. The whole thing was simplicity itself; Russia should agree with the United States that the boundary south of which the former should not go would be 55 ; Great Britain likewise was to concur in fixing her southern boundary and the United States' northern limit at 51. Each country should surrender all claims to title within the region set apart for each of the others. 25 The Russian commissioners had been brought with little difficulty to adopt this plan in its essential points, for their claim to anything south of 54 40' was base- less. 25 See instructions to Rush, 22 July, 1823, Am. S. P. For. Ret., V, 791-3. 200 LESTER BURRELL SHIPPEE Although backed by whatever rights the Spanish had ever gained through their explorations on the Northwest Coast, Adams realized that his reaching to 51 would encounter more than perfunctory opposition on the part of Great Britain, so he closed his instructions to Minister Rush with these words : "I mention the latitude of 51 as the bound within which we are willing to limit the future settlement of the United States, because it is not to be doubted that the Columbia River branches as far north as 51, although it is most probably not the Tachutche Tesse of Mackenzie. As, however, the line already runs in latitude 49, to the Stony Mountains, should it earnestly be insisted upon by Great Britain, we will consent to carry it in continuance, on the same parallel to the sea." For the negotiations with Great Britain we have more than the official dispatches with which Rush kept his government informed of the course of events: in his Memoirs he had preserved a more intimate view of the whole proceeding. 26 In December, 1823, upon the request that some hint of the views of the United States might be given as useful in later dis- cussions, and especially valuable in assisting in framing the instructions for Bagot at St. Petersburg, Rush outlined to Canning the proposals of the United States. This division of the western part of the continent between the three claimants along the 55th and 51 parallels was reasonable, Rush stated, the more so because of the extinction of the exclusive pre- tensions of Spain by the independence of the colonies on both American continents. Furthermore, Rush, in the course of his remarks, quoted from Adams' instructions the doctrine then promulgated in Monroe's message that "the American continents, henceforth, will no longer he subject to coloniza- tion." 27 Canning took the information under advisement, and a few days later (18 December, 1823) in a familiar note complained that it appeared that the United States was proposing to settle not only its own questions but those of Great Britain and Russia. 26 Residence at the Court of London, 26. Series. II, 82-88 27 The proceeding was recounted in Rush to Adams, 19 Dec., 1823, Am S P. For. Rel., V, 470. FEDERAL RELATIONS OF OREGON 201 "What can this intend?" he wrote. "Our northern question is with Russia, as our southern with the United States. But do the United States mean to travel north and get between us and Russia ? and do they mean to stipulate as against Great Britain in favor of Russia ; or reserve to themselves whatever Russia may not want?" To the claim as far north as 51 Canning (2 January, 1824) objected strongly; it ignored the fact that Nootka, south of that line, had been the occasion of a dispute with Spain, and what had been insisted upon with Spain could not be yielded now to the United States. Even more difficult was the proposition about future colonization (5 January) and upon this issue Canning was constrained to hope that Rush was inclined to allow the negotiations at St. Petersburg to proceed separately. Rush was entirely willing to agree to this proposal so far as he had any authority to speak, 28 first because the principle of non-colonization would remain a sub- ject of contest, and as Russia shared England's views the negotiations at St. Petersburg might place both Russia and Great Britain against the United States ; it was wiser to avoid the issue in this form. Moreover a preliminary and detached discussion of this great principle, if carried on when Great Britain was willing to waive it, might endanger all the other parts of the negotiation. Again, nothing was given up, and the force of the American contention would remain un- diminished. Joint negotiation was therefore impossible, and the two gov- ernments each pursued its course at St. Petersburg, while in London Rush continued his efforts to clear up the issues be- tween his government and that of Great Britain. No definite statement of his country's stand on the Oregon controversy was made by Canning during the preliminaries, but Rush was able to report to Adams his conviction that England would claim to some point north of 55 and with great firmness as far south as 49 and possibly farther, at the same time being especially tenacious of the right to colonize all parts of the 28 Residence at the Court of London, II, 88. 202 LESTER BURRELL SHIPPEE coast which were outside the admitted boundaries of other nations. 29 Rush might have put the case much more strongly had he been able to examine the instructions which George Canning gave the British commissioners on 31 May, which outlined what was to be the policy of his country on this point for the next twenty-two years. Rush had at this time again brought up the Oregon question, after it had rested some months, and had formally submitted a proposition containing the extreme demands of his government. 30 He proposed that the terms of the Convention of 1818 should be continued in force for a period longer than ten years, with the understand- ing that "no settlement (should) be made on the Northwest Coast of America, or any of the islands thereunto adjoining, by the citizens of the United States, north of the fifty-first degree of north latitude, or by British subjects either south of the fifty-first or north of the fifty-fifth degree of north latitude." To this proposition the British commissioners, Huskisson and Addington (Stratford Canning later took Addington's place in the conference) were directed to present the strongest opposition of His Majesty's Government. While the British cabinet was willing to take up the question, although the Con- vention still had four years to run, the terms offered were "little calculated to satisfy the claims of Great Britain, even when those are reduced within the narrowest compass pre- scribed by the honour and just Interests of the Country." 31 The claims of the United States were as extravagant as those of Russia, and, although the article purported to be temporary, it would in reality be determinative of the region to be held by each. "By engaging to abstain from making settlements to the south of the 51st Degree of Latitude, while the United States remain unfettered by any such engagement, it is clear that Great Britain would virtually surrender her title to the whole extent of the Coast between that Parallel 29 Rush to Adams, 19 Jan. 1823. Am. S. P., For. Rel., V, 470- i. 30 American proposal submitted 2 Apr., Paper F. Ibid., 582. 31 Canning's Instructions to the British Commissioners, in Stapleton, Some Official Correspondence of George Canning, II, 76-85. FEDERAL RELATIONS OF OREGON 203 and the 42d, which forms the Northern Boundary of the Spanish Territory, as acknowledged by the United States. Within that space is Nootka; and we may be allowed to ask, under what pretence the American Government can expect that Great Britain should, in their favour, surrender Her Claim to a part of the Coast, from which, when Spain attempted to exclude her, in 1790, she main- tained Her Right in opposition to that Power, . . ^. and maintained it successfully. Within the same space is situated the Mouth of the Columbia, or Oregon River, the only Navigable Communication, hitherto ascertained to exist, with the Interior of that part of the Country. The entrance of this River was surveyed by British Officers, at the expense of the British Nation, many years before any Agent of the American Government had visited its Shores, and Trading Ports of the Hudson's Bay Com- pany are now, and have been for some time, stationed upon its Waters." Canning was unwilling to admit that the American title could rest upon a combination of (1) American claims, (2) Spanish claims, and (3) claims arising from the possession of Louisiana, as put forth by the Minister from the United States. The Spanish title was overshadowed by that of the English, for Drake had been