Telecommunications Services Sector ("EO Telecom Committee").[1] DOJ officially leads the EO Telecom Committee, which also includes DHS and DOD; other Executive Branch agencies, including the Intelligence Community, serve as advisors.[2] The EO Telecom Committee is tasked with "assist[ing] the FCC in its public interest review of national security and law enforcement concerns that may be raised by foreign participation in the United States telecommunications services sector."[3] To that end, the EO Telecom Committee is authorized to review Section 214 and other applications, respond to any risks presented by the applications, and recommend dismissal, denial, modification, or revocation of an authorization.[4] It is also permitted—but not required—to review existing authorization.[5]
Unlike Team Telecom's historical operations discussed above, where the timeline for application review was not standardized, the Executive Order provides that any initial application review must be completed "before the end of the 120-day period beginning on the date the [Attorney General] determines that the applicant's responses to any questions and information requests from the Committee are complete."[6] Thus, before the clock begins to run, DOJ must determine that all of its questions have been satisfactorily answered.[7] This can take—and in some instances, such as those described below, has taken—months. Where the EO Telecom Committee determines that a "secondary assessment" is warranted, the Executive Order requires such an assessment be completed in 90 days.[8]
The Executive Order establishes timelines and assigns roles. It does not, however, address the entirety of past concerns regarding Team Telecom. Notably, the Executive Order does not afford the EO Telecom Committee any additional resources; it provides only that DOJ shall "provide such funding and administrative support for the Committee” as may be required.[9] As described above, DOJ's current staffing ignores the realities necessary to effectively and efficiently assess Section 214 applications and to monitor compliance with security agreements. Further, the Executive Order permits, but does not require, the review of Section 214 authorizations where no security agreement exists. Finally, the Executive Order provides no clarity regarding what may trigger a security agreement or a recommendation to deny an application.
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