MILITARY AND SECURITY IMPLICATIONS OF THE 20TH NATIONAL CONGRESS OF THE CCP
General Secretary Xi presided over the 20th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, known as the 20th Party Congress, from October 16th–22nd, 2022. Party Congresses, convened every five years, hold important military and security implications for the PRC’s national and defense strategy. The military dimensions of the Report to 20th Party Congress focused on intensifying and accelerating the People’s Liberation Army’s modernization goals, to include deploying PLA forces on a “regular basis and in diversified ways.”
In order to achieve the PLA’s 2027 centenary goal, the 20th Party Congress set objectives to “provide new military strategic guidance, establish a strong system of strategic deterrence, increase the proportion of new-domain forces (most likely cyberspace and space) with new combat capabilities, speed up the development of unmanned, intelligence combat capabilities, and promote the development and application of the network information system.” Reappointed as Chairman of the CMC for the third time, Xi selected a six-man CMC that offers political continuity, technical expertise on nuclear and space issues, and Taiwan-centric operational experience to lead the PLA toward achieving its centenary goals.
The 20th Party Congress offered new insight on the CCP’s perception of the PRC’s external security environment. Notably, the Party Congress report did not reference a “strategic window of opportunity for development,” but rather that the PRC is facing “drastic changes in the international landscape,” and thus must be more mindful of “potential dangers and be prepared to deal with worse-case scenarios.”
The PRC employed a wide range of diplomatic tools throughout 2022 to erode U.S. influence globally and subvert U.S.-backed security partnerships such as the Quad and AUKUS, which Beijing perceives as avenues to constrain its rise. The CCP is increasingly frustrated by Washington’s perceived use of an exaggerated threat picture of China to cultivate an international coalition willing subvert the PRC’s foreign policy objectives. In response, PRC leaders and officials have increasingly sought to bolster the PRC’s relations with developing countries in Africa, Southeast Asia, and the Middle East; co-opt regional multilateral organizations such as ASEAN; and assert its status as the self-appointed de facto leader of the “Global South.” Similarly, beginning late 2022, Beijing launched a diplomatic “charm offensive” targeting European countries in an apparent effort to improve perceptions of Beijing following years of “wolf warrior” diplomacy and COVID-19 isolation. Through these engagements, Beijing aims to internationally isolate Washington and persuade countries that the United States is the sole party responsible for escalating U.S.-China tensions, primarily to deflect criticism of the PRC’s efforts to reshape the international environment to protect its interests. PRC officials have also framed AUKUS as an
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OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China
