on CDO state that seizing mind dominance in the cognitive domain and subduing the enemy without fighting is the highest realm of warfare.
LESSONS LEARNED FROM RUSSIA’S WAR ON UKRAINE
The PRC almost certainly is learning lessons from the Russian war of aggression in Ukraine that are most applicable to the PRC’s strategic interests of strengthening its whole-of-government approach to counter a perceived U.S.-led containment strategy. From the PRC’s perspective, the war provides unique opportunities for PRC leaders to evaluate how countries use diplomatic, informational, military, and economic measures to advance their interests before, during and after a major conflict. As the conflict continues, the PRC’s ultimate takeaways probably will depend on the conflict’s resolution, the PRC’s predispositions and perceptions of Washington’s intent toward the PRC and competing bureaucratic priorities within the PRC system.
Diplomatically, the war in Ukraine probably has reaffirmed to Beijing the importance of persuading Global South countries in Africa, Latin America, the Middle East, and the Indo-Pacific to echo China’s narratives on the conflict. The PRC probably views support from the developing countries as crucial to blunting U.S.-led efforts imposing reputational and economic costs on the PRC as well as claiming broad international support for PRC goals. At the same time, Beijing almost certainly continues to be surprised by the scope, scale, duration, and cohesion of the international response to Russia war on Ukraine. The PRC’s dismissal of the independent agency of countries it views as aligned with the United States or the legitimacy of shared values almost certainly has contributed to the PRC’s continued diplomatic struggles, especially in Europe.
The PLA likely is observing how Russia and Ukraine are employing CDO during the current Russia-Ukraine war, and likely will seek to incorporate lessons learned from this conflict into its own doctrine for future conflicts. The PLA’s lessons learned from Russia’s war of aggression in Ukraine probably will reinforce a commitment to conducting influence operations to deter adversaries, shape public opinion early on during a conflict, polarize societies, erode the will to fight, and guard against charismatic leaders changing public perceptions. PLA researchers have stated that the victory of the cognitive narrative may yield greater strategic benefits than firepower destruction, force control, and siege, and that effects of CDO can last long after the conflict has concluded.
On the economic front, western sanctions against Russia almost certainly have amplified the PRC’s push for defense and technological self-sufficiency and financial resilience. The PRC’s reliance on Western technology and capital investment probably will slow economic decoupling from Washington.
159
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China
