Page:(1856) Scottish Philosophy—The Old and the New.pdf/46

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scottish philosophy:

shown to be nonsensical and contradictory by an appeal to the principle of contradiction. If this can be shown, I shall admit the legitimacy and necessity of the transference—not otherwise.

I am not called upon to pursue the subject of these explosive propositions, these sceptical detonators, any further. Although Sir William Hamilton had some hand in bringing them forward, they are a mere reproduction of the antinomies of Kant. They are the veriest trifling that can be conceived. They are not contradictory propositions: they do not face each other; for while it is obvious that there is no absurdity in supposing space "infinitely unlimited" (whether we can conceive this is another matter), it is evident that the grossest absurdity and contradiction are involved in the supposition that space is "absolutely limited." We cannot for a moment entertain the supposition that there is a space beyond which there is no space: this is a downright absurdity; but there is no absurdity in the supposition of space infinitely extended. In the spirit of this trifling, we might as well amuse ourselves with maintaining that, in regard to numeration, there either is a last number or no last number! and that both are inconceivable. But it is unnecessary to dwell on the merits of these contradictory propositions (propositions, however, which are not really contradictory): my purpose is answered in having shown that the argument founded upon them has no deleterious effect, either on my preliminary postulate, or first proposition of the Institutes.

A few remarks in explanation of this postulate, although not necessary for the refutation of my reviewer, will not be out of place in this exposition. It may be that the assumption on which my system proceeds, is not explained or enforced so fully as it might have been in the Institutes. The reader will find some remarks in the introduction (§ 66, 67), which only require to be amplified to bear out the assumption. It is possible, however, that it may have been set forth too much in the form of a mere postulate. The following observations may help to render it more convincing.

When the words "Knowing" and "Being" are used in any