from the very beginning, and he even regarded thought as action. It was perfectly consistent therefore for him to say, in the clearest exposition of his doctrine which he has given (Erste Einleitung in die Wissenschaftslehre, 1797), that a man’s philosophy depends primarily on his character. Fichte contends that there are two fundamental divisions in philosophy: Idealism, which takes the subject, the ego, as its starting-point, and Dogmatism, which takes the object, the non-ego, as its starting-point. This follows from the nature of the problem of philosophy, i.e. the explanation of experience. But experience consists of the knowledge of objects. And this admits of but two alternatives, either to explain objects (things) from the standpoint of knowledge (the ego), or knowledge (the ego) from the standpoint of objects (things). Persons of an active and independent nature will be disposed to choose the former method, whilst those of a passive and dependent nature will adopt the latter method. But even then idealism, from the purely theoretical point of view, has the advantage of dogmatism (which is liable, either as Materialism, Spiritualism or Spinozism, in all three cases to resolve itself into a theory of substance or things). Because it is impossible to deduce knowledge, thought, the ego, from things (i.e. regarded either as material, spiritual or neutral). But idealism makes knowledge, thought, the ego, its point of departure and then proceeds to show how experience, i.e. certain definite forms of knowledge, arises. The ego can contain nothing (known or thought) which is not posited by the activity of the ego.
In his chief work (Grundlage der gesammten Wissenschaftslehre, 1794) Fichte starts with the activity of the ego. The non-ego exists for us only by virtue of an
