Page:(1848) Observations on Church and State- JF Ferrier.pdf/36

From Wikisource
Jump to navigation Jump to search
This page has been validated.
36
Observations on Church and State.


The remarks which we have made in reference to the Protestant clergy in general, apply, of course, to our General Assembly, in so far as it rests its pretensions on its clerical character. As a clerical community, it has by Divine right no sphere of supreme spiritual jurisdiction: it does not hold from God any authority which the whole believing nation does not equally hold from God.

II. In proof that the General Assembly cannot hold an exclusive spiritual supremacy from the state.

Is it possible that the General Assembly can have derived its supreme ecclesiastical power from the state? Can the state have given this authority to the Assembly No; that is not possible. Why not? Is it that the state has not got this authority, and therefore cannot impart it? No—but for precisely the opposite reason. The state has got this authority, and therefore cannot impart it to the Assembly; for it has got this authority to keep, and not to give away. There are few things which the state cannot do. There is, indeed, only one thing which it cannot do, What is that? It cannot decline being the supreme legislative power. It cannot waive its own supremacy: it can do anything but that. It cannot make a complete surrender of any authority which it possesses. It cannot, however much it might wish it, set up, as separate from itself, any supreme and irresponsible court, either for civil or ecclesiastical legislation. It cannot in any respect cease to be absolute. In Roman Catholic countries the state never possessed supreme authority in spiritual matters; therefore, in such countries, a supreme ecclesiastical tribunal may exist, co-ordinate with the civil authority. Independent spiritual is there compatible with independent civil jurisdiction. But, in Protestant countries, the Reformation placed spiritual jurisdiction in the hands of the nation, i.e., state; and, therefore, it has been impossible for the state, since that time, to part with spiritual jurisdiction. The reason of this is, that the essential idea of the state is, that it shall be supreme in all things that belong to the state. If it ceases to be this, it ceases to be the state: the constitution is at an end. But if the state gives out of its own hands any one department of Supreme power that belongs to it, it ceases to be supreme in all things. Therefore, if the state consigns the supreme spiritual authority, which it