upon those coasts before any Spaniard; a government exploring expedition under Vancouver was the ground of a much stronger claim than any based upon a chance discoverey of a private citizen (Captain Gray) ; and the single settlement of Astoria, which had been sold to the North- west Company, and formally restored by "a liberal construction of the First Article of the Treaty of Ghent," could weigh little against the extensive establishments of British merchants. On the basis of these considerations Canning outlined the British counter-proposals : "You are therefore authorized, in conformity with the Principles already laid down, to propose that the Boundary Line shall be carried due West across the Rocky Moun- tains, along the 49th Parallel of Latitude, until it strikes the main North-East Branch of the Columbia, designated in the Maps as M'Gillivray's River, and thence down along the Middle of the said River, through the whole of 204 LESTER BURRELL SHIPPEE its Course to where it empties itself into the Pacifick Ocean. By adopting this Boundary His Majesty's Gov- ernment will renounce all Claim to any Territory Posses- sion or Right of Settlement, on the Coast between the Middle of the Entrance of the Columbia, and the Spanish Territory to the South. They will also give up to the United States a portion of the Interior Territory already occupied by British Traders. But I conceive that we shall obtain a satisfactory Return for the Concessions, by se- curing the only Points of substantial Interest to us. ... "Proposals so reasonable in themselves, though greatly differing from those presented by the United States, ought not to be lightly rejected; but if, nevertheless, they should be declined by the American Plenipotentiary, His Majesty's Government will be content to observe the Stipulations of the Third Article of the Convention, con- cluded in 1818, during the Remainder of the Term for which they are valid, rather than surrender, for no ade- quate reason, the just Claims and fair interests of the Country." These instructions are gone into at length at this point be- cause they afford the key to the British side of the diplomatic interchanges on the Oregon Territory down to the very eve of the settlement of the question. Not only are there stated the limits to which Great Britain tenaciously clung during the whole period, but there is also in outline her policy of action during the time. So long as the United States was unwilling to grant that the Columbia, from the point where it was in- tersected by the 49th parallel, should be the boundary, just so long was the British government willing to allow the prin- ciple of joint occupancy to continue and let the respective titles be strengthened by the lapse of time aided by the activities of private adventurers. Again there is a hint of the important part played by the chartered company ; the North- West Com- pany, starting as it did a rival of the Hudson's Bay Company, was merged with the latter in 1824, and from that time the voice of the directors of the Company were potent in the councils of the Empire whenever it was a question of the Northwest Coast of America. On the other hand the directors of the Company were informed at this time that the governFEDERAL RELATIONS OF OREGON 205 ment would not press a claim to any territory south of the Columbia, so thereafter the chief factor was directed to cease activities in that region and confine the Company's operations to the area northward. Furthermore, the notes written in the course of the negotia- tion of 1823-4 afford practically all the light to be obtained upon the claims which were urged whenever the topic rose to the surface. The notes of 1826-7 and those of 1842-6 con- tain only a wearisome repetition of the arguments used by Rush, Huskisson and Addington (or Canning) in 1824. In fact the earlier notes have the virtue of being less prolix than those which came later. Rush was not surprised when his proposal of April second was rejected and the British counter-proposal submitted. He rejected the proffer at the same conference when it was tendered and offered the utmost his instructions allowed him ; namely, 49 as the boundary from the Rockies to the sea. This was promptly refused of course. The British commissioners made no new counter-proposal, stating that their proposition was one from which the United States need not expect their government to depart, just as Rush had, in offering 49 de- clared it to be the extreme limit to which his government could be hoped to yield since it considerably reduced what were looked upon as well-founded and legitimate claims. At this point the affair rested. 32 When Floyd's bill, which passed the House in 1825, was tabled in the Senate, and when the election of 1824 had been finally settled, the immediate political value of the Oregon Question, such as it was, vanished. Nevertheless, the time for the expiration of the Convention of 1818 was approaching, and the British government had not viewed with absolute equanimity the continuing agitation of the topic in Congress, especially when Baylies' Resolution (16 Dec. 1825 ) 33 had called forth such a report. Accordingly it was from the British government that the invitation to resume consideration of the 32 The protocols are given in Am. S. P., V, 559-65. Rush summarizes the conferences and his views, Rush to Adams, 12 Aug., 1824, Ibid., 553-8. 33 Debatts in Congrtss, II, 813 (1825-6). 206 LESTER BURRELL SHIPPEE question came in April, 1826. 34 The Foreign Office desired to know whether Mr. King was provided with instructions which would allow him to take up the Oregon Boundary matter, alleging that it was particularly induced so to inquire since it had received a copy of a communication to the House of Representatives giving a portion of Rush's correspondence relating thereto. In order that there might be no delay Canning informed King that Messrs. Huskisson and Addington were prepared to enter into conferences and either renew the pro- posal of July, 1824, bring forward others, or discuss some new proposition to be made by the American government. It is obvious that Mr. Canning found himself with more of a complicated problem to solve than he had been aware of or at least willing to admit in 1823-4. The crucial point respected the surrender of Fort George in 1818. According to the Memorandum drawn up for Canning by Mr. Addington 35 the transfer of Astoria to the North- West Company had been "by regular bill of sale," and after the close of the war, when Lord Castlereagh ordered its restoration to the United States, Bagot, the minister in Washington, was instructed "to reserve to Great Britain the Territorial Claim to the Tract of Country in which the Fort was situated. This had been done verbally, but no record of the transaction was procurable. Equally fatal had been the omission of the same detail in the public act passed on the occasion by the parties involved, which con- tained a reference to Lord Bathurst's dispatch, but "no tangible and nominatum reservation of the Claim by Great Britain." Canning's view of this phase is summed up in his words to Lord Liverpool : 36 . . . "The absence of any producible document on our part respecting the reservation under which Fort George was restored is the principal difficulty in main- taining our claim in the argument." 34 Am. S. P. For. Rel VI, 645-6. 35 10 May, 1826; Stapleton, Some official correspondence of George Canning, II, 110-5. 