- PRC military academics assert that bases abroad can enable forward deployment of PLA forces and support military conflict, diplomatic signaling, political change, bilateral and multilateral cooperation, and training. They also suggest that a military logistics network could enable intelligence monitoring of the U.S. military.
- In August 2017, the PRC officially opened its first PLA base in Djibouti. PLANMC are stationed at the base with wheeled armored vehicles and artillery but are currently limited in their ability to conduct expeditionary operations due to a lack of helicopters at the facility. Notably, we have no evidence that the PRC has used its base to assist in evacuation of Chinese citizens.
- In late March 2022, a Type 903A “Fuchi” class supply ship, Luomahu (AOE-964), docked at the 450-meter pier for resupply; this was the first such reported PLA Navy port call to the Djibouti support base, indicating that the pier is now operational. The pier likely is able to accommodate the PLA Navy’s aircraft carriers, other large combatants, and submarines. PLA personnel at the facility have interfered with U.S. flights by lasing pilots and flying drones, and the PRC has sought to restrict Djiboutian sovereign airspace over the base.
Beyond its base in Djibouti, the PRC is very likely considering and planning for additional military logistics facilities to support naval, air, and ground forces projection. The PLA’s approach likely includes consideration of many different sites and outreach to many countries, but only some will advance to negotiations for an infrastructure agreement, status of forces or visiting forces agreement, and/or basing agreement. Critical organizations involved in planning and negotiating for military logistics facilities are CMC Joint Staff Department, CMC Logistic Support Department, and service headquarters. The PRC’s overseas military basing will be constrained by the willingness of potential host nations to support a PLA presence. Host nations are likely concerned about risks to sovereignty, regional and international perceptions, and relations with the United States when considering hosting a Chinese military facility. PRC interlocutors likely use all means available to conduct influence operations to gain political favor among elites in host nations, while obfuscating the scale and scope of PRC political and military interests.
In June 2021, Cambodian Defense Minister Tea Bahn stated that the PRC would help to modernize and expand Ream but would not be the only country given access to the facility. The following June, China and Cambodia hosted a ground opening ceremony for the Chinese-built upgrades of the Ream base.
The PRC has likely also considered Burma, Thailand, Indonesia, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, United Arab Emirates, Kenya, Equatorial Guinea, Seychelles, Tanzania, Angola, Nigeria, Namibia, Mozambique, Bangladesh, Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, and Tajikistan. The PRC has probably already made overtures to Namibia, Vanuatu, and the Solomon Islands. According to a draft copy of the China-Solomon Islands Security Agreement, the PRC will be permitted to send armed police and military personnel to the Solomon Islands to help maintain order, though the Solomon Island government denied this would lead to a PRC military base. The PLA is most
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OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China
