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  • dual-use, and some minor military items to Russian military end users, such as small arms, spare parts, navigation equipment, and protective gear.
  • China’s expansive and unregulated commercial drone market has allowed Russian defense forces to routinely acquire small drones and dual-use unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) to support their war in Ukraine. Between March 2022 and 2023, Chinese firms exported more than $12 million worth of drones and drone components to Russia. Chinese-origin drones have been employed by Russian forces for targeting, surveillance, and strike missions in Ukraine. In August 2023, Beijing announced it would implement its first controls on the civilian and dual-use drone market, as well as the sale of civilian-use counter-UAV systems, in response to international speculation over Chinese drones’ use in Russia’s war of aggression in Ukraine.

PRC leaders and officials have sought to deflect international criticism over Sino-Russian relations and protect its international reputation by using high-level diplomatic engagements and messaging emphasizing the PRC’s “neutral” role in the conflict. These efforts include Chinese officials meeting with Ukrainian officials, announcing token humanitarian assistance, and calling for peace talks without developing a specific, detailed plan to resolve the conflict. Similarly, the PRC’s ambiguous public messaging about the potential use of nuclear weapons probably is also intended to portray China as a responsible and peaceful great power. In November 2022, during German Chancellor Olaf Scholz’s visit to Beijing, Xi said that nuclear weapons must not be used, nuclear wars should not be fought, and the international community should come together to prevent a nuclear conflict in Eurasia. Xi’s repetition of the PRC’s stated stance on nuclear weapons as well as his unwillingness to specifically condemn Russian nuclear threats, suggest that Xi probably was focused on protecting China’s reputation rather than applying strong pressure to prevent Russia from using a nuclear weapon in Ukraine.

Global Initiatives. Adding to this standard framework for talking points on Russia’s war of aggression in Ukraine and other foreign policy issues, in April 2022, Xi announced the Global Security Initiative (GSI) at the Bo’ao Forum. Echoing the previous year’s rollout of the Global Development Initiative (GDI), Beijing has promoted GSI extensively and attempted to insert GSI language into multilateral forums and documents. At the CCP’s 20th Party Congress in October, Xi further promoted GSI and GDI, emphasizing that realizing the “great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation” required equal prioritization of both security and development. As of the end of 2022, however, Chinese officials had yet to clearly define how GSI would actually advance the vague security goals it espouses, such as safeguarding “comprehensive” security and protecting territorial integrity. International receptivity to GDI and GSI has been mixed so far; GDI’s links to BRI has made the initiative more attractive to developing countries, while GSI’s vagueness and implicit criticisms of the United States have made more countries hesitant to sign on to it.


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OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China