36 Canning to Liverpool, 17 May, Ibid. II, 55. Evidently Liverpool shared Canning's apprehensions, and considered the case weaker than did Canning. Vid. Canning to Liverpool, 11 June, Ibid., 58: "Unluckily you said before Harrowby and others that the printed papers gave an imperfect view of the case, without the additional information. I protest I do not think so." This refers, indeed, also to papers which the government did possess. FEDERAL RELATIONS OF OREGON 207 It was, however, not alone the form in which the restoration had been made that disturbed the Prime Minister; the return of Astoria under the terms of the Treaty of Ghent was the first and colossal mistake. . . . "The truth is, that all our difficulties in argu- ment upon this case arises from our own blunder. I am glad to be able to say our own ... I find that the date of that unlucky transaction was 1818, when I was a member of the Cabinet ; and as the Cabinet must have been consulted upon such a measure, I am entitled to my full share of the responsibility for it. "As such I do not hesitate to say that our decision on that occasion was absolutely unjustifiable, and will not bear the light of discussion." The blunder, according to Canning, consisted in viewing the transfer of Astoria, in 1813, as a case of "taken in war," whereas actually the treaty could not apply to Astoria at all, for it had not been taken, it had been sold. The restoration, however, gave a hold to the Yankees, a fact which they had seized upon. Nevertheless, Astoria lay south of the Columbia and already an offer had been made by which that river would form the boundary at that point, so "it now makes our present ground stronger by showing how willingly we departed from that part of it which we thought untenable." But further yielding would make the restoration of Astoria appear as the first of a series of "compliances with encroachments" which were bound to continue. Two points must be emphasized, said Canning; the "ambitious and overbearing views of the States are becoming more developed, and better understood in this country;" the trade between the Eastern and Western hemis- pheres directly across the Pacific was the trade of the world "most susceptible of rapid augmentation and improvement." At the moment the East India Company prevented others from entering that trade but in ten years its monopoly would no longer exist, and it was the duty of English statesmen to see that this channel of gainful enterprise should not be closed to future generations of Englishmen. 37 Canning to Liverpool, 7 July, Ibid., II, 71-5. 208 LESTER BURRELL SHIPPEE Canning's fears of the American attitude were intensified when he received a copy of the report of Baylies's Committee with its gratuitous flings at British motives. It stirred him to write: 38 . . . "After such language as that of the committee of the H. of Representatives it is impossible to suppose that we can tide over the Columbia, or make to ourselves the illusion that there is any other alternative than either to maintain our claims or to yield them with our eyes open." The British proposal to renew negotiations upon the North- west boundary question was favorably entertained by President Adams, the more so because a number of other issues waited to be settled, among them the Northwestern boundary, in- demnity for slaves taken in the War of 1812, and the question of renewing the commercial convention of 1818. In connec- tion with the last point the recent Order in Council placing an embargo upon American trade with the West Indies had aroused particular exasperation in the United States. Such questions demanded the best talent America could furnish, hence Adams offered Albert Gallatin an appointment as special envoy to Great Britain to deal with these critical topics. Gallatin accepted the mission and left New York for London on the first of July, 1826. His instructions, as touching the Oregon Question, were based on those given Rush for the previous negotiations, and it was not thought necessary to recapitulate the arguments upon which the American claims were founded. 39 The offer of 49 was to be renewed, with a possible concession of free navigation of the Columbia if it should be ascertained that the river was navigable at the point where it was crossed by the forty-ninth parallel; until the question of navigability should be determined the right might be exercised by British subjects. That this was the farthest extent to which Adams was willing to go is clear from his words to Gallatin: "This is our ultimatum, and you may so announce it. We can consent to no other line more favorable to Great Britain." 38 Canning to Liverpool. 14 July, 1826, Ibid., n. 39 Clay to Gallatin, 19 June, 1826; H. Ex. Doc. No. 199* *>tfa Coa* ist SM. FEDERAL RELATIONS OF OREGON 209 Gallatin was inclined to view this position as a bit inflexible and thought there might be allowed some latitude on two points : 40 in the first place it was probable that the "Caledonia" (Eraser's) River was cut by the forty-ninth parallel near its mouth so that while almost the whole course of the stream would be in British territory the mouth would be commanded by the United States; if this should be the case, Gallatin thought "a deviation not greater than that what may be suf- ficient to give them the mouth of that river would be of no importance to the United States, and might facilitate an ar- rangement." In the second place, five years to be allowed the British for closing their affairs south of 49 was too short a time and it would be more equitable to allow ten or even fifteen years. Adams was obdurate as to the territorial limits, but if British pride would be served Gallatin might for the first time offer free navigation of the Columbia in common with the United States ; as to the extension of time, that was a minor point and might be yielded if need be. 41 In studying the whole topic at a later date it is easy for us to see that there could be no common ground so long as Canning directed affairs, or his policy guided Englishmen, on the one side, and John Quincy Adams determined the course of the United States on the other. The interest in the negotia- tions of 1826-7 lies, therefore, in the manner in which the claims of the respective parties were presented, and especially in the views entertained by those close to the affair on the part of the United States. As to the former point it may be said that, while nothing absolutely new to support the pretensions of either side was brought out, both were able to present their arguments in a more logical form than had been the case in the earlier discussions but neither was able to convince the other of the soundness of his own position. 42 A hint of the ultimate settlement is contained in Huskisson's 40 Gallatin to Clay, 29 June; Writings of Albert Gallatin, II, 312. 41 Clay to Gallatin, 9 Aug., Am. S. P. For. Rel., VI, 646. 42 For the British argument see Gallatin to Clay, 16 Nov., Ibid, 650-2; th American arguments are given in Gallatin to Clay, 25 Nov., Ibid., 652-5. The relative merits of the presentation in 1824 and 1826-7 are expounded in Bancroft, History of the Northwest Coast, II, ch. 16. 210 LESTER BURRELL SHIPPEE objection to a straight line for a boundary on the grounds that it would cut off the end of Quadra and Vancouver's Island, 43 and Gallatin's suggestion that perhaps the United States would entertain a proposal for an exchange of territory north of 49 for what would be lost on the island. A slight concession was actually offered by the British com- missioners at the third conference (1 December, 1826) after the American offer had been declined. This consisted of an offer of a detached bit of territory bounded by a line from Cape Flattery running along the shore of Fuca's Inlet, thence across the entrance of Hood's Inlet to a point of land forming the north-eastern extremity of that inlet; from here the line would follow the east shore of the inlet to the southern ex- tremity thereof, then by a straight line to the south point of Gray's Harbor, and from there along the ocean to Cape Flattery. 44 This area would contain Port Discovery. The offer, however,, was accompanied with the stipulation that neither party should erect along the Columbia or at its mouth any works which should be calculated to hinder or impede the free navigation of the river. Gallatin considered the con- cession wholly inadequate and rejected it forthwith. Despite all these feelers Gallatin saw at an early date that there was no hope of reaching an agreement on the boundary. He ascribed his inability to accomplish the object of his mission in this respect in part to Baylies' Report, which he considered typical of Congressional agitation, to the language of the United States in its diplomatic intercourse with Great Britain, and to the feeling on the part of the British government that the Americans were trying to take advantage of them while they were laboring under temporary distresses. However, he felt that there had been a disposition to come to a settlement up to the time of the receipt in England of Mr. Baylies' re- port which struck beyond the mark and only succeeded in exasperating. 45 Gallatin was not able to make Canning see 43 Northwest Boundary Arbitration, 420! Cong., 3 Ses., V, 25 44 Protocol of the Third Conference, Am. S. P., VI, 660. 45 Gallatin to Clay, Dec., 1826, Ibid., 655. See also Gallatin to Clay (private) Writings, II, 248, 9. FEDERAL RELATIONS OF OREGON 211 that the report of a special committee which had not been accepted by the House, had little more weight than the speech of an individual member of Congress. 