British]
ARMIES
militia and volunteer artillery are periodically trained in the different works to which they are assigned. A practice school for the garrison artillery has been established at Lydd, but the various coast fortresses themselves carry out regular practice with service ammunition. It is one of the peculiar characteristics of the service of the British army that, from the extent and dispersion infantry ^ie eml,'re over the world, it is almost always at war on a greater or less scale. If the temple of Janus were, as an indication of peace, closed for one year, it would have the next to be opened at four doors for four different wars. Thus in 1900, independently of Indian frontier expeditions, of which there were more than one in the year, Great Britain had war in the Egyptian Sudan, war on the West Coast of Africa, two expeditions in East Africa, and war in China, whilst the war in South Africa was going on. The practical training of the British infantry more than that of any other army is necessarily affected by this fact. Not only are the experiences through which officers and men pass in these wars very important in their effect on the preparation which they give for future war, but they have a great influence on the permanent training of the army, and especially of the infantry, during peace time. Now even in this one year, 1900, no two of the wars were alike in their circumstances ; and, unless the comparison be made between some two Indian frontier expeditions, hardly in the thirty wars of the thirty years 1870-1901 would it be possible to find two of which the tactical conditions were identical. In these circumstances the actual views which dominate British schools of training are apt to be modified considerably by the most recent experience. This modification finds expression to some extent in the successive drill books which are issued. It is in reality much more important in its influence through the decisions given by umpires and the comments on field days. The influence of the experience of the great war between France and Germany in 1870 showed itself in the training of the British army for some years in a much more open order of fighting, in the •continual study of ground with a view to cover, and in carefully-arranged turning movements. The influence of wars in which Zulus and Mahdists showed the power of determined attacks pushed home regardless of loss, had its effect on our training in a tendency to encourage frontal attacks provided that a certain numerical superiority was attained at a given point. The actual training imparted at any given period in the camps at Aldershot or Salisbury has oscillated much between these extremes. The training of the other arms being largely dependent on the principles adopted for infantry in defence and attack, it is safe to say that there is this necessary contrast between the adequate training of the British army and that of any other European Power, that with the British army the officers at least, and to some extent the men, require to be prepared for many varied circumstances and conditions, whereas in the training of other European armies the conditions under which they will enter upon war are fixed and well known beforehand. The extent to which a British army is prepared by training for a given war must depend on the extent to which all the conditions of that war have been studied beforehand. In one respect, however, so far as the infantry is concerned, all wars are alike. In every war the most important power of infantry depends on the efficiency of its training in the use of the rifle. In this respect several changes of importance have been made of late years in the British army. First, the actual detail training of the men has been put into the hands of the company officers, and they have been made responsible for it. Secondly, at Bisley and other places a system of “ field-firing ” has been introduced. This
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consists in a most valuable combination between manoeuvring to take up the right position from which to bring fire to bear, and the actual shooting at dummies placed to represent different bodies of troops arranged so that they can be made to appear unexpectedly in a position previously unknown. Further, the combination between drill manoeuvres and shooting has been improved by requiring the actual orders for all firing to be given during the course of drill manoeuvres in such a way as to determine the object to be fired at, the range, and the nature of the fire. Nevertheless, recent experience makes it almost certain that, under the present conditions of war, almost all firing will become individual and independent. The purchase of a large area of ground near Salisbury has given scope for manoeuvres on a much larger scale than was possible formerly. As, independently of this, an Act has been passed to give facilities for the carrying out of manoeuvres on varied ground to be chosen from time to time, it is to be hoped that when events at home resume their normal course, annual manoeuvres may be carried out in different parts of the country. The system of training at present consists during the winter in regularly graduated route-marches, accustoming the troops to carry their equipment and arms for long distances. At the same time indoor and barrack-yard instruction is given in elementary duties, in the principles of scouting and protection on the march, and in such other matters as may tend to interest the men in their work, such as the nature of their weapons, accounts of what the battalion has done in the field, and of other incidents of war. In the spring each company in succession is relieved of all other duties in order that it may go through a course of systematic instruction under its company officers. After the different companies have been inspected by the lieutenant-colonel and employed against one another in minor field days, the battalion is worked together as a whole. At Aldershot, the Curragh, and at special camps, the brigades of infantry are then worked together, after which the training ceases to be arm training and becomes that of the combined arms. In principle, and according to the instructions issued from headquarters, all training is conducted on the principle of giving great latitude to the company commanders, accustoming them to decide for themselves, and to train the subordinates under them to exercise similar responsibility. In practice it is to be feared that old habit and military conservatism have tended to keep all responsibility and power too closely in the hands of the lieutenant-colonel. Probably one of the most important effects of the South African war will be to bring before the eyes of the army the indispensable necessity of training all officers to exercise an increased responsibility. In any case training for war depends much more upon the spirit which in these respects animates an army than upon any formal regulations. The special training of the Engineers is mainly given at Chatham, and embraces a very great variety of subjects, practically all the technical work of the army as described in the article Engineers. As an “arm ns neers' of the service ” it is a common delusion to speak of the engineers as essentially “ defensive.” The experience of the South African war has perhaps tended to modify this popular error. Strategically the offensive action of the army there, as always in modern wars, has depended on the rapid construction of railways, the restoration of destroyed bridges, and generally on those means of rapidly improved facilities for advance for which an army depends on the engineers. For that reason, even in Napoleon’s time, engineers have always been present with the advanced parties of every column when moving forward with an army. Without the pontoon train, bridging
