histoky]
CHILE
This Cabinet, however, was of short duration, and resigned when the ministers understood the full amount of friction between the President and Congress. Balmaceda then nominated a ministry not in accord with the views of Congress, and, to prevent any expression of opinion upon his conduct in the matter, refrained from summoning an extraordinary session of the legislature for the discussion of the estimates of revenue and expenditure for 1891. When 1st January 1891 arrived, the President published a decree in the Diario Oficial to the effect that the budget of 1890 would be considered the official budget for 1891. This act was illegal and beyond the attributes •Outbreak ^h® executive power. As a protest against of the the action of President Balmaceda, the Vicerevolution President of the Senate, Seiior Waldo Silva, and of 1891. tpg President of the Chamber of Deputies, Senor Ramon Barros Luco, issued a proclamation appointing Captain Jorje Montt in command of the squadron, and stating that the navy could not recognize the authority of Balmaceda so long as he did not administer public affairs in accordance with the constitutional law of Chile. The majority of the members of the Chambers sided with this movement, and on 7th January Sehores Waldo Silva, Barros Luco, and a number of senators and deputies embarked on board the Chilian warship Blanco Bncalada, sailing out of Valparaiso harbour and proceeding northwards to Tarapaca to organize armed resistance against the President. It was not alone this action of Balmaceda in connexion with Congress that brought about the revolution. He had alienated the sympathy of the aristocratic classes of Chile by his personal vanity and ambition. The oligarchy composed of the great landowners have always been an important factor in the political life of the republic when President Balmaceda found that he was not a persona grata to this circle he determined to endeavour to govern without their support, and to bring into the administration a set of men who had no traditions and with whom his personality would be all-powerful. The Clerical influence was also thrown against him in consequence of his radical ideas in respect of Church matters. Immediately on the outbreak of the revolution President Balmaceda published a decree declaring Montt and his companions to be traitors, and without delay organized an army of some 40,000 men for the suppression of the insurrectionary movement. Meanwhile the squadron under Montt had obtained possession of Iquique after some severe fighting, the garrison of that district offering a stout resistance to the landing of the rebel forces from the menof-war. Tarapaca was the key of the position in Chile at this moment, the possession of that district and the port of Iquique meaning that money could be obtained freely from the export duties on nitrate of soda. A lull now occurred in the struggle while both sides were preparing for the final shock. President Balmaceda administered the government under dictatorial powers with a Congress of his own nomination. In June 1891 Balmaceda ordered the presidential election to be held, and Senor Claudio Vicuna was duly declared chosen as President of the republic for the term commencing in September 1891. The resources of Balmaceda were running short on account of the heavy military expenses, and he determined to dispose of the reserve of silver bullion accumulated in the vaults of the Casa de Moneda in accordance with the terms of the law for the conversion of the note issue. The silver was conveyed abroad in a British man-of-war, and disposed of partly for the purchase of a fast steamer to be fitted as an auxiliary cruiser and partly in payment for other kinds of war material. The organization of the revolutionary forces went on
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slowly. Much difficulty was experienced in obtaining the necessary arms and ammunition. A supply of war rifles was bought in the United States, and embarked on board the Itata, a Chilian vessel in the service of the rebels. The United States authorities refused to allow this steamer to leave San Diego, and a guard was stationed on the ship. The Itata, however, slipped away and made for the Chilian coast, carrying with her the representatives of the United States. A fast cruiser was immediately sent in pursuit, but only succeeded in overhauling the rebel ship after she was at her destination. The Itata was then forced to return to San Diego without landing her cargo for the insurgents. The necessary arms and ammunition were arranged for in Europe; they were shipped in a British vessel, and transferred to a Chilian steamer at Fortune Bay, in Tierra del Fuego, close to the Strait of Magellan and the Falkland Islands, and thence carried to Iquique, where they were safely disembarked early in July 1891. A force of 10,000 men was now raised by tQ junta of the revolution, and preparations were rapidly pushed forward for a move to the south with the object of attacking Valparaiso and Santiago. Early in August a portion of the revolutionary squadron, comprising the Blanco Encalada and other ships, was sent to the southward for reconnoitring purposes, and put into the port of Caldera. During the night, and whilst the Blanco Encalada was lying quietly at anchor, a torpedo boat called the Ahnirante Lynch, belonging to the Balmaceda faction, steamed into the bay of Caldera and discharged a torpedo at the rebel ship. The Blanco Encalada sank in a few minutes, and 300 of her crew perished. In the middle of August 1891 the rebel forces were embarked at Iquique, numbering in all about 9000 men, and sailed for the south. On 21st August the insurgent army was disembarked near Concon, about twenty miles north of Valparaiso. A severe fight ensued, in which the troops of President Balmaceda were defeated with heavy loss. This reverse roused the worst passions of the President, and he ordered the arrest and imprisonment of all persons suspected of sympathy with the revolutionary cause. The population generally were, however, distinctly antagonistic to Balmaceda; and this feeling had become accentuated since 17 th August 1891, on which date he had ordered the execution of a number of youths belonging to the military college at San Lorenzo on a charge of seditious practices. The shooting of these boys created a feeling of horror throughout the country, and a sensation of uncertainty as to what measures of severity might not be practised in the future if Balmaceda won the day. After the victory at Concon the insurgent army, under command of General Campos, marched in a southerly direction towards Vina del Mar, and thence to Placilla, where the final struggle in the conflict took place. Balmaceda had massed his troops in the vicinity, and confidently expected a victory on account of the superior number of his forces. The fighting was fierce, but the rebel artillery was well directed and thoroughly prepared the way for an assault of the positions. The rebels drove their opponents at the point of the bayonet from one line of trenches to another, until they remained absolute masters of the field and the Balmacedist army was in full flight without attempting to preserve any sort of order or discipline. Qefeat anc/ Three days later the victorious insurgents suicide of entered Santiago and assumed the government Balmaof the republic. After the battle of Placilla it cedawas clear to President Balmaceda that he could no longer, hope to find a sufficient strength amongst his adherents to maintain himself in power, and in view of the rapid approach of the rebel army he abandoned his official duties to seek an asylum in the Argentine Legation.