46 President Adams was inclined to look deeper for the causes of British feeling than committee reports and the like. 47 Even the assertion "of the late president" regarding colonization was inadequate to explain the English attitude. The President believed that Mr. Canning could not be so ill-acquainted with the state of affairs in America that he did not know the factious nature of Baylies' report, and he, Canning, would think it passing strange to be held to account for the offenses of a similar character when committed by Mr. Brougham or Mr. Hume. When it was evident that no agreement on the boundary could be reached, Gallatin reserved for the United States the right to put forth a claim to the fullest extent of its preten- sions, and turned to the question of renewing the Convention of 1818. Two details of this renewal occupied the attention of the negotiators during many conferences so that, although the question of definitive settlement of the boundary was dropped early in December, it was not until late in the follow- ing June that the new convention was signed. Gallatin, in accordance with his instructions, was insistent that the old agreement for joint occupancy should be so modified as to make no reference to other powers. This contention touched the real issue between the two countries; Great Britain in- sisted that the region was open to settlement by all peoples, while the United States contended that all claims to title between 42 and 54 40' except such as were held by Great Britain and the United States had been extinguished. In other words it was the American insistence on and the British rejection of the colonization portion of the Monroe doctrine which made the difficulty. The second point which occasioned much discussion was in itself of minor importance : what was to be the duration of the new convention ? Although not vital per se in conjunction with the other disputed point it seemed to have significance. 48 46 Gallatin to Clay, 27 Nov., Writings of Gallatin, II, 342-4. 47 Adams to Gallatin (private), 20 Mar., 1827, Ibid., 367. 48 The correspondence and the protocols are given in Am. S. P. For Rel.. VI, 645-96; also in H. Ex. Doc. No. 199, aoth Cong., ist Ses. 212 LESTER BURRELL SHIPPEE While the American plenipotentiary was anxious to incor- porate some statement which would bear out the contentions of his government touching the nature of its claim, the British commissioners would include an article prohibiting in set terms, any act of exclusive sovereignty or dominion by either party in the disputed area as well as a distinct pronouncement that no existing or future settlement, within the time limits of the convention, should at any time "be adduced in suport of further- ance of any claim to such sovereignty or dominion. 49 This restriction was not acceptable to Gallatin since it seemed in derogation of the American claims. After a long delay, partly due to the necessity of sending to Washington for new instructions, the Conventoin of 1818 was renewed without change other than the omission of a time limit. Instead of a specified duration it was competent for either party, "at any time after the twentieth of October, 1828, on giving due notice of twelve months to the other con- tracting party, to annual and abrogate" the Convention. 50 Gallatin had succeeded in preventing the addition of any ex- planatory clause which was desired by Great Britain to the effect that each party felt itself precluded from exercising or assuming any exclusive jurisdiction or sovereignty within the territory. Such a demand on the part of the British was evidently inspired by the activities of Congress resulting in committee reports, proposition of bills and the like, and was intended to maintain for an indefinite period the existing sit- uation. Gallatin had pointed out that Great Britain had ex- tended the operation of her laws over her subjects in the Oregon Territory, and had virtually extended her jurisdiction through an incorporated company endowed with wide powers. Logically the government which did this could not complain if the United States took similar action, necessarily in a dif- ferent form ; where Great Britain acted through the Hudson's Bay Company the United States would have to accomplish the same end by some form of territorial organization. 51 To his 49 Proposed when it was seen that the boundary question was insoluble. 50 Treaty in Am. S. P., For. Rel. VI, 1000. 51 Gallatin to Clay, 7 Aug., Ibid., 691-3. FEDERAL RELATIONS OF OREGON 213 own government Gallatin stated his opinion 52 that he had so impressed this view upon Messrs. Huskisson and Grant (who had taken the place of Addington) that there would be no objection to the erection of a territorial government having its eastern boundary within the known limits of the United States, provided ( 1 ) no customs duties or tonnage taxes were levied, (2) the law specifically stated that the jurisdiction of the United States extended only to its own citizens, and (3) no military post was erected. Great Britain would feel herself under the same restrictions. In the United States the new treaty was accepted for the most part as a good enough solution of the whole problem; it was recognized as a temporary measure, but time did not press. In official circles there was sufficient confidence in the claims of the United States to engender the belief that time would work for it rather than for Great Britain. 53 So long as the American contention had been maintained, and since nothing in the negotiations could be considered, formally at least, as binding upon future statesmen, there was no reason to feel other than complacent at the outcome. So, too, in the country at large, insofar as there seems to have been any interest in the question, satisfaction predominated, although it would perhaps be more correct to say that indifference was maintained. Oregon was still too far away and nothing had as yet happened to create a lively interest in a place so remote. There was, however, one region which did not altogether share the prevailing sentiment. From this time Missouri be- gins to show her maternal interest in the country along the Columbia; from about 1827 the Oregon Question becomes a Missouri Question, slowly expanding into a Western issue. Senator Benton notes, 54 in commenting upon the new con- vention, that he had perceived the delusive nature of the Con- vention of 1818, and, then a lawyer in St. Louis, had written against the pact as wholly one-sided and against the interests 52 Gallatin to Clay, 10 Aug., Ibid., 694-6. In a private letter to Clay (Writ- ings, II, 382-3) Gallatin stated that he believed the change of ministry would not change the policy of Great Britain. 53 Clay to Adams, Works of Henry Clay, IV, 171-2. 30 Aug. 1827. 54 Benton, Thirty Years' View, I, 108 seq. 214 LESTER BURRELL SHIPPEE of the United States. He opposed the renewal of the agree- ment "with all the zeal and ability of which (he) was master; but in vain." He says that the treaty was ratified because of the weight of administrative influence, general indifference to remote objects, a desire to put off difficulties, and the delusive argument that the agreement could be terminated at any time. He proposed three resolutions aimed at the principle involved in the convention; that the joint occupancy feature should be allowed to drop at the expiration of the Convention of 1818, and that a new negotiation at the earliest possible moment be undertaken on the basis of separation of interests and estab- lishment of a permanent boundary. He could obtain no vote upon these propositions but he remarks that his views found favor in the eyes of a few as shown by the vote against ratify- ing the treaty. 55 A little more evidence of Missouri's interest in Oregon is obtained from the newspapers of the time, and the following extract voices a sentiment akin to that of Missouri's senior Senator. 56 "The injustice of this convention, its injury to Missouri, is too glaring and palpable to need any comment. Suffice it to say that it is of a piece with all Mr. Adams' con- duct to the western country. But the next election will relieve us. The Convention referred to contains a clause that the privilege granted to the British may be revoked on giving twelve months notice which President Jackson will promptly give." 55 The vote as recorded by Benton (Thirty Years' View, II, in) is interest- ing as showing a slight western cast to the issue, such as did not appear in the House vote on the bill in 1829. Benton, Mo., Cobb, Ga., Eatpn, Tenn., Ellis, Miss., Johnson, Ky., Kane, III., ana Rowan, Ky., voted against ratification. 