guidance to create a high-level strategic deterrence system in its 14th Five-Year Plan. The PRC views a “strong strategic deterrent force system” as a set of advanced military capabilities across various domains to maintain national security and play a strategic deterrent role. Building this system consists of two parts: the development of traditional nuclear deterrent force building and the construction of conventional strategic deterrent forces in emerging fields and technologies. The PRC’s pursuit of a “strong strategic deterrent force system” is probably driven by threat perceptions of the United States and by specific concerns over Taiwan.
Strategic deterrence is a core component of the PRC’s objectives of securing its status as a great power, achieving “the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation,” and developing a world class military by 2049. Beijing considers building a “strong strategic deterrent force system” as necessary to defend its national sovereignty, security, and development interests. It also views it as necessary to increase the PRC’s ability to manage escalation in a conflict by deterring and preventing an adversary from escalating confrontation at will.
As of 2022, the PRC perceives an erosion of strategic stability in the US-PRC relationship. PLA academics and PRC government officials also perceive that the United States is interfering in the PRC’s periphery. The PRC views building a “strong strategic deterrence force system” as a “trump card” for safeguarding the PRC’s core interest of achieving unification with Taiwan.
The PRC views development of nuclear and conventional capabilities as necessary components of its “asymmetric countermeasures” approach to defeat strong enemies seeking to by developing capabilities that exploit PRC strengths and take advantage of its weaknesses. In addition to improving nuclear and conventional capabilities, Xi has urged the PLA to speed up development of other non-traditional capabilities—such as in the space and cyberspace domains—to support modern warfare, further “intelligentization” of the PLA, and “win local wars.”
The PRC is committed to maintaining deterrence against its nuclear rivals, and PRC experts view a survivable second-strike capability as crucial to national security. The PRC’s understanding of nuclear deterrence has focused on maintaining a sufficient capability to inflict unacceptable destruction against its potential adversaries. Chinese think tanks are concerned about the credibility of its nuclear deterrent due to its smaller nuclear force, which may note be seen by adversaries as sufficiently survivable in a nuclear conflict.
The PLA views space superiority, the ability to control the space-enabled information sphere and to deny adversaries their own space-based information gathering and communication capabilities, as critical components to conduct modern “informatized warfare.” The PLA expects space to play an important role in future conflicts by enabling long-range precision strikes and in denying other militaries the use of overhead C4ISR systems.
The development of cyber warfare capabilities is consistent with PLA writings, which identify IO—comprising cyber, EW, space, and psychological warfare—as integral to achieving information superiority early in a conflict as an effective means to counter a stronger foe. The
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OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China
