ever sounds Perfection; as if all Perfectness were 1000, then this Idea removes from this absolute imperfect every unite of these 1000, allowing not so much as an unite or fraction of an unite, no not the possibility of them, to what is thus absolutely imperfect. So that what is absolutely imperfect is impossible to Exist. But necessary Existence is a Term of Perfection, as was plainly demonstrated before.
3. The Idea of a Being absolutely Wicked removes from it all manner of Goodness, Equity, Decorum, Righteousness; and implies a firm and immutable aversation of the Will from all these, and a settled and unchangeable purpose of doing things wickedly: but intimates nothing either of the Necessity or Contingency of the Existence of the Substance of this Being; that being neither here nor there to the moral deformity thereof, as is evidently plain at first sight.
4. The idea of a Being absolutely Miserable is the Idea of a Being that sustains the fullest and compleatest torments that are conceiveable; and this must be in a knowing, passive, and reflexive Subject. Now, I say, this torture arising partly from the sense of present smart, and partly out of reflexion of what it has suffered, and a full belief that it shall suffer thus eternally; this miserable Being, though but a Creature, is as perfectly tormented as it could possibly be if it necessarily existed of it self. For if it were always, though but contingently and dependently of another, the torture is equally perfect; and therefore necessary Existence is not included in the Idea thereof.
Again, the Objector is to prove that a Being wholly Immaterial can suffer any torture: which till he do, it seeming more reasonable that it cannot, I shall flatly deny that it can; and therefore do assert, that a torturable Being is a Spirit incorporate; and affirm also, as a thing most rational, that this Spirit, if very great pain was upon it, such as that it were better for him not to be at all then to be in it, that anguish by continuance would be so increased, (pain infinitely overpowering the vital vigour, and overpoising the contents of life and sense) that it would die to the Body in which it is thus tormented. But if it be not in so ill a plight as to change its state of conjunction, but that the torture proves tolerable; then necessary Existence would not be its misery, but some part of happiness: so that there can be no such thing as a Being absolutely Miserable in the world. For Misery rack'd up to the highest would make the thing cease to be. As a man cannot say an absolute big Triangle; for a Circle will be always bigger: or rather no Figure can be absolutely big because the nature of it is to be limited.
Thirdly, The Idea of a Being absolutely Perfect is compos'd of Notions of the same denomination, all of them of themselves sounding absolute Perfection; but the Idea of a Being absolutely Miserable is not compiled of Notions that found absolute Misery of themselves. For what Misery, but rather good, is there in necessary Existence? Wherefore if we should contend that an inference from the Idea of a thing to its necessary Existence is onely warrantable there where the Idea consists of Notions of one denomination, the Objector is to take off the distinction.
Or, to speak more plainly, absolutely necessary Existence and Self-
