Page:2020-06-09 PSI Staff Report - Threats to U.S. Communications Networks.pdf/48

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Telecom matters.[1] Like DHS, DOJ's employee was responsible for both the initial review of applications and post-authorization compliance monitoring.[2] With limited exception, these individuals were responsible not only for Team Telecom's portfolio but also that of the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States ("CFIUS").[3] Because the CFIUS process is governed by statutory requirements, including deadlines by which applications must be reviewed, DOJ and DHS resources typically focused on those projects, at the expense of Team Telecom projects.[4] 204 DOJ claims to have vastly increased its Team Telecom resources in recent years. Today, it has five attorneys dedicated to reviewing FCC applications.[5] According to the team's managing attorney, however, the longest tenured individual has been with the agency for little more than a year.[6]

3. Team Telecom's Post-Authorization Monitoring and Oversight Was Also Limited and Sporadic

Not only was Team Telecom's review of Section 214 applications limited, but so too was its oversight and monitoring of the carriers with which it entered into a security agreement.[7] Without a security agreement, Team Telecom had no insight into the activities of a foreign-owned carrier after Section 214 authorization was granted.[8] Team Telecom officials informed the Subcommittee that they believed they had the authority to review any Section 214 authorized carrier at any time, even where no security agreement existed.[9] The officials further noted their belief that Team Telecom could recommend that the FCC revoke an existing authorization at any time.[10] However, the officials acknowledged there was no formal legal basis for these reviews and recommendations, and Team Telecom never conducted a sua sponte review or recommended revoking the authorization of a carrier with which Team Telecom did not have a security agreement.[11]

Where Team Telecom did enter into a security agreement with a Section 214 authorized carrier, Team Telecom had a slightly larger degree of oversight power.[12] Team Telecom's authority, however, was limited to ensuring the carrier complied


  1. Briefing with the Dep't of Justice (Apr. 3, 2020).
  2. Id.
  3. Briefing with the Dep't of Homeland Sec. (Feb. 7, 2020); Briefing with the Dep't of Justice (Aug. 1, 2019).
  4. Briefing with the Dep't of Homeland Sec. (Feb. 7, 2020); Briefing with the Dep't of Justice (Aug. 1, 2019).
  5. Briefing with the Dep't of Justice (Apr. 3, 2020).
  6. Id.
  7. Briefing with the Dep't of Justice (Aug. 1, 2019).
  8. Id.
  9. Id.
  10. Id.
  11. Id.
  12. Id.

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