56 From the Missouri Messenger of Oct. 17, 1827, quoted in the Richmond Enquirer of Nov. 20. The extract contains a notice of the return of one of Gen- eral Ashley's fur trading expeditions, with the added note that the people of Mis- souri had beeen eagerly looking forward to the end of the Convention of 1818, which placed the American trader at great disadvantage. CHAPTER IV OREGON : 1827 TO 1842 In this narrative of the relations of Oregon to the Federal Government of the United States there is no place for the history of the development of the region itself that has been told elsewhere and many times. But in view of the fact that there would otherwise be an inexplicable gap for nearly ten years it is necessary briefly to sketch some of the factors which made it possible for the far-off and unpeopled land of 1827 to have acquired a sufficient population by 1848 to become an organized territory; in fact according to its fore- most champions in Congress, to have been ready for that stage at least ten years before. Reference has been made to the North- West Company, with its headquarters at Montreal, and to the Hudson's Bay Company which had been operating in Canada ever since its charter had been issued in 1670. It was the former to which the dubious sale of Astoria was made during the War of 1812, for in the establishment of that factory the directors of the North- West Company saw the entrance of a rival, probably a powerful one, upon their rich hunting grounds west of the Rockies. While on the eastern slopes of the mountains, and from there to the wilds about Hudson's Bay, the older English company had long held nearly absolute sway, nothing more than an occasional trapper or illy-organized band of hunters had penetrated into the Columbia River region.* John Jacob Astor's effective competition with the Hudson's Bay Company in the Great Lakes region made the North- West Company look upon his advent at the mouth of the Columbia with little favor, consequently their nipping his scheme to tap the fur trade of that country caused great satisfaction. Both British companies were expanding, the older one to the westward from Hudson's Bay and the newer east from

• The writer here has overlooked the extensive explorations that David Thomp-

son had been conducting on the upper Columbia and its tributaries. See Ore. Hist. Quar., V. XII, pp. 195-205. 216 LESTER BURRELL SHIPPEE the Rockies, and they came in contact in the Red River Country and in the region to the northwest of Lake Winnipeg. 1 A bloody contact here brought the quarrels of the two organ- izations definitely before Parliament. Even before this, owing to the complaints of the Hudson's Bay Company against its rival, Parliament had noticed the existing tension, but the latest outrage brought an investigation in 1819. In 1820 the death of Lork Selkirk, the largest stock-holder in the old company, removed the one person to whom more than any other the bitterness of the rivalry was due, consequently a move to consolidate the two organizations resulted in an Act of Parliament to that effect in July, 1821. By a grant in the following December the joint organization received the exclu- sive right to trade with the natives throughout all the unsettled regions claimed by Great Britain in North America, including the Oregon country. The Company's officers were made justices of the peace so that all British subjects within the granted area were brought under the protection of British law. In 1824 the amalgamation of the two companies was completed by full absorption of the North-West Company in the Hudson's Bay Company. The Company had several "forts 2 " to the west of the Cascade Mountains, the principal of which was Vancouver on the Columbia River, four miles above the mouth of the Willamette, where the headquarters of the Company in the Pacific North- west were located. Two important posts and several scattered ones of less significance controlled the trade between the Cascades and the Rockies. The whole organization in the Northwest was under the direction of Dr. John McLoughlin, who assumed his position as chief factor for this region in 1824 and continued therein until he resigned in 1846, when he took up his residence in Oregon City on the Willamette. Whatever direct interest Great Britain or her subjects had in Oregon was centered about the Company whose word was law and under whose smile or frown fortunes prospered or languished. No chartered organization with monopoly priv- 1 See especially Bancroft, History of the Northwest Coast II, ch 14 2 Bancroft, History of Oregon, I, ch. i. FEDERAL RELATIONS OF OREGON 217 ileges, however, such as suggested by Calhoun when Secre- tary of War in 1819, represented the dignity of the United States in the same region. Private enterprise, unsupported by legislative grant, undertook to penetrate the country which afforded British stock-holders handsome returns. William H. Ashley of St. Louis, who had for some years been engaged in fur trading between the Missouri frontier and the Rocky Mountains, attempted in 1823 to cross to the transmontane district. The expedition failed in its object, but the following season a second venture resulted in Ashley's crossing the divide at South Pass which became later the recognized route to the Columbia River valley. 3 In 1825 he went to the Great Salt Lake, and a part of his company went north into the Snake River country where they trapped until 1829. At this time Jedediah Smith was entering the preserves of the Hud- son's Bay ; in 1824 and 1825 with a strong company he. trapped along the Snake River; in 1826-7 he went as far south as San Diego. The Spanish authorities, jealous of this American intrusion, designated in 1828 the route of his exit to Oregon. In the Umpqua Valley he and his men were set upon by Indians and all but three were killed ; these, among whom was Smith, reached Fort Vancouver where supplies were furnished by Dr. McLoughlin, who sent out a party to punish the Indians. The more or less individualistic enterprises which from now on sought the country west of the Rockies in greater numbers had to compete with stronger organizations such as the Rocky Mountain Fur Company, which took over Ashley's interests, and Astor's American Fur Company. The former, under the direction of Smith, William Sublette and D. E. Jackson, struck west from St. Louis in 1829 and reached the mountains whence they brought back a large quantity of furs in 1830. 4 To the Secretary of War these men reported that they could have crossed the mountains at South Pass with their wagons. 5 3 At the request of Eaton, Secretary of War, Ashley gave his opinion of the best way to protect the western frontier, promote the fur trade, etc., against the Indians, to whom, he said, the Hudson's Bay Company furnished arms. Appen. Cong. Debates, VII, 92-5. 4 Niles' Register, 6 Nov. 1830. 5 Richardson, Messages, II, 534, for Jackson's message submitting Eaton's report. 218 LESTER BURRELL SHIPPEE It is at this point that Hall J. Kelley, a Boston school teacher, appears actively in the Oregon agitation. He began writing on the subject of Oregon and the necessity of action by the United States as early as 1815, according to his own account, although there is now to be discovered nothing earlier than 1830. 