PEOPLE’S LIBERATION ARMY ROCKET FORCE (PLARF)
Key Takeaways
- The PLARF is advancing its long-term modernization plans to enhance its “strategic deterrence” capabilities.
- The PRC probably completed the construction of its three new solid-propellant silo fields in 2022, which will cumulatively contain at least 300 new ICBM silos and has loaded at least some intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) into these silos.
- The PRC is developing new ICBMs that will significantly improve its nuclear-capable missile forces and will require increased nuclear warhead production, partially due to the introduction of multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle (MIRV) capabilities.
- The PRC may be exploring development of conventionally-armed intercontinental range missile systems. If developed and fielded, such capabilities would allow the PRC to threaten conventional strikes against targets in the continental United States, Hawaii, and Alaska. Conventionally-armed ICBMs would present significant risks to strategic stability.
The PLARF organizes, mans, trains, and equips the PRC’s strategic land-based nuclear and conventional missile forces and associated support forces and missile bases. The PLARF is a critical component of the PRC’s nuclear deterrence strategy and its strategy to deter and counter third-party intervention in regional conflicts. According to the PRC’s 2019 defense white paper, the PLARF is working towards “enhancing its credible and reliable capabilities of nuclear deterrence and counterattack, strengthening intermediate and long-range precision strike forces, and enhancing strategic counter-balance capability, so as to build a strong and modernized rocket force.”
The PLARF fields a variety of conventional mobile ground-launched short-, medium-, and intermediate-range ballistic missiles and ground-launched cruise missiles. The PLARF’s groundbased missile forces complement the air and sea-based precision strike capabilities of the PLAAF and PLAN. The PLARF’s conventional missile forces include the CSS-6 (DF-15) short-range ballistic missile (SRBM) (range 725-850 km), the CSS-7 (DF-11) SRBM (600 km), the CSS-11 (DF-16) SRBM (more than 700 km), land-attack and anti-ship variants of the CSS-5 (DF-21) medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM) (approximately 1,500 km), the hypersonic glide vehicle capable DF-17 MRBM, the DF-26 Intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) (3,000 km4,000km), the CJ-10 (DH-10) ground-launched cruise missile (GLCM) (approximately 1,500 km), and the CJ-100 (DF-100) GLCM (approximately 2,000 km). The PLARF’s conventionally-armed CSS-5 Mod 5 (DF-21D) ASBM variant gives the PLA the capability to conduct long-range precision strikes against ships, including aircraft carriers, out to the Western Pacific from mainland China. The DF-21D has a range exceeding 1,500 km, is fitted with a maneuverable reentry vehicle (MaRV) and is reportedly capable of rapidly reloading in the field. The PLARF continues to grow its inventory of DF-26 IRBMs, which it first revealed in 2015 and fielded in 2016. The multi-role
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OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China
