referring to Russia’s invasion as a “war”. The PRC has also legitimized Russia’s role on the world stage by continuing to work with Russia in various multilateral fora such as the UN, BRICS, and ASEAN as well as by conducting routine bilateral meetings with Russian leaders. China has stepped up trade and become a willing buyer of Russian energy exports to buoy Russia’s sanction-battered economy. As of mid-2022, the PRC’s approach probably has shifted towards opportunistically advancing China’s interests, specifically to strengthen its international efforts to counter the United States.
On the one-year anniversary of Russia’s further invasion of Ukraine, the PRC Foreign Ministry released a 12-point proposal discussing the PRC’s approach to the political settlement of Russia’s war of aggression in Ukraine. Although Beijing touted the proposal as a major diplomatic statement, it largely recycled and consolidated previous PRC statements and proposals on the war, which probably indicates that Beijing primarily aims to exploit the peace plan as a messaging tool to advance China and Russia’s interests. Beijing probably views the proposal as an opportunity to advance China’s desired image as a responsible great power, deflect international criticism of Sino-Russian relations, and reemphasize the PRC narrative that blames the United States and NATO for causing and perpetuating the war; this messaging is probably intended to primarily target developing countries in the Global South.
Similarly, the PRC’s ambiguous public messaging about the potential use of nuclear weapons probably is intended to portray China as a responsible and peaceful great power and signal its discomfort about the prospect of nuclear escalation to relevant parties in the war in Ukraine. In November 2022, during German Chancellor Olaf Scholz’s visit to Beijing, Xi said that nuclear weapons must not be used, nuclear wars should not be fought, and the international community should come together to prevent a nuclear conflict in Eurasia.
Beijing probably has taken a discreet, flexible, and cautious approach to providing materiel assistance to Russia. To date, PRC officials have publicly denied providing any lethal assistance to Russia. However, as Beijing deliberates the scale and scope of materiel commitments, it probably will seek to balance its strategic partnership with Russia while avoiding reputational or economic costs that could result from its assistance. Russian customs data revealed that Chinese companies, including state-owned enterprises under the purview of Beijing, have sold civilian, dual-use, and some minor military items to Russian military end users, such as small arms, spare parts, navigation equipment, and protective gear. Additionally, the United States announced sanctions in 2023 against specific PRC companies for their role in sharing imagery to the private Russian military company, Wagner.
China and Russia have continued to increase the frequency of combined military exercises and maneuvers despite Russia’s war on Ukraine. These maneuvers typically are scripted and parallel rather than integrated, suggesting that both countries are not capable of operational or tactical interoperability. During the past five years, China has increasingly participated in several Russian capstone exercises and both countries have undertaken a number of combined air and naval patrols. Beijing has probably benefitted from hands on training with Russian command and control systems
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OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China