6 He petitioned Congress for a grant of land in 1824 at the time when Dr. Floyd was the active worker for Oregon; in 1829 he was the major part of the American Society for encouraging a Settlement of the Oregon Territory, through which he besought Congress to grant twenty-five square miles of land in the Columbia valley. Acting in the name of this society he circulated widely his pamphlets descriptive of the attractions of Oregon, a region which he said was being stolen by the British through the instrumental- ity of the Hudson's Bay Company. He spent the winters of 1830 to 1833 in Washington where he tried to arouse the interest of members of Congress. But his efforts were inop- portune, since the crest of the Oregon flurry had passed. Nothing more was accomplished than a House resolution which called upon the President for information as to whether any part of the territory of the United States upon the Pacific Ocean had been taken possession of by the subjects of any foreign power. President Jackson in reply submitted brief reports from the Secretaries of War and Navy to the effect that there was no satisfactory information on the point in the possession of the Executive. Twice Kelley attempted and failed to organize parties to go with him to the Promised Land (1828 and 1832) and finally he set out with a few companions by the way of Mexico and California. He was deserted by his associates at New Orleans but persisted in his determination to reach Oregon. After much hardship he succeeded, but he arrived under the cloud of an accusation of horse-stealing in California, so that his reception by Dr. McLoughlin was not the cordial one usually extended to strangers. He remained in Oregon until 6 Bourne, Aspects of Oregon History before 1840, Quar. Ore. Hist. Soc., VI, 260 seq. 7 H. Doc. No. 191, 22d Cong, ist Ses. 17 Mar. 1832. FEDERAL RELATIONS OF OREGON 219 1835 when he returned to New England by the way of the Sandwich Islands, after having lost a considerable portion of his means in the venture. Kelley's schemes were looked upon by many, perhaps most, people as absolutely wild, in view of the fact that Congress after so much discussion had decided to make no move regarding Oregon. Ridicule and scorn were heaped upon the "gentleman for whose talents and ambition his native land does not afford sufficient scope," 8 and who had "been employing his leisure in devising schemes to better the condition of his countrymen." He was undertaking a venture which had been repudiated even by the people of Missouri who, although "a little addicted to dirking and duelling" were not "destitute of humanity" and so would not see their fellow creatures perish without their expostulation. 9 He proposed to withdraw his fellow men from the haunts of civilization and lead them into a region of which the most conflicting reports were given ; he promised them wealth from trade in grain and lumber with Japan and South America, although in Japan only one port was open to foreign trade and that only to the Dutch, while South America was supplied with lumber which, under any circumstances, could be obtained more cheaply from Maine. Mr. Kelley promised lands to his dupes yet no title could be given, and it was against the laws of the United States for individuals to buy from the Indians. One of those who had been interested in Kelley's plans wrote the Secretary of War early in 1832 and received a response which he published in the Boston Courier. "The executive," wrote Cass, "can give no aid to individuals in their efforts to establish a colony upon the Oregon river," since the law made no provision for occupying the country or for negotiating with the Indians there, and Congress alone could give the requisite authority. 10 8 W. J. S. in New England Magazine, II, 123-32 (Feb. 1832). Se also by same writer article in II, 320-6 (Apr. 1832). 9 The St. Louis Republican* spoke disparagingly of Kelley's projects, and con- sidered that Missouri offered quite as good opportunities as Oregon. Niles' Regis- ter, 6, Aug., 1831. 10 Niles' Register, 28 July, 1832. After Oregon was organized as a terri- tory Kelley petitioned Congress for a grant of land in recognition of his services, but nothing was done. Globe, XXII, 92. 220 LESTER BURRELL SHIPPER Nathaniel J. Wyeth, of Cambridge, Massachusetts, was one of those who believed there might be something in Kelley's ideas and so made two trips to Oregon where he attempted to establish a salmon-fishing enterprise. The missionary movement which played so important a part in the Oregon story begins at this time. 11 It is related that in 1831 some Indians from across the mountains appeared in St. Louis inquiring for Captain Clark and stating that their people wished religious men to be sent among them. This story was circulated in the newspapers of the day and reached, among others, the Missionary Board of the Methodist Epis- copal Church. After much discussion it was decided to estab- lish a mission among the Indians of the interior, between the Cascades and the Rocky Mountains under the direction of Jason Lee and his nephew, Daniel Lee. Before preparations for the departure of these men had been completed the elder Lee learning of the return of Nathaniel J. Wyeth from his first Oregon journey and visited him in Boston in the winter of 1833-34. Here arrangements were made to send supplies by Wyeth's vessel and for the missionaries to accompany Wyeth's party overland. In September, 1834, the Missionaries and Wyeth arrived at Fort Vancouver, whence the latter proceeded to select as a site for his fishing operations, the end of an island in the Columbia just below Vancouver. From the first, however, it was felt that this project was doomed to failure, and although efforts were continued into the next year, in 1836 the establishment was broken up and Wyeth returned to Boston. In 1836 the fishing station and a trading post, Fort Hall, which had been established by Wyeth's party when they crossed the Rockies, were sold to the Hudson's Bay Company. Both the fur trading operations and the salmon fishing were looked upon by Dr. McLoughlin as business ventures directly in competition with the organization to which he owed his loyalty, consequently he used the strength of the Company ii See Bancroft, History of the Northwest Coast, II, chapters 25 and 26. Also Bancroft, History of Oregon, I, chapter 3. FEDERAL RELATIONS OF OREGON 221 to drive this rival from the field, although personally he liked Wyeth and treated him and his associates with consideration. The Methodist missionaries looked over the lower Willam- ette valley and chose for their settlement a point just south of a rolling plain called French Prairie, where a number of French Canadians, retired servants of the Company, had taken their abode. With the Canadians were some Americans who were survivors of the Astor expedition of 1811. Jason Lee had been sent out primarily to establish a mission among the Indians east of the Cascades, but his choice of the Willamette valley was due to the fact that not only were there savages to be found there, but the surroundings were far more attractive than in the comparatively barren country of the Flatheads. While the Methodist were extending their work in the Willamette valley another missionary movement was on foot. The American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions, after having looked over the field, sent out in the spring of 1836 Dr. Marcus Whitman and the Reverend H. H. Spalding, each accompanied by his wife, as missionaries among the Oregon Indians. William H. Gray was sent along as mechanic and general assistant to the others. The next year this mission was reinforced and the work somewhat extended. Although the number of Americans in Oregon was not large, the task of settling Oregon by United States citizens had begun in spite of the disinclination of the government to act. Sporadic attention was given, indeed, by one or another public personage during these years of quiescence, since those who were interested in some one of Oregon possibilities took occasion to bring their desires either before Congress or the Administrative departments. In December, 1834, J. N. Rey- nolds, of Rhode Island, presented through Congressman Pearce a petition which was backed by a recommendation from both houses of the Rhode Island General Assembly. Reynolds, who represented that he had recently returned from a voyage of exploration in the Pacific Ocean, prayed that an expedition be fitted out by the government for the purpose of surveying the coasts and islands of that ocean. Mr. Reynolds' interest 222 LESTER BURRELL SHIPPEE lay chiefly in the whaling industry and it was for its benefit that he approached Congress. 12 It was not long after this that Hall J. Kelley returned from his unfortunate experience in Oregon, and, smarting from his sense of injury, he published a pamphlet in which he denounced the Hudson's Bay Company as inimical to all Americans, pre- venting them from gaining a foothold in the country. This pamphlet was brought to the attention of John Forsyth, then Secretary of State, who directed that William A. Slacum make a quiet investigation of the situation. 