the PRC could launch an invasion of small Taiwan-occupied islands in the SCS, such as Pratas or Itu Aba. A PLA invasion of a medium-sized, better-defended island, such as Matsu or Kinmen, is also within the PLA’s capabilities. Such an invasion would demonstrate military capability, political resolve, and achieve tangible territorial gain while simultaneously showing some measure of restraint. However, this kind of operation involves significant, and possibly prohibitive, political risk because it could galvanize pro-independence sentiment on Taiwan and generate powerful international opposition.
CIVILIAN ROLL-ON/ROLL-OFF (RORO) SHIPS AND THEIR POTENTIAL USE IN A TAIWAN INVASION
The lack of significant PLA amphibious ship buildup does not independently reflect a PLA deficiency toward building a military option to take Taiwan by force, but rather, is consistent with the PRC’s exploratory approach to testing multi-dimensional Taiwan seizure concepts.
In 2015, China’s official media reported that all future builds of five categories of civilian vessels had to be built to “national defense requirements” including container ships, RORO ferries, multipurpose vessels, bulk carriers, and break bulk ships.
In 2019, images emerged on Chinese state television that at least one of its RORO ferries had been modified with a ramp to allow amphibious vehicles to disembark at sea suggesting these ferries could be used to deliver first echelon forces without requiring prior seizure of a pier. By demonstrating intent to use commercial ROROs during an amphibious invasion, the PLA is eroding the principle of distinction under the law of armed conflict and obscuring crucial lines between warships and non-warships, civilians and combatants, and civilian objects and military objectives.
In a similar state media disclosure, images emerged in 2021 showing that China had modified a flat deck container vessel to function as a landing platform helicopter (LPH) or as an expeditionary transfer dock (ESD); such modification could serve as a mid-way refueling point for helicopters returning from delivering air assault forces to Taiwan or enable PLA helicopters to transport forward stocks of logistics ashore.
Although China has not officially revealed the size of its civilian fleet or how it plans to use it during an invasion, 2019 information indicated the PLA have at least 63 civilian ROROs suitable for military operations.
Subsequent information from one Chinese province indicates as many as 64 civilian ROROs would be made available to the PLA in wartime and that these platforms would be equipped with weapons as part of the mobilization process.
Some public estimates suggest that China’s use of its dual-capable civilian fleet could provide it greater displacement tonnage than the sum of all of the U.S. Navy’s amphibious assault ships.
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OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China
