month. Both these reasons existed in this case (2Ch 30:3): the priests had not sufficiently sanctified themselves, and the people had not assembled in Jerusalem, sc. at the legal time in the first month. למדּי, contracted from מה־דּי, that which is sufficient, is usually interpreted, “not in sufficient number” (Rashi, Vulg., Berth., etc.); but the reference of the word to the number cannot be defended. למדּי denotes only ad sufficientiam, and means not merely that the priests had not sanctified themselves in such numbers as were required for the slaughtering and offering of the paschal lambs, but that the priesthood in general was not yet sufficiently consecrated, many priests not having at that time wholly renounced idolatry and consecrated themselves anew. Nor does the passage signify, as Bertheau says it does, “that although the purification of the temple was completed only on the sixteenth day of the first month (2Ch 29:17), the passover would yet have been celebrated in the first month, though perhaps not on the legal fourteenth day, had not a further postponement become necessary for the reasons here given;” for there is nothing said in the text of a “further postponement.” That is just as arbitrarily dragged into the narrative as the idea that Hezekiah ever intended to hold the passover on another day than the legal fourteenth day of the month, which is destitute of all support, and even of probability. The postponement of the passover until the second month in special circumstances was provided for by the law, but the transfer of the celebration to another day of the month was not. Such a transfer would have been an illegal and arbitrary innovation, which we cannot suppose Hezekiah capable of. Rather it is clear from the consultation, that the king and his princes and the congregations were persuaded that the passover could be held only on the fourteenth day of the month; for they did not consult as to the day, but only as to the month, upon the basis of the law: if not in the first, then at any rate in the second month. The day was, for those consulting, so definitely fixed that it was never discussed, and is not mentioned at all in the record. If this were so, then the consultation must have taken place in the first month before the fourteenth day, at a time when the lawful day for the celebration was not yet past. This is implied in the words, “for they could not hold it at that time.” ההיא בּעת is the first month, in contrast to “in the second month;” not this or that day of the month. Now, since the reason given for their not being able to