13 Slacum, a purser in the United States naval service, was ordered to proceed up the Oregon River as soon as he should have arrived upon the Northwest Coast, and ascertain as nearly as possible the num- ber of persons, Indians and whites, in the country. He was to observe the nationality of the whites, and find out what disposition toward the United States existed, as well as the feeling about "the two European powers having possessions in that region ;" and "generally, endeavor to obtain such informa- tion, political, physical, statistical, and geographical, as may prove useful or interesting to this government." Acting upon these instructions Slacum reached the Columbia in December, 1836. There he found the customary friendly welcome from the officers of the Hudson's Bay Company, although Dr. McLoughlin suspected that there was back of the visit more than the whim of a private gentleman seeking information about the country. In the month Slacum remained in Oregon he was able to discover the salient facts and report to his government what the situation was in the winter of 1 836-37. 14 At Fort Vancouver the Company had within its stockade some thirty buildings with a larger number outside. A farm of about 3,000 acres gave employment to over one hun- dred men, and some thirty more were engaged at the Com- pany's sawmill. Of the servants and officers of the Company only about thirty were Europeans, the rest being Canadians, 12 Globe, II, 26. 13 Forsyth to Slacum, n Nov. 1835. H. Doc. No. 470, 25th Cong., 2d Ses. 14 Slacum's Report, written 26 March, 1837, Sandwich Islands, Sen. Doc. No. 24, 25th Cong., 2d Ses. FEDERAL RELATIONS OF OREGON 223 half-breed Iroquois, and Sandwich Islanders. Every year forty or fifty trappers left with their women and slaves for the season's trapping and trading going as far south as the fortieth parallel sometimes. The Methodist settlement on the Willamette he found in a flourishing condition as testified by the harvest they had been able to gather with the assistance of their Indian "neophytes" in the autumn of 1836. Slacum was instrumental in clearing up a cloud which threatened the peace of the community and at the same time affording means of getting into Oregon the cattle needed by the settlers. Ewing Young, who had come from California in 1834 with Kelley, had been regarded with disfavor by Dr. McLoughlin ever since on account of a story of horse-stealing in the south. On this account he was not able to secure sup- plies from the Company as other settlers did and so, in order to make a living, he threatened to establish a still to supply whiskey to that hitherto comparatively dry community. This proposition was opposed both by the Company's agents and by the missionaries, but Young had declared that he would persist in his scheme. Slacum, acting as intermediary, offered to Young facilities for getting to California in order to secure a retraction of the defamatory statement made by Governor Fugueroa. At the same time Young proposed that he drive some cattle north in order to supply the settlers who, up to then, had been obliged to get on with the few head loaned by the Company. Money was raised for the purchase from the settlers, and Dr. McLoughlin and Slacum added to the sum, so that a sufficient amount was raised to purchase some 800 head of cattle and a number of horses. At the meeting held to consider the question of cattle Slacum says that he told "the Canadians (i. e. the settlers at French Prairie) that, although they were located within the territorial limits of the United States, their pre-emption rights would doubtless be secured to them when our government should take possession of the country. I also cheered them with the hope that ere long some steps might be taken to open a trade and commerce with the country." Slacum's 224 LESTER BURRELL SHIPPEE statements were largely instrumental in causing the settlers to draw up a memorial to be presented to Congress, a document made use of by Dr. Linn in his Oregon propaganda. 15 The settlement begun in 1832, said the memorialists, had prospered "beyond the most sanguine expectations of its first projectors" on account in part of the extremely favoring nat- ural conditions of the country. The advantages as to position, soil, climate were pointed out although, said they, "the winter rains, it is true, are an objection." However, these pioneers were imbued with the true spirit of the country when they added, "but they are generally preferred to the snows and intense cold which prevail in the northern parts of the United States." In later years the real Oregonian never found it necessary to apologize for the winter damps ; rather were they to be preferred above all other varieties of weather for the season in which they were (and are) accustomed to prevail. To the benefits derived from the officers of the Hudson's Bay Company the memorialists paid a grudging tribute and then went on to voice their fear that in the future it could not be hoped that things would be so satisfactory. They spoke of the lack of civil institutions without which a desirable popula- tion could not be expected to fill the land; instead of the hardy pioneer of the west, if the United States did not hasten to afford protection, the country would be filled by "the Botany Bay refugee, by the renegade of civilization from the Rocky Mountains, by the profligate, deserted seamen from Polynesia, and the unprincipled sharpers from Spanish America." Just after the departure of Slacum there arrived the first considerable reinforcement of the Methodist mission, so that by the end of 1837 instead of three white persons, as Slacum found, the settlement numbered thirty. Nevertheless Jason Lee thought that the needs of the institution must be put before the eastern brethren more emphatically than was pos- sible by letter, and for that purpose went to the States early in 1838. He was able, therefore, to be in Washington when 15 The Memorial is printed in the Globe, VII, 148. See Ch. 5 below. FEDERAL RELATIONS OF OREGON 225 Caleb Gushing, in the House, and Lewis Linn, in the Senate, were exerting themselves to secure legislative action on Oregon. Oregon by that time was in the air; more than one com- munity was discussing its promises and prospects. Among the more pretentious of the organized efforts to promote the Oregon propaganda was the Oregon Emigration Society, organized in Lynn, Massachusetts. This society proposed to send two hundred men with their families as the first group of some thousands whom they hoped to persuade to migrate in order to clinch the title of the United States. The society by its secretary, the Reverend F. P. Tracy, published a little paper called the Oregonian which was used to spread information and to obtain members who were assessed at three dollars apiece to finance the undertaking. The society never came to the point where it could carry its ambitious plans into opera- tion, although it is possible that the persons subsequently led to Oregon by Lee were influenced directly by its activity. Lee did not accomplish in Washington any of the more ambitious plans which he had, such as securing positive action by Congress, but an appropriation from the secret service fund was granted by the President in order that Lee might charter the Lausanne to take his pioneer band to Oregon. It was not until after the Treaty of 1846 was ratified that this fact was divulged. Not all the activity of the early 'Forties was on the side of the Americans. The directors of the Hudson's Bay Company sent Sir George Simpson to the Northwest Coast in 1841 to look into the affairs of the Company there and also to con- sider the advisability of attempting to acquire the Russian post in California. His report gives a rather full account of the situation in Oregon at the time. 16 He found that the four establishments of the American Board, the five missions of the Methodists, the three established by Catholics from St. Louis, together with the Hudson's Bay Company servants and some Americans not connected with the missions afforded a non- 16 Given by Schafer, Am. Hist. Rev., XIV, 73-82. 226 LESTER BURRELL SHIPPER Indian population of some five hundred. All of these people, including the missionaries, who were not directly employed by the Company were engaged in agriculture, having taken land wherever they desired with the expectation that their titles would be confirmed when the boundary was settled. The Company had fostered an agricultural undertaking of its own. In 1837 the question had come before the directors in London and it had been decided that, as agricultural pursuits were so radically opposed to the primary object of the organ- ization, a separate company should be formed. Accordingly the Puget's Sound Agricultural Company, which was not to engage in trapping or fur trading, took over all the Hudson's Bay Company's farming interests. Nevertheless all the stock of the new company was held by stock-holders in the old Com- pany and its officers were chosen from among the officers of the parent organization. A region north of the Columbia River, toward the upper part of the Cowlitz River was chosen for exploitation, but the company was not a success and the holders of its securities were glad to dispose of its possessions to the United States in 1867. Sir George not only discovered that there were American settlers in Oregon, but he found an even more significant symptom of the growing interest that country afforded the United States. An exploring expedition had been authorized by Congress in 1835 but its departure had been delayed until 1838. This delay had made it possible for Dr. Linn's sugges- tion that some time be devoted to exploring the Oregon coun- try to be incorporated in the instructions for Lieutenant Wilkes, who was directed to note especially the topographic and strategic features of the country. 17 Sir George was at Vancouver at the same time the Wilkes Exploring Expedition was at work in the region, and from conversations with the men he was not reassured as to the future for his Company. The year 1842 saw a considerable increase in the population of Oregon. The agitation in Congress of the previous winter, when Linn's efforts made it seem possible that the next session 17 The Report is in Cong. Record, XLVII, 3120-26. FEDERAL RELATIONS OF OREGON 227 of Congress would produce some definite action the bill did, indeed, pass the Senate, the reports of those who had been in the country, all resulted in the largest single migration that had taken place up to that time, for more than one hundred persons went over the Oregon Trail under the leadership of Dr. Elijah White. This Dr. White had been in the Methodist colony on the Willamette, but as he had not gotten on well with Jason Lee had returned to the United States about a year before. When Lee was in Washington he had urged the appointment of some sort of a civil magistrate for Oregon, but the suggestion had not been favorably received, but when Captain Spaulding of the Lausanne reported the situation in the Columbia Valley on his return from taking the Methodist party, there was a change of sentiment. Lee's suggestion was recalled and White, since he had been in Oregon, was called to Washington in January, 1842. He was presented to Presi- dent Tyler and Secretary Webster by Senator Linn and with them talked over the situation. After some discussion, for it was rather difficult to appoint an official for Oregon and not at the same time infringe the stipulations of the treaty, White was commissioned a sub-Indian agent with half salary to be doubled if the Oregon bill passed. 18 The migration of 1842 then not only doubled the white population of Oregon but brought the first United States official charged with duties for that specific region. With the large increase of Americans in 1842 plans which had been under consideration in the Willamette valley could be carried out. The question of civil organization had long troubled the United States citizens in Oregon; British subjects had Her Majesty's Government represented by the servants of the Hudson's Bay Company, for each factor was a justice of the peace, but there was nothing to typify the dignity of the United States, Moreover, like most Americans, they had a feeling that things were not proceeding properly unless there 1 8 Ten Years in Oregon; travels and adventures of Dr. E. White and Lady, west of the Rocky Mountains, compiled by Miss A. J. Allen, 138 seq. ; also T. C. Spencer (Sec. War under Tyler) to White, Ibid., 322-5. Report on White's petition, S. Doc. No. 50, 29th Cong., ist Ses. Bancroft, History of Oregon, I, 254, 5. 228 LESTER BURRELL SHIPPER was some sort of governmental machinery. 19 In 1841 the death of Ewing Young brought the question directly before them for Young left considerable property and no known heirs, consequently some provision for disposing of his estate had to be made. Accordingly there was a meeting, mostly made up of members of the Methodist mission, in February of 1841, and it was agreed that some kind of government must be organized. A second meeting carried the plan still further, and at the same time elected a judge, a clerk and recorder, a sheriff and constables. The judge was directed to act in accordance with code of laws of New York since there was a copy in the colony until a code could be prepared. Owing to the lack of sympathy with the government idea on the part of Dr. McLoughlin, and to the advice of Wilkes, then in the region, against taking action when only a minority of the population desired it, no further steps toward organization were taken then. The large migration of 1842 changed the aspect of the situa- tion. The question continued to come up and throughout the winter of 1842-3 meetings and informal discussion sought to win over to the notion of organization the Canadians who held the balance of power. At one of these meetings, the "Wolf meeting" so-called because it was convened to consider the depredations of wild animals, there was adopted a resolu- tion for a committee "to take into consideration the propriety of taking measures for the civil and military protection of this colony." The committee held frequent meetings to dis- cuss the general topic of organization and the apparently more important one of who should be governor. Finally it was felt that the time was ripe for action and a mass meeting was called to convene at Champoeg on the Willamette on May 2, 1843. There it was decided by a majority of two two Canad- ians to adopt the recommendations of the committee and take the preliminary steps in forming a provisional government. A legislative committee was immediately elected and instructed to draw up a frame of government and a code to be submitted at an adjourned meeting in July. 19 F. V. Holman, Quar. Ore. Hist. See., Sept., 1912. FEDERAL RELATIONS OF OREGON 229 This committee presented a form of organization which had as its basis a legislative committee of nine, while executive powers were to be vested in a committee of three, for the mis- sionary party apparently would have prevented organization if they insisted upon having a governor as they had at the outset. 20 The judicial power was vested in a supreme court composed of a supreme judge and two justices of the peace; the laws of the Territory of Iowa were adopted for all "civil, military, and criminal cases, where not otherwise provided for, and where no statute of Iowa Territory applies, the principles of common law and equity shall govern." The right to vote was given to every "free male descendant of a white man of the age of 21 years and upwards, who shall have been an inhab- itant of this territory at the time of its organization" and all new comers after a residence of six months. The fourth article of the "constitution" provided that there should be no slavery or involuntary servitude except for the punishment of crime whereof the party should have been duly convicted. Opposi- tion to all formal taxing prevented the grant of any taxing power to the officers of this government, and all necessary expenses were to be met by voluntary contributions. One of the most important of the subjects dealt with in the body of laws was that relating to title to the soil. No individual could hold more than a square mile, in square or oblong form, nor more than one claim at a time. Furthermore all persons were forbidden holding claims upon city or town sites, extensive water privileges, or in places necessary for the transaction of mercantile or manufacturing operations. Dr. McLoughlin considered that this was direct evidence of the animosity of the Methodists who disputed with him a claim at the falls of the Willamette, where both had made the begin- ning of development of the water power; the title of the Methodists, however, was safeguarded by a proviso which read, "that nothing in these laws shall be so construed as to affect any claim of any mission of a religious character, made 20 The original code is given in Bancroft, Oregon, I, 306-9 note. 230 LESTER BURRELL SHIPPEE previous to this time, of an extent not more than six miles square." With this provisional government, modified somewhat after a little experience, the people of Oregon managed until Con- gress provided for a regular territorial organization in 1848.